For other versions of this document, see http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-96-494 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 96-494 F June 5, 1996 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web War Powers Resolution: A Brief Summary of Pro and Con Arguments Richard F. Grimmett Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division Summary The War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93-148, was enacted by Congress over the veto of President Nixon on November 7, 1973. Through more than twenty-two years of experience, the resolution has remained a focus of controversy on the war powers of the President and Congress under the Constitution.1 Major areas of controversy include the constitutionality of some provisions, the proper roles for the President and Congress in entering armed conflicts, the effect on U.S. military operations, and the effectiveness of the resolution in achieving its purpose of assuring that the collective judgment of the Congress and the President apply to the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities. In the post-Cold War era, the relationship of the War Powers Resolution to U.S. participation in military/peacekeeping activities under the auspices of the United Nations, as well as peacekeeping operations in general have become an issue. This report lists major arguments for and against the resolution. This report will not be updated. PRO CON The War Powers Resolution The War Powers Resolution is seeks to carry out Article I, Section 8 unconstitutional because it impedes of the Constitution which grants the ability of the President to carry out Congress the power to declare war and his function as Commander in Chief to make all laws necessary for carrying granted by Article II, Section 2 of the into execution the powers vested by Constitution. The War Powers the Constitution in the government. Resolution attempts to take away The founding fathers gave Congress authorities that the President has 1 For additional information, see: The War Powers Resolution: Twenty-Two Years of Experience. May 24, 1996. CRS Report 96-476 F. 58 p.; War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance. CRS Issue Brief IB81050; updated periodically. War Powers: Bibliography-in- Brief, 1988-1992. CRS Report 93-675 L. Congressional Research Service ~ The Library of Congress CRS-2 the power to declare war so that the exercised for 200 years. Throughout President alone could not commit the American history Presidents have used Nation to war. U.S. forces abroad, without a The War Powers Resolution is declaration of war or other necessary to reverse the trend since congressional authorization, when World War II for Presidents to send necessary to protect American citizens armed forces into conflicts abroad or defend U.S. interests. without congressional authorization. The War Powers Resolution The War Powers Resolution permits adequate flexibility by impedes the President's flexibility to recognizing the President's right to respond quickly and decisively to respond to a national emergency world events by providing for created by attack upon the United congressional consultation and States, its territories, or its armed a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r s u s t ai n e d forces. deployments into hostilities. It encourages foreign adversaries to continue their activities until U.S. mandatory withdrawal deadlines are reached. The War Powers Resolution has The War Powers Resolution has been effective in encouraging been ineffective because it has not Presidents to consider the opinion of prevented Presidents from undertaking Congress prior to engaging in conflict military actions without congressional and in some instances in restraining approval and it has not brought about the size or duration of military consultation prior to decisions. Except commitments. Presidents have in the Mayaguez incident, Presidents reported consistent with the War have never reported under section Powers Resolution on more than sixty 4(a)(1) that they have introduced occasions. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Collective judgment and the The War Powers Resolution support of Congress and the President hinders effective conduct of military are essential to effective conduct of operations abroad. The resolution is wars, and the War Powers Resolution not necessary because Congress has seeks to assure that both branches ample opportunity through resolutions, share in making the decision from the authorizing legi slation, and beginning. appropriations, to shape decisions on the use of armed forces. The War Powers Resolution The War Powers Resolution provides a framework of procedures to diverts congressional debate from the obtain congressional advice and merits of specific courses of action authorization for military actions and focuses attention on prerogatives abroad in a timely fashion. and procedures. The power of the purse provides CRS-3 The War Powers Resolution Congress opportunity to halt any provides a method for Congress to military action it disapproves so the bring about the end of any War Powers Resolution is not commitment of forces into hostilities necessary. or imminent hostilities. The War Powers Resolution It is unconstitutional to require provides a time limit for using forces that forces be withdrawn within 60 to without first obtaining congressional 90 days because of congressional authorization, and this time limit inaction. The time limit is arbitrary provides important leverage for and inflexible and assures adversaries Congress. After the President reports that if they wait out the time limit, under the War Powers Resolution, or U.S. forces will be withdrawn. Some should have reported, that he has Members object that the time limit has introduced forces into hostilities or in practice given the President 60 free imminent hostilities, the forces must days in which he can use forces be withdrawn within 60 to 90 days without congressional authorization. unless Congress declares war or authorizes the forces to remain. Section 5(c) of the War Powers The War Powers Resolution is Resolution provides that at any time unconstitutional because Section 5(c) Congress by concurrent resolution can is a legislative veto, providing for direct the President to withdraw forces action to withdraw forces from from hostilities. This is not a hostilities by a concurrent resolution legislative veto because there is no of Congress. A concurrent resolution delegation of authority as in other does not require presentation to the legislative vetoes (rulemaking, President for signature, and thus such suspension of deportation, etc.), where a measure does not go through the full Congress placed a condition on legislative process. In INS v. Chadha delegated authority. If Members want and related cases, the Supreme Court to act by joint resolution, that d e c l a r e d l e gi s l a t i v e v e t o e s procedure already exists in Section unconstitutional. 1013 of P.L. 98-164, signed November 22, 1983. If the War Powers Resolution has Laws such as the War Powers been less effective than its supporters Resolution are attempts by Congress originally hoped, it is because to micromanage foreign policy and to Presidents have not complied with all force consultation and cooperation. its provisions, or because Congress Such cooperation cannot be mandated has not had the will to take the by legal line-drawing but must be decisions necessary to enforce it. If based on recognition of shared either the President or Congress would responsibilities, attitudes of trust, and observe the legislation, the resolution mutual goals. could be effective in assuring that both branches supported military action. CRS-4 The War Powers Resolution is The War Powers Resolution is a essentially sound and any necessary vestige of the Vietnam War era and steps to adapt its functioning to the not suited to the new world situation new post-Cold War world could be in which U.S. involvement in taken through minor amendments or hostilities may often be part of a without amending the resolution itself. multilateral effort. The post-Cold War Such measures might include era requires greater flexibility for the establishing a standing consultative President to make rapid decisions that group or specifying congressional may entail the use of forces in new procedures in the United Nations and varied ways. Participation Act. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ For other versions of this document, see http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-96-494