Number: 95-849 Title: Individual Transferable Quotas in Fishery Management Authors: Eugene H. Buck, Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division Abstract: Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) are controversial fishery management measures allocating privileges of landing a specified portion of the total annual fish catch in the form of quota shares. This management option differs from the traditional open-access approach to commercial fisheries, and allows fishing vessel owners to sell their ITQ certificates or buy others' certificates or, in some cases, lease their quota shares depending on how much (or whether) they want to participate in the fishery. ITQ programs are intended to reduce overcapitalization, promote conservation of stocks, improve market conditions, and promote safety in the fishing fleet. ITQ programs guarantee a share of the catch, thus generally slowing or eliminating the "race to fish" and allowing fishermen flexibility over the rate and timing of their fishing. Amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act in 1996 suspended consideration of new ITQ programs while the National Academy of Science conducted a study of three existing federal ITQ programs and their merits. Pages: 22 Date: Updated September 25, 1995