GERMANY plots with the KREMLIN

by T. H. TETENS
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MR. PRESIDENT:

In this book—Germany Plots With The Kremlin—I have assembled documents exposing the ominous situation which has developed out of our German policy. This policy is leading out people into a trap which has been carefully prepared by German planners. The very freedom and independence of America is at stake, as revealed by these documents.

While the free world is busy organizing its strength in the struggle against the Soviet bloc, Germany's geo-political master minds have quietly sharpened the weapons from their time-tested arsenal of Realpolitik. They have mapped out a bold plan aimed at undoing our military victories. They hope to achieve this goal by a treacherous sellout of Europe to Moscow, a scheme
that would entail economic and political disaster for the United States.

As a political analyst who has spent a lifetime in fighting Germany's bid for world conquest in two world wars, I see the old plot emerging again in the words and deeds of the new Germany. The Bonn Republic, under Dr. Adenauer, pursues the same pattern which was applied so successfully under the Weimar Republic. Again the German leaders profess their attachment to the West in order to extract from the American taxpayer billions of dollars. Once we have enabled Germany to recapture her pre-war military strength she will again offer it to Moscow as her contribution to the common front against the West.

We have not learned our lessons from the past. Twice within a generation we went to war in order to stop German aggression. Each time we gained military victory, only to throw it away by making Germany strong again as a "bulwark against the East". That policy has always backfired against its architects. This was proven in 1922 at Rapallo, and in 1939 in the Moscow-Berlin Pact.

After World War I, the United States put Germany back on her feet with generous political concessions and huge loans. But shortly thereafter the German industrialists, politicians and generals turned toward Moscow and made their economic, political and military deals against the West.

If the Germans have their way it will happen again. If events take that course, then the United States will indeed be faced with the greatest disaster in her history. All of our planning since 1945 will have turned out to be the preparation which hastens our economic and political suicide.

Mr. President, there is no one alive today who is more aware of the importance of the German problem than yourself. Eight years ago you saw the consequences of their actions at first hand. There is not the slightest proof that their behavior and political outlook have changed or that they can be considered a reliable
ally. On the contrary, events in Germany prove that the old Nazis, the Pan-Germans and the militarists move into positions of command again. Through American-sponsored elections, they have reconstituted their parliamentary strength.

The Bonn government is blackmailing the Western powers to obtain the freedom of the last few hundred war criminals. With ever increasing frequency, monster rallies are staged where thousands of rabble-rousing Nazis and former officers demonstrate their contempt for America. Large sections of the German population support these Nazi-like outbursts. At a recent mass meeting of Hitler’s Waffen SS, you, Mr. President, were labelled the real war criminal and branded with the favorite German epithet: "Schweinehund".

American officials, led astray by wishful thinking, have tried to paint Germany as a country infused with the spirit of democracy. However, the documents published in this book tell a different story. They prove from the plotters’ own mouths how Germany plans to "put the United States against the wall".

There is no doubt in my mind that our fallacious policies have accelerated rather than decreased the building up of a new potential German-Russo coalition. To those who see the danger but hope to buy it off with additional billion dollar injections, the documents in this book prove that with each injection Germany’s attraction for Moscow will grow as her potentialities are enhanced. This will make a deal more profitable for both of the former partners of the Berlin-Moscow Axis.

It is strange but nonetheless true that while all of our major changes in foreign policy have been debated in Congress and in public forums, the paramount question of Germany and the vital changes in our post-war policy have never had the close scrutiny either in the Congress or in public debate which this number one American problem demands.

Germany Plots With The Kremlin has been written to place our Government—the American people—on guard. If this book
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opens the much-needed debate on our German policy, it will have fulfilled its purpose.

Mr. President, after reading this book, you will agree that there must be a change. We must re-examine our German policy in order to regain our freedom of action in Europe, and to preserve our moral leadership in the free world.

With this thought in mind, and as a warning to the nation, I bring this book with its documentation to your special attention.

Respectfully yours,

T. H. TETENS
Cooperstown, N. Y.,
February, 1953.
[PART ONE]
"No case can be made for the belief that the Western Germans are really on our side against Russia, that they will work for us and fight for us, and that those who aided and worked for Hitler can be trusted as allies because they hate and fear the Russians. That is an illusion, and nothing more. By devising and cherishing it, we have at worst begun to build up an ally for Russia. . . ."

DELBERT CLARK
Former Berlin Correspondent
of the New York Times.

"There is a wing of the German industrialists, and some of the officers, who believe an alliance with Russia and agrarian eastern Europe against the West (is more promising). In any case the concept seems uniform that Germany play off East against West and ally itself with one against the other in the interests of German dominance in Europe."

HOWARD K. SMITH
Chief European Correspondent
for CBS
DURING THE NIGHT OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1939, THE TELEPHONE rang in the White House. The sleepy voice of the operator answered the call. It was Ambassador Bullitt in Paris urgently insisting that his call be put through to the President. After the night operator received the approval of the President's private secretary, Marguerite Le Hand, the ringing bedside telephone awakened Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

It was a dramatic moment when Ambassador Bullitt notified the President that he had just received a telephone report from Warsaw that German troops were marching into Poland and that German bombs were raining down on the Polish capital. To President Roosevelt, who had tried everything possible to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War, Bullitt's message
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came as a shock. He was only able to answer with a sigh "God help us all . . ."

The events of September 1, 1939, had such an impact on public opinion throughout the world that people everywhere had the uneasy feeling that this was "the beginning of the end." *

Today, we know that the roaring thunder of war that rocked the world in the early hours of September 1, 1939, was only the aftermath of the lightning that had struck eight days previously. It was on August 24, 1939, that the world was stunned by the announcement of the Nazi Government that it had signed a pact with Moscow. What occurred thereafter may be found in the mute evidence of destroyed towns and in the heaps of human wreckage which made German-occupied Europe a vast tomb.

Yet, the Berlin-Moscow Pact was not a sudden shift in policy on the part of the Germans or the Russians. For months, in the strictest secrecy, negotiations had been conducted between the Hitler Government and the Kremlin. The final agreement was the culmination of these negotiations which gave Hitler the assurances that he could launch his assaults against Poland and the West without facing great risk. This Pact was prepared by Ribbentrop's diplomats and Hausrofer's geo-politicians. Today these same forces are entrenched in the various departments of the Bonn Government, particularly in Dr. Adenauer's Foreign Office. They are the planners, the men who think in terms of generations and continents and who have never been inhibited by moral considerations. What do they now have in store for the West?

In this book we will prove with irrefutable evidence that Dr. Adenauer's policy is following a "grandiose concept" of making Germany an independent world power again. It will be shown that before the end of the Second World War the Nazi High Command drafted a "Master Plan" under which German postwar policy was directed—first to exploit the lenient policy

* See Alsop and Kintner: American White Paper, who reported in their book the scene described above.
of the West and later to follow a long-term policy of close cooperation with the East. We will show how the basic policy of fooling and betraying the West has gradually developed and how it is presently carried out by the Ribbentrop diplomats and the geo-political planners who now serve Dr. Adenauer. Furthermore, we will show how the Nazi masterminds, long before the German collapse, had established a well-financed headquarters in Madrid and how another group of German diplomats went underground after the collapse and continued to operate a skeleton foreign office in Stuttgart, effectively camouflaged under the phony name of "Evangelic Relief Organization." This Ribbentrop outfit was later taken over by Dr. Adenauer as his new Foreign Office.

Recent events have lifted the veil from Bonn's foreign policy. Statements in the pro-Adenauer press reveal the true nature of Bonn's basic concept of foreign affairs, whose aims are, as documents will show, identical with the principles which were laid down by the Ribbentrop diplomats and the geo-political planners many years ago. We will show how Dr. Adenauer's foreign policy is based on the same first commandment of the old German Foreign Office code which says that it is the supreme objective of the art of diplomacy to conceal as much as possible its real intentions.

It has been difficult, in a sense, to unmask Dr. Adenauer's foreign policies, because, like the iceberg, two-thirds of the planning is below the surface. Yet, the world caught a glimpse of how the Bonn diplomacy works on the occasion of the Soviet Note of March 10, 1952, addressed to the Three Western Powers and suggesting a new solution for the German problem. The Russians—who, for almost seven years, pretended to defend the principles of the Potsdam agreement—made a 180 degree turn-about by offering German unification on the basis of free elections, a new German Wehrmacht, fully rearmed, the decontrolling of Germany's industrial war potential, and the return of former Nazis and Wehrmacht officers to public life. It is no
exaggeration to say that the Soviet Note had an electrifying effect on the German people regardless of class or political persuasion. The Soviet Note was the German dream come true. It opened up new perspectives for Germany's ambitions to establish a Fourth Reich, free from the controls of the Allies.

At first, Dr. Adenauer brushed the Soviet Note aside as inconsequential, but when he encountered growing opposition even among his most faithful party followers, Dr. Adenauer was forced to lift slightly the veil that hides the strategy of German diplomacy. Unquestionably, the Chancellor did not think the time was ripe for candor but the opposition had forced his hand. It was his task to "explain" the basic principles of the Bonn Government's foreign policy without making embarrassing disclosures.

It should be pointed out that the "explanation" of Bonn's foreign policy came not only from the lips of Adenauer, but from inspired stories and leaks which appeared in the pro-Adenauer press.

In leading German newspapers, it was stated that Dr. Adenauer's policy "runs on two tracks." There is first the European concept—a short-term policy which aims at the creation of a united Europe, or to use the expression of one German editorial "to fulfill the goal for which Germans were dreaming for decades." In confidential talks with some members of the Federal Parliament, Dr. Adenauer declared that negotiations with the Russians would have to wait until Germany had regained a strong and dominant position in European affairs. He assured his listeners that Russia's conciliatory attitude was most helpful to Germany's aspirations and that other Russian offers were to be expected in which even greater concessions would be made to Germany, especially on the territorial question of the Oder-Neisse Line. The Chancellor hinted in his talks that the Soviet Note had created the heated atmosphere of an auction room where two eager opponents outbid each other. Therefore, he assured his listeners that the rejection of the first Soviet Note
would not prevent an agreement with the Russians at a more favorable moment. The essence of Dr. Adenauer's views was outlined on April 3, 1952, in one of Germany's leading newspapers, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, which is often employed as the mouthpiece of the Bonn Foreign Office. In a front page editorial this newspaper stated:

"The Chancellor follows a tremendous bold plan: First rearmament, followed later on by talks with the Russians in order to persuade them to remove their armies behind the Bug River. For this goal the Chancellor has been working tenaciously for some time. And because he sticks to his timetable, he is presently opposed to the Russian Note."

Dr. Adenauer's "tremendous bold plan" was prepared by the Ribbentrop diplomats as a time-bomb which one day will blast asunder everything U.S. foreign policy has built up since 1945. The German Chancellor's plan is based on the calculation that the U.S.A. is now so deeply committed to her European defense pledge that she will readily sacrifice dozens of billions of dollars in the strengthening and the rearming of a German-dominated Europe. After this is accomplished, Dr. Adenauer's grandiose concept envisions negotiations with Russia with the prospect of getting substantial territorial concessions from the Kremlin in Eastern Europe for which Germany in return will break away, with the whole of Western Europe, from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In the pro-Adenauer press, including the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Christ und Welt, the Deutsche Zeitung of Stuttgart, editorials have been written assuring the Russians that Dr. Adenauer's policy aims to create the security necessary for both the Germans and the Russians, and that this can only be brought about after Germany had become a third power factor which could employ its influence in such a way as to deter the United States "from starting a preventive war." Thus, while, in the short run, the Bonn Government aims to create a United
Europe, it hopes ultimately to reach a solid understanding with the Soviets at the expense of the United States.

It is true, of course, that in the person of Dr. Adenauer, the West has been led to believe that the Bonn Government is deeply devoted to the furtherance of the common welfare of the West. But these estimates of Dr. Adenauer and his diplomacy are based on superficial evidence and ignore the fact that Dr. Adenauer was in the past a fanatical believer in the pan-German gospel that the Fatherland should rule Europe and the world. It is, therefore, no accident that the Ribbentrop diplomats and the Haushofer geo-politicians should be his chief advisors. They are prepared to create the Third Power Bloc under German domination through the financial help of the United States, and then turn around and make their final bargain with Moscow.

Trained in the school of Realpolitik, Dr. Adenauer is not one who acts like a bull in a china shop. Even before he became Chancellor, he admonished his German compatriots: "We must move very cautiously. We ought not to give the impression either in Germany or in the United States that we shall collaborate in any way with the Russians."

The reaction of the German strategists to the Soviet Note of March 10, 1952, however, exposes their true designs. German geo-political journals speak of it as "the highest trump card in the hands of the Chancellor" which will enable him to mow down the resistance of France against Germany's concept of a united Europe. The pro-Adenauer press interpreted the Russian Note as a tremendous asset in speeding up the timetable for the creation of a European army under German domination.

It has been stated by experts again and again that Moscow has all the trump cards in her hands for making luring offers to the Bonn Republic. Little effort has been made by Western diplomats to penetrate the clandestine negotiations between Bonn and Moscow. From statements in the German press we can only conclude that Bonn's final diplomatic objective is a far-reaching agreement with Moscow.
Two years of secret negotiations between Berlin and Moscow preceded the Rapallo Treaty of April 16, 1922, which had the effect of a "diplomatic bomb-shell" in the Western world. In this connection, it should be noted that this treaty was concluded by a leader of German "liberalism," Dr. Walter Rathenau. Fifteen years later, when Western statesmen believed they had bought "peace in our time" at Munich, the Germans and the Russians again entered in secret negotiations which culminated in August, 1939, in the Berlin-Moscow Pact.

The lightning that flashed throughout the world when Berlin joined hands with Moscow in 1939 is striking again and the ultimate target of the Germans is the U.S.A.
AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II, THE UNITED STATES HAD
reached a point of unsurpassed power and influence throughout
the world. Yet, by 1950, our historic victories in Asia had been
turned into devastating defeats. Must we face similar disaster in
Europe? There are important voices among the Germans who
seem to be cocksure of the answer. "The Americans have lost
the peace, the cold war and their entire future, but they are not
yet aware of it."

Five years ago we were content to assess the situation in China
on the basis of superficial evidence. We are now in a similar po-
sition as regards Germany where the growing crisis is shrouded
by an optimism divorced from reality. It is not too late to act
intelligently and with farsightedness. Indeed, with timely coun-
ter-measures, we may be able to avert a new catastrophe before it falls upon us with paralyzing impact. But this will depend to a great degree on our success in comprehending the portentous signs in Europe. It is toward this end that we shall focus attention in these pages on the gathering storm.

On the basis of abundant evidence, it will be proven, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that Germany—through her most influential political and economic groups—is moving toward the Soviet bloc vis-a-vis the West.

We shall show that this is not a momentary trend but rather the outcome of a conscious and cunning plan which had been prepared before the end of the Second World War.

Whether or not this comes as a surprise to our policy shapers in Washington is of no relevance—we have to take this development as a fact. Our policy planners had blueprinted a postwar world wherein a re-invigorated Germany would cooperate as a trustworthy ally and serve as a "bulwark against the East." If the documents here presented hold any weight, it means that our planning has been built on false premises, and the United States foreign policy is heading toward a blind alley.

Decisive elements in all political grouping and parties from the Communists to Adenauer's camp followers are thinking in terms of close Russo-German cooperation. In this connection, an official publication of the State Department* pointed correctly to the fact that since Napoleon's time "there has been much in common between the upper military and social class in Germany and in Russia." The State Department document then emphasizes the close cooperation of Germany's Iron Chancellor, Bismarck, with old Tsarist Russia, and it adds:

"Now that Russia has a new ruling class as dictatorial as the old aristocracy, some of the old feeling of kinship is still to be found among extreme conservatives in Germany, from the Junkers to the ex-Nazis."

* Confuse and Control—Soviet techniques in Germany, Washington, 1951.
The document goes on to say that "the East German Government is using large numbers of Nazi and Junker officers in its militarized policy," and that "there is some feeling among the aristocrats that they might make terms with the Soviet aristocracy and because of their experience and ability might become indispensable and powerful members of the Soviet ruling class."

After presenting this gloomy picture, the State Department concludes:

"The tendency for the extreme right to play with treason must be listed as a definite weak point in the democratic cause."

Our State Department fears "treason" in Germany. To such charges, the Germans will only laugh. Does anyone believe that the Germans feel loyalty-bound towards the United States? The Germans, whether they follow Herr Pieck, Dr. Schumacher or Chancellor Adenauer, place Germany's supreme interests above everything.

However disunited these political leaders may be, they are one in the belief that the Fatherland must never again become a battlefield. Thus the doctrine of "neutralism," which aims to avert a new war on German soil, has found wide support among Germans in all walks of life—Protestants, Catholics, workers and professionals, ex-army officers and youth.

Dr. Adenauer's approach to the problem of German Realpolitik is a more subtle and far-reaching one, as will be seen from statements made by the German Chancellor and the pro-Adenauer press. A careful study of the available documentation must lead to the conclusion that the German aim is the creation of a Third Power Bloc, based on the following principle: "Let the United States first press for a European Federation and let the American taxpayers provide the billions of dollars required for German rearmament. After a German-dominated Europe is established, we shall have the opportunity for a far better bargain with the Russians. Moscow will pay a high price if we pledge
ourselves to break with the United States. Then the moment will come when Germany can again play an independent role in the world power politics."

It is a fact that most Americans have never listened to the real voice of Germany. We quote below a few of those voices selected out of a wealth of evidence:

1944 "We do not have to fear that the conditions for peace will be similar to those which we would have imposed—for our enemies will always be divided and disunited. We must even strive to sow the seeds of future dissension in the next peace treaty . . . No defeat is final. Defeats are simply lessons to be learned in preparation for the next and greater attack."

(General von Stuelpnagel in 1944.)

"There is a way out for Germany from total defeat . . . Germany can change this situation of defeat decisively and at once by lining up with the only real power on the Eurasian continent, with Russia . . . Germany, even in defeat, can give many things to Russia: the open way to Hamburg and the Rhine, trained general staff officers, technicians, skilled workers, soldiers, warships, tanks, bombers and the most modern weapons of destruction . . . Germany can bring about the final destruction of the French-British barrier, the liquidation of the British Empire and the end of West European colonial rule. This would mean the establishment of German domination over Africa . . ."

(From an editorial written by the leading Social Democratic theoretician, Friedrich Stampfer, appearing in the December 1944 issue of the publication Neue Volkszeitung, New York.)

1945 "The partition of Germany will be considered in the Soviet Union, too, as only temporary and unbearable to us. While Yalta gives Russia only a limited influence in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, which will be even more and more
contested in the future, the influence of the Soviet Union in all of Europe can be made possible only through cooperation with Germany ... A colossal bloc of world-dominating greatness, economic power, energy and numbers of population would be created from ocean to ocean. Not only would the danger of future wars for generations be eliminated from Europe but also from the double continent of Eurasia . . . Thus, would be formed an alliance between the young Socialist forces against the old rotten entrenched powers of the West.”

(From the document "The Overcoming of the Catastrophe," issued in April 1945 and initiated by Field Marshal Keitel and Grand Admiral Donitz.)

1947 "Germans do not want to sell ourselves to either side, not for the Potemkin promises of Marshall Zhukov nor the CARE packages of America . . . Germany wants to establish good relations with the Soviet Union. However, we cannot allow this goal to be reached by letting the rest of the world become an enemy of Germany. We are not anti-Russian, but we are pro-German."

(Social Democratic Leader Dr. Schumacher, in a speech: New York Times, June 2, 1947.)

1948 "The Germans know that their hour will come . . . They are full of faith that they will see the day of resurrection . . . They will take their destiny in their own hands, whether together with others is a question that can be discussed, but only as equals . . . The Germans can wait; only together with them can Europe come back on her feet, and from such a strong Europe we have to expect everything."

"The tremendous expansive force of economic power in the United States constitutes not only a threat to the whole of Europe but also creates fear in Russia . . . Europe,
under German leadership, has to mobilize all her spiritual and cultural forces to defend her position and heritage."

(From the January and November 1948 issues of the geo-political monthly Der Weg, Buenos Aires.)

1949 ", . . . We Germans do not want to have anything to do with the West—with the Yankees, with their capitalistic exploitation and their political arrogance . . . We Prussians have always been closely associated with the Russians; we Germans returned gladly to the tradition of Bismarck . . . We are actually predestined for an alliance with Moscow . . . Socialist Germany and Communist Russia together are invincible and thus our alliance secures the peace of the world."

(From the "Open Letter to Stalin," published by the former Nazi and Black Front leader Bruno Fricke, in the anti-Communist Buerger Zeitung of Chicago, November 17, 1949.)

1950 "The Americans fondly hope that we will one day repay with our blood all the benefits we received from them. They want us to sign a pact whereby we, as mercenaries and vassals, shall back American power politics . . . However long we may continue to milk the Americans of millions of dollars, there must come the inevitable moment when we shall have to make it crystal clear to them that we are not willing to join the fight against Russia for American interests. There probably is no danger that we shall become hated by the Yankees, because they are businessmen and understand very well that we will act only in accordance with our own interests. . . . The fact that the Americans would now like us to join them in the defense of Europe and to become their ally will thereby enhance our bargaining power with the Russians. The Americans have lost the peace, the cold war and their entire future, but they are not as yet aware of it."

(From a circular letter issued in September 1950 by the German Geo-political Center in Madrid.)
"... A federated Europe will become a Third Force in the world, not as strong as Russia or the United States, but powerful enough to intervene successfully—in a decisive moment—to safeguard the peace . . . Germany has again become a factor with whom others will have to reckon in international affairs . . . There is also a long-range economic goal: the colonization of Africa . . . If we Europeans colonize Africa, we create at the same time a supplier of raw materials for Europe which will be of the greatest importance."

(Article by Dr. Konrad Adenauer in the Rheinischer Merkur, May 20, 1950.)

1951 "In order to arrive at a settlement with the East, there is only one avenue open: the unification of Europe. It is the only possibility for a peaceful settlement. None of us are interested in forcing the solution by war—for that would be the end for all of us. If Europe becomes strong and Stalin has no need to worry any longer that she will be used as a jumping-off place for an attack against the East, then the moment will have come when Stalin will no longer deem it necessary to continue the occupation of the Eastern Zone."

(Count von Rechenberg, in the session of the Federal Parliament in Bonn on October 17, 1951.)

"There is danger that the Americans will one day launch a preventive war against the Soviets . . . Those who would like to prevent such a war must see to it that Europe becomes strong enough to act as an arbitrator . . . Only when Europe possesses its own strong military arm, can it make its voice heard effectively . . . No one has more to gain through unification of Europe than the Germans who are the most numerous and most dynamic among the nations west of the U.S.S.R. . . . The West German Republic can best be compared with a sailboat cruising towards two islands far on the horizon and, in order to withstand strong-blowing winds, it sets its course alternatively to the left and to the
right. Will the day then not arrive when we must make a
decision on which island to land? Maybe, but it is not cer-
tain. Perhaps one of the islands will be washed away by the
waves before we reach it . . ."

(From an editorial on German foreign policy in the
pro-Adenauer newspaper Christ und Welt of No-
vember 1, 1951.)

"Only under political pressure would Moscow show readi-
ness to return those Eastern territories which Russia has
already incorporated into her orbit. It would be necessary
that we first create a united, healthy, and strong Western
Europe in whose name the following offer to the Kremlin
could then be made: Continental Europe would break away
from the Atlantic Pact if the Soviets agree to withdraw their
forces behind the Priepet-Marshes and release not only the
Eastern zone of Germany, but the whole of Eastern Europe
into the European Union. A United Europe, standing on its
own feet and possessing its own powerful army, could begin
with the development of its colonial empire in Africa. Such
a Europe, whatever the ties might be with America, could
afford to carry out such an independent policy because it will
have the strength of a third power."

(EDITORIAL FROM THE FRONT PAGE OF CHRIST UND WELT, STUTTGART, DECEMBER 27, 1951.)

1952 "Never before has the world political situation been so
favorable for Germany as it is today ... It is not for
nothing that both power blocs concentrate their efforts on
Germany in order to dominate it politically and economically.
Therein lies our chance and our obligation. Our economy
has to be kept independent from both sides . . . This is
the way that leads towards sovereignty and equality which
finally will eliminate all those clauses which were imposed
upon us as a result of the lost war . . . While integration
with the West restricts our industry to markets where we are
subjected to a cut-throat competition, the Eastern bloc offers
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us markets where countless millions are hungry for our industrial goods. Here (in the East) is Germany's market. . . . Thirty years ago, on April 16, 1922, there were courageous men who, in Rapallo, through direct Russo-German negotiations brought a great turning point in Germany's post-war policy . . . The situation in present day Germany should exhort our leading statesmen to show courage . . . courage towards a Rapallo Policy."

(From the editorial "Courage Towards a Rapallo" of the weekly Der Fortschritt, Essen, May 16, 1952.)

"What Can Russia Win If She Plays Her Trump Card? . . . In order to jump out from her present isolation she can, exactly as the Rapallo Treaty did 30 years ago, place Germany as a protecting buffer between the East and the West. From the politico-economic point of view, she could repeat the old game for world power position by concluding long-term agreements with German industry and by renewing her trade with Germany. Thus, Russia might re-open the door to the world market."

(Editorial in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 15, 1952.)

"If we Germans would come to feel that the other powers, openly or tacitly, try to hinder German equality and reunification, the (Western) treaties would quickly turn out to have been built on quicksand . . . The fact that we are tied up with the NATO pact does not make it impossible for Europe, as soon as it is strong enough and the international situation has changed, to become one day independent from every side ('nach alien Seiten unabhaengig')."

(Editorial in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 5, 1932.)

Here is the real voice of Germany and we must listen to it. In the past, whenever critics have pointed to the growing danger of a reunited Reich siding with the East, two answers were
usually given by American officials responsible for our German policy:

A) We know that such a danger exists, but we completely trust Dr. Adenauer in that he will keep Germany on our side.
B) Just because we have to face such a precarious situation in Germany, we must do our utmost to keep Germany within the Western orbit; and for that reason we have to pay the Germans a high price.

This book will show, on the basis of facts, the total fallacy of such reasoning. However, there is a third argument which can often be heard and with which we will deal here once and for all.

It has been customary over the past fifty years to brand serious students of German policy as "alarmists" when they called attention to the brutally frank writings of militarists and pan-Germans which revealed Germany's plans for aggression and conquest. So-called responsible Germans would try to gloss over these writings with the usual refrain: "But you cannot ascribe irresponsible writings of an individual, be it a high-ranking military man, a university professor or a politician, as the officially adopted policy of the German Government. There are so many crackpots in public life, and we certainly do not have the power to keep them quiet."

American authorities have in recent years frequently emphasized this point of view in criticizing American correspondents for having supposedly stressed the "negative side" of the German picture, and forgetting to underscore the "positive" achievements of the Adenauer administration.

There is undoubtedly a tendency among U.S. officials to close the eyes before mounting danger, but does not the record of history speak for itself?

In 1912 when General Bernhardi published his stirring book Germany and the Next War, the German Foreign Office was
eager to convince a bewildered world that the thoughts expressed by Bernhardt were in no way identical with Germany's official foreign policy. Two years later, the world experienced German "Schrecklichkeit" precisely as outlined by General Bernhardt.

After Hitler came to power, a German geo-politician, Professor Ewald Banse, published a book (Raum und Volk im Weltkrieg) in which were laid bare Germany's plans for conquest in Europe. Professor Banse's book interpreted in more scholarly language the blueprint of another "crackpot" who had ten years previously, in Mein Kampf, expounded the thesis that Germany had first to defeat the West in order to have a free hand for the "Drang nach Osten."

When foreign diplomats became disturbed over the publication of Herr Professor Banse's book, the Foreign Minister von Neurath was right at hand to assuage their feelings with assurances that such "irresponsible" writings had nothing in common with the peaceful intentions of the responsible leadership of the Third Reich.

A few years later the "responsible" German Government executed the very plans that their many "irresponsible" writers had blue-printed in previous years.

Today the World faces the same diabolical combination of "responsible" leadership and "irresponsible" blue-printers in Germany. Yet, ought it not to be easier for us, after we were burned twice, to see the facts behind the flimsy drapery? Is it not a fact that many of those political experts who worked under von Ribbentrop, under Goebbels, and in General Karl Haushofer's geo-political staff are operating again for the revival of German World power? Is it not a fact that many of these "irresponsible" planners and political propagandists under Hitler are today in key positions, either in Dr. Adenauer's Foreign Office or in the editorial rooms of such leading German publications as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Zeit, Christ und Welt and the Deutsche Zeitung?

Unfortunately, the American public is, to a large extent, to-
tally unaware of what is going on in Germany. What is even more disturbing is the fact that our leading diplomatic officials seem to be afflicted with blind spots when they are supposed to judge German affairs objectively and intelligently.

This was clearly demonstrated on June 12, 1952, in a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Contractual Agreement with Germany. On that day, Mr. McCloy, then High Commissioner in Germany, appeared before the Senate Committee in order to ask for a speedy ratification of the Contractual Agreement, which serves as a substitute for a peace treaty with Germany. One of the Senators enquired about the political trend in Germany and whether it was not necessary to be on guard against unpleasant developments. The following exchange of questions and answers on a specific issue is taken from the stenographic minutes:

SENATOR GREEN: I see German newspapers from time to time that are sent to me marked, and there is one question that I would like to draw your attention to for your comments. It comes from the Christ und Welt. That is an Adenauer paper, is it not?

MR. MCCLOY: Yes.

SENATOR GREEN: And it is dated December 27, 1951, and there are the following quotations—it refers to making in the name of a United Europe the following offer to the Kremlin:

"Continental Europe would break from the Atlantic Pact if the Soviets agree to withdraw their forces behind the Pripyat Marshes and release not only the Eastern Zone of Germany but the whole of Eastern Europe into the European Union. "A Western Europe, standing on its own feet, and possessing its own powerful
array, can begin with a development of its colonial empire in Africa. Such a Europe, whatever the ties might be with America, could afford to carry out such an independent policy because it will have the strength of a third power."

Now, that being a newspaper that supports the present (Adenauer) administration, I wonder what your comment might be as to the extent of such ideas?

MR. McCLOY: I do not think that is—in the first place, that is not the Chancellor's attitude. I do not think that is supported by his party. It is not his party newspaper. It has a very small circulation, and I do not know where that—did that appear in an editorial of that paper?

SENATOR GREEN: Yes; call it an editorial, an article.

MR. MCCLOY: Well, you can see all sorts of expressions, viewpoints in Germany. I simply say that is not today the trend of German thinking. I think the trend of German thinking today wants to associate itself with the West, wants to associate itself particularly with the United States, and is not disposed to go off on a frolic of its own in another aggressive adventure.

As we can see from the record, Mr. McCloy parried Senator Green's question, by stating that this particular newspaper had no significance in German political affairs and that it did not represent the trend of German thinking or the attitude of Chancellor Adenauer.

In every respect, Mr. McCloy was ill-informed on the standing and importance of Christ and Welt. Furthermore, his statements on the trend of German political thinking do not correspond to the facts. We will show in the forthcoming chapters
that Christ und Welt is one of the leading political journals in Western Germany, a paper of wide circulation and, what is more important, quoted frequently by representative German newspapers, such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. In addition, the articles of Christ und Welt are often reprinted in the German-language press in the United States and in Latin America.

One of the founders of Christ und Welt, Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, is the leading representative of the Protestant faction in Chancellor Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union and he serves as Deputy Chairman in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bonn Parliament.

Among the editors of Christ und Welt are such well-known political figures as Dr. Klaus Mehnert and Dr. Giselher Wirsing. Dr. Mehnert served as a top-notch geo-politician and Russian expert under the guiding hand of General Dr. Karl Haushofer. Dr. Giselher Wirsing was one of the top-ranking journalists under Dr. Goebbels and served during the war as special adviser on international affairs under von Ribbentrop. To classify a political journal with such an array of geo-political experts and journalists as unimportant, shows either a surprising lack of information or could be regarded as a deliberate attempt to withhold from Congress and the American people vital facts concerning the current trends in Germany.

In any case, the excerpts which Senator Green quoted from Christ und Welt constitute only an infinitesimal part of similar material which has been gathered from leading pro-Adenauer newspapers in recent months. It all points to a well-organized drive to exploit as much as possible American aid, with a view toward reaching a final agreement with the Russians. What Germany's political planners suggest today is just a repetition of the old trick with which Hitler outsmarted the Western Powers in August 1939.

There is a wealth of material providing irrefutable proof that Dr. Adenauer's whole timetable in dealing with the Western Powers has been carefully prepared by those "irresponsible"
Haushofer-Ribbentrop disciples who, from Madrid and Buenos Aires, regularly give directives to their former Nazi colleagues in the Bonn Foreign Office and in the leading German papers. There is still time to put a stop to this sinister German conspiracy—if America will listen. If not, the day will come when a "responsible" German Government will once again execute the blueprints cooked up by the "irresponsible" geo-political "crackpots."
The End of an Illusion

THE MYTH THAT GERMANY COULD SERVE AS A "BULWARK against the East" is bursting. We have pumped billions of dollars into Western Germany in order to rescue the former enemy from the consequences of defeat. We based our policy on the assumption that we could transform the West German Republic into a trustworthy American ally.

This notion received its inspiration from the German propaganda mill. As military defeat approached, the Germans began to harp on the threadbare theme that they could best be depended upon to stand fast against the Soviet challenge. Their labors were not in vain because our planners and strategists fell for the bait.
Hypnotized by the German siren song, Washington policy shapers became convinced that the German people would show gratitude for the benefits they had received from the U.S. It was assumed that the Germans would repent for their past crimes and that they would cooperate sincerely with the U.S. With this in mind, the Pentagon began to plan for the rebuilding of Germany's military power to balance Soviet strength in Europe. Our policy planners hoped to guide Germany toward democracy and convert her into a faithful ally. This was precisely what the Germans wanted us to believe.

Today it is admitted in Washington that our program of democratization and re-education in Germany has failed. Even High Commissioner John McCloy, a leading proponent of the "bulwark" theory, has expressed alarm over the increasing Neo-Nazi propaganda and the revival of German nationalism. On December 10, 1951, in a speech before U.S. Occupation officials, Mr. McCloy admitted that our policy in Germany is running a great risk. Mr. McCloy confessed that at times he could not suppress a "feeling of uncertainty" when he pondered Germany's future.

In regard to German remilitarization, the world will be confronted with more uncertainties and greater headaches as soon as the new Frankenstein monster will come to life.

The belief of our strategists that Germany would show gratitude for America's generous relief action and for the costly reconstruction of her economy, has proven to be an illusion. Thus the U.S. News and World Report of September 14, 1951, noted: "The fact that the U.S. alone has spent nearly nine billion dollars in Western Germany is ignored or minimized. The tendency is to take these billions for granted."

Another fallacy held by Washington is that a remilitarized Germany could still be controlled by the United States. In discussing German remilitarization, the U.S. News, in its issue of January 18, 1952, stated that "a strong Western Germany is on the horizon." The editors emphasized the fact that the French
army "is not likely to play the big role counted on by the U.S.A.," but that

"Germany will again be a big power in Western Europe and, instead of Western Europe bossing Germany, it may be the other way round. This is not the way the U.S. planned it but it is the way things are going."

Here it is openly admitted that something has gone wrong. The question whether it was planned that way will be answered in the next chapter. Yet it is sufficient to mention the fact that Washington planners decided right at the end of World War II to maintain a strong Germany which, in the hour of need, would place its power at the service of the West.

Thus after having convinced our policy shapers of their indispensability and reliability, the Germans were in a position to plan future strategy. Knowing exactly how we would act in a given situation, Germany's postwar tactics and propaganda could now anticipate U.S. moves. In this manner the Germans could exert a decisive influence through their diplomacy of blackmail.

From German documents, we know today how the Germans had plotted the breakup of the Grand Wartime Alliance as a means for a quick comeback. When the Germans observed that we were enmeshed in the entanglements of the cold war, they became confident of their final triumph. Believing that time was on their side, the Germans were now resolved to "sit it out" and exploit the growing tension to their advantage.

In the meantime it has begun to dawn on our policy shapers that our position in Germany is not only precarious but that we are rapidly losing control of the situation. In a report from Bonn, Stewart Alsop stated, on October 12, 1951, that we have no "stick" in Germany:

"The demonstrable fact is that something has gone very wrong with Allied plans for a West German defense force. Consider the facts. It is more than a year now since Secretary
of State Dean G. Acheson, pushed and chivvied by the Pentagon, and against the advice of able United States High Commissioner John J. McCloy, demanded immediate German rearmament. At that time, the Pentagon planners, suffering from the delusion that the militant German nation would spring to arms at the word of command, were talking of an important German military contribution in a matter of months. ... In the view of some very able men here, it is time to have a good hard look at what has gone wrong. . . . What seems to have gone principally wrong is that the Pentagon planners, fascinated like a rabbit by a snake by the thought of future German divisions, have fixed a rigid but entirely unrealistic timetable for German rearmament. Thus the Western administrators here, including the extremely able Commissioner McCloy, have been robbed of the flexibility required in negotiation."

In his report, Stewart Alsop emphasizes the fact that "because German politicians are convinced that the West must have a German defense contribution at any cost, the Allied negotiators had no stick." The Pentagon planned program had placed the Allies "in the position of doing the begging" which, on the other hand, has "immensely stimulated the sort of irrationality" displayed by such fanatical nationalists as Dr. Schumacher of the Social Democratic Party, the leaders of the German Rightist Parties, belonging to the Adenauer Government, and the Neo-Nazi groups.

The fact is that Dr. Adenauer, due to Germany's strong bargaining position, can put the "squeeze" on us in order to extort one concession after another. And time is working in Germany's favor. This became sufficiently clear when Dr. Adenauer and the Bundestag announced as conditions for a German defense contribution, first: the settlement of the Saar dispute to German satisfaction; second: a place of equality in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; third: the release of all war criminals; fourth: full sovereignty for the West German Republic.
While the Germans are glad to obtain the means for the defense of their own soil and, in addition, the guarantee of assistance by the Atlantic Community in case of Soviet aggression, they have taken the haughty position of "Ohne Mich"—"without me." Thus we find ourselves in the ironic position where the Germans can say: "Ohne Mich," but we cannot say to them: "Without us." The Germans, said Walter Lippmann, in his column of January 29, 1952, are in no hurry to sign up; "They are measuring our eagerness to have them sign, and with considerable skill and astuteness, they are raising their terms to accord with our eagerness." As Walter Lippmann correctly pointed out, they have heard over the years how necessary German troops are for the defense of Europe, and it would be quite unnatural if they would not use their diplomatic bargaining power to the utmost:

"I do not see how or why we should blame the Germans for making the most of our official misunderstanding and miscalculation in Germany. It is not they but we who adopted the unprecedented and fanciful notion that a nation forced to surrender unconditionally—and subjected to immense destruction and humiliation—could within two or three years be turned into a loyal, active and docile ally. Once we announced that the free world could not be defended without the Germans, then the Germans were in the driver's seat."

Walter Lippmann has not been alone in seeing through the wishful thinking of our policy planners. Others, including former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, James P. Warburg, Edgar Ansel Mowrer, William Shirer, Delbert Clark, Drew Middleton, have been noting and recording since 1945 the evidences of Washington's wrong approach to the German problem. These men have understood clearly two facts of the German character. One is that, in German eyes, victors who spend money on the vanquished are dreamers ripe for destruction, with whom no self-respecting warrior nation wishes to ally
herself. The second is that, no matter how weak Germany herself may be, fear of Russia is the most effective weapon to be employed in dealing with the West. The Germans are old hands in such tactics.

Our military planners were converted to the idea of building Germany as a bulwark against the East because there was no proper guidance from the State Department. The military planners in the Pentagon should have been told that Prussianized Germany had at no time served as a bulwark against the East. This was a propaganda slogan which the Germans had effectively used in overcoming the military defeat after the First World War and then in the blackmail diplomacy of the Weimar Republic and later under Hitler, Goebbels and Ribben- trop.

From the beginning, it was an illusion to believe that the Germans could be brought around to our side by generous dollar handouts. This policy has had its drawbacks, especially in Germany where it created only hate and contempt for us. If the military planners believed that we could win Germany as a friend by making her a "going concern" and "strong military factor," they overlooked the essential fact that an alliance can only be built on the basis of common interest and mutual trust. Possessing the requisite facts on Germany's real interests and ambitions, it was the function and duty of the State Department to demolish the Pentagon's illusions. The historic truth is that the German ruling class, industrialists, aristocrats, army officers and diplomats, had always viewed, with great apprehension, the United States as the chief antagonist and menace for Germany and the whole of Europe.

The record shows that German industrialists were among the main plotters against the United States. Their aim was always the destruction of America's industrial supremacy and the conquest of world markets. For this reason alone it was the most unrealistic policy we could ever have embarked upon. To resurrect Germany as a dangerous competitor and establish her
again as a dominant military power in Europe is a folly which should have been prevented through intelligent guidance of the State Department. Even if we take into account that the outcome of World War II had created an unbalance of power, especially in Europe, we could have found other ways and means to check Russia's advance.

The lesson of the past should have served as a warning not to fall for Germany's diplomatic booby trap—the myth of a "bulwark against the East."
Today the German resistance is boldly showing how little it seeks genuine cooperation with the West. According to the planning of the Germans, the U.S. must pay for German rearmament, but after having made them strong they will have the means to use their regained military power as a trump-card in a deal with Moscow. The United States News, quoted in the previous chapter, observed that this was not the way the United States had planned it. However, it can hardly be said that this should come as a surprise to our policy shapers.

As early as 1944 it was well known in Washington what the Nazi High Command was planning in order to "overcome the catastrophe." When in 1943 the German war machine stalled on the Russian plains, German diplomats worked diligently to find a way out of the inevitable military defeat.
In March and April of 1945, our State Department announced that the Germans had elaborated a complete plan on how to upset the military victory of the Allies and thereby win the peace for Germany. According to the New York Herald Tribune of March 31, 1945, the State Department gave the following account of Germany's secret postwar plans:

"The Department of State announced today that reliable information collected by Allied Governments clearly indicates that the Nazi regime in Germany has developed well-arranged postwar plans for the perpetuation of Nazi doctrines and domination. Some of these plans have already been put into operation and others are ready to be launched on a widespread scale immediately upon termination of hostilities in Europe. . . . German technicians, cultural experts and undercover agents have well-laid plans to infiltrate foreign countries with the object of developing economic, cultural and political ties . . . This government is now in possession of photostatic copies of several volumes of German plans on this subject. The German propaganda is to be an integral part of the overall postwar program. The immediate aim of the propaganda program will be directed at removing Allied control measures, by softening up the Allies, through a subtle plea for fair treatment of Germans, and later the program will be extended and intensified with the object of giving rebirth to all Nazi doctrines and furthering German ambitions for world domination. Unless these plans are checked, they will present a constant menace to postwar peace and security."

A few days after this announcement, Assistant Secretary of State Julius C. Holmes, on April 7, 1945, sounded a warning in an official broadcast that "German leaders are trying to find refuge in neutral countries" and that they are planning for a comeback:

"They realized that they had lost the war almost a year ago, and began laying the groundwork for the postwar period."
They hope to achieve world domination through a third world war. We have ample evidence of that intent . . . von Papen told a close friend of his in 1943 that Germany could no longer hope to win the war and that every possible move should be made to save German industrial and military power for the future."

Discussing Germany's preparation for a world-wide underground network, Assistant Secretary Holmes stated:

"We Americans are too ready to believe things like this don't really happen. But they do. They are villains in the plot. They'll search for every possible loophole in the Allied military plans for controlling Germany. One of the most interesting angles of the German plan is to place technicians where they can be most useful to the Nazi underground in its next bid for power . . . Certain Nazis are assigned to pose as Communists, Socialists, and members of trade union organizations. The Nazi strategists intend to use these people to penetrate into anti-Nazi circles, in Germany and outside. Some may even try to pass as refugee members of the German anti-Nazi movement . . . The Allied Governments are fully aware of all this, and determined to prevent the Nazis from getting away with their schemes. That's half the battle. The other half is still to come."

The sad truth is that this battle was never fought by the State Department, although on June 25, 1945, William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State, testified to a sub-committee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs:

"The second matter I should like to discuss relates to the current and urgent problem of frustrating German attempts to hide abroad a stake for another gamble at world domination.

"The Department of State has abundant evidence that the Nazis, in anticipation of military defeat, made careful plans to carry on in foreign countries a wide range of activities necessary to support an eventual resurgence of German
power. For this purpose plans were made, and carried out in part, to transfer abroad sufficient funds and specially trained personnel to carry on pan-German activities, even while the Allied armies were in occupation of Germany."

A week after Assistant Secretary Holmes' radio announcement, Franklin Delano Roosevelt died and soon afterwards the military planners in the Pentagon set quietly out to implement their new policy based on "calculated optimism" towards Germany.

The new policy was carried out in complete disregard of the German record and without a thorough evaluation of the vital evidence which had been discovered in occupied Germany by our victorious armies. The files of the German foreign office contained detailed memoranda of the secret "America Committee" that had operated under the direction of Dr. Dieckhoff, the former German Ambassador in Washington. In these memoranda detailed plans had been drawn up for disruptive war and postwar propaganda in the United States. It appears from these documents that the main objective of the German High Command was to obtain a separate peace either with the West or with Soviet Russia. In case this objective could not be achieved then the Germans could bank on the development of a chaotic postwar world which would provide the opportunity to regain their former power and influence.

Under the date of July 7, 1943, Dr. Colin Ross, one of Haushofer's foremost collaborators on geo-politics and his liaison officer to the German Foreign Office, submitted a fifteen-page report analyzing the favorable conditions for an "ideological offensive in the U.S.A." As a main weapon, he recommended the exploitation of America's fear of Bolshevism, and the creation of a secret organization that would carry on the campaign to undermine the postwar plans of the Allies. In his memorandum, Dr. Ross recommended as an effective argument that Germany, in case she were confronted with the pros-
pect of a harsh peace, would ally herself with the Soviets, thus making Russia invincible in the future.

Other memoranda described schemes of how to strain and disrupt British-American relations, and how to use the Holy See as a channel to spread "confidential reports," manufactured in the Ribbentrop office.

One of the most important documents is a directive issued by the Intelligence Department of the German High Command, dated March 15, 1944, and signed by Admiral Canaris, the mastermind of the German intelligence setup. In the document German agents were ordered to start a subtle campaign in the United States with the object of defeating Roosevelt's policy, splitting the Allies and securing a separate or soft peace for Germany.

"SECRET STATE MATTER

OKW—Abwehr March 15, 1944

"At a meeting of the representatives of the Foreign Office, the Security Division, ('SD') and the Department of Defense ('Abwehr'), the following resolutions were adopted for unified action by all our agents in foreign countries:

"1. Utilize to the fullest extent all available possibilities in neutral and enemy countries, in order to support our military efforts with political and propaganda campaigns.

"2. Our goal is to crush the enemy's plan whose object it is to destroy forever the German Reich militarily, economically, and culturally.

"The new regulations put into effect by the political leaders for the dissolution and disintegration of the enemy bloc should be carried out more intensively. We must do our utmost to create a state of confusion and distrust among our enemies. Such a state of disunity would enable us to sue for a quick separate peace with either side. While it is true that the efforts made in that direction have failed so far due to the implacable hate policy of Roosevelt and Churchill, it does not mean that some day, under different conditions, the
unnatural front of our enemies could not be broken. Roosevelt's electoral defeat this year could have immeasurable political consequences.

"The political and military leaders are of the opinion that Germany cannot expect any mercy from the Soviets; on the contrary, should the war take a turn for the worse, we must assume that the Slavs will do everything in order to retaliate against the harsh treatment we have inflicted upon them. In spite of everything, no effort should be spared to stir up, through carefully directed propaganda, political animosity inside the Anglo-Saxon countries which would enrage the Soviets to such a degree that, as a consequence, they would welcome a chance to conclude a separate peace with Germany.

"In the event of a negotiated peace, or should we be defeated, Germany would have everything to gain—in the long run—by joining the East.

"Right now, the chances for a separate peace with the West are a little better, especially if we succeed, through our propaganda campaign and our 'confidential' channels, to convince the enemy that Roosevelt's policy of 'unconditional surrender' drives the German people towards Communism.

"There is great fear in the U.S.A. of Bolshevism. The opposition against Roosevelt's alliance with Stalin grows constantly. Our chances for success are good, if we succeed to stir up influential circles against Roosevelt's policy. This can be done through clever pieces of information, or by references to unsuspicious neutral ecclesiastical contact men.

"We have at our command in the United States efficient contacts which have been carefully kept up even during the war. The campaign of hatred stirred up by Roosevelt and the Jews against everything German has temporarily silenced the pro-German bloc in the U.S.A. However, there is every hope that this situation will be completely changed within a few months. If the Republicans succeed in defeating Roosevelt in the coming presidential election, it would greatly influence the American conduct of war towards us.
"The KO-leaders abroad and their staffs have innumerable opportunities of constantly referring to Roosevelt's hate policy. They must use in this campaign all the existing contacts and they should try to open up new channels. We must point to the danger that Germany may be forced to cooperate with Russia. The greatest caution has to be observed in all talks and negotiations by those who, as 'anti-Nazis,' maintain contact with the enemy. When fulfilling missions, they have to comply strictly with instructions."

(sgd.) Canaris.

Another significant document, dated April 3, 1945, was written a few weeks before Germany's surrender. This document bears the initials of the Chief of the High Command of Hitler's Wehrmacht, Field Marshal Keitel, and of Grand Admiral Doenitz who, after the collapse, became the immediate successor to Hitler. The document, entitled "The Overcoming of the Catastrophe," stressed the point that Germany's final comeback can be made only in close cooperation with the Soviet Union. The most important parts of the document can be found in the appendix. In the conclusion the document says:

"A colossal bloc of world-dominating greatness, economic power, energy and numbers of population would be created from ocean to ocean.

"Not only would the danger of future wars for generations be eliminated from Europe but also from the double continent of Eurasia.

"The two great peoples, the Russians and the Germans, have extraordinary possibilities for development without collision of their interests.

"The chief emphasis in this bloc will shift more and more to the racially superior, intellectually more active and more energetic (people), that means to Europe.

"Thus, would be formed an alliance between the young Socialist forces against the old rotten entrenched powers of the West."
All these documents prove that the German High Command had drawn up a detailed plan in order to change defeat into victory. However even before we had captured the files of the German Foreign Office, our State Department knew from countless intelligence reports that the Nazi High Command had planned from 1943 on, the transfer of German assets to neutral countries, and the organization of a large-scale underground network with its center outside of occupied Germany.

In every document the German thesis laid stress on the view that the military defeat in World War II has only to be regarded as an unhappy episode in the far larger struggle for world supremacy. In many documents it was stated that Germany had to go ahead in spite of all set-backs in her strivings for world conquest. In 1944, the French weekly Combat published a sixty-page memorandum, written by General von Stuepnagel, which examined the causes for German military setbacks in World War II and analyzed the conditions for victory in a coming war:

"In the next world war, which should take place within 25 years, the same mistake must not be made. The principal adversary will be the United States, and the entire effort must be concentrated against this country from the beginning . . . Our defeat in the present war need not be considered except as an incident in the triumphal march of Germany towards the conquest of the world, and from now on we must give a defeated Germany the spirit of a future conqueror. "What does a temporary defeat matter if, through the destruction of people and material wealth in enemy countries, we are able to secure a margin of economic and demographic superiority even greater than before 1939? If we can succeed in doing this, this war will have been useful, since it will enable us, within the next 25 years, to wage another war under better conditions . . .

"Our enemies will grow weary before we do. We shall have to organize a campaign of pity designed to induce them to
send us needed supplies at the earliest possible moment. Above all we must hold on to the assets we have deposited in neutral countries. The present war will thus have been victorious, in spite of our temporary military defeat, because it will have been a march forward towards our supremacy. We have not to fear conditions of peace analogous to those we have imposed, because our adversaries will always be divided and disunited."

On December 13, 1944, the Associated Press reported that Himmler had started plans for an underground network at the end of 1943 and that the propaganda warfare was to be carried on "by some 200,000 Nazi followers in Europe and elsewhere." It was stated in the dispatch that many party members had prepared double identities and that the Nazi propaganda campaign was designed toward setting the Allies against each other.

Tracing the pitfalls of American post war policy planning in retrospect, and comparing the present situation with the German blueprint for resurgence, it becomes clear that the Germans planned it that way, though our State Department had the necessary information to foil the plot.

Many of the objectives toward which the German High Command in 1943-45 devoted its planning have been realized today. A very impressive account of the successful execution of the German post war conspiracy was provided in a secret memorandum dated September 1950 and issued by the German Geo-political Center in Madrid. The document in question, the full text of which is translated and published in the Appendix, constitutes a general analysis of the world political situation after the Korean War broke out. The importance of the document is shown by its directives pertaining to the diplomatic attitudes of the West German Republic in its dealings with the Western powers. There is no doubt that the Madrid document constitutes something like a blueprint for the foreign policy of the Bonn Government. In a larger sense, the Madrid Circular
Letter is a general staff plan for a new German approach to divide and conquer the world. Quoted below is a chapter of this document entitled "Has Germany an Obligation towards the United States?":

"Germany has emerged from the cold war as the chief beneficiary. That is our great asset in the ledger of the five-year period since Potsdam. For the first time in the history of nations it has been proven that clever propaganda, especially when it is camouflaged and directed through other channels, accomplishes far more than the mightiest army or the best diplomatic service of a smoothly-functioning state. It is a great mistake to assume that Western Germany recuperated so quickly thanks to America's sympathetic concern for us. We repeatedly encounter, especially as expressed by some politicians in Bonn, the idiotic opinion: 'But the Americans have put us back on our feet, should we therefore not show our gratitude?' To this our answer is as follows: The Americans put us back on our feet, not purely for altruistic reasons but for their selfish interests and on the basis of clever calculation. It must not be our worry but theirs if in the last resort their calculations prove to be abysmally stupid. We are not wholly innocent in the shift of America's postwar policy. For us the war has never stopped and, as is well known, in war every ruse is permissible. We cannot repeat too often that Germany never has ceased to carry on the war with political weapons and propaganda, with economic sabotage and other means. In order to protect Germany against total destruction of its military and economic potentials, as planned at Yalta, we blueprinted a bold plan and created a flexible and smoothly working organization which, during the first months of the war, provided the pre-condition for all the gains that by necessity emerged for Germany out of the chaos of the postwar period. All our calculations at that time were not fulfilled without a hitch. Some of our expectations proved faulty. We had to sail around dangerous cliffs and the German people had to suffer for a while even under conditions deliberately created by ourselves. It even seemed at
times as though every effort was in vain and that all our hopes had to be given up. Today, however, five years after Potsdam, we can look back with pride on our accomplishments.

"Future historians will one day reveal the great vision with which responsible leaders of the Third Reich created with confident determination those measures which subsequently smashed the united front of the enemy and made Germany again a much desired partner in a new politico-strategic alliance. And all this was accomplished at the time when German leaders had to go through the severe crisis of the oncoming defeat. By no means did the political and military leadership of the Third Reich skid into the catastrophe in an irrational manner as so many blockheads and ignoramuses often tell us. The various phases and consequences of the so-called 'collapse' ('Zusammenbruch') were thoroughly studied and planned by the most capable experts ('faehigsten Koepfen'). Nothing occurred by chance; everything was carefully planned. The result of this planning was that, already a few months after Potsdam, the coalition of the victors went on the rocks.

"The decision for a Western or Eastern orientation was influenced by the factors of Realpolitik. In the light of conditions prevailing in 1945, we could expect from only the West—or rather from the United States—moderate conditions for an armistice, measures of relief, and a sympathetic understanding. Only in America did there exist at that time a small but influential group who had not fallen victim to the hate and revenge outcry of the Jewish triumvirate Rosenfeld*-Morgenthal-Burch, but had maintained in a well-concealed but consistent manner throughout the war its sympathy for Germany.

* The name "Rosenfeld" refers to the late President Roosevelt. It was frequently used by the Nazis, who tried to imply in their propaganda that the President was a descendant of a Dutch Jewish family.
vance had consciously brought about conditions and situations which after the collapse confronted America's political leaders with the choice of accepting chaos and Bolshevism throughout Germany, or adopting a constructive program that would save Germany and the whole of Europe. Such a plan and such a bold program could only be successfully carried out by a political schooling now proved to have been of paramount importance. When we take into consideration under what tremendous difficulties and dangers the organization had to work in an underground manner and directed from abroad without any protection or backing by any state, carefully watched and persecuted by agents of a revengeful enemy, then the successful outcome seems like a miracle. In order to bring the Americans back to reason and away from Potsdam, we organized chaotic conditions in a thorough and systematic manner ("haben wir mit grundlacher Systematik das Chaos organisiert"). It was a subtle political resistance, seemingly unorganized and seldom visible, but nonetheless having a deadly effect. The peasants were delivering almost next to nothing to the cities; no coal was brought up from the pits, the wheels of industry were not turning, the people came near to starvation; the monetary system was disintegrating—there remained nothing for the Yankees to do but to give in and scrap the Potsdam program. Soon thereafter the Western Zone received food supplies, local self-government, extensive economic help, credits for currency reform, and, finally, broad political self-determination. Today we are on the last stage towards complete sovereignty.

"Through superb planning and disciplined use of the political weapon of quiet resistance, the German people have brought to nought the plans for revenge of the victors. By forcing the Americans to give in, the first broad cracks were caused in the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. As a consequence, not only did the front of our enemy break wide apart, but the Soviets too were forced to abandon their mad program of destruction in Eastern Germany. Thus it was proven that the excellent political skill and remote control
of a well-trained people can score such great successes even
after total military defeat as have never before been recorded
in history. This could only have been achieved by the leaders
of the Third Reich through superb planning in the realm of
psychological and political warfare within the United States
before and even during the war.

"Just as Clausewitz declared that war is merely an extension
of action by other means, so the German people continued
the war after the 'collapse' by propaganda and other means.
Despite sacrifice and hardship, the German people won this
political war along the whole front. It is our great asset in
the ledger of geo-political schooling and planning that five
years after Potsdam, the aims of our enemies have been
abandoned, Germany's strength has been preserved, and the
Fatherland can look forward to a revival rich in possibilities.

"The revival of Germany was not a gift of the Americans
but exclusively the result of our own far-sighted planning.
The first overwhelming success of this planning was achieved
through our well-organized anti-Morgenthau campaign. We
thereby succeeded in undermining Roosevelt's plans of re-
venge against Germany and created total confusion in Wash-
ington. By keeping Germany industrially strong and by gain-
ing the support of influential senators and representatives in
the American Congress for our propaganda against the dis-
mantling of large industrial enterprises, we finally succeeded
in preserving Germany as the leading industrial power in the
heart of Europe. Thus the plans of Potsdam and Yalta came
to nought and the period of the cold war began which de-
veloped into a struggle between the East and the West on
the decisive question as to who should exploit German in-
dustry and within whose orbit Germany's industrial potential
should be incorporated. In this way, Germany gained valu-
able time for further maneuvering. Thus, without a doubt,
the correctness of our earliest planning was proved, which
anticipated that orientation towards the West would open
up great possibilities for the speedy overcoming of our mili-
tary defeat. In 1945, orientation towards the East would
have been totally wrong. It could only have stirred up the West against us and, in view of the deep-rooted hatred of the Russians at that time against everything German, it would have brought common action of our enemies against us and would have spelled 'finis' to all our aspirations. Thanks, however, to our correct decisions, the situation has changed entirely today. We are now once again in the position to influence the turn of events—today we are again making history.

"Five years after Potsdam, the Yankees are stuck deep in the mud; they are now seeking the advice of our generals whom they formerly called criminals; they come pleading for our help against Russia. That of which we could never convince the world, namely; the injustice of the policy of revenge, was finally accomplished by the Americans themselves who, speculating on German help, have propounded the necessity for a revision of policy toward Germany. They have even convinced the French and the English of this.

"The helplessness of the Americans in the midst of this chaotic situation has caused such confusion that, barely six years after Potsdam, we have obtained as much as—according to the most optimistic calculations—we had hoped to attain in only ten to fifteen years."

Here is bluntly described how the Germans accomplished the "miracle" of a comeback. Today the same men of the Goebbels-Ribbentrop-Haushofer clique who charted the program to undermine the security of the Allies before and during the war now proudly boast in their secret memoranda how they succeeded in duping the U.S. policy planners.
KEY LEADERS IN GERMAN POLITICS SHARE THE BELIEF THAT the future of the Reich can be secured only by close cooperation with the Soviets.

There is an historical basis for this view. Time and again the Germans have inflicted severe defeats on Russia's armies only to face disastrous consequences by the time the last gun had been fired. On the other hand, the Germans have discovered that cooperation with Russia has frequently turned to their greatest advantage.

On January 5, 1952, the Swiss newspaper Basler Nachtrichten reported a general trend among German politicians to discuss the possibilities of closer cooperation with Soviet Russia. There is, said the paper, a steady withdrawal from a pro-Western
attitude and a growing friendly orientation towards the Soviet Union: "The German political leaders may have different ideas, but all are striving towards the same goal—to neutralize Germany and to establish the Reich once again as a great leading power."

The political and ideological concept that Germany must ally with the East against the West is a very old and deeply-rooted tradition in German foreign policy. It was an important factor in Frederick the Great's diplomatic schemes 200 years ago; it dominated the Iron Chancellor Bismarck's policy during the second part of the nineteenth century; it became the guiding idea of the policy makers of the Weimar Republic; it was Hitler's great solution for the opening of the Second World War, and it has again become the guidepost among leading political and industrial circles of the West German Republic.

Two centuries ago, when Prussia's king, Frederick the Great, faced certain defeat at the end of the Seven-Year-War, an unforeseen event saved the tiny Prussian State from total destruction. The death of Russia's Empress Elizabeth in 1762 brought Peter the Third to the throne. The new Czar, an admirer of Frederick the Great, ordered his armies which had already occupied Berlin, to quit the European coalition and fight on the side of Prussia. This decision laid the basis for a long-range Russo-Prussian alliance, which was climaxed in the first partition of Poland.

A second outstanding event in Russo-German relations occurred after Napoleon's defeat in 1812. General von Yorck, commander of the Prussian Corps in Napoleon's Army, opened friendly negotiations on his own initiative with the Russians, in complete disregard of the orders of his king. This so-called "Neutrality Pact of Tauroggen" was actually the beginning of the Russo-Prussian alliance that sealed Napoleon's fate in 1815. The "Spirit of Tauroggen" has never lost its attraction for German officers.

Friendship with Russia was the guiding idea of the Iron
Chancellor Bismarck's diplomacy during the second half of the last century. The fruits of that policy were wiped out in World War I by a change in policy dictated by Emperor Wilhelm the Second. But the German General Staff, fearing the loss of the war, pulled a master trick. In 1917, on Ludendorff's order, Lenin and 60 leading Bolsheviks were shipped in two sealed Pullman cars from Switzerland to Germany and released on the Finnish border with the assignment to undermine the democratic Kerensky government, break Russia away from the Allies and make a separate peace with Imperial Germany. The scheme worked well, but the German General Staff would never have dreamed that the same Bolsheviks would be able to create a tough military machine which, 25 years later, could withstand Germany's Juggernaut.

Not only did the German generals help Bolshevism in Russia; they also worked to build up the modern Red Army. In their desire to circumvent the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty, the Reichswehr, in 1920, made secret deals with the Red Army. German military experts and German armament firms erected airplane and tank factories in Russia, poison gas plants and laboratories for biological warfare. In turn the Red Army allowed German staff officers and special cadres the use of the military establishments in order to study tank warfare and tactical problems of modern blitzkrieg.

The tacit cooperation between Reichswehr and Red Army was soon bolstered by two important political pacts; the Rapallo agreement of 1922 and the Berlin Treaty for Russo-German friendship of 1926.

Main supporters of the idea of an Eastern orientation for Germany at that time were Reichswehr-Minister General Hans von Seeckt, who laid the groundwork in building up the modern German Army, and Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, the first Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic, who later became German Ambassador to Moscow. The idea of approaching Soviet Russia came up immediately after Germany's defeat in the First World
War, and significantly it originated in the minds of the Prussian militarists. We know today what happened in the first years of the Weimar Republic. We know that Soviet Russia greatly helped the rearmament of vanquished Germany after 1918.

From captured German documents, we are able to throw the spotlight on some hitherto unknown facts dealing with the close cooperation between German generals of the Weimar Republic and Soviet Russia. Back in 1921, even before the Rapallo Pact, a secret agreement for the production of armaments was concluded between the Weimar Republic and Soviet Russia. Ten years later, in 1931, General von Blomberg met with a group of Russian General Staff officers to celebrate the tenth anniversary of Russo-German cooperation. The honorary guest was Soviet Marshal Tuchatchevsky, who was later executed. Toasting the Russian Marshal, General von Blomberg said: "We Germans will never forget what the Soviet Army has accomplished for Germany during the past 10 years. I hope that in spite of all present existing difficulties our thanks will be expressed in deed. I drink a toast to the well-being and the future of the great and glorious Soviet Army and of loyal comradeship in arms for today and in the future."

As is well known, the Versailles Treaty had prohibited the Reichswehr from having any Panzer or air forces. German officers were accepted in the Panzer school of Kazan in Russia and there they received the training and experience they later used as generals of Hitler.

Together with the secret General Staff in Berlin, German big industrialists worked for the same goal. For instance, the airplane manufacturer, Junkers, was permitted to build a factory for fighter planes at Charkow, Russia.

This Eastern orientation of Germany was cemented on April 24, 1926, when the Russo-German Treaty was signed at Berlin. This treaty was a direct predecessor of the Hitler-Stalin Pact of August 23, 1939.

Seen against this background, insiders were not surprised that
the Stalin-Hitler Pact of 1939 was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm in Prussian officer circles. The goal of German military circles always was—and still is—the destruction of the Western powers, above all of Britain and the United States. This was the road they had prescribed to Hitler. The fact that Hitler failed, has convinced these Prussian militarists even more of the correctness of their original concept.

No wonder, therefore, that German militarists, diplomats and geo-politicians of today follow closely the red line of their old masters. It might be very timely to quote excerpts from a highly important and practically unknown German document, a secret memorandum written in longhand and initialed by General Hans von Seeckt. It is dated September 11, 1922, and addressed to the then Reich Chancellor, Dr. Joseph Wirth, leader of the Catholic Center Party:

"With Poland we arrive at the core of the Eastern problem. Poland's existence is intolerable, incompatible with Germany's conditions essential to life. It must disappear . . . With Poland falls one of the strongest pillars of the peace of Versailles, the hegemony of France . . . The restoration of the old frontier between Russia and Germany is the prerequisite of any reciprocal recuperation. Russia and Germany in the frontiers of 1914 should be the basis of a mutual understanding. What do we want from, in, and with Russia? What does the dreaded east-orientation consist of? We pursue a twofold purpose. First, Russia's economic and political strengthening. By that we shall achieve our own strengthening, because we shall strengthen a future possible ally. Furthermore, we want to achieve—for the time being in a cautious and trying way—our own immediate strengthening by developing a Russian armament industry which will serve our own purpose in case of need."

The foreign policy of the Weimar Republic was strictly carried out according to this blueprint. Years later, Hitler's shrewd diplomacy, camouflaged by noisy anti-Bolshevik tirades,
followed this basic line of German orientation towards the East. Hitler renewed the Russo-German friendship treaty in 1933, he extended the Russo-German trade agreement in 1936 and he cemented those ties by the Berlin-Moscow Pact in the crucial month of August 1939.

A careful study of geo-political and Nazi literature should have easily convinced the statesmen and diplomats of other countries that Hitler blueprinted war against the West, but was concerned with safeguarding Germany's back in the East. This scheme, plainly outlined many years before in Mein Kampf, was the pet idea of Hitler's geo-political adviser, General Haushofer, and of many other Nazi leaders.

Count Reventlow, an expert on Nazi foreign policy, warned that Germany should never side with the Western democracies against the East: "Today, Russia is the counterweight against the West, inclusive of Poland, and a German foreign policy with vision could exploit this very effectively."

Dr. Goebbels wrote in the early years of the Nazi movement to a young German Communist that "the day will come when Nazism and Communism will fight side by side the decadent powers of the West." The Nazi party manual of 1933 advocated that Germany "by a close tie-up with Russia will free herself in the quickest way from her present untenable strategic position."

In 1934 Hitler said to Rauschning: "Why should I not conclude a pact with Russia when, by doing so, I can improve our position? An alliance with Russia will be the last trump card in my hand. Maybe this will become the most daring gamble of my life. But we should not chatter about it in literary salons and we shall not show our hands too early. . . ."

Today, the old game is played all over again. Many of the former diplomats of the Weimar Republic, such as ex-Ambassador Nadolny, as well as the disciples of the Ribbentrop-Haushofer school, have taken the game up where Hitler had left off. The geo-politicians know that Russia, more than ever
before, constitutes the decisive drawing card in the poker game of German Realpolitik.

In the light of history, American diplomats could safely assume that Germany, after the defeat in World War II, would follow the pattern of dividing the East and the West and, after having exploited her favorable position in power politics, would finally line up with the East. That the Germans intend to give a repeat performance can be seen from the circular letter of the Madrid Geo-political Center, written in 1950:

"During the forthcoming months, Germany's foreign policy must be geared to a subtler exploitation of the conflict between the eastern and western blocs. Our aim in the immediate future must be to regain full sovereignty for Western Germany which will eventually result in the restoration of freedom of action to the whole of Europe. With accelerated speed we are approaching the point at which we must liberate Europe from American control. It is Germany's task to take the lead in this campaign. It is up to us to determine the method and the timing..."

"In view of the present political situation ('realpolitische Lage'), the policy of orientation towards the West has lost all meaning or sense. A conscious policy of neutrality, going hand in hand with close economic cooperation with the East, would, from a long range point of view, supersede a merely pro-Soviet orientation. The former would finally bring about our freedom, while the last would keep us in the status of vassals.

"We must not forget that Germany has always considered orientation towards the West as a policy of expediency, or one to be pursued only under pressure of circumstances. Such was the case in Napoleon's time, after 1918, and also after 1945. All of our great national leaders have constantly counselled the long-range policy of close cooperation with the East; thus, Frederick the Great, Count von Stein, Bismarck, von Seeckt, Brockdorff-Rentzau, and, in the past 30 years, all our leading geo-politicians. By the end of 1940,
Hitler's policy had run into a blind alley ('Zwangslage'), and the hard decision had to be made to ensure by means of the sword access to the gigantic sources of raw materials in the East, which Russia would never have delivered voluntarily, and without which we never could expect to force a show-down against the Anglo-American bloc.

"Our present policy must be to overcome the consequences of our previous mistakes. An emasculated Germany should never allow itself to be used as a spearhead in an attack against the Russian colossus. This would be an insane act ('Wahnsinns experiment') and would spell our final doom, whereas Germany as the exponent of European neutrality could gain far reaching concessions from the Soviets. As we have pointed out again and again, the Russians have no desire whatsoever to burden themselves with all the difficulties and complex problems of Europe; they would consider a neutral and well-intentioned Europe, exerting its influence also on the Arab world and Latin America, as the best solution.

"We must not let ourselves become befogged by Washington's stupid and meaningless slogans about the "Struggle of Democracy versus Communism." The so-called American democracy does not deserve the sacrifice of the bones of even a single German soldier. In the age of regimented and militarized economy, the babbling about democracy and so-called 'free enterprise' is such nonsense that we need not squander a single moment in refuting this American propaganda swindle.

"What Germany needs in the future is not democracy but a system of statecraft similar to that of the Soviet dictatorship which would enable the political and military elite in Germany to organize the industrial capacity of Europe and the military qualities of the German people for the revival of the German race and the re-establishment of Europe as the power center in the world."

Coming back to the Russian issue at the end of the circular letter, the Madrid document states:
"A correct evaluation of the Russian problem is important for Germany's future. World War II clearly proved that Germany was not in a position to mobilize the necessary manpower and the tremendous economic reserves to deal the knock-out blow which would have destroyed the Slavic world forever. Our surprising successes in the Polish and Western campaigns lured our political and military leaders into the belief that they could quickly overrun the Russian armies. And it was demonstrated anew how foolish it was to disregard the wise admonition of Bismarck who, throughout his life, warned us against making Russia our enemy. It will require the greatest diplomatic efforts to lull Moscow's profound distrust of us. The cold war has fortunately relegated the memory of Germany's march into Russia to the background far more quickly than we could ever have hoped. But we must not deceive ourselves; Moscow will not forget the Second World War so quickly.

"The present power position of the Slavic world is a geopolitical reality which we must accept, at least for the time being. Germany's future policy should be the quiet penetration of Europe and must aim at consolidating our spheres of interest in Africa and Latin America. We should avoid as far as possible dangerous propaganda ventures with the expellees which might antagonize the East. Russia may one day be willing to yield or negotiate, but we must never let it come to a struggle for prestige."

It will be demonstrated in a later chapter that this blueprint of the Geo-political Center in Madrid shapes the basic direction for the long-range planning of Dr. Adenauer's foreign policy today.
American officials in Western Germany are sure that the bulk of the German people are at present anti-Communist. Nobody can doubt the correctness of that observation, but the point is that those observers have entirely failed to grasp the real meaning of what the Germans call "Realpolitik."

A German, whether he is a Communist, Democrat, Conservative or Nazi, doesn't have to learn "Realpolitik." He is conditioned to it. He talks as a Russophile in the Eastern Zone, he is an Anglophile in the British Zone, he pays respect towards France under the Tri-color, and he is full of admiration for America under the Stars and Stripes. But when Germans from East and West come together, they will surely talk German "Realpolitik," as was the case when former Ambassador Nadolny came from the Russian Zone in the Spring of 1949.
to talk things over with leading industrial, political and military Germans in the West or when Ex-Chancellor Joseph Wirth visits the East. There is nothing bad or amoral in German "Realpolitik." It is a national tradition in the same way as baseball is a national pastime for Americans. The difference is that baseball leads the American people to harmless outbursts, whereas the game of German Realpolitik ends every 25 years in a world-shaking blast which destroys millions of lives.

Here is an illustration of the workings of German Realpolitik: Toward the end of World War II, a book appeared in the U.S. which became a best-seller in the German-American neighborhoods of New York, Chicago, Cleveland and St. Paul. The title was The German Talks Back. The publishing house, Henry Holt, apologized in newspaper ads for presenting this "angry and incendiary book which . . . will prove infuriating reading to Americans." The author, Heinrich Hauser, a German newspaperman, tells us that the Germans have been "disgusted with Western civilization, the culmination of which was and is the United States." The Germans, Herr Hauser said, hate America for various reasons, among which is its reputation as a charitable benefactor and because it is the richest nation in the world.

According to Hauser, the Germans have no other choice than to go with the East. America, he says, "still cherishes strange illusions." There is no hope to build a democratic and capitalistic Germany, because "to restore a bourgeois Germany would be a little matter of a hundred billion dollars at the very minimum."

Believing that the American people would not spend a hundred billion dollars for a German comeback, Hauser predicts that the Germans will turn their hatred against America; that Americans will go down in history "as killers of innocent women and children and as harbingers of barbarism and chaos all over Europe," and that German patriots will never forget these realities:
"Four times we were on the point of winning the war. The first time was after the defeat of France, when we were on the point of forcing Britain to her knees. What saved Britain? Only the American supplies. The second time we almost won the war was when we were knocking at the gates of Moscow and of Stalingrad. What saved the Russians? Only the supplies from America. The third time was when we were about to crash into Egypt and make the Mediterranean a German lake. What saved the British that time? Only the military aid from America. Our fourth and last chance depended on the V-weapons and the atomic bomb which was under development. What spoiled it? The smashing of our industries by the Americans and the American-equipped British."

Hauser writes further that, full of "apocalyptic hatreds against the world of Western civilization and directed pre-eminently against the United States" the Germans, in their final despair, will turn to the East, and that Germany will soon become "the Queen on the giant chessboard of power politics."

Hauser ridicules the idea that Germany will again become either a capitalist or democratic nation. So long as American aid is forthcoming, he declared, the Germans will take as much as they can get—then turn to the East.

It is Mauser's contention that the Germans "must be provided with a dream powerful enough to justify the sacrifice of 8 or 10 million lives," and he adds:

"There is only one great ideology left which as a nation we have not yet tried, which therefore has not yet failed—Communism. If the Germans accept Communism for their new dream and ideology and do it quickly, they will be lifted almost overnight from the status of outcast lepers to the status of—allies of the biggest land power on earth ... If one has to embrace Communism in order to get Lebensraum, what of it?"
This is the voice of German Realpolitik speaking through an anti-Nazi German. It is a voice that has many echoes. The temptation to play both ends against the middle induced even such a staunch anti-Communist as Friedrich Stampfer, former member of the German parliament, to employ the threat of German-Russian rapprochement. In December, 1944, when the Battle of the Bulge took place, he published an article in the Neue Volkszeitung, New York. He severely criticized the Western Allies for planning a long-term occupation, demilitarization of Germany and eradication of its war potential.

Stampfer, who was a top flight Social-democratic leader during the Weimar Republic, warned the West that, unless leniency was shown, the Germans would turn to the East. He wrote:

"There is a way out for Germany from total defeat and—we have to say it openly—the Western powers are pushing Germany systematically toward that way. Germany can change this situation of defeat decisively and at once by lining up with the only real power on the Eurasian continent, with Russia . . .

"Germany, even in defeat, can give many things to Russia: the open way to Hamburg and the Rhine, trained general staff officers, technicians, skilled workers, soldiers, warships, tanks, bombers and the most modern weapons of destruction. Germany can bring about the final destruction of the French-British barrier, the liquidation of the British Empire and the end of the West European colonial rule. This would mean the establishment of German domination over Africa . . ."

Stampfer's bland assumption of Russo-German collaboration, together with Hauser's bitter anti-American prejudices, are natural progeny of the ever-recurrent Reapolitik.

Though Herr Hauser and Dr. Stampfer hurled their threats during the war, no protest came forth from leading German-American circles. Both men represented the "good Germans," both were staunch anti-Communists, but they were convinced
that, if necessary in the interests of Realpolitik, Germany would side with the Soviets.

In order to provide the reader with a better understanding of what "Realpolitik" really means to the average German, we cite several examples in the United States where Americans of German descent have always lived in freedom and where they enjoy to the fullest extent their national culture and tradition. Official investigators of United States Government agencies found that the many German-American societies and the 300 German-language dailies and weeklies have manifested a pro-German attitude that extended above the normal sentimental attachment to the old homeland. They have often regarded themselves as political outposts ("Vorposten") duty-bound to further the interests of the "Fatherland" in the United States.

After both World Wars, leading German-American circles conducted large-scale "whining" campaigns in order to rescue the Fatherland from the consequences of military defeat. Following their successes on that front, they resorted once more to the usual ruthless methods of German Realpolitik.

The war-crimes trials in Nuremberg have been branded in many German-language papers as illegal infamies. American statesmen are presented as the tools of Jewish revenge. According to these German-American papers, the war guilt was not Hitler's and the German generals' but Churchill's and Roosevelt's. Moreover, they have disseminated fraudulent reports which served to discredit the American Occupation.

For this outspoken pro-German stand, this press not only received the blessings of the Adenauer Government but was also praised in the circular letter of the Geo-political Center in Madrid:

"The discontinuation of the National-Socialist press after the collapse deprived us of the most important weapon for national indoctrination. The victors had tried to suppress every expression of national feeling. They filled the editorial offices of the licensed newspapers with Jews and traitors."
Nonetheless, there were some periodicals which—first abroad and then in the Zonen-Reich—did their best to fight courageously and frankly, sometimes in a cleverly camouflaged manner, for the national interests of Germany . . . Praiseworthy work was accomplished by the German press in South and North America.

"In Argentina, Der Weg and the Freie Presse have striven in an extraordinary manner to create a distinct political approach among Germans abroad, as well as in the Zonen-Reich.

"The German press in North America, especially the New York Staats Zeitung, proved of great value in battling the hate-psychosis and in its efforts to re-establish close German-American relations. There are also numerous small papers in the United States which, in the midst of the most intense German hate-wave, interceded bravely and fought with unbelievable courage for the resurrection of a united Fatherland."

When Dr. Paul Schwarz, the former German consul in New York and later the diplomatic columnist of the New York Staats-Zeitung, toured Latin America in the summer of 1947, he brought the good news from New York that the leading German-American circles in the USA had succeeded in carrying out a campaign of "enlightenment" and he boasted that, thanks to this crusade, the name "Nazi" would be forgotten within a few years. According to Dr. Schwarz, Germany had regained much of her former reputation and German-Americans had not only put an end to the idea of punishing Germany, but also were able to secure the help of influential circles in the United States for the rebuilding of Germany.

Dr. Schwarz told some Nazi officials and pan-German businessmen in Rio and Buenos Aires that, thanks to the close contact between German-American leaders and influential Senators and Congressmen, it was possible to lay the basis for a speedy revival of Germany's economy. "Even greater things
could be accomplished," declared Dr. Schwarz, "by coordinat-
ing and synchronizing the efforts of the German elements in
all countries of the Western Hemisphere." But at the same
time Dr. Schwarz visualized in his column in the New York
Staats-Zeitung the hopeful development towards a Russo-Ger-
man alliance: "The Soviets have able diplomats who might
come forward some day with very reasonable suggestions. They
might develop possibilities which could be profitable for the
German people."

Dr. Schwarz also reminded his readers that one of the
shrewdest diplomats of the Wilhelmstrasse, Ambassador Dr.
Karl Ritter, had once told his friends after one of Hitler's fire-
eating anti-Moscow speeches: "Germany needs Russia, . . .
some day both will cooperate in spite of all the double talk
with the Bolsheviken-Schreck. It serves only to gain alliances or
to make hay in domestic politics."

The Deutsche Sonntagspost, Winona, Minnesota, declared
in 1949 "even the greatest hate apostles of Russia and the
most bitter enemies of Communism have never forgotten that
it was to Germany's advantage when she was on friendly terms
with Russia."

Since 1947 many German-language papers in North and
South America have endeavored to pressure the United States
with the veiled threat that if Germany were not fully restored
to her former position of power, the German people would
ally themselves with Russia. In 1949 the German-language
paper Buerger Zeitung of Chicago published on its front page
under a six-column headline "An Open Letter to Stalin." It was
a most brazen example of how ruthless German "Realpolitik"
can be. The author, Herr Bruno Fricke, is a former Nazi and
Black Front Leader, and a political collaborator of Dr. Otto
Strasser.

The Buerger Zeitung is an old and respected German lan-
guage weekly that carries on its masthead the notice that it is
the "Official Organ of the German-American Citizens' League
of Illinois." The paper boasts that it is the mouthpiece for the sentiments of 500,000 German-Americans in Chicago. It speaks for the German-American Citizens League and for the German Day Association which includes 91 German-American Societies in Chicago.

The Steuben Society, the leading pan-German organization in the US for years, uses the Buerger Zeitung for its announcements. Thus, in a respected German-American publication, which has its place on the extreme right politically, and has whole-heartedly given support to Senator McCarthy's anti-Communist campaign, the "Open Letter to Stalin" was splashed over the whole front page. And what did the letter say? It proposed nothing less than that Germany and Russia should form an alliance and smash the coalition of Western Powers. Addressing Stalin, the author writes:

"Your intelligence service will tell you who I am ... Essential and important and interesting for you is only that I am speaking here as a representative of a great part of my Volksgenossen and that it would be good for you to know what millions of battle-trained men think today. This sector of the German people, namely the national sector which not only comprises former Nazis but everyone who feels for the Fatherland, is quantitatively quite noteworthy and qualitatively of decisive importance. Its components are the frontline-soldiers of both world wars and the overwhelming majority of our youth. Thus, its importance from the purely military point of view becomes clear, and this is one of the reasons why the opinions of these circles must be worthy of your consideration.

"In view of the imminent third world war, as well as in view of principle considerations, you are naturally very much interested in us Germans. We may be down materially, morally and ethically, nevertheless, and despite the dismemberment of our Fatherland, we remain with eighty million—the strongest people on the European continent. Whatever one
German Realpolitik in the U.S.A.

will tell you, we consider ourselves absolutely as a unity and nobody will drive these ideas from our heads—not for generations to come."

Stressing the importance of Germany's industrial capacity and the intellectual potentialities of the Germans, the writer explains that, after Truman's announcement about a Russian atomic explosion, "Europe's decisive role in a pending showdown" has become greater than ever before. Having obviously in mind a German-dominated Europe, the writer continues:

"You, Generalissimo Stalin, are probably much more conscious of the fact than the civilian governments in Washington, London and Paris, that the Western Union as well as the Atlantic Pact are nothing but an organization of military zeros around an Anglo-Saxon one."

Continuing, the writer comes to the key point of his letter by suggesting that if Stalin would restore German sovereignty, he could "win back the German peoples' fist":

"We Germans do not want to have anything to do with the West, with the Yankees, with their capitalistic exploitation and their political arrogance. We Prussians have always been closely associated with the Russians; we Germans return gladly to the traditions of Bismarck, Freiher von Stein and Maria Theresa, and we as a politically trained people have never forgotten Lenin's intelligent words about the desire of cooperation between Germany and Russia. We are actually predestined for an alliance with Moscow, all the more so since mutual cooperation with the integrated bloc of the Soviet states has attracted millions of Germans, educated under strict discipline. Who could resist us if both our Reichs were united? What Napoleon did not succeed in doing, Truman will not succeed in either: the subjugation of the earth! Socialist Germany and Communist Russia together are invincible and thus our alliance secures the peace of the world."
This and subsequent articles which propagated a German-Russo alliance published in an outspoken anti-Communist paper in the U.S. neatly illustrates the essence of German "Realpolitik."

The authors, Bruno Fricke and Dr. Otto Strasser, are known as daring political plotters. In addition to their regular writings for the Chicago Buerger Zeitung, their articles have been published frequently in the German-language press in North and Latin America.

Some people say that the views of Dr. Strasser, Herr Fricke and others of the same stripes represent only the thinking of a minority. The fact is, however, that there were no articulate voices of protest among the 500,000 German-Americans in Chicago against this "Open Letter to Stalin." The Buerger Zeitung is read in the editorial rooms of dozens of other German-language papers in the USA, but there is no evidence that any other German-language newspaper, or any of the numerous German-American societies in Chicago for whom the Buerger Zeitung serves as an official mouthpiece, protested against this dangerous and open plotting. A sensational front-page feature like this "Open Letter to Stalin" could not have been overlooked by anybody, not even State Senator Charles Weber, the political bigwig among the German-Americans in Illinois, who utilizes the Buerger Zeitung as his political instrument.

The fact that the Buerger Zeitung could carry on a blackmail campaign in favor of Germany for years and even promote a Russo-German alliance against the West, without encountering any criticism from patriotic stalwarts, is proof of the extraordinary strong position of leading German-American circles in American political life. It is easy to imagine what would have happened if this "Open Letter to Stalin" would have appeared in the Daily Worker, or in a Hungarian, Polish or a French language paper in the USA. The "Open Letter to Stalin" would have been exposed under screaming headlines. Congressional investigation would have been going on for months under klieg lights, and our FBI would have gone into immediate action.
But nothing like this happens when German-American groups are engaged in promoting this kind of "Realpolitik."

Considering the possibility of a Russo-German tie-up and its ramifications in terms of our security, the question arises: What is the attitude of representative Germans on this subject both here and in Western Germany? We can turn to many sources, well-informed on the subject—such as the editor of the Chicago Buerger Zeitung—for a partial answer.

On May 11, 1950, the Buerger Zeitung published on its front page an editorial under the caption "Will Germany Side With Russia?" In this article, running over several columns, the editor quoted from letters which he had received from Germany from people of all walks of life "within one week." According to the editor, all of the letters were unanimous in favoring a German alliance with Russia. The editor states that many millions in Germany are discussing the question whether it would not be to the greater advantage of the Fatherland to side with the East than to go with the West. He quotes from a letter of a former Colonel who declared that in the eyes of leading German generals the revival of Germany creates problems which can more easily be solved under the Eastern pattern than under a democratic system. "Only an alliance with Russia," says the writer, "can free Germany from the eternal threat of the French and the British."

In another letter from a German politician, whose name is not given, it is stated that it is whispered in leading circles that Russia is willing to compensate Germany for its lost provinces in the East with huge territories in the West, such as Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and large parts of France. Other letters in the Buerger Zeitung stress the point that Germany and Russia have much in common and could get along well, and it was hinted that Germany, in maybe 50 years, will have another Fuhrer—a "Caesar—with the soul of Christ."

In an effort to prove his point, the editor of the Buerger
Zeitung quoted from a column by Karl H. von Wiegand who reported on February 15, 1950 in the Hearst press that German orientation is veering towards the East. Wiegand reported that on the occasion of his recent visit in Bonn, he was told that one-third of the deputies of the Western German parliament were privately recommending an Eastern orientation and that this number was steadily increasing.

During 1951 the trend towards Russia has gained momentum in Germany. The recent conversations of the former leader of the Catholic Party, ex-Chancellor Joseph Wirth, with high Russian officials and Pastor Niemoller's visit to Moscow gave new impetus to the movement to "Neutralism" and for the unification of Germany on Moscow's terms.

When the Moscow note of March 10, 1952 suggested German reunification and a national army, the reaction among the German-language papers in the USA was very much in favor of a deal with the Russians. As an example, we refer to an article by Father E. J. Reichenberger, published in the German-Catholic paper Nord-Amerika, April 17, 1952. Father Reichenberger states that the reunification of the Reich "cannot be achieved without the consent of the Russians." According to Father Reichenberger, Moscow's primary aim is "not the spread of Communism in Germany, but to make Germany an Ally." He comes forward with the following question:

"We cannot see the reason why Germany should not line up politically with Russia, especially after the Western democracies found nothing objectionable against Russia as an Ally. For Germany, the political question is therefore: From which side has Germany, in a long run, to expect the better bargain?"

Reminding the readers that Germany will never forget how the West "robbed German foreign assets, stole German patents and eliminated German competition on the world market," Father Reichenberger sees the "better bargain" with Russia, be-
cause she is able "to offer a market from the Elbe River far over to Korea."

Taking the line of the Madrid Circular Letter, Father Reichenberger says that Communism and Western Democracy are only different forms of vicious materialism which in the end will be overcome by the sweeping triumph of German "Weltanschauung."

It is noteworthy that this article of the well-known pan-German propagandist, who has a substantial following among millions of expellees in Germany, was reprinted in other German language papers.

Reports from Latin America make it clear that among the large German groups in Argentina and Chile, the feeling is also predominant that Germany should ally herself with Russia. This attitude is reflected in the scurrilous anti-American propaganda spread by such German papers as the Freie Presse and Der Weg in Buenos Aires.

Piecing the evidence together, analyzing the editorials of the pro-Adenauer press, and reading the reports of reliable American correspondents on the spot, one cannot help but conclude that America's position in Western Germany rests on quicksand. The Allies came out victoriously in World War II, but German "Realpolitik" is winning the peace.
AS WAS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED, THE UNITED STATES WAS forewarned during World War II about Germany's secret plans to regain her dominant power. It was pointed out that Washington policy-planners could have prevented the Germans from carrying out this program. Germany's record after World War I should have served as additional evidence as regards her political and economic capabilities to undermine world security.

During the First World War the leaders of imperial Germany had preached the idea that they would need “Three Punic Wars” to destroy the British Empire and the United States. Hitler and the German war lords followed this concept when they explained to the German people that military defeat should not be accepted as the final judgment of history. In one of his
rare speeches during the war, Hitler told his faithful, on November 9, 1943:

"We shall never capitulate. We shall not give in at the eleventh hour. We shall go on fighting even after twelve o'clock."

Thus the German planners followed the time-honored principle that a lost war has to be continued by political means. "Defeats are simply lessons to be learned in preparation for the next and greater attack," declared General von Stuelpnagel in his memorandum of 1944.

The Netherlands' Ambassador in Washington, Dr. Alexander Loudon, a man with a deep knowledge of German history, stated in a radio address at the end of 1943:

"The Germans will do exactly the same thing they did in 1918. In case of defeat, the Nazis and the Gestapo will go underground in order to prepare for the next war."

This is exactly what the Germans did. They transferred their brain-trusts in geo-politics, in economics, in technology, and military science to Spain, Switzerland, and Argentina. When the Germans still occupied France, they organized a mass exodus of men, money and material across the Pyrenees. Files and secret formulae were shipped to Spain by the carloads.

The existence of a German escape plan was reported as early as January 25, 1943 by Burnet Hershey, foreign correspondent of the Hearst press, in a dispatch from Lisbon. He reported the "influx of Nazi officials into Spain and Portugal" and stated:

"Every talk I had with the Germans in Lisbon made that fact clearer. They may be defeated on the battlefield, as they were in 1918; but they expect to win again at the peace table as in 1919. Of course, they will sacrifice Hitler as they sacrificed the Kaiser; but the old gang—the generals, big industrialists, phony professors of mis-education about German race superiority—will try to go underground again to lay the eggs for another war of German conquest."
TO GERMANY PLOTS WITH THE KREMLIN

A year later, on January 17, 1944, Times correspondent Harold Denny cabled the following dispatch from Madrid:

"Heavy new increments of German agents have been pouring into Spain in recent days in an obvious effort by Germany to save what she can of a situation that has gone badly against her.

"A thousand Gestapo agents and other German representatives have appeared in Madrid alone in the past fortnight. Significant additions to the German population have been noted in other parts of Spain . . .

"They are not easy to deal with, for Germany has extensive commercial interests in Spain and many of these agents are here in the plausible guise of executives, technicians and lesser employees of these interests, as well as cogs in Germany's vast diplomatic, consular and propaganda machinery. In Madrid, spies swarm in the big hotels in such numbers that even casual visitors cannot help noticing them . . ."

On April 13, 1944, the New York Herald Tribune carried a two-column report with detailed figures from the records of the British Intelligence Service and the American Alien Property Custodian concerning the huge sums placed by high Nazi officials and industrialists in American and neutral banks. On July 19, 1944, the Office of War Information reported that "Swiss bankers are alarmed about the huge sums transferred recently by Germans to Swiss and Portuguese banks. . . . They are of the opinion that these money transfers will serve one day to finance the resurrection of the Third Reich." Newsweek magazine of October 19, 1944, reported that, according to diplomatic advisors from Buenos Aires, "German technicians and military experts are believed to be reaching the country incognito by devious routes." On January 15, 1945, Newsweek magazine declared:

"Many of the men Himmler sent to Spain and Argentina to carry out Nazi plans for postwar survival, carried passports under false names and later were reported dead in Ger-
many. All have had training in Nazi political methods and experience abroad in commercial and other posts.”

In this way the Germans transferred thousands of experts, technicians, military instructors, political planners and propagandists to Spain and Latin America. Long before the war ended, a sort of geo-political general staff had been organized in Spain which operated on a world-wide scale from its center in Madrid. The German planners in their lush offices in Madrid, Barcelona and Seville are not burdened with administrative routine work as are their counterparts in Washington, Paris and London. They enjoy a luxurious life and they devote their entire time and talent to one task only: to resurrect a powerful German Reich.

The German Geo-political Center in Madrid and the other German planning agencies are well-camouflaged as commercial enterprises or as German relief organizations. According to recent European press reports (Frankfurter-Rundschau, February 23, 1952; Die Nation, February 13, 1952), the main centers of the Neo-Nazi set-up are located in Madrid and Rome. From here a huge network of activities is directed to Argentina and other Latin American countries, to North America, Africa, Asia, West and East Germany, and even to the Soviet bloc. More recently, another Nazi center was opened in Cairo to direct the anti-Western activities in the Arab world.

Before we analyze the strategy of the geo-political masterminds, it would be worth while to take a close look at what the Germans pride themselves on as their most formidable weapon. Geopolitik is described by the professionals as a new science of the relations between space and power. The roots of geo-politics go back to the "Heartland" theories of the British geographer Mackinder, which were later on developed by the organizer of the German geo-political school, Herr-Professor Karl Haushofer.

Before the First World War, Haushofer was known as a gifted officer. He was a fanatical pan-German who could and
would not accept the fact that Germany was defeated in 1918. When he brought his division back from France to Germany, he developed a detailed plan for Germany's resurrection which, subsequently, served as a master blueprint for German diplomats and industrialists. Haushofer recognized that with the Kaiser's flight to Holland, the Monarchy was dead and the German masses required a new symbol—a Fuehrer. He was one of the first backers of the Nazi movement, and helped pave the way for Hitler's rise to power. As a dominant figure behind the Deutsche Academy in Munich, the meeting place of Germany's elite, the General exerted a great influence on industrialists, scientists, and political leaders. It was Haushofer who sold the idea of the Fuehrer Staat to the ruling circles in Germany. Haushofer prepared the platform on the basis of which the plan could be carried out. His new science of "Geopolitik" was merely a term for the old pan-German theories of world conquest and "might is right." Geo-politics can be defined as "total science for total war." Geo-politics is concerned with many subjects including: physical geography, ethnology, military science, the husbanding of technological advance for military needs, exact information about economic and political conditions in other countries, the art of espionage and psychological warfare.

Haushofer once described geo-politics as the "most deadly weapon, a double-edged Japanese dagger in the hands of the expert." He compared his well-trained geo-political assistants and agents with "hungry crows sitting on the fence of world politics eagerly waiting for opportunities to plunder."

Before the end of World War II, this network of geo-political planning and leadership was dispersed strategically partly in Spain and Argentina, and also set up surreptitiously in Germany.

The Nazi headquarters in Madrid has been financed throughout the post-war years by treasure chests which had been brought to safety before the German collapse.*

For years it was known that the Nazi headquarters in Madrid operated an International organization called "Die Spinne" ("The Spider"). Other organizations are known by the names "Edelweiss," "Konsul," "Scharnhorst," "Sechsgestirn," "Leibwache," "Lustige Brüder," etc. The organization of the Nazi Elite Guard operates under the name "Odessa." On May 29, 1951, Times correspondent C. L. Sulzberger reported the existence of a group which had revived the Fascist International in various countries "from Malmo to Tangier, and from Rome to Buenos Aires."

There have been reports that Hitler's Deputy, Martin Bormann, "shuttles between Spain and Argentina trying to work for unity and cooperation among Fascist minded bodies."

Other Nazis involved in this underground work include: S. S. Colonel Otto Skorzeny, and the German Luftwaffe ace Ulrich Rudel.

According to the Madrid Circular Letter, referred to above, the German planners have never ceased their political warfare against the Allies. They admit that they had "blueprinted the bold plan and created a flexible and smoothly working organization," in order to safeguard Germany from defeat and to bring Allied post-war planning to nought. They boast that they were able to create total confusion in Washington and that they saved German heavy industry from destruction:

"By no means did the political and military leadership of the Third Reich skid into the catastrophe in an irrational manner as so many blockheads and ignoramuses often tell us. The various phases and consequences of the so-called 'collapse' ('Zusammenbruch') were thoroughly studied and planned by the most capable experts ('faehigsten Koepfer'). Nothing occurred by chance; everything was carefully planned. The result of this planning was that, already a few months after Potsdam, the coalition of the victors went on the rocks."
The geo-political planners in Madrid are convinced that only a politically well-trained nation will, in the end, become the master over all other peoples in the world. Accordingly, the Madrid Circular Letter stresses the paramount importance of the Nazi Weltanschauung ("World Outlook"): "The great historical accomplishment which overshadows every other deed of Adolf Hitler was his decision, carried out with iron energy, to condition the German people into fighting for their great world political task. The necessity to educate a whole nation for total war had been recognized long before Hitler, but Hitler was the first one who tackled the tremendously difficult problem of getting a firm hold on the people and of organizing them into a unified movement on the basis of National Socialism. "The training which the German nation received during the twelve years of National Socialist leadership has created a firm basis on which German world politics will be able to carry on again in the future. The National Socialist Weltanschauung furnishes the intellectual potential ('geistiges Potential') in the struggle for world supremacy. "The future of the world will be decided by the conquering force of a political ideology. 'Democracy' is a wishy-washy term which has found no ear among the German people, notwithstanding the efforts made by the Americans for re-education. No German is willing to fight and die for democracy. The German people, well trained and steelèd under national socialist leadership, are dominated by two sovereign ideas: the concept of a German Reich and Germany's mission of leadership in the world ('deutsche Fuhrermission in der Welt'). These two ideas have given our people a powerful driving force for the dynamic execution of their world mission. The mystical element and the religious tradition embodied in the concept of the Reich, sparks our political mission and is especially attractive within the Catholic world. Even after the collapse, the National Socialist Party continued to work in a camouflaged way ('getarnt') in dozens of seemingly innocuous societies and groups, in order to
keep alive and undiluted the National outlook of the German people. In the same "way as many small brooks go toward making a mighty stream, the various nationalistic and radical groups in the Zonen-Reich carried out, almost without exception, worthwhile and powerful propaganda. Each of these groups had its special task and had to adjust its work in line with certain situations and circumstances. However, it was of chief importance to direct the underlying trend of the patriotic propaganda towards the same goal. The more diverse and unconnected these groups appeared on the surface, the less they were apt to arouse suspicion (of the Occupying authorities) that they were directed and influenced by a central organization.

"We have placed our confidential agents, observers, and representatives for special assignments in all groups and parties—even among Communist organizations and their fronts. The greater the number of organizations controlled and influenced by us, the more effective will be the results of our work..."

"The convulsive effects of the military defeat have not broken the German spirit. The national tradition is carefully fostered among the youth and the veterans. The biological substance of the German people remained unshaken in its foundation. Our people are ready to be called upon for historic decisions. A nation which has lost two world wars in the short span of 30 years but is already again conscious of its future tasks, can never be defeated. National training and political schooling have conditioned the German people as a first-class instrument for the execution of world politics on a grand style. No other people on earth has such political maturity, fanatical faith, iron-clad willpower and flexibility in tactics—not merely to overcome defeat but also to start again from scratch. German tradition and belief in a world mission uplifts the whole German nation. Everyone feels within his deepest consciousness that the great national task—the struggle for world domination—will ultimately be crowned with victory."
The geo-politicians in Madrid have created an intimate tie-up with their former pals from General Haushofer's geo-political staff in Germany, with leading journalists and officials who served in Dr. Goebbels's propaganda set-up and with the diplomats of Ribbentrop's foreign office who are today shaping Bonn's foreign policy under Dr. Adenauer.

In a subsequent chapter we will provide the names of the men who operate today as the geo-political masterminds in Bonn. Among them are some of the old stalwarts of pan-Germanism under the Kaiser, there is the whole propaganda brigade which served the Nazis, and finally the geo-political disciples of Herr Professor Karl Haushofer who now pose as "Christian Democrats" in the Adenauer camp.

After the end of World War II, the State Department made no serious attempt to smash the German geo-political network. It is true that the then Assistant Secretary of State, Spruille Braden, endeavored to smoke out these conspirators but he was blocked at every turn. The policy of the Pentagon was decidedly unsympathetic with Mr. Braden's efforts and was reflected in the late General Patron's attitude that "Nazis are the same as Democrats and Republicans."

The main contacts of the geo-political general staff in Spain are with people in influential positions in Western Germany, especially in the Foreign Office of the Bonn Government. During a debate in the Bonn parliament on October 16, 1951, Dr. Adenauer admitted that 134 former Nazis who were once serving in Ribbentrop's Foreign Office, are now in the high echelons of the foreign service in the Bonn government. Other well-known Nazis and geo-political planners are today holding top positions on leading German newspapers and magazines. Thus, there is a steady stream of information and instructions flowing between the Madrid Geo-political Center and its collaborators in Western Germany and vice versa.

What is the long-range program of the geo-political brain-
trust in Madrid? A careful perusal of the Madrid Circular Letter reveals the fact that they see their main objective to be the maintaining of German and European neutrality if a showdown should come between the Soviets and the U. S. A. They visualize the creation of a united Europe under German domination and the build-up of a third power bloc. The Geo-political Center recommends a long-range orientation towards the East, which will subsequently open profitable markets to German industrialists. The Madrid circular clearly emphasizes why Germany and Europe should remain neutral in the event of war between the Soviet bloc and the United States:

"Not merely Germany, but the whole of Europe has been bled white and is not now in a position to act as a decisive factor in world politics. The aim of German policy, and that of Europe as a whole, must be to remain neutral in any new world conflict no matter the circumstances. This is especially important for Germany for she still has a long way to go until she can regain her political freedom and her economic strength to the fullest extent. Germany has exploited the tension between the East and the West to the utmost and she must continue her efforts in that direction. She must endeavor to influence discreetly the shaping of the future. Not only is it decisive how Germany acts in her own interests, but she in turn is also tremendously affected by the policies of the other European powers. England and France today are perhaps more dependent on the U. S. A. than the still occupied West German Republic.

"Europe, on the one hand, is today in an unenviable strategic position, but, on the other hand, it enjoys the advantage of being the geo-political center astride the Soviet colossus and the U. S. A. Present circumstances make it therefore necessary for Europe to be on guard against both sides in order to avoid being swallowed up by one of the two colossi. The dollar imperialism is certainly in no way less aggressive or reckless than communism. The British and French, al-
though former 'allies' and 'victors' feel the impact of that arrogant dollar diplomacy to a greater extent than we Germans whose sympathy they (USA) hope to gain . . .

"German foreign policy must be directed with a view to steering Europe clear from another world conflict. Conditions for such policy are favorable. The European nations long for peace. The self-interests of France and England categorically demand that a new holocaust must be avoided. The interests of the Vatican run along the same lines. Our paramount attention must be devoted to the preservation of German strength and its native potential ('Erhaltung der deutschen Substanz'). World political events could take such a turn that a situation may emerge in which Russia, North America and a great part of Asia may become the battleground for a third world war, whereas Europe might be spared. Were Russia to give a guarantee to the European countries that she would abstain from attacking them, then the whole of Europe could take a neutral stand in the event of a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The prevalent mood in every country of Europe is against war, and in England broad masses of the people are convinced that the next war will be one provoked by America. If, therefore, we were to succeed in obtaining from Russia a guarantee that she would respect the neutrality of Europe, then the United States could be confronted with a similar demand, and the war could thus be confined to the territories of both great victorious powers and their vassals. In this manner, German strength ('deutsche Substanz') and the resources of Europe would be safeguarded against annihilation. Such an outlook may seem fantastic at the moment, but the realistic policy recommended ('Realpolitische Zielsetzung') is the only one which should be followed by Europe today. A war of exhaustion between Russia and America, in which Europe could be spared, would automatically result in the upsurge of a third power bloc. If the continent of Europe succeeds in preserving its strength, it would thus regain the leadership in the world . . .
"It must therefore be our supreme duty to place ourselves in the vanguard of the struggle to keep Europe out of any future war. If we succeed in this, we will surely gain the trust of the people and undisputed leadership in Europe, not excluding Britain. In such a roundabout way we would be able to establish the foundation for future world leadership. The world is longing today for the millennium. In the role of champion for peace, we would gain stature in world public opinion and create for ourselves an unshakable moral position. The propaganda against German 'militarism' would subside entirely, old charges would be forgotten and Europe would then be willing to follow German leadership. Such a policy can be pursued successfully, especially in view of the present attitude of the Vatican. The Pope is a realist in politics ('ist Realpolitiker genug') and knows well enough that, in the age of the Atom bomb, there is too much at stake for the Church and for Europe as a whole. "The Atlantic partners will always be able to find an opportunity to evade their obligations by pointing out that the provocative behavior of the United States has foolishly brought about a conflict for which the Russians cannot be charged as the aggressor and therefore, all contractual obligations to help becomes void."

We will show from statements of the pro-Adenauer press that this plan for the betrayal of the U.S. has been adopted as the basis for the West German government's long-range foreign policy.

If we compare the thorough and detailed planning of the geopoliticians in Madrid with the program of our own policy-shapers in Washington, we must come to the conclusion that the Germans have once again shown themselves as masters in Realpolitik. Yet it is not that these German schemers were unusually smart in their planning; on the contrary, they are merely repeating the essentials of the old game which they had played after the defeat of 1918. The sad fact is that after Roosevelt's death
the geo-political amateurs in the Pentagon took diplomacy in
their own hands and our State Department had not the courage
to speak up. Due to our failure, Germany's star is rising again,
whereas America is sinking deeper and deeper into the morass
of a self-defeating policy.
[PART TWO]
"What can Russia win if she plays her trump card? . . . In order to jump out from her present isolation she can, exactly as the Rapallo Treaty did 30 years ago, place Germany as a protecting buffer between East and West. From the politico-economic point of view, she could repeat the old game for world power position by concluding long-term agreements with German industry and by reviving her trade with Germany. Thus, Russia might re-open the door to the world market."

EDITORIAL, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 15, 1952

"Western Germany should follow a policy of cooperation with the Western powers. But this must never lead to a situation in which Germany becomes the battlefield and the Germans the cannon fodder. . . . When, however, against all expectations and reasons, the Americans should start an aggression against the East, disregarding our determination and probably those of other Europeans to stay out of the war, then we should not be forced into participation of a war just for the reason the Americans had helped us in our rearmament. In such a case, the superior strength of Europe should then be automatically directed against any disturbance of the peace that comes from the West."

EDITORIAL, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Sept. 4, 1952
IN ORDER TO GRASP THE FULL EXTENT OF THE TRAGEDY WHICH has darkened the post-war affairs of the United States, we have only to compare the situation in which Germany found herself in the year 1944, with the political predicament in which we find ourselves today, or—according to the forecast of German political writers—that will confront us by the end of 1954.

From captured German documents, we know how the German High Command, in 1944, had reached a military and strategic impasse with every hope for victory gone. The Germans had made futile attempts to break up the Grand Wartime Alliance by offering, alternately, to the Russians and to the West a separate peace and even alliances. They even had the audacity to suggest that the West change sides and join together with a
"reformed" German government in a holy crusade against the Russians. As the captured documents reveal, the German High Command channeled proof about their secret negotiations with the Americans to Marshal Stalin through agents who were in contact with the German Ambassador von Papen. That was the cause for the serious discord between Moscow and the Western allies during the last months of the war. This discord found expression in the exchange of letters between Stalin and Roosevelt, in which Stalin bluntly charged that he had proof that American representatives indulged in secret political negotiations with Nazi officials.

Facing certain defeat in 1944, the Germans centered their political fire on the unity of the Allies, hoping that success in this direction would preserve their power for revival.

The German High Command had recognized, since 1943, that its traditional weapon, the German steam-roller, was not capable of overcoming Russia's military power. Thus they saw the necessity of switching over to political conspiracy. The many captured German documents, coming from such sources as Admiral Canaris, the Chief of German Intelligence, and from the Ribbentrop Foreign Office, speak for themselves.

The Germans hoped that they would find the necessary support in the United States as had happened after 1918. We must recall the fact that, in 1944, a small but vocal group in the U.S.A. had launched a "Salvage Germany" campaign. The "line" at that time was: The United States must give defeated Germany a chance and a helping hand; otherwise, the Germans will go Bolshevik and the whole German Schrecklichkeit plus Bolshevism would descend like an avalanche upon Western civilization. Of course, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his closest advisors were not frightened by such devices. Although this argument was rehashed in many forms in American newspapers, magazines and books, no one bothered to counteract this poisonous propaganda sowed by agents and dupes of the enemy. But today we know that this propaganda had its effect on a number
of high officials in the Pentagon and in the State Department who were frightened to such an extent that they desperately seized the idea to build Germany up again as a "Bulwark against the East."

Drew Pearson reported in his column of April 25 and 26, 1944, that the day after President Roosevelt was buried "a meeting was held in the State Department at which the policy of a hard peace for Germany was reversed by appeasers who proposed a new line." Thus we had, at the end of the war, two different blueprints for our post-war policy, an official one shaped under Roosevelt, and a secret one prepared by the Pentagon. The Roosevelt post-war program for a realistic treatment of Germany and friendly relations with Russia had been recognized as a sound approach by the overwhelming majority of the American people.

The other plan, backed by a few influential men in the Pentagon, was based on the geo-political realization that Russia's dominating rule over the Eurasian "heartland" must be contested. Therefore, it would be a smart idea to establish Germany and Japan as strong outposts of the free world. The idea of a strong Germany completely disregards German realities, her historic past and the warnings of experts who had a profound knowledge of the German problem.

One of the strongest warnings came from Bernard M. Baruch, the elder statesman, who had an experience with German affairs going back over more than 30 years. During the First World War, he was the chief of our war industry and later he accompanied President Wilson to the peace conference at Versailles. The comeback of Germany's military power under Hitler made it clear to him that Europe was again on the road to disaster, and that the Western Hemisphere was in great danger. As early as 1938, Baruch urged the creation of an Atlantic-air-armada of 50,000 long-distance bombers to counterbalance the German Luftwaffe.

Baruch knew the German danger and he had learned a lesson
from the errors we committed in the past. He saw the key to the whole post-war problem in Germany's gigantic industrial apparatus, in her control of raw materials in Europe and her skilled labor.

Starting from the basic belief that Germany must never become a bone of contention between the East and West, Baruch demanded the prompt whittling down of Germany's military, industrial and scientific power. Aware of the traditional German trend to line up with the East against the West, Baruch foresaw that in an Allied tug of war to favor Germany, the West would in the end lose out to Moscow. Therefore, to him the settlement of the German question was the core of the peace-making. His program for a "sure peace" was based on four main points:

1. To "prevent the revival of Germany's warmaking might."
2. To "keep the Allies united in peace as in war."
3. To "keep America strong and adequately prepared."
4. To "create a higher human standard throughout the world."

"War must be displaced as Germany's chief business," declared Bernard Baruch before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in June 1945:

"No more important question will ever come before you than this one—of how to prevent the revival of Germany's warmaking might. It is the heart of the making of the peace. What is done with Germany holds the key to whether Russia, Britain, and the United States can continue to get along."

Mr. Baruch stated correctly that we cannot solve the economic problems of peace unless we take steps "to demilitarize Germany's traditional war economy." If this is not done, we "face the certainty that Germany will make a third try to conquer the world."
"Break once and for all Germany's dominance over Europe. Her war-making potential must be eliminated; many of her plants and factories shifted East and West to friendly countries. All other heavy industry destroyed; the Junker estates broken up. Her exports and imports strictly controlled; German assets and business organizations all over the world rooted out."

In the light of Baruch's program for Germany, we can measure today the failure of the Pentagon policy-shapers. Baruch's plan for just punishment of Germany's entire warrior caste was as follows:

"Russia and other countries are entitled to labor reparations, particularly if they will include in their labor battalions the principal war makers—the Nazis, the Gestapo, the Junkers, the General Staff, geo-politicians, war industrialists, and war financiers—leaving the ordinary peasants and workers."

To those who declare that Germany is the industrial heart of Europe and that her de-industrialization would entail suffering for the whole world, Baruch answered emphatically: "To accept the view that the restoration of German industrial dominance in Europe is inevitable—something we can do nothing about—is to resign ourselves to the return of a new cave age."

In a memorandum dated March 18, 1945, Bernard Baruch, speaking about the planners and plotters, made a daring prophecy that after the war "the German general staff will be found hiding all over the world." His recommendation was to "send the schemers away" and let them do reconstruction work under inter-Allied supervision. Instead of adhering to Baruch's advice, the Pentagon organized "Operation Lustig" and brought many of the schemers as "experts" to the United States, providing them with comfortable homes, substantial salaries and for good behavior—American citizenship. When the Russians and the English did the same, the Germans recognized immediately that
the Allies were competitors for German scientific "know how" and there was hope that they could finally win the peace.

Judging from thousands of articles, editorials and letters to the editors of newspapers, it is clear that important sections of American public opinion throughout 1945 favored a realistic policy toward Germany. When the whining campaign for "poor Germany" reached its height, Major George Fielding Eliot wrote on June 27, 1945 in the Herald Tribune:

"Why shouldn't the German standard of living be lower than that of Germany's neighbors? Since when has it been considered an obligation of civilized society to see to it that a criminal, in the custody of the law, must enjoy every privilege, every luxury and every article of Lucullan diet which may be available to the law-abiding members of the community?"

When the Occupation Directive 1067, containing the Roosevelt program for Germany, was published, it had the full backing of American public opinion. This Directive had been kept secret for months by the Pentagon, because it ran counter to their program. The essential objectives of the Allies were stated in the Directive 1067 as follows:

"The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world. Essential steps in the accomplishment of this objective are the elimination of Nazism and militarism in all their forms, the immediate apprehension of war criminals for punishment, the industrial disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, with continuing control over Germany's capacity to make war and the preparation for an eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis."

Key American Occupation officials have charged that the execution of this Directive was systematically sabotaged by leading military figures. Even General Eisenhower saw the necessity to give stern
warnings against those officers under his command who were not with their hearts behind this policy. Unfortunately he was unable to remedy the situation for soon afterwards he had to give up his command in Germany.

It is not true, as the German conspirators would like to have it appear, that the Americans do not know their way around in world politics. Under Roosevelt's guidance Americans found the right approach to tackle the German problem once and for all. If the Pentagon had not ditched the realistic post-war program of Roosevelt, the Madrid geo-politicians would not be jeering today at the "American Cowboys" who burnt their fingers in geo-politics.
What will be the condition of the world by the end of 1954 if the blueprint of the Pentagon policy-planners is carried out completely? According to State Department experts, who had to translate the basic ideas of the military into practical diplomacy, Germany will become the strongest nation—industrially and militarily—on the European continent. In some high quarters, it has been contemplated that Germany might become the USA's main ally.

Germany, the planners say, will not only become the strongest military factor in Europe, but also a shining beacon testifying to the great achievements of American democracy. Western Germany is spoken of as the American "show-window" not only to East Germany but to all the other Soviet satellite nations in Eastern Europe. From here defection should spread into the Soviet
orbit until the Soviet regime has been sufficiently weakened to a point that would make it possible to overthrow the masters in the Kremlin.

Important sections of the German press, however, regard this as the daydreaming of a "very, very young nation" which has yet to understand the realities of world politics.

It has been stated repeatedly by our policy shapers that by 1954 we will be "over the hump." America will then have created "Situations of Strength" everywhere which will impress the Russians, then "everything will be fine." This of course involves the concept that Germany must play a decisive role in taming the Russian bear, and by Germany's incorporation in the Atlantic defense, peace will be preserved.

However, the future, America's future, looks quite different when seen through German eyes. Here is how the Germans describe the shape of things to come. According to the geo-politicians, Germany has the situation well under control. The Adenauer government is in the strongest bargaining position. Germany, "in the driver's seat," can wait and let the other fellows do the bidding. Washington has staked everything on its German gamble. When Chancellor Adenauer recently warned the Bundestag that the refusal to rearm would entail grave consequences, the Social Democrats laughingly shouted, "You know very well that the Americans cannot pull back."

The Germans expect us to do a job that they have repeatedly attempted through aggression, but were never able to accomplish: the unification of Europe or, as Washington policy planners like to call it—"The Shotgun Wedding."

The Germans, having instigated this long-range scheme, can rely on their inside knowledge that America will force France and the other European countries into a merger that will create a great European trading area. Thus, our policy will put Germany in the saddle, first economically and later on politically. In that way Germany will be able to gain command over the whole European continent.
An accurate analysis of German space-thinking and world planning was given long ago by an intelligent American observer who had an intimate knowledge of Germany's sinister political plotting:

"The Germans have a clear plan of what they intend to do in case of victory. I believe that I know the essential details of that plan. I have heard it from a sufficient number of important Germans to credit its authenticity . . . Germany's plan is to make a customs union of Europe, with complete financial and economic control centered in Berlin. This will create at once the largest free trade area and the largest planned economy in the world. In Western Europe alone . . . there will be an economic unity of 400 million persons, skilled, civilized white men, with a high standard of living. To these will be added the resources of the British, French, Dutch and Belgian empires. These will be pooled, in the name of Europa Germanica . . .

"The Germans count upon political power following economic power, and not vice versa. Territorial changes do not concern them, because there will be no 'France' or 'England,' except as language groups. Little immediate concern is felt regarding political organizations . . . No nation will have the control of its own financial or economic system or of its customs. The Nazification of all countries will be accomplished by economic pressure. In all countries contacts have been established long ago with sympathetic businessmen and industrialists, and those who have been openly hostile will be punished by boycott.

"As far as the United States is concerned, the planners of the World Germanica laugh off the idea of any armed invasion. They say that it will be completely unnecessary to take military action against the United States in order to force it to play ball with this system. They point out that there will be no other foreign market for the raw materials and agricultural products of the United States, since these can hardly be sold in the Western Hemisphere. Here, as in every other country, they have established relations with
numerous industries and commercial organizations, to whom they will offer advantages in co-operation with Germany. Certain conditions will have to be met . . . The immense gold reserve of the United States will be, obviously, worthless. The international currency will be a managed currency, the German mark, and all external trade, will be based upon barter. This new world-wide complex will want raw materials, and will pay for them in manufactured goods. The United States will become an economic colony, for its economic independence will be lost . . .

"South America will be conquered by business agents, not by guns. The plantation owners will be asked by the Germans whether they want to send their meat, cotton and raw materials to Germany in exchange for machinery, industrial material, automobiles, etc., or whether they want to be boycotted. Inasmuch as the chief market of South America is Europe . . .

"They do not believe that the proletarian workers in any country will seriously oppose them—even if they could. They argue that the tendency in all democracies demonstrates that workers only want to eat and have work, and care nothing for national matters or for individual liberty . . . 'And,' they add, 'There is nothing that capitalists will not do, if profitable. Democracies have taught their people, workers or corporation chiefs to believe only in money.' And finally, only the master race, the Germans, will be allowed to bear arms. If, however, the United States wants to concur, all armaments can be radically reduced."

The foregoing analysis is taken from Dorothy Thompson's article "The World Germanica," published in the New York Herald Tribune, May 31, 1940. Nothing in this picture has changed. The strings are pulled by the same geo-politicians, the same Ribbentrop diplomats, and the same industrialists who are behind Dr. Adenauer, as they were once behind Hitler—all striving for the same goal: "The World Germanica."

Through the heroic efforts of freedom-loving peoples, Ger-
Germany's plans came to nought by 1945; but a few years after the bankruptcy of the "Thousand Year Reich," the Germans are nearer to their goal than they ever had been under the Kaiser or "Der Fuehrer." This time the Germans don't have to fire a shot, they hope to obtain control of Europe free of charge with the American taxpayer footing the bill.

It is a well-known fact that the Germans, after the failure of the First World War, tried to dominate European industry through a pre-war European steel cartel. The same tendency is evident today. Some diplomats believe that a marriage of convenience is possible between French and German interests by way of some cartel agreement or Schuman Plan, whereby France could limit German industrial production and check German aggressiveness. This idea will turn out to be an illusion.

Washington supported the Schuman Plan for entirely different reasons. Our planners see in a European steel and coal combination a first step towards the "integration" of Europe to be followed subsequently by the political unification of Europe in which Germany will play the leading role. The Germans, however, have quite different plans. Statements by Dr. Adenauer and his press reveal that Germany regards the creation of a united Europe as the first step in the direction of a Third Power bloc that some day shall become independent from the United States as well as from Russia.

Plans for a Third Power Bloc have been discussed in German geo-political circles for many years. It was an old pet idea of the pan-German school under the Kaiser and it became again the main strategic objective during Hitler's Third Reich. The unification of Europe was the undying hope of General Haushofer and his geo-political disciples.

What the Kaiser and Hitler could not gain with their war machines is now served to Germany on a silver platter by our policy planners in the Pentagon and the State Department.

A European Union with Germany as its strongest pillar will turn out to be the greatest blunder. Germany's industry will not
only dominate the markets in Europe, in competition with the British and the U.S.A., but it will also conquer additional markets in Latin America, Africa and Asia. The logic of events would bring inevitably economic and political rapprochement between a German-dominated Europe and the Soviet Union. Thus, we would have just accomplished what we are trying feverishly to prevent: namely, that Europe will line up with the East against the Anglo-American bloc.

The German scheme of changing defeat into victory envisages the following steps: After the establishment of a German-dominated Europe, a close tie-up will follow with a Peron-dominated Latin America. At the same time, the big German industrial combines will initiate an ambitious plan for the economic exploitation of Africa for which they expect great financial support from the United States. Having gained a foothold in Africa, Germany will create close relations with the nationalistic Union of South Africa, and at the same time she will buttress her friendship with the whole pan-Arabic world. Of course, that scheme can only be carried out after Germany will have established friendly political and economic relations with Russia. The agreement with Russia will also open the door to a very profitable trade with China and South-East Asia.

That a resurrected strong Germany will see her future task in the creation of a Third Power Bloc is clearly demonstrated by Dr. Adenauer's speeches and articles, in which he told his fellow Germans about the great advantages resulting from the acceptance of the Schuman Plan. In a signed article in the Rheinischer Merkur of May 20, 1950, Dr. Adenauer greeted the Schuman proposal as the first step towards the unification of Europe. A united Europe, he said, will "become the Third Force in the world, powerful enough to intervene successfully—in a decisive moment—to safeguard the peace." He then mentioned, as the main attractive feature of the Schuman Plan, the common European "long-range economic venture in Africa." There was not a word about the fight against Communism; instead Dr. Ade-
Nauer had to stir German imagination towards the alluring idea of creating a great Euro-African Power Bloc.

Already under Hitler, the Germans had made elaborate plans for gigantic economic projects in Africa such as hydroelectric power stations, new waterways, great irrigation projects in the Sahara, the closing of the Mediterranean at the Atlantic side and the reclamation of a hundred million acres of new fertile soil. The Germans have never abandoned those long-range economic plans. German industrialists, engineers, and scientists have traveled year after year through Africa as "explorers" since the end of the Second World War. German newspapers and magazines feature regularly articles about the great possibilities in Africa. The book of the geo-politician Anton Zischka, Africa—Europe's Common Task, has become one of the German political best-sellers.

Since the days of the Kaiser it has been the fond dream of pan-Germans, industrialists, merchants, and ship owners to create a powerful German colonial empire, "Mittel Afrika." The Germans are today the most vigorous and energetic pushers of great African exploitation projects. These programs have also had the backing of our policy-shapers. For example, Mr. John Foster Dulles, one of the chief architects of our foreign policy, writes:

"The countries participating in the Marshall Plan have a total population of more than 200,000,000 and there is a high level of education and culture. That population is greater than the entire population of the Soviet Union or of the United States. . . .

"These 200,000,000 and more people have, in Europe and in their African colonial possessions, a great part of the world's natural resources. Coal, iron, copper, potash, phosphate, uranium, are only a few of the many mineral resources found in greatest richness within this Western-controlled area, a natural wealth that cannot be matched either in the Soviet Union or in the United States. . . .
"Why should an area that possesses such tremendous resources, human and material, be a poorhouse where the people live in a state of weakness which is frightening to them and their friends and a source of delight to their foes? "There is only one reason. All the great qualities and assets possessed collectively must be discounted because they are not possessed unitedly. Disunity alone prevents Western Europe from being a great—perhaps the greatest—distinctive area of spiritual, intellectual, economic, and military power ..."* 

What better means can be devised to satisfy German ambitions than to foster opportunities in Africa? Under Dr. Adenauer, the great African project has become an electrifying concept such as the "thousand year" Reich under Adolf Hitler. The Adenauer government recently announced the setup of a "Deutscher Arbeitstab Afrika" ("German Planning Command Africa"), whose task is to "interpolate German industries into the U.S. $8,000,000,000 Program for the development of Africa." (Stuttgarter Nachrichten, March 12, 1952.)

This $8,000,000,000 development program is destined to lay the foundation for a gigantic armament industry in North and South Africa which will be run chiefly by the powerful industries of the German Rhine and Ruhr. As German newspapers have stated, the technicians and skilled personnel will be furnished by Germany. They expect to place thousands of their skilled men in key industrial and agricultural positions. The native population shall provide millions of cheap hands for the hard work. Hitler frankly advocated in Mein Kampf that "a truly great civilization can be built on the backs of enslaved subject peoples." Long before Hitler, a German scientist advocated:

"The German race is destined to impose its domination upon the entire world, to make the most of its natural resources

and man-power, and to utilize the inferior races as slaves for its culture." (Dr. Ludwig Waltmann in Politische Anthropologie [Political Anthropology], 1903, page 298.)

One of Hitler's accomplices, Count Reventlow, declared in 1931:

"There is no civilization without slavery. We must not forget a statement that is as courageous as it is true: civilizations can be created only with the help of Slavery." (Weltkampf [World Struggle], 1931, page 533. Monatschrift für Weltpolitik.)

In a secret memorandum which was circulated a few years ago here in the United States among big business circles,* a plan was discussed to send the Negro population of the United States back to Africa for employment in such a large-scale development project.

Under Hitler the Germans tasted the sweetness of living on the backs of slaves. Today Africa, with its many millions of colored people, is their great hope. The Malan Government in South Africa has completely adopted the Nazi racist theories. There exist close contacts between the Nationalist Movement in South Africa and the German geo-political planners. Many large German industrial firms have established "branches" in Africa. The Adenauer Government is going to honeycomb the "Dark Continent" with a network of Consulates and representatives for the promotion of German trade. In this connection, it should be pointed out that as early as the Fall of 1950, the firm of Friedrich Krupp, whose head, Alfred Krupp, was sentenced at Nuremberg for war crimes, received an order of one hundred locomotives from South Africa. The New York Times of December 16, 1951 carried a dispatch which disclosed the fact that the Krupp interests were interested in acquiring and developing titanium-bearing mines in South Africa. This precious metal,

* The secret memorandum was first published in Kenneth de Courcy's Intelligence Digest of August 1947.
according to the Times report, is of strategic value and the "United States is reported to have found secret uses for it connected with atomic bombs and every effort is being made to attain mass production of the metal."

Africa has become the great hope for the Germans. Here a new power bloc is to be developed strategically located and relatively safe from Soviet Russia and America. Anton Zischka stated in his book on Africa:

"Our present position might be unpleasant but it has one advantage: The East is blocked to us and the process of Americanization has reached its dead-end. Thus, the only way open is to the South, to Africa."

The African plan is a vital part of a third power bloc which is mentioned above. It also encompasses Latin America and the Near and Middle East. It involves the ultimate control by the Germans of approximately 800 million people.

The Germans believe that during the next five to ten years, they will gain such tremendous economic strength and will make such great strides in scientific accomplishments that in a not too distant future they will be ready for a knockout blow against the Anglo-Saxon world. According to a dispatch in the Hearst press by Karl von Wiegand, published in the spring of 1950, a British General in occupied Germany ventured his opinion as follows: "Given the opportunity and necessary credits, Germany, with its extraordinary stockpile of brains, energy and working capacity, would within ten years become the most modern country in Europe, if not in the world."

During a Hearing in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committe, March, 1952, Senator Hickenlooper declared:

"I was told . . . that Europeans were not so fearful of German military resurgence but that basically there was running through the minds of each of those countries, the French, the British, the Italians and so on, the thought that if they took Germany into a comparatively integrated
Europe, in 10 years' time, Germany would own all of Europe; that is, the German industry, the German organizing ability, . . . would completely dominate the economy of Europe, and the rest of them would be more or less economic satellites of Germany within about 10 years' time . . . Within 10 years, they will have obtained by peace what they could not obtain by two wars . . ."

German planners expect a severe economic crisis in England and in the U.S.A. within the next few years. If such an economic slump comes, it will have a terrific impact on the Anglo-Saxon power position in the world. The Germans are confident that, under such conditions, the British Commonwealth will begin to disintegrate and the United States will be torn to pieces in a turbulent domestic crisis. At that moment a German-dominated Third Power Bloc will have its chance to make another bid for world mastery.

A decade ago American foreign policy was determined to help the European nations in order to remain free from German lordship. Today our policy has been reversed. It is usually believed that the stronger Germany becomes, the better will America be protected. The Germans think differently on this score. Everyone who has followed the so-called reputable German press, the middle of the road and the pro-Adenauer papers, such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the Deutsche Zeitung, Stuttgart, Christ und Welt and other papers, will find ample proof that Germany is only waiting to become sovereign again, of course with American help, and then turn to Russia for decisive bargaining. Even Chancellor Adenauer himself has declared that he will never allow Germany to become a battlefield and that German rearmament would strengthen his bargaining position with the Russians.

German geo-politicians predict that we will be confronted with the greatest difficulties in 1954-1955, when in Europe the cry for peace will be irresistible. We will then arrive at the crossroads of American armament policy. A German-dominated
Europe will declare "Ohne Mich," and Russia will also manifest loudly her intention for peace. At that point the U.S. will have reached a blind alley, with a huge armed force and all her industries geared for war. The complex situation will plunge America into a turmoil of confusion and a powerful and sovereign Germany will pull all the tricks and devices to drive the United States to the brink of economic and political disaster.

This is how the German geo-politicians in Madrid see America’s future for 1954:

"The higher the difficulties pile up for the Americans, the more favorable become our prospects for successfully overcoming our defeat. The Yankees are willing to pay a high price for our help. This is clear from all confidential reports which we have obtained from circles close to the American High Commissioner . . . How should Germany proceed diplomatically in the present situation? It is openly stated in Washington that Europe cannot be defended without German help. The Americans are becoming insistent and we must give them some hope, but we must at the same time point to the fact that the German people are hesitant and not inclined to defend Europe so long as Germany is treated as a defeated nation. By constantly squeezing concessions out of the victors, we can best prepare the way towards the re-establishment of our Wehrhoheit.* During the coming weeks and months we must extract the utmost in concessions. We will therefore not be able to avoid making promises . . . But there is a difference between mere promises and such commitments as would bind us irrevocably. We must ultimately remain free in our decisions towards all sides, even if we are obliged for reasons of expediency to agree formally to such obligations. We should reap all advantages but never commit ourselves . . . The fact that the Americans would now like us to join them in the defense of Europe

* "Wehrhoheit" is the German term describing a country's exclusive prerogative to determine the size and disposition of its armed forces. The Translator.
and become their ally will thereby enhance our bargaining power with the Russians. The Americans have lost the peace, the cold war, and their entire future, but they are not as yet aware of it. After the failure of their amateurish policies in Asia, the Americans will one day experience a far more painful and devastating smash-up in Europe . . . We should grab a few more billions from the Yankees' huge dollar-cheat and then kick them out or simply hand them over to the Russians. A few little hints and threats would perhaps make them scram in time . . . The strategy of breaking the chains of our enthrallment ('Fesselnsprengen') is sometimes more daring and dangerous than the most dashing feat in war. We could, for instance, visualize that through secret negotiations with Moscow a situation would be brought about whereby the Yankees could overnight be eliminated as a power factor in Europe . . . Economic difficulties will one day plunge the United States down from its present dizzy heights. Such a catastrophe can be brought about through crafty manipulations and through artificially engendered crises. Such maneuvers are routine measures which have already been employed in international power struggle and will be used again and again as long as economic rivals fight for power positions and markets in the world. It is quite conceivable that America, weakened by a depression, will one day seek support from a resurrected Germany. Such a prospect would open tremendous possibilities for the future power position of a bloc introducing a new order in the world."

If we should ever come to face the dreadful decision of war, the Germans have already hinted which formula they will use in order to evade the Atlantic Pact obligations:

"The Atlantic partners will always be able to find an opportunity to evade their obligations by pointing out that the provocative behavior of the United States has foolishly brought about a conflict for which the Russians cannot be charged as the aggressor and therefore, all contractual obli-
gations to help become void." (From the conclusion of the Madrid Circular Letter.)

The leading geo-political paper in Western Germany, Christ und Welt, stated in an editorial that a strong German-dominated Western Europe could make the following offer to the Kremlin:

"Continental Europe would break away from the Atlantic Pact if the Soviets agree to withdraw their forces behind the Pripet-Marshes and release not only the Eastern Zone of Germany, but the whole of Eastern Europe into the European Union. A Western Europe standing on its own feet and possessing its own powerful army . . . could afford to carry out such an independent policy because it will have the strength of a third power." (Christ und Welt, December 27, 1951.)

Dr. Adenauer stated the same idea, only camouflaged by a little diplomatic restraint:

"... A federated Europe will become a Third Force in the world, not as strong as Russia or the United States, but powerful enough to intervene successfully—in a decisive moment—to safeguard the peace . . . Germany has again become a factor with whom others will have to reckon in international affairs . . ." (Rheinischer Merkur, May 20, 1950.)

Up to now developments have run smoothly according to the German timetable. American blueprints look fine on paper but in the reality of world-politics they have resulted in Germany's revival, and at the same time brought America nearer to a dead end. If this development should continue, Germany will become a threatening world power again but the United States will reach—by the end of 1954—the same blind alley which the Germans faced in 1944.
A Frankenstein Monster Again?

TWICE WITHIN A GENERATION A COALITION OF NATIONS fought and defeated German militarism. When the German military machine collapsed at the end of World War II, the Allies resolved that Germany must be rendered harmless once and for all. Today, we are on the way to resurrect, for the third time, a powerful German military machine.

A great part of the German plans for a comeback have been realized. Politically, the Germans are again power drunk and inflated with the old superman ideology. The old Nazi leaders and reactionary militarists are coming to the fore again. The arrogant spirit and the abusive language of German political writings give convincing proof that the Allied denazification program failed completely. The United States High Commis-
sionet in his report on Germany (December 1951) noted the emergence of an "increased number of extreme rightist and ultranationalist organizations." All those groups propagate, more or less openly, Nazism. They do not differ materially, says the report, in the propaganda against capitalism, in "their theories about a governing elite, their use of mysticism, their contempt for democracy, their preoccupation with war guilt theories and their desire for Germany to play the role of a bystander in the East-West struggle." The report of the High Commissioner admits that the highest ranking officers of the former German Wehrmacht are back in politics again, organizing the veterans and agitating among all nationalist groups and parties. The trend towards a rabble-rousing nationalism runs through the whole German political structure:

"Unhappily, most of the established political parties have also been stocking the merchandise of nationalism. Individuals or circles, and in a few cases even the controlling elements of an entire state political organization, have expressed highly nationalistic sentiments, either out of conviction or as a vote-getting device. Even some Federal Ministers have not been above such actions. They seek to draw the followers of the extreme rightist forces or to prevent losses of their own, by attempting to appear as nationalistic as the extremists . . . The use of the extreme nationalist narcotic creates the need for larger doses. Worse, the users must ultimately find that they cannot subsist on talk alone but must resort to some action to avoid decline. The consequence of such a course, if long continued, must be general disaster . . ." (Report of the United States High Commissioner, December 1951.)

In spite of the many alarm signals, United States policy-shapers still have not been awakened from their complacency and illusion. These officials really feel proud of what they have accomplished towards the resurrection of Germany. They will work like beavers to finish what still remains to be done in order
to create the new Frankenstein monster—of course, as a "bulwark against the East."

The beginnings of Germany's return to power have been partially hidden from public view. They go back to the days when Roosevelt was still alive and had to defend his German policy against roadblocks of the Pentagon and some circles in the State Department. The men who, after Roosevelt's death, became more and more influential in formulating our policy on Germany were, in the first few years of Occupation, concerned with the safeguarding of Germany's industrial potential and, since 1947, with the gradual mobilization of her manpower. This desire to change defeated Germany into an American ally was discussed more and more openly as early as 1946. This was the reason for the constant pressure on President Truman to oust Secretary of State Byrnes, who at that time suggested a four-power agreement for the control of Germany for 40 years. When General Marshall became Secretary of State and George Kennan Chief of the Policy Planning Division, the Pentagon planners obtained full sway for the carrying out of their blueprint.

Since 1947, reports of these plans had been leaked out to the press as trial balloons in order to influence American public opinion. On March 31, 1948, columnist John O'Donnell wrote in the Washington Times-Herald:

"... We are now about to make military sense in Germany. Despite denials from some sources, we have drawn up plans to reactivate some of those tough fighting German Panzer and SS divisions, give them plenty of food and first-rate American equipment and let them, led by American officers, fight the rear-guard action when and if Pal Joey decides to send a few Commie armies against the MPs and non-combat service troops we have now dispersed in pathetically thin lines all the way from the Baltic to the Mediterranean... Years and years ago, we pointed out that FDR was backing the wrong horse in this war—that the continent of Europe, so far as sternly isolationist Amer-
ica was concerned, was better off under Germanic rule than under Joe Stalin . . ."

That the re-establishment of an American-equipped German army was not a daydream of an unrepentant pro-Axis propagandist can best be seen from the following report in the well-informed and conservative US. News of July 30, 1948:

"U.S. military officials in Germany are talking in terms of a re-building of the German army as an offset to Russian strength in Europe. This talk is causing a rather sharp reaction in France and among other countries in Western Europe."

This was followed up, on August 6, 1948, with a few other interesting items:

"U.S. Military men, who have been shaping U.S. policy in Germany, favor rebuilding a German military force as an offset to the Russians. The military attitude is that the Germans are more ready to take on military obligations than are the French, who are slow to make serious moves toward rearmament . . . Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Minister, is complaining privately that those who are shaping U.S. policy in Germany are trying to build a U.S.-German front."

The policy of reviving Germany as a military factor evoked, at that time, bitter criticism among leading newspapermen and columnists in Washington, and it stirred fear in France and in England. Walter Lippmann wrote on July 19, 1948:

"Though our German policy is in fact the determinant of our whole European policy, and will be decisive for peace or war, it is notorious that it has not been made by the President, or by Secretary Marshall, or by the so-called 'policy-makers' but by General Clay and General Draper, and in the Pentagon . . ."

Before the Western German Federal Republic came into being in 1949, secret negotiations had been conducted between the
Pentagon and German politicians and ex-Nazi generals on the question of rearmament. Dr. Adenauer, who became the first Chancellor of the Bonn Government, had such confidential talks on rearmament as early as 1948. In a recent press conference he declared that in 1948 he asked General Speidel to prepare a secret report dealing with the question of German remilitarization. The Adenauer-Speidel memorandum of 1948 became the basis for the subsequent discussions in Washington, Paris and London on the advisability of German rearming. The negotiations were carried on with great secrecy due to the fact that public opinion in the United States as well as in Europe was overwhelmingly opposed to any form of German remilitarization.

In 1949 the Pentagon showed great eagerness in forcing the German rearmament issue ahead regardless of the political consequences. The second half of 1949 was characteristic of the great confusion in which demands for quick German rearmament changed alternatively with official denials of such intentions. It will be remembered that in the Fall of 1949 Dr. Adenauer, who had then just become Chancellor of the new Republic, had given press interviews in which he suggested the rearming of Germany. After the Chancellor had asked for a new Wehrmacht with 25 German divisions, he stated a few weeks later, on November 24, 1949, that it is "the earnest determination of the Federal Government to maintain the demilitarization of the Federal territory and to prevent by all means in its power the re-creation of armed forces of any kind."

It was the opinion of the Pentagon that the time was ripe to condition the American public with the idea that Germany must be rearmed. There appeared in all leading magazines articles discussing the problem of German rearmament. The following quotations are taken from the reliable U.S. News and World Report:

"Generals and admirals heading U. S. armed services, in private, are far less enthusiastic over the idea of giving weapons to European nations than they are in public. Mili-
tary officials of this country are not too sure that the French, Belgians, Greeks and some others could resist Russia effectively. They find the German potential more interesting."
(August 12, 1949.)

"Question of a German army of 25 divisions, as privately urged by influential Germans, is to be postponed. It's too hot to handle now." (September 16, 1949.)

"George Kennan, No. 1 brain truster in the State Department, has a new idea that the U. S. had better put its faith in Germany, rather than in France, as the bulwark against Russia. Mr. Kennan's view is that France never will regain her old position of leadership in Western Europe."
(November 18, 1949.)

"Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, signalled a vital turn in U. S. policy when he traveled to Germany to promise things to the Germans, instead of having German officials, representing a defeated nation, travel to a meeting with U. S. officials to ask for favors, hat in hand. Original U. S. plan to turn Germany into a sheep pasture is revised into a secret plan to rearm the Germans into a powerful nation."
(November 25, 1949.)

"Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, is embarrassed by the way Senators and former officials are talking about rebuilding a German Army. Gen. Lucius Clay, retired Military Governor, started the talk with a remark that Germany might contribute some troops to a Western European army. Senators picked up the tune with the result that French, Belgian and other governments are upset." (December 2, 1949.)

"Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of Western Germany, is crossing up high Allied officials in Germany with his open talk about rebuilding of German military power. That subject was supposed to be kept under cover." (Dec. 30, 1949.)
Along with the propaganda for German rearming, there was constant pressure in a certain section of the American press to make Germany a partner or ally of the U.S. It was suggested that we cease supporting the French and British. Even Senators like George of Georgia, and Thomas of Oklahoma, pleaded for the strengthening of Germany militarily. Newsweek magazine reported on November 28, 1949 that an influential group in the Pentagon urged the re-establishment of a German Wehrmacht: "The group feels . . . the U. S. must rely on Germany as the main source of continental manpower." Two days later, on November 30, Arthur Krock reported in the New York Times that plans were pending for the re-establishment of a German army. On December 12, 1949, Life appeared with an editorial, "The Rise of Western Germany," which declared that four and a half years after unconditional surrender, "the resurrection of German power is the foremost fact of Europe." Life demanded an "end to the official double talk that obscured the German problem." The editorial declared that sooner or later "the Western Germans are going to be rearmed, or they are going to rearm themselves," and came to the conclusion: "What is on the way is the re-creation of a German army under German command. Nothing else, and nothing less."

This type of propaganda for rearming Germany had the desired effect—it conditioned the American people into accepting the Pentagon thesis of German rearmament. On the other hand, however, it created fear and distrust among the former victims of German aggression in Europe, and it made the German political leaders and militarists cocky in their negotiations with the Western powers. The reaction to this semi-official "line" created such fear among European peoples that the President, Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of Defense Johnson, General Bradley and others had to come forward with solemn assurances that German rearmament was not in the cards and not contemplated for many years to come.

The year 1950 brought the war in Korea. Again organs of
public opinion returned to the theme of remilitarizing Western Germany. However, even at this late date leading government officials denied again that such plans would be carried out. When the Schuman Plan was announced it was declared that the economic integration should be followed up with the creation of a European army including a substantial manpower contribution by Western Germany. The developments in German rearmament during 1951 and 1952 are recent history.

It is noteworthy that all earlier plans of the Western Powers, especially the limitations on Germany's contribution contained in the Pleven Plan, have been dropped. Under the pressure of the Pentagon, most conditions and demands that the Adenauer Government and the German ex-generals had brought forward during the past three or four years were accepted by the Western Powers.

Today it seems as though the United States Government fears to refuse Germany's demands. This is indeed a far cry from the year 1945 when we still had the situation in control and the Germans seemed to respect the power of our strength and prestige.

The agitation of the Pentagon for German rearmament and the often-heard cry "without German help we are sunk" placed Dr. Adenauer and the German militarists in a powerful bargaining position. If the Germans had really feared a Russian attack, one would have expected them to volunteer their help without our prodding. However, it was we who sought Germany's help and it was this immature behavior that placed the Germans, as Walter Lippmann stated, "in the driver's seat." Thus Dr. Adenauer knew that he could squeeze U.S. diplomats or the High Commissioner like a lemon.

What price have we paid up to now for a German rearmament contribution that will not even materialize within the next year or two? What price have we paid for Germany's "ghost army"? It is known from the record that the State Department, which had little to say as regards actual functions of the occupation in
Germany, gave Mr. McCloy a free hand in building up Germany as the mightiest bulwark of the free nations in Europe. After the Bonn diplomats were reassured that the Americans were "on the hook," they went ahead with their blackmail diplomacy and pressed for everything they wanted. We will show in a subsequent chapter how insidiously Chancellor Adenauer worked out a "manipulated opposition" in order to frighten the U. S. High Commissioner into submission.

In 1947 and 1948 when the German generals and the Adenauer geo-politicians had been fully informed about the Pentagon secret plan for Germany's remilitarization, they formulated the price and the conditions under which they were willing to play ball with the Pentagon. When Adenauer, in 1949, became Chancellor of the Bonn Republic, these conditions of the German militarists were officially announced and they became the basis and the guide-post for all diplomatic dealings which followed over several years.

As early as 1948 we had completely dropped our de-Nazification program. From nearly 4 million Germans who had been found chargeable under the law, we selected only a few hundred cases in which war criminals had to stand on trial. Up to April 1948 approximately 2 1/2 million Nazis had received amnesty without trial. The rest enjoyed the same magnanimity a year later.

After de-Nazification was scrapped, the second and third German demand followed: an end to the dismantling of German surplus heavy industry and the freeing of all convicted war criminals. To the second demand, the USA yielded in 1949, and the third condition—the freeing of all war criminals—was gradually carried out in 1950-1951. The remaining few hundred war criminals are expected to go free in the near future.

Along with this policy, most economic and political restrictions have been dropped. Indeed, atomic research and experiments on super-modern weapons are allowed and the German militarists, the geo-political schemers, the Ribbentrop diplomats,
the Goebbels fire-eating agitators, and the Streicher disciples of anti-Semitism are enjoying a Roman holiday.

The main lever the Germans employ in order to get rid of all Allied controls is the demand for "full equality," which means the re-establishment of Germany's sovereignty, so that they will be completely free to shape foreign policy according to the requirements of their special interests. As we will demonstrate later on—by quoting from the Adenauer press—it means that a Germany which has regained its full sovereignty will finally open the door to close cooperation with Moscow. Here again it becomes clearly visible that the Adenauer diplomacy has painstakingly followed the blue-prints of the geo-political schemers in Madrid.

All the pampering and coddling by the U.S. has not been sufficient to satiate the appetite of Dr. Adenauer and his generals. In spite of all the agreements that Germany should be the last on the receiving end in regard to American relief, the former enemy got the lion's share in dollar grants and in relief. The Pentagon and the State Department have not dared to make public the full bill which the taxpayer has had to foot during the seven post-war years. In this connection, the United States News reported on September 14, 1951 that the U. S. poured into Germany 9 billion dollars and that "the Germans took it for granted." In contrast, Washington policy-planners have constantly placed France, our ally and a victim of German aggression, in a disadvantageous position.

This policy on the one hand is partially responsible for the demoralizing effects which are today so visible in French political life, and on the other hand it is responsible for the re-Nazification and re-militarization of Germany. The record shows that under constant German blackmail the French and British diplomats have had to acquiesce to every German demand brought forward first by Dr. Adenauer and then suggested and pushed through by American negotiators.
No wonder that the French people became more and more embittered so that the middle of the road parties have become the constant losers and that the election shows a trend towards the extreme right and left. The French people see the open betrayal. They are horrified by the thought that German militarism, after its total defeat, can stage a comeback for a second time. The French still remember the German conquerors ruling with a hard hand when they shot hostages by the hundreds, when they plundered and looted their country and shipped Frenchmen by the thousands as forced labor to Germany. They remember Prussian militarism as the monster and the German conquerors as the barbarians:

"In such a war—fall of indescribable atrocities—there will be no longer any victors or vanquished, but only survivors and those whose names are stricken from the list of nations . . . The elite lies torn to pieces and poisoned on the battlefields. The survivors, a mob without a leader, demoralized, broken in body and mind by unspeakable horror and suffering and by terror without end, are at the complete mercy of the victor ... It is irrelevant how many remain alive. Fifty million trembling Fellahs are no more difficult to subjugate than five; for many million times zero still makes zero."

(Deutsche Wehr, official organ of the German General Staff, June 13, 1933.)

The French remember this too:

"If the world looks upon Germany as the disturber of peace, it does so from its intuition that this approaching German super-man will disturb one thing: the peaceful rumination of the satiated, who are content with a life which is merely a digestive process."

(Colonel Wulf Bley, Wehrpflicht des Geiste, [War Service of the Mind], 1935, p. 58.)
And the French remember this voice long before there were "Nazis" in Germany:

"It is necessary that our civilization build its temple on mountains of corpses on an ocean of tears and on the death cries of men without number."

(General Count von Haeseler, in 1893).

And the French remember this pan-German voice under the Kaiser:

"War must leave nothing to the vanquished but their eyes to weep with. Modesty on our part would be pure madness."

(Tannenberg, Greater Germany—The Work of the Twentieth Century, Leipzig, 1911, page 304.)

The French, with their intimate knowledge of German military tradition, instinctively fear that German rearmament will bring about the re-emergence of German aggressiveness. In recognition of this fact, the New York Times recently warned in an editorial:

"We are not going to rewrite our histories to expunge one line of German guilt or the foul deeds that Germans performed, in some ways among the most horrible in recorded time. Germany may one day be forgiven for those crimes, but the crimes themselves will never be forgotten."

(New York Times, September 17, 1951.)

The French still feel the burning shame of the Frenchmen who became collaborationists of the Nazis, and traitors to their country. And now come the Washington policy-shapers and arrange a "shotgun wedding" whereby "Marianne" should "voluntarily" espouse herself to the same Nazi generals.

The following newspaper item, taken from the front page of the Wall Street Journal of February 15, 1952 is symbolic of the
profound distrust which the French feel toward a remilitarized Germany:

"FLARE-UP IN FRANCE . . . U. S. DIPLOMATS ARE WORRIED"

By A. E. Jeffcoat
Staff Correspondent of the Wall Street Journal

"Paris—In the great marble chamber of the French National Assembly this week, ushers helped a crippled concentration-camp victim named Georges Heuillard down the aisle and onto the dais.

"'We survivors of the last war swore not to allow the revival of German militarism,' shouted Monsieur Heuillard, now a legislator from one of the government coalition parties. 'I don't want my sons to serve alongside the butchers of their father. I beg you—don't trust Germany.' The entire assembly was on its feet in a second, amidst an explosion of applause."

French fears are shared by the other peoples of the Western community. The French and British have correctly stated that a strong Germany will by no means be a reliable Germany. They remind us that it was a strong Germany under Hitler that, in August 1939, concluded the Berlin-Moscow Pact which helped precipitate World War II.

Competent observers are of the opinion that a German-dominated European army will create a wave of opposition among the European peoples reminiscent of the period of the Nazi occupation. If Russia ever attacked a free and independent Europe, they would find themselves in a hornet's nest. The free spirit of the Swiss, the French, the Dutch, and the Yugoslavs would not submit to a Russian occupation. However, with Germany as the new master in Western Europe, the free nations would not only lose enthusiasm to defend themselves, but might even turn to the Russians for "liberation" from the rule of the Germans. Thus a remilitarized Germany may spell the doom of freedom and democracy in Europe.

European peoples wonder why American policy-shapers are so
insistent about the revival of a powerful Germany. To them it would be more sensible, and sounder for American security, if the military power of the French, British, Scandinavians, Italians and the Yugoslavs were strengthened.

They are convinced that only in this way can Western Europe be saved from German or Russian domination.
"Uncle Sam Must Pay the Bill..."

THE ADENAUER-PENTAGON PLAN FOR EUROPEAN REARMAMENT has a different meaning to the Bonn Government than it does to the Pentagon. The Pentagon still clings to the illusion that a German-dominated Europe will serve as a bulwark against Russia, whereas the Germans regard their rearming only as a stepping stone from which they can attain an independent position of power.

Skillful propaganda has told us again and again that the French are weak and unreliable, that the British are unwilling to fight and that all other European nations do not count—there remains only the Germans. Thus, the agreed policy is to make Germany really strong. First, there was talk of a German "contribution" of only five infantry divisions, then the figures...
rose rapidly, like the mercury in a thermometer, to ten and twenty divisions. Now 30 to 50 German divisions are mentioned. Of course, there is not even one German division in existence, but this does not prevent Dr. Adenauer from gaining more and more concessions on the basis of his ghost army.

It has been clear to those directly responsible for the European rearmament program that the sums involved will place a great strain on the European economy. In this connection, the New York Times carried a series of articles (May 21-25, 1951) on the economics of Western European rearmament wherein it was bluntly stated that "Europe can't bear the cost of rearmament."

Little light has been shed on the sums which will be required for this project although a detailed Associated Press Dispatch from Lisbon (February 23, 1952) reported that the Atlantic Council "unanimously approved a master economic program" for a three-year defensive build-up against Communism:

"The program calls for tapping Western taxpayers for 300 billion dollars to build the anti-Communist armies—a sum, planners believe, which can be scraped together without bringing economic ruin."

Though the Secretary of State has since denied the authenticity of this report, the fact remains that the rearming of Western Europe in the next few years will cost untold billions of dollars. It is the general feeling of European statesmen and has been hinted in the press frequently that the United States must shoulder the major burden of these expenditures. This view is shared by the Germans, who declare that they are unable to raise more than one to two billion dollars annually for defense. This plea of poverty comes with ill grace when it is recalled that the Germans were only too happy to work, sweat, and pay taxes for the rearming of Hitler's Wehrmacht.

Let us see from newspaper dispatches and articles what Germany expects in the way of financial contributions from the
United States for her rearmament program and the expansion of the basic industries upon which the rearmament program must rest.

According to an Associated Press dispatch from Bonn, of December 2, 1951, Western experts have "estimated the first year's cost of arming twelve German divisions at fourteen billion dollars." That sum is for the first year only, for the equipment and setup of six Panzer divisions and six motorized infantry divisions.

In addition, a new German Air Force is planned by the Germans with approximately 2,000 modern jet fighters and bombers and Luftwaffe personnel of a hundred thousand men. The investment for this new aircraft industry and the cost for the Luftwaffe will amount to many billions of dollars. That is not all. The Germans have come forward with demands that America should pay for the required investment to expand their basic industries, a sum which is estimated at three to four billion dollars. The last sum is needed for the increase of coal production and other basic materials. In regard to the strategic armament industry, Dr. Adenauer and his military experts have frequently declared that it would not be advisable to create a new armament industry in the Ruhr. He has, therefore, suggested tapping the riches of strategic raw materials in Africa and creating there, with German technicians and American financial help, a new armament industry for the support of European defense. The initial sums needed for this gigantic venture in Africa have been estimated by German technicians to be between 20 and 40 billion dollars.

In the Adenauer press there recently appeared many articles dealing with the financial cost of European rearmament. The Deutsche Zeitung in Stuttgart of December 22, 1951 published a three-column article in which the question was brought forward why "at so late an hour and in a rush for the solution of political and military problems, the financial experts were
finally called in to look at the reverse side of the coin: The cost of European rearmament." The article stated that the sums necessary for continental rearmament are so "fantastic" that only one thing seems sure: "The financial requirements for continental defense go far beyond the economic potential of the European partners and, therefore, there remains only one way out—the Americans have to carry a great part of the burden."

The Frankfurter Rundschau published in January 1952 a series of four articles analyzing the initial investments for European defense in the first year. The result of the inquiry was that "for the first year an investment of 35 to 40 billion dollars is necessary to cover the expenses for the equipment for the first 43 divisions of the European army."

From these discussions one can readily imagine how high the cost will be if the NATO forces in Europe will gradually be increased to 80 or a hundred divisions. A hundred divisions are the minimum that German military experts have declared are necessary for an effective defense of Europe. On the basis of the figures mentioned above, the total sum necessary for the complete setup and maintenance of the European defense system reaches astronomical proportions. A substantial portion of the U.S.A.’s contribution to European rearmament will go to Germany. Where shall the money come from? The Frankfurter Rundschau answers: "Uncle Sam will have to continue in the role of the rich uncle from America."

Dr. Adenauer has frequently pointed to the great accomplishments of Germany's revival since the collapse of 1945. The Circular Letter of the Geo-Political Center in Madrid boasted that Germany had become "the chief beneficiary of the cold war." Now Germany is on the way to become the super-profiteer of the European armament boom. Recent press reports reveal that Germany contemplates the build-up of a cadre-army of five hundred thousand men with the latest equipment and an air force of two thousand modern fighter planes. According to the official German news agency, 100 billion D. Mark will
be spent during 1952 for the strengthening of the defense of Germany, which includes the creation of a German armed force and the build-up of allied forces in Germany. A reading of the German press indicates that the main portion of this sum will have to be paid for by the United States.

Nobody knows what top-level American officials have promised to the Germans. Yet, one fact can be relied upon: There will be no German divisions until the Germans receive billions of dollars. The military experts and the industrialists behind Dr. Adenauer are realists. They remember that Hitler's industrial investment plus the rearmament outlay of 1933 to 1939 represented an equivalent of approximately a hundred billion dollars. That armament was sufficient to overrun Europe, but it was not enough even with all the additional resources of the conquered countries to defeat the Russians.

The enormous sum required for the build-up of German Armed Forces takes on added significance when one considers the fact that we are living in an inflationary period. Moreover we must take into account the additional expenses arising from the more complicated equipment used today by the military.

The Germans are well aware of the staggering costs of modern warfare. That is the reason why they wait to see whether Uncle Sam will be willing to "pick up the check." The West German magazine Der Spiegel, January 2, 1952, discussed the financial requirements for European defense. It came to the conclusion that the cost for European rearmament is so tremendous that the United States in all probability cannot fulfill her promise to rearm the Atlantic Pact partners. The article stated:

"The system of limited dollar injections will bring no solution to the pressing economic problems of Europe and the additional task of European defense."

It seems strange that figures and details of the NATO budget are widely discussed in the German press whereas a virtual
news-blackout exists in the United States in regard to the vital question: "How much is the European Rearmament going to cost?"

It is a fact that leading Washington officials dealt evasively with this important problem when they were queried before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March and April 1952. The 800 printed pages of the hearings, mainly containing the statements of Acheson, Harriman, Lovett, Draper, and their chief assistants, show that these top officials hesitated to discuss the hot question regarding the extent to which European rearmament will drain the purse of the American taxpayer.

The Western European nations, altogether, raise annually 12,000,000,000 dollars for their armed forces. It is generally agreed that the economy of the European countries is already overstrained and that some of them labor under the burden of heavy military commitments in areas outside of Europe. Thus it becomes obvious that our NATO allies are unable to raise the tremendous sums necessary to carry out the Lisbon Program of equipping 50 modern divisions and 4,000 combat aircraft. The sums necessary for building up an effective deterrent against 200 Soviet and 50 satellite divisions with 30,000 aircraft and 60,000 tanks are so far out of all proportions to our normal concept of budget figures, that Washington officials quite naturally hesitated to touch this sensitive point.

Walter Lippmann, in his column of May 27, 1952, reported on the basis of information gathered in Europe that "radical measures" are necessary to make our global policy work:

"For the policy of these agreements can be carried out only if the United States makes a very considerably greater military and financial contribution than it is now making to the global alliance . . . The real question is whether after our election the American Congress, this one or the next one, will underwrite the measures which will be required in order to make the policy workable."
In view of the foregoing, what may be anticipated in three or four years after the United States has financed the rearming of Europe in which a resurrected Germany will be a cornerstone? Here again the answer is given in the German press and by Dr. Adenauer. The pro-Adenauer weekly, Christ und Welt, the leading geo-political mouthpiece in Western Germany, published, on November 1, 1951, a long editorial in which the thesis was expounded that Dr. Adenauer's policy aims at the creation of a strong Germany as the main pillar in a United Europe. The editorial, which explained the long-range view of Dr. Adenauer's foreign policy, came to the conclusion that the Germans "as the most dynamic among the nations" will gain immensely through the unification of Europe and will thus enhance her bargaining position towards Russia. A few weeks later, on December 27, 1951, Christ und Welt envisioned a strong Western Germany that could make, in the name of a United Europe, an offer to the Kremlin as previously indicated.

The same idea that a strong Germany could make a deal with Stalin in order to free Eastern Germany was expressed by Count von Rechenberg in the session of the Federal Parliament in Bonn on October 17, 1951.

All leading German newspapers have pleaded for a moderate approach in Germany's foreign policy towards Russia. They have sharply rejected the ideological concept in Washington's global policy for the very reason that it might draw Germany into a showdown between East and West. The thesis of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the Deutsche Zeitung, Stuttgart Nachrichten, and of many other papers, is that Germany must do everything in its power to avoid an armed conflict, and do everything possible in order to arrive at a friendly understanding with Moscow.

"Without the consent of the Russians," stated the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of November 6, 1951, "the re-unification of Germany is impossible." The editorial emphasized the fact that the Germans and Russians have to live peacefully.
together and it suggests that the Russians, in order to be re-assured, should have "the right of regular inspection of the strength of the German armed forces."

One of the leading geo-political schemers behind the Adenauer policy, Herbert von Borch, the editor of the monthly, Deutsche Aussenpolitik, pointed to the fact that it was Marshal Stalin who, on May 8, 1945, in the midst of the German collapse, issued a manifesto to the German people in which he gave assurance that the Soviet Union does not intend to dismember Germany. Von Borch declared that within a few years Germany will reach the peak of rearmament and that this will be the turning point in ending the cold war and in reaching a general agreement with the Soviet Union. This significant article was published in Das Ganze Deutschland, December 22, 1951.

The weekly, Der Fortschritt, in Essen declared in an article of January 18, 1952, that the strategy of the German foreign policy must be:

"Never burn the bridges towards the East; gain time and keep on with diplomatic negotiations."

There is one aspect which needs some explanation. When the Western Powers discussed the issue of German rearmament in the fall of 1950, the Kremlin hastened to send notes of sharp protest to France and Britain claiming that such rearmament will constitute a violation of the Potsdam Agreement and also of the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, which was concluded in December 1944. The Russian press was filled with threats and it was stated that any German found in uniform would not be regarded as a combatant, but would be shot as a partisan. Since the beginning of 1951, the Russians have stopped this kind of propaganda. The question arises—what facts have changed the Russian attitude? They still attack Dr. Adenauer and his policy as part of "Wall Street Warmongering," but they are no longer so bitter in their denunciation against German rearmament. Now, when the plans for German rearmament have
grown larger in size, why is the remilitarization of Western Germany not the same burning issue as it was in 1950?

Some statements of Chancellor Adenauer and his press may give a hint of what has happened in the meantime. In the great debate against "Neutralism" during 1951, Dr. Adenauer stated that he had "good reasons to believe that Russia would not interfere with the planned rearmament in Western Germany."

How could Adenauer be so sure of Russia's intentions in the beginning of 1951? Did the Bonn Government or some Western industrialists or geo-politicians receive reassurances from Moscow? Had Dr. Adenauer advance knowledge of Russia's note of March 11, 1952, which removed Russia's objections to German rearmament? Is this a part of the Moscow scheme to let the U.S. sink dozens of billions of dollars into Europe? Are the Russians already informed that West German policy will end with a somersault a la Rapallo of 1923, or in a Berlin-Moscow pact as in 1939 under Hitler? The respected and leading West German magazine Der Spiegel reported on August 31, 1950 that two schools of thought were pondering the German problem in the Kremlin. One school recommended a preventive action to stop rearmament in Western Germany, whereas the other preferred a resurrected, rearmed and independent Germany that could serve as an effective buffer between Russia and the Anglo-American world. The Soviet note of March 11, 1951 seems to indicate that the latter group had won out. Yet there is additional proof: Christ und Welt stated in an editorial on German foreign policy on November 1, 1951 that Pieck and Grotewohl, the rulers of the East German zone, had given assurance to the Bonn Government that they could carry on their dealings with the West, if they only would continue their negotiations with the East.

Of course, Chancellor Adenauer understands his role thoroughly. It is his duty to keep the "American Cowboys" in line and he does so by frequent allusions to the great part that Germany will play in warding off the Soviet menace. Yet, at the
same time, he keeps his fellow Germans in line by reassuring them that his policies will not incur a Soviet attack. Whatever Dr. Adenauer's plans with the Russians might be, there is unanimous agreement among German politicians that some day the Germans must sit down with the Kremlin and come to an agreement on the most important problem of German reunification.

Such negotiations will be the beginning of a general discussion of Europe's position as a whole towards the Soviet Union. When that moment arrives the Germans will sit again in the driver's seat—as the strongest nation economically, politically, and militarily on the European continent, nourished with billions of dollars from the USA.

If that happens, and the Germans predict that it will happen within the next three years, then our predicament will be the same as that of the Germans in 1944: the world will hate us, everyone will be our enemy, we will have strife and turmoil within our own borders—and Germany will be the laughing victor.

This is what they mean when they say in the Madrid Circular Letter of 1950: "The Americans have lost the cold war and the entire future, but they are not as yet aware of it."
DURING THE LAST THREE YEARS AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS in West Germany have frequently reported that large sections of the German people show a great unwillingness to rearm. The common expression of this German feeling in regard to another war is: "Ohne Mich" (without me). This, of course, does not express a pacifist's attitude but rather it emphasizes the fact that the average German is horrified by the thought that he might have to fight the Russians again. "The memory of the Russian campaign still haunts like a nightmare all those who took part in it" reported Sonia Tomara in the Herald Tribune of May 18, 1950. An important factor in the German refusal to fight against the Russians is the experience of the horrors of two long-drawn-out wars. German officers and
soldiers alike are most reluctant to take on the hell of the Russian winter again, with partisans hounding them at every turn. The Germans went twice through this agony and they say: Never Again!

This attitude is only a confirmation of a well-known psychological fact, frequently referred to in German military literature, namely that German soldiers are handicapped and discouraged from the beginning, when they are ordered to launch an offensive or an attack which had previously ended in a setback or defeat. That is the reason why few German generals would like to see another campaign against Russia. The ghost of Stalingrad has left a deep imprint on the psychology of the Germans.

On the other hand, there is a growing sentiment among former German soldiers and officers that it would be far better for the Germans to side with the East against the West. A most popular argument among German veterans is this: "If we fight for the Americans, Stalin will ship us by the millions as prisoners to Siberia; that means misery, slave labor and death. But if we fight with the Russians and the Americans win, we will go as prisoners to the United States which means good food, good treatment and nothing to fear. Thus it is better we go with the Russians."

The slogan "Ohne Mich" has become the popular description for German resistance to the plan for remilitarization. However, we must differentiate between the prevalent mood in all strata of the German people, and those non-Communist groups who are opposed to Adenauer and who propagate the concept of immediate agreement with Russia and the position of "neutralism" for Germany and Europe. These middle-of-the-road groups fear that European rearming will prevent the reunification of Eastern and Western Germany which is the number one demand of all Germans regardless of creed, party, or class.

The trend of "Ohne Mich" gained tremendous impetus after
President Truman's 1949 announcement of the discovery by American Intelligence that an atomic explosion had occurred in the Soviet Union. When a poll was taken in 1949 on the question of whether it would be advisable to create a new German army, 75 per cent of those approached answered "no"; only 6.9 per cent agreed and the rest qualified their answer or had no opinion.

William Attwood reported in Colliers' Magazine of March 24, 1951 his experience from interviews with German factory workers and white-collar people in the little town of Remagen, Germany. The arguments of the Germans were striking. "So far as we can make out the problem is really quite simple, we just don't want war. If you Americans have to fight the Russians, go ahead, but Ohne uns. Don't count on us." Another fellow said: "Isn't it true that you need German soldiers to cover your retreat to the Atlantic?" Or this argument popped up: "Who wants to be a rear guard for the Amis? If the Russians come and find me in uniform, it's a firing squad or Siberia. My brother's there already. Who'll support my parents?"

The director of a factory, a former officer, declared: "If you want my own opinion, as an officer who fought in both wars, I would never serve again so long as German officers are being held in jail as war criminals. And I saw how rottenly the Americans behaved who took Remagen. I've had a bellyful of wars! Talk to my men—you'll see they feel the same way."

Correspondent Attwood reported that he found "no other employee in the factory who didn't feel basically the same way." All were convinced "that Germans in uniform would be used as cannon fodder by the Western high-command."

A Navy veteran and former prisoner of war in England declared: "We all had enough. A war's the worst thing that could happen. Danger from the East? I think that's a fairy tale. You could settle your quarrel with the Russians if you really wanted to."

Many other British and American correspondents have re-
ported similar conversations with German veterans. It all sums up to this: Most Germans are unwilling to fight on the side of the Western powers. Due to economic, strategic and psychological reasons they would rather tie up with the East against the Anglo-American bloc. Chancellor Adenauer and his military advisors are well-informed on this score. If they offered man-power to the policy planners in the Pentagon they certainly did it with ulterior motives. They would like to have a new German Wehrmacht and let Uncle Sam pay for the rearmament, but in the end they hope to make a deal with Moscow.

The Russians know that they have nothing to fear from Western Germany. They have secret and open assurances from the industrialists of the Ruhr of Germany's desire for close cooperation with the East. On Stalin's birthday, according to a report by Karl von Wiegand, chief foreign correspondent for the Hearst papers, leading industrialists in Western Germany sent carloads of gifts to the Red Czar in Moscow. Every informed newspaperman in Europe knows that Western Germany would not be a reliable ally but rather a powerful satellite of Russia. In spite of all this evidence, our policy planners in the State Department and in the Pentagon still live in a fool's paradise.

From the beginning, we staked our whole policy on the assumption that the Germans, due to the rough treatment they received at the hands of the Russians, would be filled with hatred and would turn towards the West, if America would give them the necessary assistance to quickly overcome their defeat.

We could have found out the basic error in our approach had we attentively followed the "great debate" among the Germans which started very early around the central issue "West or East Orientation"? The issue was first discussed in 1948 in the leading geo-political monthly Der Weg in Buenos Aires, and it was doubtlessly inspired by the policy shapers in the Madrid Nazi headquarters.
GERMANY PLOTS WITH THE KREMLIN

The fact that Hitler's great mistake was to attack Russia had the effect of promoting the Haushofer concept of Russo-German collaboration. For virtually every German whether industrialist or worker, an out-of-job general or hungry ex-private, peasant or politician, knew that the cardinal principle of the Haushofer School demanded cooperation with Russia. As a consequence, therefore, the group of Haushofer geo-politicians operating from Madrid and Argentina represents, in German eyes, a source of irrefutable logic and guidance.

Thus there developed in Germany a powerful national front. The Communists in the East and the ultra-nationalists in the West are jointly orienting the dynamic militaristic instincts of the German people toward cooperating with Russia against the West. The men who are blueprinting Germany's future knew that their program appealed as much to conservative manufacturers anxious for profits as it did to beaten militarists yearning for revenge.

The economic program is closely tied in with military considerations, for the planners assume that the Russian side will be the winning side in a third world war.

One important reason they cite for certain Russian victory is that Russia has been building its armaments at a far greater pace than the U.S. Russia, being totalitarian, they emphasize, can direct her industry and labor force as she chooses. The U.S., on the other hand, even while stepping up its preparedness for war, must also maintain the freedom of private enterprise and democracy.

The Soviets, the geo-politicians note, are accomplishing tremendous industrial expansion particularly in hydro-electric power, pig iron and steel production. Their tractor-tank capacity is prodigious and their airplane capacity up to 100,000 a year. Hence, as early as November 1948, the editor of Der Weg had concluded that it would be "impossible for the West to stop communism in a world war . . ."

German experts are convinced that Russia can gain full com-
mand over Europe and the Middle East within a few weeks after the outbreak of hostilities. In any such event, they point out, the Eastern bloc would acquire a tremendous advantage in resources and manpower. They stress the point that Russia is not inferior in modern weapons—about which they know much more than any non-Russian general staff. Readers of Der Weg were told that Russia had an atom bomb long before President Truman reported it to the world.

The final conclusion of the German planners was, already in 1948, that the Free World is heading toward disaster. Like Hitler, they hold that the democracies are soft, empty shells condemned to inevitable defeat at the hands of more vital, more dynamic nations. In the issue of May 1949, Der Weg declared:

"The soldiers of Moscow's international army are not tired of war; a powerful impulse is alive in them. But the bourgeois world of the West is bare of fanatical belief, lacking those elementary forces that stir up whole peoples, shape history, make decisions and are the source of power . . . The rulers of the Atlantic cannot kindle the enthusiasm of other nations in support of their world power."

This is the appraisal of the West which is now sold to the German people, pro-Communist and anti-Communist, neo-Nazi and Roman Catholic. Of course, it is not a question of Communist sympathies. Many conservative leaders were fully convinced, in 1948, that Russia's need for Germany will persuade the Kremlin to leave the Germans masters of their own destiny as far as their internal political and economic system is concerned. To them, an alliance with communist Russia against the West is Realpolitik in action.

Influenced by the directive given from Madrid and Buenos Aires, the great debate soon stirred the entire population in Western Germany. Officers and veterans showed an outspoken contempt for the Western Powers but, for reasons of expedi-
ency, they thought it worth while to exploit, as long as possible, the illusions of our policy planners. On the issue of German rearmament as part of the Atlantic Pact defense, they stood unanimously on the platform of "Ohne Mich." This, of course, together with the opposition of the Social Democrats, was a tremendous help to Dr. Adenauer's blackmail diplomacy.

When the discussion for German rearmament had reached its peak, a few weeks after the outbreak of the war in Korea, Herald Tribune correspondent Joseph Newman reported on August 27, 1950, from Germany:

"There is a widespread impression abroad that the German people would jump at a chance to get into uniform again and try a few more blitzkriege. Every political and labor leader with whom this correspondent spoke in the principal cities of West Germany said those who hold that impression are sadly mistaken."

Other newspapermen reported a widespread feeling among ex-Wehrmacht officers that it would be wiser if Germany would line up with the East against the West. In the beginning of 1950, the Bruderschaft, then a secret society of high Wehrmacht officers, had circulated a memorandum in which the following principle was stated:

"The goal of the Bruderschaft is the union of the peoples of Europe between the Atlantic and the Urals with the Reich of all Germans in its ethnographic and historic borders as an organic part."

In an Associated Press report of December 18, 1949, German generals were quoted as follows:

"A year ago you called us war criminals," said one high officer. "You can't expect us to turn around overnight and be your allies after that insult." But if they were asked, how many of the ex-generals would offer to raise an army to help defend Western Europe? "About 35 to 40 per cent," said a former S. S. (Elite Guard) general. "The rest
are utterly fed up, although a few think Germany's future could be best strengthened by fighting for the Russians."

Karl von Wiegand reported in the New York Journal American of April 16, 1950 a long interview he had with the former chief of staff of the German Wehrmacht, General Guderian. The General stated bluntly that the Western powers would first have to accept all demands the Adenauer Government would put forward, otherwise Germany will "turn to the East and even endeavor to find a basis for cooperation with Soviet Russia."

What kind of cooperation the German nationalists envision with the Soviets was best expressed in one of the speeches of the rabble-rousing General Remer who recommended that in case of a Russian attack, the Germans should do everything "to facilitate a quick advance through Germany so that the theater of war, within 24 hours, will be shifted to France and England."

Dr. Otto Strasser, the former Nazi pal of Hitler, analyzed in one of his articles the precarious situation of Allied troops in Germany. He stated that in case of another war the Germans would help "to arrest the 200,000 British and Americans in one dark night without any struggle." (Nord-Amerika, October 28, 1948.) Such a coup could be effected, said Dr. Strasser, due to the "exact knowledge of the private quarters of every officer and the location of every tank and airplane."

A similar hope was expressed in the circular letter of the Nazi Headquarters in Madrid, where it was stated:

"The strategy of breaking the chains of our enthrallment is sometimes more daring and dangerous than the most dashing feat in war. We could, for instance, visualize that through secret negotiations with Moscow a situation would be brought about whereby the Yankees could overnight be eliminated as a power factor in Europe."

In a recent article in the Saturday Evening Post (March 15, 1952), associate editor James P. O'Donnell tried to answer the
question "Will the Germans Go Along With Us?" O'Donnell found our position in Germany a very shaky one. He does not feel comfortable at the thought that we are raising "the Frankenstein monster of a new German army." We have used "bad psychology and poor diplomacy" in Germany and it reminds him that "in the past ten years, we have had so many policies that looked good at the start and later blew up in our faces." Here is his pessimistic judgment: "There are forces lurking around in the Teutonic political underworld yearning to use the East-West clash as a springboard for one more attempt to cut the throat of the world."
THE GERMANS INTEND TO BUILD THEIR NEW WORLD EMPIRE

on the ruins of what today constitutes the greatness and the power of the United States. Whether these professional plotters will help the Soviets to destroy America by military means, or whether they will attempt to subjugate us some day through an "inside job," is of no relevance. The fact that the German planners regard the United States as doomed becomes clearly visible from the writings of the geo-politicians. The schemers in the Madrid Geo-political Center have quite openly described how the United States will be thrown on the rocks. They are dreaming of building up a new Third Power bloc and declare that this "new power combination would plunge the United States down from its present dizzy heights," and they boast that it would
depend entirely on their "diplomatic and propaganda finesses when and how we would take over an America enfeebled by its foreign and domestic policies."

A similar anti-American propaganda has been peddled by the Goebbels and Ribbentrop disciples in the geo-political monthly Der Weg, Buenos Aires. The Adenauer geo-politicians in Germany have also foretold the doom of the United States, but they have been more circumspect in voicing their views. In a long article, they described in Christ und Welt, how the United States one day will encounter great difficulties after Europe is fully rearmed and the American armament has reached its peak. At that moment, according to these planners, the props will be pulled from under and the American economy will become a shambles for a very simple reason—there will be no war. By having a full voice in the Atlantic Council, Germany will be able to prevent a war against Russia, the paper stated. The article stresses the fact that Germany must not hasten future developments. Germany must shift its policy alternately towards the United States and to Soviet Russia:

"The West German Republic can best be compared with a sailboat cruising towards two islands far on the horizon and, in order to withstand strong-blowing winds, it sets its course alternately to the left and to the right. Will the day then not arrive when we must make a decision on which island to land? Maybe, but it is not certain. Perhaps one of the islands will be washed away by the waves before we reach it...."

(Christ und Welt—November 1, 1951.)

In our reading of German newspapers, we have not encountered any articles which discuss the possibility that the Soviet Union might be the "island" which "will be washed away by the waves." All German expectations in that respect center around the United States. The German geo-political monthly Der Weg in Buenos Aires spoke of the "coming
doom" of the United States as early as 1949. A year later it was stated in the Madrid Circular Letter that "the present power position of the Slavic world is a geo-political fact which we must accept, . . ." but in the same document it was declared to be Germany's task to "take the leadership in Europe's struggle against the United States," to "grab a few more billions from the Yankee's huge dollar-chest and then kick them out or simply hand them over to the Russians."

Of course, the camouflaged geo-political journals in the Bonn Republic cannot print in so blunt a language or predict outright that "economic difficulties will one day plunge the United States down from its present dizzy heights," as stated in the Madrid Circular Letter. Thus Christ und Welt expresses the same thought carefully sandwiched in the metaphor of the island and the sailboat. To compare the United States with an island "washed away" by the waves of the future is a quaint way of describing the ultimate fate of Western democracy. In a way of calculations of the geo-politicians may be summed up in the following parable:

There was a rich and influential banker named Pentagonius, whose life had been troubled by threats and attacks from gangsters. One of the toughest leaders in gangland was a certain Germanicus who, after a long and most strenuous search was finally hunted down. Just when the gangster's jig was up, a bright idea flashed in banker Pentagonius' head: "Wouldn't it be wonderful to have such a tough fellow as a bodyguard? This Germanicus," the banker pondered, "certainly knows all the ins and outs of gangland, he is a most powerful and ruthless fighter—and if I save him from the electric chair and gain his gratitude, maybe he can be of use to me and can keep lots of unpleasantness from my door."

Thus, through his influence, banker Pentagonius saved gangster Germanicus from the electric chair. Of course, this action shocked the police experts. The Police Commissioner Lippenwald warned the banker against such a foolish undertaking. He
called to his attention the long criminal record of Germanicus, his absolute unreliability, his trickery, his uncontrolled temper, and so forth. But all these and other warnings were of no avail. Banker Pentagonius was deeply afraid of another gangster, Sovieticus, and he firmly believed that gangster Germankus could give him better protection.

Thus, Germankus became the bodyguard of the banker, and moved into the gardener's house on the banker's estate. Banker Pentagonius felt proud and satisfied with what he had engineered. He was convinced that he had done a good deed, and felt sure that in the end gangster Germanicus would be reformed and would show his gratitude and devotion towards his benefactor throughout his life.

In the beginning, the feelings of the banker were bolstered by the assurances of eternal gratitude which Germanicus daily expressed. As time went by, a few incidents occurred which made the banker a little skeptical of the soundness of undertaking this self-styled reform work. Yet, considering the fact that this was an unusual experiment, he did not allow his trust to be shaken too much by these initial incidents. At any rate, he was unafraid since he knew that Germanicus was still on parole and in case his behavior should become improper, the banker could ask the police to take corrective action.

Germanicus, in the meantime, was fully aware of the situation, and cunningly worked with promises and little threats until he had gained a firmer position and was finally free from parole. Now it was time for him to act in accordance with his new outlook on life. He was well aware of the advantageous position he was in and was determined to make the most of the various possibilities that the turn of events had presented to him. The banker had indeed opened a new aspect of life for Germanicus. As a smart, calculating and ruthless fellow, he was set to exploit these new opportunities to the fullest extent possible. He convinced the banker that in order to be more useful to him, he, the ex-convict, would have to regain his self-respect. He
told the banker in unmistakable terms that he would have to stop treating him in a charitable way by giving him handouts, and he made it clear that what he wanted was to be treated like an independent person. Germanicus said that if he could own the gardener's house or another piece of property, it would give him his self-assurance and the independence he wanted. Pentagonius yielded to these requests, all of which were backed up with menacing tales intended to frighten the banker, but in which Germanicus himself did not believe. The banker, still clinging to his faith in the basic soundness of his experiment, continued to let himself be taken in more and more by Germanicus. But with every new concession and compromise, the pressure of new and greater demands grew in increasing proportion.

Finally, Germanicus confronted the banker with the demand that since he was now a remade man, he wanted to take his place in accepted society. He asked his benefactor to introduce him into the circle of high society. Again, Pentagonius conceded. Thus, at least, in outward appearance, Germanicus entered into the status of social equality. As a result, however, the banker lost some of his social prestige for having become too intimate with a former gangster. Quite naturally some of the banker's most faithful friends resented the fact that he had foisted this former gangster on their circle. Many of the old friends of Pentagonius began to question his wisdom and his sanity.

As things developed, Germanicus became more and more dissatisfied with his new role. The old "king of gangland" was determined to use all his tricks to reconquer for himself a position of power. The more his demands were met, the more cocky he became. Increasingly, he became resentful at having to take orders and follow certain directives of the banker.

In the meantime, there were new developments which made Pentagonius very uneasy. Reports came to him that secret dealings were taking place between gangster Germanicus and that other character and archenemy of his, Sovieticus. Pentagonius
found himself in an untenable position. He could no longer appeal to the police for help, and practically all of his influential friends had deserted him. The banker became irritated and lost his cool judgment; he suffered considerable financial losses under the increasing blackmail tactics of Germanicus. Impoverished through the expensive protective measures he had undertaken, and driven nearly insane with fear and worry, he saw no way out of his sorry plight but to take his life. And so, in December 1955, Pentagonius met his tragic end by leaping from a window.

By strange coincidence, Pentagonius’ end not only had been foretold in the diaries of Germanicus (in Christ und Welt, November 1, 1951), but was also predicted in an article "How America Took It," published in the Moscow New Times of January 1, 1952. (NOTE: Historians who are interested in the details of the rise and fall of banker Pentagonius will find additional facts in the interesting booklet written by the American banker and author J. P. Warburg, entitled Rearming Germany —How Stupid Can We Be?, 1949.)
[PART THREE]
"There are still not enough troops in Western Europe to stop a determined Soviet attack.... So far as Germany is concerned the success of the whole defense program depends largely on one man—Chancellor Adenauer."

EDITORIAL, New York Times, April 22, 1952

"Konrad Adenauer, hand-picked by Washington as the first chancellor of the Bonn Republic, has been an enthusiastic supporter of the State Department policy precisely because he was shrewd enough to see that it would make Germany the dominant West European power and place it in a position to play off Russia against the West, much as Adenauer's close friend, Gustav Stresemann, had maneuvered in the early days of the Weimar Republic."

JAMES P. WARBURG

"We must move very cautiously. We ought not to give the impression, either in Germany or in the United States, that we shall collaborate in any way with the Russians."

CHANCELLOR DR. KONRAD ADENAUER
Dr. Adenauer and German Realpolitik

THE INCREDIBLY RAPID REVIVAL OF GERMANY FROM TOTAL military defeat within a few years is closely linked with the name of Dr. Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Bonn Republic, and its most influential political leader. Even if we take into account that preparation was made for a German comeback by the German High Command long before the collapse, the work itself was accomplished through a tenacious struggle by a master of the political game who, during forty years, had learned every trick in the book of diplomatic finesse. The collapse of the Nazi regime in 1945 confronted the Western Allies with the problem of reshaping the political structure of Germany in order to foster democratic ideas and acts in harmony with the vital interests of the West.
time political groups seemed to convey the idea that they were devoted to democratic principles and to the welfare of Europe. In the course of political maneuverings and elections, there emerged at the helm of the West German Government Konrad Adenauer. His stature as an individual and a representative of these so-called "better German" forces is for the most part unquestioned by the Allied authorities. Indeed, in the eyes of the Allies he stands for all the things which our Occupation was designed to achieve in Germany. Even when he has been criticized, the criticisms have been more or less subdued and reserved because the alternative to Adenauer's leadership appears to be nothing less than catastrophic to American interests in Germany. Apparently, there is no alternative to Dr. Adenauer—he is the great hope.

Yet, on closer examination of Dr. Adenauer, his past and the forces he represents, one cannot help but conclude that the calculations of the occupying authorities were based on superficial evidence at best, for the ideas of Dr. Adenauer and the strategy which he employs to carry out his goals are, in reality, designed to treat all powers alike—East and West—that is, by subordinating all such relations to the supreme and exclusive interest of Germany everywhere.

Dr. Adenauer represents the tradition of old imperial Germany that was defeated once and came back for a second try at world domination. After the second attempt ended in failure, the Germans could not have found a political leader more astute for the difficult task of restoring Germany's power than Dr. Adenauer. In him they have found a master of political strategy who derived his rich experience from Germany's past under the Kaiser, from the skillful maneuvering of the Weimar Republic, under Wirth, Stresemann, and Bruening, and from the political trickery of the Third Reich. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Chancellor is generally called the "Old Fox" not only by German politicians, but even in the columns of such a distinguished political writer as Walter Lippmann.
Dr. Adenauer's personality is deeply rooted in the old conservative and pan-German political views of the Reich. He was born in 1876 at Cologne. As a young lawyer his interest turned early to municipal politics. In 1906 he became an assistant and subsequently the deputy to the Lord Mayor of Cologne. From 1917 to 1933 he served as Lord Mayor of the great Rheinish city, but at the same time he wielded a great influence on all issues of domestic and foreign policy in the Weimar Republic. He was chairman of the Conference of German Cities; he served as president of the Prussian State Council from 1920 to 1933, and he was a member of the Executive Committee of the Catholic Center Party.

In addition to his political influence, Dr. Adenauer is regarded as a trusted representative and spokesman of the great financial and industrial interest of the Ruhr. He is a close friend of Dr. Robert Pferdmenges and of Dr. Herman Abs, both leading bankers in the city of Cologne, who were influential supporters of the Hitler regime. Dr. Adenauer's long-time standing as a leading politician in the Catholic Center Party has enhanced his reputation in the Vatican and among the high officials of the Roman Church.

The name of Dr. Adenauer was virtually unknown to the non-German world before he came into the limelight in 1949. However, in German politics Adenauer was a powerful and influential figure. How great his influence was, even on foreign policy, can best be seen from the fact that an outstanding statesman like Foreign Minister Stresemann saw fit to consult and take the advice of Dr. Adenauer on questions of foreign policy. For instance, on January 7, 1925, Dr. Stresemann wrote to the Mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer, a long letter from which we quote:

"I hope that you will be in agreement with the terms of the German Reply Note. In a careful diplomatic form it contains the sternest reproaches to the Allied Powers..."
from the text you will see that we accuse the Allied Powers of disloyalty to the carrying out of the treaty.

By way of comparison one would have to accept as a matter of course Secretary of State Acheson writing to the Mayor of Cleveland or Rochester the following:

"I hope that you will be in agreement with the attitude I expressed in my negotiations with the NATO representatives last month in Lisbon.

Yet, Adenauer, ostensibly a local political boss, wielded sufficient power to have an influential voice in the Reich's foreign policy.

Though he had been mentioned for important posts, including the Chancellor's Office in the Weimar Republic, Dr. Adenauer preferred the unassuming title of Mayor of Cologne. Evidently he found it to his advantage to remain in the background while influencing policy as a recognized leader of the powerful financial and industrial interests of the Ruhr. No wonder that many of the politicians in the Center Party feared Dr. Adenauer's ambitions.

Even today in his own party, the "Christian Democratic Union," Dr. Adenauer is disliked and feared for his adherence to authoritarian concepts of government. Frequently, German papers have complained about Dr. Adenauer's disregard of the wishes of the people and of democratic procedure. His extreme conservatism prevented him from going along with the Nazis, although there were no great differences in his own nationalistic outlook and the foreign policies of the Nazi Party. But he had contempt for the upstart in the Nazi movement, who ousted him from his office in 1933. Yet, it is significant that Dr. Adenauer surrounded himself in the Chancellery and in his foreign office with dozens of former Nazis who had served as top schemers under Ribbentrop and Dr. Goebbels.

When in 1945 Allied armies occupied Cologne, the Amer-
icans reinstalled Dr. Adenauer in his job as Lord Mayor. After the Reich was divided into zones and the British took over in Cologne, Dr. Adenauer was dismissed from his office and his political activities banned for reasons which were never discussed publicly.

From the beginning, U.S. authorities placed great hope in Dr. Adenauer. His relations to Washington were very close long before he became Chancellor of the Bonn Republic in 1949. Dr. Adenauer was one of the first German politicians who was allowed to come to the United States in 1946 and to propagate his political views.

By now, the Western Powers have found out that it was an illusion to believe that Dr. Adenauer was "Heaven's gift to the Occupation powers." Dr. Adenauer has given the three High Commissioners plenty of headaches. They know today that the Chancellor has strictly followed Germany's time-honored political game of playing both ends towards the middle. Dr. Adenauer's diplomacy is based on the old pan-German concept of "Deutschland Uber Alles in der Welt." Times correspondent Drew Middleton reported that American and British diplomats are sometimes baffled by Dr. Adenauer's "fondness for large, even grandiose, political conceptions and theories." They find it "difficult to reconcile these flights of thought with the urgency of Germany's needs at the moment."

These large, even grandiose, political conceptions of Dr. Adenauer's stem from the political schemes for which Imperial Germany went into the First World War. It was the concept of the "Greater Germany," the space theories of a European prosperity sphere ("Mittel Europa"), an overseas colonial empire, and the establishment of a powerful steel and coal combine as a stepping-stone toward the economic and political domination of Europe. A Germanized Europe was at that time already envisioned by the pan-Germans as the strategic center in the coming struggle for world domination. The aggressive ideas of pan-Germanism found their main backers among the industrial-
ists of the Rhine and the Ruhr who profited from the ever-increasing rearmament under the Kaiser. These same industrialists, twenty years later, helped the rabble-rousing agitator Hitler into power.

Among the backers of the pan-German program was the extreme nationalistic wing of the Catholic Center Party which had its main political bailiwick in Cologne. The most influential leader of this pan-German faction was the then young and ambitious Dr. Konrad Adenauer. The idea of pan-Germanism had been repugnant to a Party that had come into existence a few decades earlier as a heroic fighting unit against Prussian militarism and Bismarck's autocratic regime during the time of the "Kulturkampf." However, after the Vatican had made its peace with Bismarck and after the courageous leader Windhorst died, the Center Party, within a few years, became the main government party in Imperial Germany and acted as the most militant voice in the support of the militaristic and aggressive German policies which marked the twenty-year period before the First World War. The ambitious and "grandiose political conceptions" of Dr. Adenauer have their roots in the ideological setting of the pan-German Reich of Kaiser Wilhelm. It was this factor that the Washington policy planners overlooked when they thought they had found in Dr. Adenauer a representative of the "better Germany."

When, in the summer of 1949, Dr. Adenauer was elected, by a slim majority of one vote, as the first Chancellor of the West German Federal Republic, he declared that he would reserve the conduct of Foreign Affairs as his own domain. From the beginning, he proved to be a shrewd tactician in all matters of domestic and foreign policy. He started off with rousing nationalistic speeches, wherein he presented himself in the eyes of the German people as a "strong national leader." Simultaneously, he introduced in his dealings with the Allied High Commissioner a kind of blackmail diplomacy which, within a short
time, played havoc with the whole set of principles and policies of the Western occupying powers.

Let us sketch Dr. Adenauer's policy on the basis of his record. In his election speeches, he expressed his hatred for England, and he declared that the British "are our true enemies and they intend to block the resurrection of Western Germany." The New York Times quoted on August 14, 1949 the following passage from Dr. Adenauer's election oratory:

"A nation like Germany, with one of the first seats in mankind's history, has a claim to feel along nationalistic lines . . . The foreigners have got to understand that the period of collapse and unrestricted domination by the Allies is finished."

In the spring of 1949, before he was Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer created consternation in the Allied camp when he declared in a speech in Berne, Switzerland, that the German people had never surrendered to the Allies. The German military leaders who did so in May 1945 had "no mandate from the German people to submit to the terms of unconditional surrender." In the same speech he characterized Allied confiscation of German patents as "outright robbery." In 1950, Dr. Adenauer caused new embarrassment for the occupying authorities at a mass meeting in Berlin when, at his request and in the presence of Allied representatives, he led the crowd in the singing of "Deutschland Uber Alles."

In his dealings with the Allied High Commissioners, Dr. Adenauer has proved to be a master in diplomatic strategy. The London Observer once called Dr. Adenauer "the best tactician on the German political scene."

Walter Lippmann has termed Dr. Adenauer "a shrewd and farsighted man who may yet prove to be the German Talleyrand if he survives long enough."

The Frankfurter Rundschau noted in an editorial that Dr. Adenauer hopes to enter the pages of history as Bismarck II.
Dr. Adenauer’s immediate objective from the first day of his Chancellorship was to lull the suspicions which were still alive among the Allies toward Germany. His goal was to free Germany from the consequences of defeat, to gain back full sovereignty and make a resurrected Reich again attractive as a partner in a new alliance. In this grandiose political enterprise, he shrewdly exploited the tension between the East and the West.

There is a great similarity in Dr. Adenauer's diplomatic approach with the manner in which Dr. Stresemann handled the post-war political situation after Germany’s defeat in the First World War. Foreign Minister Stresemann, like Dr. Adenauer today, was also regarded by the Western Powers as a "good European." Dr. Stresemann had the same objective of "restoring confidence among the Western Powers towards Germany," but there always was hanging over the head of Western diplomats the threatening possibility that Germany would conclude an alliance with the East.

Dr. Stresemann, like Adenauer, preferred to bolster his diplomacy by working with a "manipulated opposition." The more he was criticized by his political opponents, the easier it was for Stresemann to extract concessions by telling the British and the French: "Look what you have to expect from people that will come after me."

Stresemann always played the English against the French and was eager to gain the support from the financial circles in the United States. Under his diplomacy, the French were always the losers. Stresemann, like Adenauer, was filled with "grandiose ideas and schemes." Yet, the Western Powers forgot that Stresemann had also been one of the most fanatical pan-Germans before and during the First World War and that the political game he was playing was full of booby traps.

Like Dr. Stresemann, Chancellor Adenauer regards it as a good business proposition to sell Germany as a safe haven for American investments. Like Stresemann, Dr. Adenauer employs his diplomacy as the preliminary anesthetic for a major opera-
tion on the body of Europe which will be performed later with a resurrected German Wehrmacht.

Dr. Adenauer's main weapon is the diplomatic double talk, of which Stresemann was also a master. It was Stresemann who declared that "German policy must be one of finesse ('finassieren') and of avoiding the great decisions," and in 1925 he gave the following diplomatic gem: "Our policy of offering the Entente powers a security pact was undoubtedly correct ... it broke up the Entente ..."

Is it not exactly a repeat performance if we compare Dr. Adenauer's dealings with the High Commissioners with the complaint that Britain's Foreign Minister Austen Chamberlain once made to Stresemann: "Whenever we make a concession to you, instead of acknowledging it you ask for more." The Western Powers learned nothing from the experiences during the Twenties which were followed later on by blackmail diplomacy of Adolf Hitler. Now comes Dr. Adenauer and uses the same tactics in his diplomatic strategy with the West.

In his diplomatic approach, Dr. Adenauer never places the whole menu of German demands on the table. He moves carefully, step by step, and whenever Western negotiators believe that they are over the hump after having granted a major concession, they are confronted with new demands from Adenauer—pushed by the boundless agitation of his "manipulated opposition."

In spite of the distasteful experiences with Dr. Stresemann and Hitler, the Western powers try again to calm down the crying German brat with one lollypop after another. When the French High Commissioner, Francois-Poncet, criticized the German tactic of consistently coming up with new demands, the leading newspaper in the pro-Adenauer camp, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, answered in an editorial that "all concessions in the direction of German equality were won only after Germany had exercised relentless pressure. According to Francois-Poncet, well-behaved children do not cry—but well-be-
haved children will never get anything . . ." [Frankfurter Zeitung, July 17, 1951.)

Dr. Adenauer has played the game in accordance with the prescription outlined by this German newspaper. It has reaped enormous dividends for the Germans.

Thus the dismantling of German surplus industry for reparations was stopped. Millions of militant Nazis were set free without investigation or trial. All measures to prevent a revival of German war industry were dropped; and with generous American help, Germany became again the most prosperous country in Europe. But, still the brat cries for more, and will get one "lollipop" after another, due to a peculiar set of circumstances to which only the American taxpayer can put a stop.

Nothing can be expected from the policy shapers in the Pentagon and the State Department, because these men who have always posed as stalwarts against "an appeasement policy" are, in the case of Germany, the most willing to grant one concession after another. It started early in 1946 when General Clay banned the dismantling of German industrial plants for reparations. According to a dispatch in the New York Herald Tribune, it was explained that "by this policy he seeks German goodwill for political purposes at the expense of Allied friends who desperately need surplus German industrial equipment." In addition, our military authorities presented the Germans with a gift of millions of dollars' worth of American surplus goods to assist Germany's speedy rehabilitation.

In 1949 Mr. McCloy was appointed as High Commissioner and introduced his policy of "calculated optimism." On February 19, 1950, Herald Tribune correspondent Don Cook quoted a high American official as follows:

"In six months here Mr. McCloy gave in tremendously to Chancellor Adenauer and the West German Government—gave in at what many felt was an alarming rate in the hope that demands would cease, but only to be confronted with other demands from other quarters."
On January 9, 1950, correspondent Ernest Leiser reported from Bonn that Dr. Adenauer had "seized the psychological initiative" from the United States High Commissioner and had managed "to put the commission on the defensive and reduce its role to largely a negative one . . . By this tactic, Dr. Adenauer has increased his prestige and authority in the whole field of politics and whittled away, simultaneously, at Allied prestige and authority."
U.S. POLICY SHAPERS HAVE BECOME THE PRISONERS OF THEIR own miscalculations. It is a policy of "Calculated Optimism" and insufficiently calculated risks that is ending in a situation characterized by fear and outright appeasement under the constant pressure of Dr. Adenauer's diplomacy. Our policy for Germany's revival sprang not from a compromise of mutual interests, it was the result of gambles which had no basis in realities. Times correspondent Drew Middleton has frequently pointed to the strength of Dr. Adenauer's position in his dealings with the Western powers:

"He has been helped, of course, by the almost pathological fear on the part of some of the Occupation powers that if his requests were not met Germany would either fall to
Dr. Schumacher or drift along into a fatuous neutrality more helpful to the Soviet Union than to the Western powers."
(New York Times, September 30, 1951.)

What is the real cause for the fantastic success of Dr. Adenauer's post-war policy? We must first bear in mind that during the war the State Department had made plans to form a conservative government in Germany under the leadership of Dr. Bruening or a politician with a similar orientation. In 1946 Dr. Adenauer came to the U.S. to discuss his political views and to propagate, as the N. Y. Staats Zeitung stated, his ideas on a United Europe. Professor Hallstein, now Dr. Adenauer's Secretary of State, visited the U.S. to "lecture" at the Georgetown University in Washington. We can safely assume that as early as 1946 Dr. Adenauer and Professor Hallstein discussed in their talks with Washington policy planners the possibilities for the creation of a United Europe and for a reactivation of Germany's manpower potential. In 1948, a year before he became Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer asked General Hans Speidel to prepare a memorandum on German rearmament. It was during the time when an influential section of the American press ballyhooed the "need" to rebuild a strong Germany while the Pentagon was dreaming of a German army of 25 or 50 divisions.

It is of great import that we understand the real meaning of Dr. Adenauer's diplomatic maneuverings. From the beginning he stressed the point that the whole plan could only be realized within the framework of a "United Europe." Europe, especially Germany, must regain its economic strength, the policy of "punishment" had to be foregone, and Germany must be treated as an equal in order to gain the cooperation of the German people for a Western Alliance.

When Washington bought this rehashed scheme of the Twenties, Dr. Adenauer had only to engage in diplomatic finesse in order to accomplish the most fantastic shakedown. He knew that Washington was determined to arrange a "shot-gun wedding"
between France and Germany and that the Pentagon was set to reactivate the German military potential. In addition, certain American business interests were deeply devoted to the revival of a powerful Germany. In such a strong bargaining position, the "Old Fox" could constantly raise his price and squeeze the U.S. negotiators. This makes it clear why it is not Dr. Adenauer who must go "hat in hand" and ask for favors. In the context of political realities the victors appear in a far weaker position than the vanquished.

Dr. Adenauer's greatest diplomatic success was the selling of his "United Europe" plan to Washington. It is a double-feature hit because it will assure the realization of a 70-year-old pan-German dream of bringing Europe under the domination of Germany and simultaneously prove the easiest device to overcome the consequence of Germany's collapse. When Dr. Adenauer came forward with his suggestion, he performed a miracle for which the Nazi High Command had made long preparations during the last years of the war. The Nazis, fearing that the name "German" would be a stench in the nostrils of decent people for decades to come, decided to initiate after the war a clever world-wide campaign for the creation of a United Europe, in which the defeated Germans would give up nothing but would actually became the main winners. The Nazi theory was that if the Germans would lose their sovereignty, it would be a smart idea to talk the other nations into a scheme in which they would also have to give up their sovereignty and the Germans, allowed to participate, would automatically gain equality and thus the stigma would be removed from the Fatherland. It was the Nazi author Grimm who stated that Germany had lost territory and prestige but that it would profit in a European union tremendously by trade, industry, science, "Kultur-propaganda" and political schemes. The Germans are boasting today of being the champions of a new Europe. Hitler's Waffen SS is out in front in renewing the propaganda for a German-dominated Europe.

Obviously Dr. Adenauer's suggestion for the unification of
Europe has served various purposes. First of all, it will give the industrialists of the Ruhr an integrated market in Europe for which the pan-Germans had already agitated at the end of the last century. One of Dr. Adenauer's industrial friends, the I. G. Farben tycoon Dr. Duisberg, wrote in 1931 in a geo-political book by General Haushofer:

"Only an integrated trading-bloc, stretching out from Bordeaux to Sofia will enable Europe to gain that innermost economic strength which is necessary to uphold her leading position in the world ... the longing for a thousand year Reich cries for a new approach. For such a purpose we can use the mirage of a pan-Europe."

Even such a "good" European as Count Coudenhove-Kalergi suggested, in 1932, in a fifteen-page "top secret" memorandum to the German government and the German General Staff, the unification of Europe, starting first with the creation of a German-French combine in economics, armament, and foreign policy. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi intended to use his plan as a means to overcome the consequences of German defeat in the First World War and as a lever to open the door for Germany to dominate the great trading areas in Europe and Africa. Twenty years later, the Germans acclaimed the Schuman Plan, which possessed all of the basic principles contained in the memorandum of Coudenhove-Kalergi.

Another essential point in Dr. Adenauer's "United Europe" plan is the speculation that Germany, after it has been put in the driver's seat by the United States, will not only have command over her own re-established Wehrmacht, but will also be able to control and dominate the non-German military forces. Finally, and most important, it was clear to Dr. Adenauer and his generals that the rearming of Europe can only be carried out with the financial help of the United States.

Thus, Dr. Adenauer is in the process of executing the Nazi blueprint of "Overcoming the Catastrophe." Of course, in all
his plannings, Dr. Adenauer had the help of the diplomats who once had served Hitler and Ribbentrop, and he is also backed by the geo-politicians.

Since 1950, when Dr. Adenauer began to organize the Foreign Office in Bonn, world public opinion has been frequently shocked by reports that his diplomatic staff consisted of old-line Nazi diplomats who had played a decisive role in the conspiracies of the Hitler-Ribbentrop gang. For a long time the charges that Nazis and Ribbentrop diplomats were filling Dr. Adenauer's Foreign Office were bluntly denied by the Bonn Government. No investigations were made by the Three High Commissioners.

The scandal broke after a courageous and independent German newspaper, the Frankfurter Rundschau, gave a detailed expose in a series of articles in September 1951. It became known that nearly all key positions in Dr. Adenauer's Foreign Office were staffed with Nazi diplomats who had played a prominent role in the preparation of Hitler's aggressive warfare and who had even participated in planning and executing the mass extermination of the Jewish population in European countries. Among the diplomats named by the Frankfurter Rundschau were: Dr. Hans Globke, Dr. Theodore Kordt, Dr. Herbert Blankenhorn, Dr. Emil von Rintelen, Dr. Werner von Grundherr, Dr. Gottfried von Nostitz, Dr. Herbert Schwartzman, Hasso von Etzdorff, Dr. Albrecht von Kessel, Heinz Truetzschler von Falkenstein, Dr. Werner von Bargen, and many others.

On October 16, 1951, Dr. Adenauer had to admit in the Bundestag that among the 383 officials and employees in his Foreign Office, 134 were former Nazi Party members, and 138 had served under von Ribbentrop. An investigating committee of the Federal Parliament admitted that some of the Nazi diplomats had such a black record that they regarded them as "absolutely inadmissible" to any position in the diplomatic service.

It seems that the percentage figures which Dr. Adenauer had given to the Federal Parliament had been kept rather low, for on March 17, 1952 the Associated Press reported from Bonn
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that a German radio commentator declared that 85% of the personnel in Adenauer's Foreign Office were former Nazis.

How did these Nazi diplomats manage to escape investigation and punishment? According to the Frankfurter Rundschau and other newspaper reports, many of them went underground in 1945 or posed as members of the resistance against Hitler. They founded the "Evangelisches Hilfswerk" (Evangelical Relief Committee) before or right after the Nazi collapse. When they saw that nothing happened to them, they proceeded further by organizing in Stuttgart a more compact body, a sort of new foreign office, under the innocent title "Bureau for Peace Problems" ("Buro fuer Friedensfragen"). When Dr. Adenauer organized his foreign ministry, this whole Ribbentrop group was transferred from Stuttgart to Bonn.

The way this was done is best illustrated by the following example: One of the old Ribbentrop diplomats, Heinz Truetzschler von Falkenstein, who was appointed by Hitler on April 5, 1943, as Secretary of the Nazi top-secret "Europe Committee," was chosen in 1949 for a similar job by Dr. Adenauer. Hitler's "Europe Committee" was a setup assigned to organize a "New Europe" under the leadership of a "Greater Germany."

When Dr. Adenauer organized his diplomatic service, this same Nazi member who had the task of building a Hitler Europe was appointed by Dr. Adenauer as Director of the "European Division" of the Bonn Foreign Office. It is obvious that von Falkenstein carried on where he had left off in 1945—if he ever had left off! The whitewashing committee of the Bonn Parliament did not even press for the dismissal of this old Nazi hand.

There is another important sector in Dr. Adenauer's foreign policy setup: Germany's leading political press and the geopolitical and economic research institutes and organizations are back in existence and are functioning again as under the Hitler regime.

Leading Nazi journalists, who played a prominent role under Dr. Goebbels and were the interpreters of Hitler's foreign pol-
icy, are today sitting in the editorial rooms of the reputable pro-
Adenauer press. Dr. Rudolph Kircher, under Goebbels the edi-
tor-in-chief of the Frankfurter Zeitung, is now editor of the
Deutsche Zeitung in Stuttgart.

Dr. Gieselher Wirsing, former editor-in-chief of the Nazi
paper Munchener Neueste Nachrichten, who was also the pay-
master of the U.S. Nazi agent George Sylvester Viereck, is today
editor of a leading political weekly. This paper has camouflaged
its geo-political activities under a very innocent-sounding name,
Christ und Welt. It was founded in 1947 by the same clique of
Ribbentrop diplomats and geo-politicians in Stuttgart who had
taken cover under the "Evangelical Relief Committee."

There is Dr. Karl Silex, another prominent Nazi journalist
who publishes today the pro-Adenauer weekly Deutsche Kom-
mentare. One of the "old hands" of pan-Germanism is Dr. Paul
Rohrbach, who under the Kaiser helped to interpret Germany's
"Drang nach Osten" (Drive to the East). Subsequently, he
propagated Nazi foreign policy under Dr. Goebbels and Ribben-
trop. Today he "explains" world political events under Dr.
Adenauer.

Among the leading periodicals in Germany which carry on
the old geo-political and Nazi ideologies are the following: the
Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik; Der Standpunkt; Nation Europa;
Aussenpolitik; Ost-Europa; and Uebersee Rundschau.

The very effective research and propaganda organizations of
the Nazis are operating again. The notorious German Foreign
Institute in Stuttgart, once the propaganda center for 30,000,000
"Volksgruppen" Germans, who were citizens of many lands,
has been re-established as the "Institute for Foreign Relations."
The new director is an old Nazi official, Dr. Franz Thierfelder.
Formerly, the Nazis had one higher institution for foreign pol-
icy, the "Hochschule fuer Politik" in Berlin. Today there are
three such organizations located in Berlin, Munich and in Duss-
seldorf. In addition, there is the Institute for History of National
Socialism, the German Society for East European Problems, the
German Colonial Society, the Ibero-American Institute, and many others. The Carl Schurz Society is also functioning again. This organization played a decisive role in spreading Nazi propaganda in the U.S.A. under the leadership of the I. G. Farben director, Max Ilgner.

Many disciples of the German geo-politician General Haus- hof er have resumed operations, including such men as Dr. Klaus Mehnert, expert on Russia and Asia, Ernst Samhaber, the South American expert, Rupert von Schumacher, Dr. Heinz Kloss, Walter Pahl, Ferdinand Fried, etc.

Branching out from this hard core of geo-politicians and members of the former staffs of von Ribbentrop and Goebbels are the contacts to countless neo-Nazi organizations, research institutes, Officers' and Veterans' Societies, youth movements, flying clubs, Landsmen and Expellee Vereine, in which thousands of former Nazi officials and Wehrmacht officers have found a fertile soil for the old propaganda line that a new German Reich must have its "place in the sun."

The former Goebbels journalists and geo-politicians are today the main mouthpiece in the interpretation of Dr. Adenauer's foreign policy. Close contacts exist between the Geo-political Center in Madrid and those groups who are shaping and influencing today Dr. Adenauer's foreign policy. The recent discovery of a Nazi center in Switzerland revealed a broad network of contacts that has its ramifications not only in Germany but also in other countries.

It is edifying to compare the instructions which are issued from Madrid with the political views expounded by the German press not only in Western Germany but also in South and North America.

The main concern of the geo-political schemers in Madrid is that Europe should not become involved in a new war. According to the Madrid directives, Bonn's diplomacy must be conducted in such a way as to milk the United States as much as possible of money and resources, but never to commit Germany
to any irrevocable alliance with the West. If we compare the reputable German press with the Madrid policy blueprint, we will find, sometimes in a more subtle manner, the Madrid formula followed closely.

The Madrid Circular Letter contains the significant statement that German negotiators must, of course, have certain freedom of maneuvering in their dealings with the West. They should use promises and other devices in order to instill among the American negotiators the belief that Germany will fight on the side of the West against the East. They might even enter formal agreements in order to extort greater concessions or obtain more loans from the U.S.A., but they are admonished that they must always follow the basic policy of steering Germany and Europe clear from any entanglement of war on the side of the U.S.A. against the Soviet Union. The Circular Letter of the Geo-political Center in Madrid must have been used as a quasi directive for Adenauer's diplomacy because the Bonn Government is carrying out precisely the basic policies prescribed by the Madrid geopoliticians. Furthermore, the influence of the Madrid directive in the Bonn Government is also reflected in the discussions and editorials in the pro-Adenauer press.

The significant fact is that in spite of Washington's great eagerness for the reactivation of German manpower, the Bonn Government has handled the issue in such a cunning manner that up to date the United States has been unable to obtain from Germany the semblance of an armed force. Instead, the Adenauer Government has used the German "ghost army" since 1949 as a bargaining device to press relentlessly for political concessions. If the Bonn Government were honestly convinced that the danger of aggression was really threatening from the East, they would have told the German people and would have suggested an appeal to the masses that a few hundred thousand German ex-soldiers should voluntarily offer their services to the Western powers in order to help in the defense of German soil. Yet, the Adenauer Government does not regard the strengthening of the
Atlantic defense as the primary issue. Their aim is to regain German "Wehrhoheit," to eliminate the last feeble instrument of Western control over German affairs and to exploit America's diplomatic plight financially and politically. The guidepost in Dr. Adenauer's diplomacy was always: "The higher the difficulties pile up for the Americans, the more favorable becomes our prospects for successfully overcoming our defeat." Thus the directives given in the Madrid document were faithfully translated by the Bonn Foreign Office into practical politics.

Allied observers have stated that Dr. Adenauer's diplomacy follows a "grandiose concept" in the realm of world politics. In explaining his policies Dr. Adenauer has frequently stated that the main objectives are the unification of Europe and large-scale financial support from the United States, in order to make Germany again a going concern. Dr. Adenauer and his geo-political advisers place the main emphasis on the earliest creation of a United Europe with the help of billions of dollars from the American taxpayers.

In a recent interview, Dr. Adenauer stated that there is no alternative to his conception of a United Europe:

"It is a great mistake to think that the German military contribution is the main problem. The main issue is Europe herself. A United Europe would be a pressing need even if a Soviet danger did not exist."

In the same interview, Dr. Adenauer expounded the thesis that the age of national and sovereign states has come to an end, and that the future belongs to the great regional power blocs. As a matter of fact, Adenauer's ideas were advocated by the pan-Germans sixty years ago and they were rehashed more recently by Hitler.

In Dr. Adenauer's "grandiose concept" the second phase will be the consolidation of German economic, political and military hegemony over Europe, the expansion of German influence in Africa, followed by a close tie-up to the Arabic world and the
Latin American continent. Only after Germany has established a great third power bloc, acting in full independence of the East and the West, will she step into her third phase, which is foreseen as close political and economic cooperation with the East. Of course the Germans expect that Moscow will pay a high price for this cooperation. The Russians will pay that price because the realization of Dr. Adenauer's "grandiose concept" means the doom of Russia's present rival—the United States.

How do we know that Dr. Adenauer anticipates such a course of events? We know it from statements out of his own mouth, from his signed articles, from lapses of the tongue by his political camp followers, and from statements of the pro-Adenauer press.

Much of the hidden scheme became visible to the eyes of trained observers during the last two years, when the great debate in Germany was on between the promoters of the Adenauer policy for "integration" with the West, and the so-called school of "neutralism."

The pro-Adenauer press has frequently stated that the German Chancellor is the chief exponent of German "Machtpolitik" (Stuttgarter Zeitung, December 4, 1951). Dr. Adenauer prides himself on the fact that he is a great statesman of the stature of Bismarck. He is a shrewd political poker player, and plays for high stakes. He has the initiative and he uses his skill and will power to push things through. The French newspaper Combat, noting the similarity of Chancellor Adenauer's diplomacy with that of his predecessors Kaiser Wilhelm II and Adolf Hitler, commented:

"Chancellor Adenauer has only one ambition: to follow in the footsteps of Bismarck and to bring others under his dictate."

Members of Dr. Adenauer's cabinet have often come out in favor of an aggressive German policy. His Minister for Unification, Jacob Kaiser, told the Catholic Party congress:
"No real Europe can be formed until the German bloc is reconstituted. I remind you that this bloc includes, in addition to Germany, Austria, a part of Switzerland, the Saar of course, and Alsace-Lorraine. When I think of the Strasbourg Cathedral, my heart hurts."

The Chancellor himself stated in a speech in July, 1951:

"The creation of a Europe which is politically and economically strong is the only path leading to the recovery of Germany's Eastern territories, which remains one of the essential goals of our activities."

On September 15, 1951, Dr. Hans Christian Seebohm, Minister of Commerce in the Adenauer cabinet, addressed a mass meeting of the Sudeten Germans at Stuttgart in which he spoke about the "monstrous crime the victors had committed against Germany, Europe and the whole world." He then pondered the question whether Germany must join the West or the West be dependent on Germany:

"Does free Europe want to join Germany? Germany is the heart of Europe, and the limbs must adjust themselves to the heart, not the heart to the limbs."

An illuminating picture of Germany's ambitious role in world politics was recently given in an article which appeared in the Swiss paper, Wochen Zeitung, of March 6, 1952, under the title: "Germany's aim for 1952." The article explained that Germany will not be content with the role of a satellite to the West. Declaring that the leading German industrialists learned their lesson during the last war, the article states that the potential of the Soviet Union has made a deep impression on German policy shapers. The industrial captains of the Rhine and the Ruhr, according to the Wochen Zeitung, have admitted that they "underestimated Russia's strength when they looked at the East through the ideological glasses of Nazism." Now, the German industrialists will follow their real interests, which they see best fostered
by collaboration with the East. While Chancellor Adenauer "has still to function as an ice breaker in order to remove the barrier that is blocking the road to full independence . . . the geopoliticians in the meantime have to study the problems and prepare the terrain for further diplomatic actions."

One of the leading magnates of the Ruhr told the paper:

"Indeed, Germany's prospects in the East are far more attractive than those which are offered us in the West."

The present situation, concludes the article, opens for Germany "many possibilities to reap rich bargains in her international negotiations." Russia's trump cards for Germany are the markets in the East and in Asia. In order to outbid Moscow, the West must "offer Dr. Adenauer a part in the colonial exploitation of Africa." Then the paper concludes:

"Stalin is willing to pay a high price for German neutrality . . . Seven years after unconditional surrender Germany holds most of the trump cards for the international poker game in her hands."

How does Dr. Adenauer plan to play his cards in his bid to unify Europe, attract huge American investments, and finally reach an understanding with Moscow? According to the geopolitical planners in Madrid and in the Bonn Foreign Office, the United States has maneuvered herself into a trap through a "fatal mistake in the evaluation of the power potential of the European continent." Analyzing the American diplomatic debacle in Europe, the magazine Der Spiegel (February 13, 1952) has this to say:

". . . The banking group ('Konsortium') Harriman, Acheson, Draper, and McCloy intended to build a strong Germany into a strong Europe. However, the calculation on which they based their plans contains a fatal mistake . . . The Europeans, including the German potential, will never become strong enough to be able to stop a Soviet
invasion . . . Harriman and Acheson ace deeply committed in their policies to strengthen Europe. In their opinion America's power politics stands or falls with its position in Europe . . . Harriman and Acheson risked the greatest un-popularity in order to keep up the principle of their Europe-First policy. If this policy, for which America has spent such a tremendous amount of money fails, then Truman, Harriman, and Acheson are finished for good."

It is the nearly unanimous opinion among German politicians and diplomats that the United States policy in Europe will end in a complete bankruptcy. Such a prognosis was already made in the circular letter of the Madrid Nazi Headquarters in September 1950. In that document, the German planners foretold that the Americans "after the failure of their amateurish policy in Asia will one day experience a far more painful and devastating smashup in Europe." Thus, by 1950, the Germans had concluded that the enormous difficulties confronting the United States would eventually "plunge the United States down from its present dizzy heights." While directing the Germans to grab as many billions of dollars from the United States as possible, the circular letter cautioned that under no circumstances should the Germans permit themselves to be committed to fight for American interests. By pursuing this tactic, geo-politicians in Madrid expressed confidence that Germany would be able to take over the leadership of Europe by isolating the United States and in this way create the principal conditions for a final agreement with the Soviet bloc.

Frequently leading German papers give veiled hints that the Chancellor's foreign policy is based on these tactics. On April 3, 1952, in the midst of the great debate about the Soviet Note on German re-unification, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the mouthpiece of the big Ruhr interests and the Bonn Foreign Office, stated in a front-page editorial:

"The Chancellor follows a tremendous bold plan: First re-armament, followed later on by talks with the Russians in
order to persuade them to remove their armies behind the Bug River. For this goal the Chancellor has been working tenaciously for some time. And because he sticks to his timetable, he is presently opposed to the Russian Note."

The meaning of these sentences is absolutely clear. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung tells its readers bluntly that Chancellor Adenauer is opposed to the Russian Note for German Reunification because in his opinion the moment for diplomatic talks with the Russians is premature. The geo-political planners in Dr. Adenauer's Foreign Office have set their course first on unification of Europe and in the process shaking down Uncle Sam for more billions of dollars. Only when the Germans have realized these plans for the creation of a Third Power Bloc will they feel the moment opportune to come to terms with the Soviets. It must be pointed out that this plan presupposes the political isolation and bankruptcy of the United States which will ultimately be crowned by an economic depression.

One wonders how such bold political plots can be openly discussed in leading German papers right under the noses of our Occupation authorities in Germany. The Adenauer blueprint of how to trap the United States was explained in detail on a full-page editorial in Christ und Welt, on November 1, 1951, under the headlines "German Foreign Politics in the Fall of 1951." The paper analyzed the four basic principles by which Dr. Adenauer's Foreign Policy is guided. The first principle is the duty to keep Germany and Europe out of war. The second one is the unification of Europe. The third one is European rearmament and the regaining of German equality ("Gleichberechtigung" ). The fourth is re-unification of East and West Germany through a friendly agreement with Moscow.

It is clear that Dr. Adenauer's long-range foreign policy is set for a reorientation towards the East. German industry needs new markets and such outlets can only be offered by the Soviet Bloc. German diplomatic planning is motivated by a combina-
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The question arises: "Is Dr. Adenauer already involved in a secret deal with Moscow?" This question does not seem to be farfetched because the Bonn and Moscow diplomatic stratagems have given sufficient reason for suspicion.

It will be remembered that in the early part of 1949 secret meetings were held between German diplomats and industrialists which were addressed by the former German Ambassador in Moscow, Rudolf Nadolny. He had lived in the Soviet zone and according to newspaper reports was "used in the past by the Soviet Military Administration for compromise offers to the West." Among the participants of the secret meetings were such prominent personalities as Dr. Andreas Hermes, Dr. Hermann Puender and Professor Ludwig Erhard, all close friends and prominent co-leaders in Dr. Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union.

The reports about the secret negotiations between Count Nadolny and West German political and industrial key figures shocked United States officials. A half year later, when Dr. Adenauer was designated to become Chancellor of the newly created Federal Republic, he declared in an interview:

"We must move very cautiously. We ought not to give the impression, either in Germany or in the United States, that we shall collaborate in any way with the Russians."

Dr. Adenauer kept strictly to the line of this formula "not to give the impression . . ." In order to facilitate his "grandiose conception" of a diplomatic deal with the Americans, Dr. Adenauer had to prevent every move that could raise suspicion in the American mind. His task was to implant confidence among the Americans and to convince them that the Germans were full of hatred against the Russians and therefore trustworthy allies of
the West. In this diplomatic undertaking, Dr. Adenauer was successful to an amazing degree. He knew that without America's dollar grants and aids Germany's economic and political revival would have been impossible.

From the beginning, it was clear to Dr. Adenauer and his advisors that Germany would play a decisive role in Washington's containment plans, but he also knew that this would involve great dangers for Germany. In the fall of 1949, when Dr. Adenauer had become the first Chancellor of the Bonn Federal Republic, the Russians were vehemently opposed to all plans of German rearmament. Moscow declared bluntly that it would not tolerate German rearmament and that every German found in uniform would be shot as a partisan and conspirator.

When, at the outbreak of the Korean War, Washington pushed ahead with its plans to rearm the Germans, the Russian opposition had made such a deep impression on the German masses that the "Ohne Mich" movement became the genuine expression of German public opinion.

In the beginning of 1951 rumors were circulating among German political and industrial leaders that Moscow would welcome a secret understanding with Western Germany. A long list of events could be cited to prove that throughout 1951 Moscow pursued a policy of reconciliation between East and West Germany. We can safely assume that since the beginning of 1951, when West German industrial representatives had their secret talks in Moscow, a certain clandestine diplomatic contact was also established between the Adenauer Government and the Kremlin.

Diplomatic observers have wondered on what basis Dr. Adenauer, during the year 1951, could give firm assurances to the German public that Russia would not intervene in the proposed German rearmament within the framework of the Atlantic Pact Organization. Furthermore, in numerous editorials from Germany's leading newspapers, including the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Das Ganze Deutschland, Christ und Welt, the
Russians were assured that they would have nothing to fear from German rearmament. These newspapers pointed out that, as a matter of fact, Russia's western borders would be greatly secured if the United States Armed Forces in Europe were replaced by a new German army. The German papers have even hinted that on this score there exists a perfect understanding between Russian interests and the diplomatic views of the Bonn Government.

In a review of events of the year 1951, Dr. Adenauer's mouthpiece, the Rheinischer Merkur, of January 4, 1952, pointed to the fact that the former widespread panic and fear of Russian aggression has completely receded due to "new facts which have taken the pressure from us." Then the paper stated: "The Chancellor had certain reasons to declare in his Christmas message that the threat for peace has lessened." Were the "new facts" of which the Adenauer paper spoke those which changed Russian policy towards the German problem, granting Germany reunification, remilitarization, full equality, freedom of trade and uncontrolled reinstatement of former Nazis and officers in public life? Did Dr. Adenauer have advance knowledge of Moscow's diplomatic bombshell? It is quite possible that Bonn and the Kremlin could have helped each other considerably in furthering their mutual diplomatic game by a secret understanding. This would explain also the fact why Moscow even encouraged Dr. Adenauer to continue his negotiations with the West, as was mentioned in the article in Christ und Welt of November 1, 1951.

The Russians could long ago have incorporated East Germany into the Soviet bloc for good. If they abstained from such a venture, they must have good reasons for it. Eastern Germany was certainly not a liability to the Russians but a source of good revenue. The 18 million Germans in the Eastern Zone worked hard and were exploitable. Therefore, why did the Russians decide to give Eastern Germany up, in face of the announced American plan to incorporate the Eastern Germans in a formi-
dable power unit together with West Germany? All German papers are convinced that Russia's offer for re-unification is seriously meant. Only Dr. Adenauer plays coy. Is that strange behavior part of his diplomatic game to put pressure on Washington in order to obtain a higher price from the West?

The diplomatic scene in Germany looks indeed very strange. We must bear in mind that Stalin already in May 1945 made an offer to the German people for unification and that similar offers followed in subsequent years.

Is it not clearly visible that Dr. Adenauer's diplomacy is shaped according to the blueprints of the geo-political planners in Madrid? As a clever tactician, Adenauer does not disclose his future plans to the Western powers. But nobody knows better than he that Germany cannot get along indefinitely on the crutches of financial assistance from the United States. As the political representative of the industrial captains of the Rhine and the Ruhr, he knows full well that Germany needs markets for her exports. These principal markets are in Russia, in Eastern Europe, in China and Southeast Asia. Therefore, Germany has to look towards the East for a solution of her future problems.

In order to solve the problems of German Realpolitik, Adenauer has to strive for an immediate goal which at the same time will not hamper the realization of Germany's traditional long-range policy.

Exploiting American illusions while, at the same time, preserving the bridge leading to a rapprochement with the Soviets, is the heart of German policy today, as carried out by Chancellor Adenauer. An example of this diplomatic tightrope performance occurred during the period when the Contractual Agreement was up for consideration before the United States Senate in June 1952. At that time, U.S. High Commissioner McCloy and the State Department placed heavy pressure on the Senate to ratify the agreement promptly. Mr. McCloy's anxiety partially stemmed from the fact that Chancellor Adenauer, according to newspaper dispatches from Germany, had warned him that the
treaty must be signed and ratified as quickly as possible for, otherwise, the Chancellor would no longer be able to keep the German people in line vis-a-vis the luring offers of German re-unification coming from the Kremlin.

By raising this alarm, Dr. Adenauer strengthened Germany's bargaining position and forced our officials to move with such haste that the Senate was prevented from making a careful study of the voluminous treaty which consists of 400 typewritten pages. In contrast to Dr. Adenauer's arguments for the necessity of a speedy ratification of the Contractual Agreement, leading German newspapers, at the same time, were assuring the Kremlin in editorials that Bonn's long-range policy was directed with a view toward the establishment of German-Russo collaboration.

For example, the influential Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, known for its close relations to the Bonn Foreign Office, stated editorially on May 30, 1952:

"We do not need to call the attention of the experienced men in the Kremlin to the fact that a strong and unified Western Europe can defend its independence against every side. Why should the Kremlin not be interested in such an independence? ... If the world, which is split today in two parts, could be reshuffled into a number of independent power groups, it may prevent this horrible conflagration for mankind. A flexible and prudent Russian policy could, for instance, grant German reunification in exchange for the independence of Europe which could be defended against every side. In such a case the reunification of Germany would become a guarantee for peace. The treaties which are presently signed will not prove to be a curb toward reunification if the Russians remain interested in such a solution."

A few days later, in an editorial of June 5, 1952, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung declared:

"If we Germans would come to feel that the other powers, openly or tacitly, try to hinder German equality and re-
unification, the treaties would quickly turn out to have been built on quicksand. Out European neighbors must learn to forget their fear of the revival of German power . . . The fact that we are tied up with the NATO pact does not make it impossible for Europe, as soon as it is strong enough and the international situation has changed, to become one day independent from every side ('nach alien Seiten unabhaengig')."

Similar suggestions were made in other German newspapers. The political weekly, Der Fortschritt, representing the industrial interests of the Ruhr, published on May 16, 1952, an editorial under the significant title, "Courage Towards a Rapallo," from which we quote:

"Never before has the world political situation been so favorable for Germany as it is today ... It is not for nothing that both power blocs concentrate their efforts on Germany in order to dominate it politically and economically. Therein lies our chance and our obligation. Our economy has to be kept independent from both sides . . . This is the way that leads towards sovereignty and equality which finally will eliminate all those clauses which were imposed upon us as a result of the lost war . . . While integration with the West restricts our industry to markets where we are subjected to a cut-throat competition, the Eastern bloc offers us markets where countless millions are hungry for our industrial goods. Here (in the East) is Germany's market. Here we have to sell our merchandise. Our industrialists should see to it that they do not arouse suspicions of being more interested in armament orders which usually bring a boom for a limited period only . . . Thirty years ago, on April 16, 1922, there were courageous men who, in Rapallo, through direct Russo-German negotiations brought a great turning point in Germany's post-war policy . . . The situation in present day Germany should exhort our leading statesmen to show courage—courage towards a Rapallo Policy."
Few of the Senators who were responsible for recommending the treaty for ratification were aware of this strange contrast in German maneuverings. However, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, Senator Theodore Green did confront Commissioner McCloy with an excerpt from the editorial in the pro-Adenauer newspaper, Christ und Welt, which declared that Germany, in the name of a united Europe, would make an offer to the Kremlin that Continental Europe would break away from the Atlantic Pact if the Soviets would care to make territorial concessions on Germany's eastern frontier. This open manifestation of a policy of betrayal expressed by a leading political journal of the Adenauer camp was viewed by Mr. McCloy as unimportant and he added: "I simply say that this is not today the trend of German thinking."

In view of the editorial comment of leading German newspapers as quoted above, Mr. McCloy's statement might be easily adjudged as sheer wishful thinking. In any event, the overwhelming majority of the Senators who were called upon to ratify the Agreement were kept in the dark as to the real trend of German public opinion as reflected in the German press. Thus, through cunning maneuvering, German diplomacy was able to work both sides of the street. Dr. Adenauer succeeded in stampeding the United States into a hasty ratification, while, at the same time, the Russians received assurances that Germany's support for European integration was based on pure expediency and would ultimately be of advantage to both Russian and German interests.

When it was clear to the Germans that the State Department would have no trouble in obtaining a prompt ratification of the Contractual Agreement in the Senate, they seized this opportunity to demand new concessions as their price for ratification. The German press and leading German politicians joined in one chorus in denouncing the agreement as "another Versailles" and insisted on the immediate release of war criminals and on obtaining additional billions of dollars from the U.S. Treasury.
Even the pro-Adenauer press openly recommended that this was the time to insist on immediate revisions of the treaty and that ratification of the agreement would in no way prevent West Germany from coming to terms with the Russians.

Ordinarily, one would have expected the State Department to "stop, look and listen." However, having succumbed to Adenauer's bargaining strategy, our officials proceeded full steam ahead on the business of ratification, ignoring the danger signals. It is true that some Senators voiced concern whether the U.S.A. should have been the first to ratify the treaty. They pointed to reports from Germany that the Germans "are not going to be in any hurry to ratify these treaties." Again, Mr. McCloy came to the rescue of Chancellor Adenauer by assuring the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he had received "in the last 24 hours" from "direct contacts with the Cabinet and the Chancellor" assurances that all was well. Thus, the Senate went ahead and ratified an agreement which abolishes all effective controls over Germany's economic and political capabilities and has thereby created a situation where the Germans are now in a position to execute their strategic design based on a future agreement with the Soviets.

Mr. McCloy has not only failed to provide the Senators with the real facts concerning German public opinion, but he made another profound error in judgment for which, one day, other millions of American youths may have to pay with their lives. We quote from the stenographic record of the hearings:

SENATOR SMITH: Mr. McCloy, do you feel that these agreements when they are executed, will tend to calm down the upsurge of the old Nazi points of view?
MR. MC CLOY: I think so. I firmly believe that with the fundamental non-Nazi attitudes which exist today in Germany, and when they are buttressed by a closer association of the Germans with the free peoples of the
West, the influence of the Nazis will decrease rather than increase.

Every informed observer of the political scene knows that Mr. McCloy's reply to Senator Smith's query is contrary to the facts. Indeed, if the Senators had made a thorough investigation of this question, they would have found overwhelming evidence attesting to the fact that Germany is in the process of being re-Nazified. German nationalism, as every informed observer knows, is on the upsurge. The Prussian militarist and Hitler's generals are coming back to power. Thousands of Nazi war criminals have been or are being released and many of them have reappeared in positions of power. Neo-Nazi movements are gaining strength daily and many of them boast that by 1956 a Nazi dictatorship will be re-established. As a matter of fact, Dr. Adenauer's coalition cabinet is anchored on two right-wing parties of the German industrial war lords who fattened themselves on Hitler's wars of conquest. This is a picture decidedly at variance with Mr. McCloy's description of "democracy" in Germany.

The consequences of our unrealistic policy in Germany may lend itself to a similar catastrophe as we experienced a few years ago in China. This fear was expressed by one of the most alert and farsighted among the foreign policy experts in the U.S. Senate, Senator Guy M. Gillette (D.—Iowa), who, on April 17, 1950, introduced a resolution calling on President Truman to appoint a Commission in order to re-examine our German policy.

Two days later, Senator Gillette, in a speech at the Town Hall in New York, warned:

"A day of reckoning will come over Germany just as it came over China. I suspect that the resulting explosion in the U.S. will make the outcry on China seem like a pleasant afternoon tea."

"For in Germany it will be seen that we have not only lost the second world war—and that the Nazis, rather than we,
were the victors—but that we have, unconsciously, prepared the way for us to lose a third world war if it comes."

Unfortunately, the German problem is regarded as tabu in the State Department and in the Pentagon. Up to now, the American people have had to swallow every blunder of our policy shapers, and the taxpayers are confronted with the "necessity" to pump billions of dollars into feeding this Frankenstein. Yet, after the Germans have squeezed from us all possible concessions, after they have extorted additional billions of dollars and after we have relinquished important rights of control, the Germans will turn their backs on us and start their bargaining with the Kremlin. Such a development would not only spell the doom of our whole containment policy in Europe, but it would also result in a new threat by a German-dominated Third Power Bloc.

From the military victory of 1945, we have gone a long way towards losing the peace. Unless the United States casts away the hypnotic spell so artfully created by the "Old Fox," Dr. Adenauer, the trap will be sprung.
During the war the German geo-politicians declared that if the campaign is lost militarily in Europe, the war must be won politically in the United States. Recalling how successful they had been after 1918 they were confident that they could repeat those accomplishments.

The geo-politician Dr. Colin Ross, who was the "Amerika" expert in Ribbentrop's Foreign Office, suggested in his memorandum of July, 1943, that "the more the prospects of military victory diminish, the more urgent becomes the necessity for all-out psychological warfare." An ideological offensive in the USA was recommended by Dr. Ross as "the order of the day."

It is true that after each World War the victors made elaborate plans to demilitarize Germany. Yet the plans of the victors fell through. Why did they fail? The usual explanation is that the
war-time alliance after the cessation of hostilities "fell apart" because of basic contradictions within the Allied camp. However, this is only part of the answer for it does not take into account the active role of Germany in bringing about this split.

The captured German Foreign Office files contain a wealth of evidence on this score. Moreover, the files show that from 1943 to 1944 the diplomats in the Wilhelmstrasse felt absolutely sure that Germany, if defeated, would enjoy the protection of influential circles in the United States.

The Germans based their hope on the experience after World War I when German power was also resurrected mainly with the financial, diplomatic and propagandistic help of certain powerful groups in the U.S.A. In addition, they knew that the network that German agents had built up under Hitler in the U.S. remained relatively intact. Germany's influential friends in the U.S.A. had only temporarily restrained their pro-German activities after Pearl Harbor. They came out into the open when it became necessary to agitate in public for forgiveness towards Germany and to safeguard Germany's war potential.

Germany's success in overcoming military defeat is the fruit of German geo-political planning. The essentials of the pan-German scheme for world power were clearly recognized as early as fifty years ago by Theodore Roosevelt. Yet, it took the lesson of the Second World War for Western statesmen to recognize the main features of Germany's master plan. Germany had always applied the old principle of "divide and conquer." As after the First World War, Germany was the sole profiteer of disunity among the Allies after World War II. Our European Allies have not fared well under our post-war policy toward Germany. In addition, the French are exhausted, and the British are weakened. The United States, the most powerful victor at the end of the war, is laboring under great strain because it has over-extended its commitments. On the other hand, defeated Germany is now in a position to start afresh. Thus, the great American experiment of establishing a secure and peaceful
world may end in failure in Europe as it has in Asia. Germany, caught red-handed in the greatest crime of recorded history, was not made harmless. Within a short time, she will be set free to resume her intrigues and her diplomacy of the jungle. If it is true that Germany's resurgence is partially the result of a conscious plan to split her adversaries, how does it happen that U.S. policy in the post-war period played into the hands of the former enemy?

Since Roosevelt's death, fundamental aspects of our foreign policy have been shaped or influenced by a small circle in the Pentagon, composed mostly of top-level military planners and big-business representatives who served at that time in the Pentagon. This group, from the beginning, opposed Roosevelt's post-war policy which aimed to render Germany harmless once and for all. A few days after Roosevelt's death, his plans for Germany were dropped, and as Drew Pearson revealed in his column of April 25 and 26, 1945, the inside group "favored a soft peace for Germany with a view to making her a bulwark against Russia after the war." Instead of Roosevelt's post-war program, the Pentagon adopted ex-President Herbert Hoover's thesis of a "cooling-off period" and of a soft peace for Germany. A few months later the policy shaping group in the Pentagon found a political platform in the theories of a young State Department official, George F. Kennan, who had spent many years in Germany where he had absorbed the techniques and concepts of German geo-politics.

Early in 1946 George Kennan had attracted the attention of top officials in Washington with a memorandum on Soviet foreign policy:

"This dispatch was considered so lucid that Kennan was recalled to Washington to act as State Department deputy in the newly reorganized National War College. His lectures on international affairs quickly became 'musts' for all high-ranking officers in the armed forces."

(United Nations World—March 1952)
According to the well-informed U.S. News and World Report of July 25, 1947, George Kennan's ideas had "a profound influence" upon the decisions which led to policy changes in Germany and Japan:

"Under the new policies, the German people will get a chance to recover and to rebuild their industries, subject to supervision. That will be true as far as U.S. can influence policy. Steel capacity will be raised to at least 12,000,000 tons."

After the Kennan formula of rebuilding Germany as a "bulwark against the East" had been adopted, all the subsequent decisions made by the leading men in the Pentagon were carried out in accordance with this view. Yet this premise was a fallacy from the very beginning.

The top officials in the State Department were, in 1945, thoroughly aware of the issues involved. They knew that the German High Command, in 1943-1944, had made extensive preparations for a continuation of political warfare against the Allies after the anticipated military collapse. The State Department had also ample evidence in its files, showing that German authorities had laid the groundwork in foreign countries for the continuation of activities of German political brain trusts and for the preservation of Germany's economic war potential. That the Germans had also made plans for the continuation of German scientific research in foreign countries was also known to the State Department.

After Roosevelt's death, little of significance was done by the State Department to clarify the vital issue of Germany. The documents on Germany's post-war planning, supposedly in the safes of the State Department, were never made public. But a point was reached where even the policy-shapers in the State Department became skeptical about the direction of our foreign policy. In 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes made a last attempt to compromise between the course of a one-sided pro-German
policy and the political realities in our relations towards Russia and the friendly powers in Western Europe. Secretary Byrnes saw clearly the dangerous consequences arising from a resurrection of German power.

In order to eliminate Russian fears as well as the suspicions in London and Paris, Mr. Byrnes suggested, on October 3, 1946, a program of Allied control over the whole of Germany for a period of 40 years:

"Twice in our generation doubt as to American foreign policy has led other nations to miscalculate the consequences of their actions. Twice in our generation that doubt as to American foreign policy has not brought peace, but war. "That must not happen again. "France, which has been invaded three times in the last 75 years by Germany, naturally does not want to be in doubt as to American foreign policy towards Germany. "To dispel any doubt on that score the United States has proposed that the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States shall enter into a solemn treaty not only to disarm and demilitarize Germany but to keep Germany disarmed and demilitarized for 40 years. And the treaty can be extended if the interests of international peace and security require. "The treaty I proposed on behalf of the United States contains all the provisions of that agreement. It provides that all German armed forces, all para-military forces, and all the auxiliary organizations shall be kept demobilized. It provides farther that the German General Staff and the staffs of any para-military organizations shall be prohibited and no German military or para-military organizations in any form or disguise shall be permitted in Germany. It provides for the complete and continued demilitarization of her war plants and for a continuing system of quadripartite inspection and control to make certain that Germany does not rearm or rebuild her armament plants or reconvert her civilian industries for war."
"So long as such a treaty is in force the Ruhr could never become the arsenal of Germany or the arsenal of Europe. That is a primary objective of the proposed treaty. "The United States is firmly opposed to the revival of Germany's military power. It is firmly opposed to a struggle for the control of Germany which would again give Germany the power to divide and conquer. It does not want to see Germany become a pawn or a partner in a struggle for power between the East and the West."

(Department of State—Publication 2670.)

In retrospect, we see clearly that the Byrnes plan was the last attempt for the creation of a constructive U.S. post-war policy. At that time we still had a tremendous bargaining power against a weakened Russia, and we also had a big stick in order to enforce proper conduct on defeated Germany.

Byrnes was looking for a stabilizing element in our foreign policy. He was aware of the danger inherent in a policy based on wishful thinking and expediency. Unfortunately, after Byrnes our diplomacy became prisoner of that very policy.

Byrnes' attempts to reach a settlement with the Russians were opposed by the policy shapers in the Pentagon. One of the chief opponents of the Byrnes formula for a compromise with the Soviets was George F. Kennan, who held the position of Deputy for Foreign Affairs at the National War College during 1946.

After Byrnes was replaced by General Marshall as Secretary of State, the main policy shaping job in the State Department was put into the hands of George Kennan. As director of the Policy Planning Staff and Counselor to the State Department, he became the de facto Secretary of State. Together with the military, this young diplomat completely reversed the original program for Germany.

In the foreword of his book American Diplomacy, Kennan declares that "it fell to me to bear a share of the responsibility for forming the foreign policy of the United States in the difficult years following World War II."
George Kennan was a leading spirit among those in the Pentagon and in the State Department who were dabbling in the geo-political theories of General Haushofer. They were overawed by Haushofer's dictum that Germany was the key to Europe. Perhaps this may explain the strange attitude of Mr. Kennan even after Pearl Harbor. When Kennan was interned with other American diplomats in the Grand Hotel at Bad Nauheim, Germany, he gave lectures in which he expounded the thesis that Germany's defeat "would extinguish the 2,000 year old history of European civilization." (Der Spiegel, Hanover, December 5, 1951)* During his years of study at Heidelberg and at the "Hochschule fuer Politik" in Berlin, he was taught to believe the geo-political gospel that Germany was the "bulwark against the East," and that without a strong Germany, the world would become a shambles.

* The report that an American diplomat should, in 1942, have deplored the possible defeat of an enemy who had ruthlessly engineered the attack and declared war on the United States, seemed so unbelievable to the author that he asked Mr. Kennan as well as the editors of Der Spiegel whether this particular incident was correctly reported.

In a letter to the author of August 19, 1952, Mr. Kennan did not reject the possibility that he could have made such a statement, but he pointed to a lack of recollection:

"The account of the lectures which I gave to my fellow internees at Bad Nauheim is somewhat inaccurate. It is true that I lectured to them about Russian history, but I never got beyond Catherine the Great, and I recall no discussion of contemporary problems as described in Der Spiegel article."

The editor-in-chief of Der Spiegel declared in a letter to the author, dated October 29, 1952:

"In regard to your inquiry about the Kennan discussion at Bad Nauheim, we can assure you that we received this information from a reliable person—an official of the former German Foreign Office—who had been especially assigned to take care of the interned personnel of the American Embassy in Berlin. After our staff members had an opportunity to talk extensively with Mr. Kennan about the article published in our magazine, we have no reason to doubt the accuracy of our source in regard to the reported events at Bad Nauheim."
It is known that some of Germany's leading geo-politicians have boasted of the close relations they had at one time or another with George Kennan. From these German geo-political writers we know that Kennan shared their opinion on major political problems. His outlook on world affairs was partially influenced by his education in Germany. He was born in Wisconsin in 1904, but he spent part of his formative years in Germany. The New York Times of December 11, 1949, reported that George Kennan "did post-graduate studies at the University of Heidelberg, the University of Berlin, the Oriental Seminary, and the Hochschule fuer Politik in Berlin." All these institutions were well-known for teaching extreme pan-German and geo-political doctrines.*

It seems that Kennan's views on Germany have been colored by the historical "truths" propounded at the Hochschule fuer Politik in Berlin. It is well known that this kind of "history" was tailored in Germany for foreign consumption and it had, during the twenties, its deepest impact on the "revisionist" school in the United States.

In order to discern clearly the elements on which "America's diplomatic Chief of Staff" built our foreign policy, it is necessary to trace in Kennan's book American Diplomacy his attitude toward Germany, the same Germany whose demoniacal spirit and

* The case of George Kennan is only one example of the influence of German thinking and education on diplomats, political leaders, and military men who have thought and acted along the geo-political tracks in which they were brought up and nourished in their formative years. There is little difference whether they were educated in Germany by pan-German professors or in the United States by professors with pan-German leanings. The influence of German education and its political consequences have been clearly visible for a long time in the U.S., Latin America and in many countries of Europe. The effects of German education have been well analyzed by Professor John L. Brown of Catholic University of Washington, D.C., who in an article in the Journal of Legal and Political Sociology traced the pan-German ideology in the United States to the growing German influence in the cultural and educational spheres of this country.
lust for power brought the free world to the brink of disaster twice within a generation.

Kennan, discussing the origins of both world wars, does not bother to make a critical analysis of Germany's war-making forces. The doctrine of pan-Germanism which dominated the saber-rattling policy of Imperial Germany is totally ignored by him. The documentary evidence attesting to Germany's guilt with regard to World War I is not mentioned. Kennan absolves Germany from being the main culprit of World War I by declaring: "You could not say that anyone had deliberately started the war or schemed it."

The following statement from Kennan's book has been especially emphasized in important sections of the German press:

"Both wars were fought, really with a view to changing Germany: to correcting her behavior, to making the Germans something different from what they were. Yet, today, if one were offered the chance of having back again the Germany of 1913—a Germany run by conservative but relatively moderate people, no Nazis and no Communists, a vigorous Germany, united and unoccupied, full of energy and confidence, able to play a part again in the balancing-off of Russian power in Europe—well, there would be objections to it from many quarters, and it wouldn't make everybody happy; but in many ways it wouldn't sound so bad, in comparison with our problems of today. Now, think what this means. When you tally up the total score of the two wars, in terms of their ostensible objective, you find that if there has been any gain at all, it is pretty hard to discern. Does this not mean that something is terribly wrong here? . . . We can only assume some great miscalculations must have been made somewhere." (American Diplomacy, p. 55)

Having paid his highest respect to the Germany of the Kaiser, Kennan glosses over the serious political defections of the Weimar Republic with the following remark:
"Events have moved so fast that we have almost lost sight of this intensely interesting period in German history—the period before 1933, with its amazing cultural and intellectual flowering, so full of hope and yet so close to despair. In the decade of the twenties, Berlin was the most alive of the capitals of Europe, and things were taking place there from which the Western democracies might have derived profit and instruction." (p. 80)

In clarifying the origins of World War II, it is absolutely irrelevant to dwell on the "cultural and intellectual flowering" in Germany. The point in question is only Germany's political honesty and reliability, and whether or not she was guilty of both world wars. Yet there is not a word of criticism in Mr. Kennan's book against the secret war preparations and the insidious foreign policies of the Weimar Republic under Drs. Wirth and Stresemann, and there is no mention of how Hitler was pampered and nourished by the financial and industrial circles, and the militaristic plotters in the Republic. In spite of the fact that we put defeated Germany back on her feet and restored her war potential to the tune of billions of dollars, Kennan blames America for not having given "greater understanding, support and encouragement to the moderate forces in the Weimar Republic." It is the same old illusion that with more favors, with greater concessions, and with additional billions of dollars you could satisfy the appetite of the always insatiable German eagle.

The world-shaking event of Hitler's aggressions is only dealt with superficially. Kennan's book is a belated justification for American isolationism. He is pained by the "great mistakes of the Western statesmen . . . which had permitted the development of a situation so grievously and fatefully 'loaded' against Western interests." And he adds:

"The thought at once suggests itself that the best way to win so inauspicious a war might have been to find some way in which one would not have had to fight it at all." (p. 77)
Kennan actually blames the Western powers for a development in Germany where "the German people found itself in such a frame of mind that it could, without great resistance or remonstrance, accept a Hitler as its leader and master." Having thus freed the Germans from responsibility for accepting the Fuehrer, Kennan blames the West for not having implemented a policy which "might have enforced a greater circumspection on the Nazi regime and cause it to proceed more slowly with the actualization of its time table." [italics supplied]

Completely overlooking the inherent war-making forces in Germany, Kennan innocently asks "whether World War II was not perhaps implicit in the outcome of World War I." He has an answer for this too:

"Looking at these things, it is easy to conclude that World War II just could not help to develop, that it was nothing more than the inevitable aftermath of World War I." (p. 78)

There is not a word in Mr. Kennan's book about the outrages of German militarism during World War I or a condemnation of the unspeakable crimes committed against millions of innocent people by Nazi Germany. However, he blames the Western powers for their attitude of "distaste and suspicion" against Germany, "intermingled with a sort of social snobbery so grotesque that as late as 1927 a German could still be prohibited from using the golf links at Geneva, the seat of the League of Nations."

Here, the discrimination against a German on the golf course in Geneva, whether it ever happened or not, is duly noted, but the intoxicated frenzy of "Deutschland Uber Alles," the torture chambers, the extermination ovens, the murder of one million two hundred thousand Jewish children, and of many millions of other European peoples is not even mentioned in Mr. Kennan's book.
No wonder that this kind of "history," seen through the glasses of the Hochschule fuer Politik, could only end up in the resurgence of a strong Germany. Kennan declared in his book that he felt "very unhappy" about the conferences in Moscow, Teheran and Yalta in which Germany's fate was sealed. Was it then not logical for him, therefore, that when he became the most influential policy shaper in Washington, his immediate aim was to build Germany up again as the power house of Europe?

The New York Times of October 4, 1952, stated that Kennan's position as Director of the State Department Planning Staff made him "more than any other single person the architect of our foreign policy."

When George Kennan developed his containment policy, it was basically the sound application of the formula "no more appeasement." It was put to work only against Russia, but not against Germany. In regard to Germany, Kennan always favored a policy of appeasement. It was this policy that finally paved Germany's way out from defeat and again made Germany the strongest power on the continent. This policy will finally open the door to the coming rapprochement between Germany and the East. Kennan's policy deprived the United States of the "big stick," because his recommendation that we curry favor with the Germans in the cold war and that diplomatic intercourse with the Russians should be held at a minimum, provided the Bonn Government with an absolute guarantee that it could demand concessions from the United States without end. Thus, our containment policy towards Russia became simultaneously the basis for the successful operation of the blackmail policy pursued by the Bonn Government.

The Germans could only become the winners of the cold war because our policy was shaped and conducted in a way which, with mathematical certainty, had to end in a triumph for German geo-political planning. In the Madrid Circular Letter.
of September 1950, the geo-politicians boast that Germany's quick resurrection was the consequence of their "superb planning," which caused "the first broad cracks in the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements":

"It is our great asset in the ledger of geo-political schooling and planning that five years after Potsdam, the aims of our enemies have been abandoned, Germany's strength has been preserved, and the Fatherland can look forward to a revival rich in possibilities. The revival of Germany was not a gift of the Americans but exclusively the result of our own far-sighted planning. . . . Five years after Potsdam, the Yankees are stuck deep in the mud; they are now seeking the advice of Our generals whom they formerly called criminals; they come pleading for our help against Russia. "The American policy of reconciliation with Germany was very advantageous because it gave us a breathing spell at the very beginning; it was precisely this policy which smashed the allied front. . . . Only Roosevelt's death opened the way to those forces who advocated a positive or, at least, a more moderate program towards Germany, and whose blue-print for a post-war world were entirely opposed to that of Roosevelt. These circles recognized in the Russian victory a strengthening of Communism, and they feared its complications and the shattering effects it entailed for the capitalistic system.

"These considerations resulted in a plan—first formulated secretly in Washington and later openly discussed, aiming at the creation of a united Europe as a bulwark against Russia with the proviso that a strengthened and rearmed Germany be incorporated in such a combination."

The fantastic result of German geo-political planning becomes clearly visible if we compare the following two sets of policies: the plan which Hitler and his General Haushofer once devised for the "Greater Germany," and the Pentagon-Kennan blue-print for a resurrected Reich.
HITLER-HAUSHEOFER
Blueprint for Germany

1. Liquidation of the Versailles Treaty.
2. German equality (Hitler's demand for "Gleichberechtigung").
3. A prosperous German Economy.
4. A powerful German Army.
5. Economic integration of Europe with Germany.
6. A strong European continent with Germany as the "bulwark against the East."
7. Build-up of Africa as a German-European hinterland.

PENTAGON-KENNAN
Blueprint for Germany

1. Liquidation of the Potsdam Agreement.
2. German equality (Dr. Adenauer's demand for "Gleichberechtigung").
3. A prosperous German Economy.
4. Powerful German Armed Forces.
5. Economic integration of Europe with Germany.
6. A strong European continent with Germany as the "bulwark against the East."
7. Build-up of Africa as a German-European hinterland.

The first six points of the Pentagon-Kennan blueprint for Germany will be readily accepted by every newspaper reader because they constitute the often discussed basic formula of our post-war policy on Germany. If point seven seems to be vague, we refer the reader to the evidence on the German-Africa plan, presented in Chapter IX.

There is one feature in the Pentagon-Kennan blueprint which stands out as a novelty if we compare it with the original Hitler-Haushofer plan. Under Hitler, the financial burden for build-
Our German Appeasement Policy

ing up the German armed forces had to be carried entirely by the German taxpayer, and only later on was to be supported by the systematic plunder of the subjugated European nations. Under the Pentagon-Kennan plan the bill for Germany's resurrection "must be paid by Uncle Sam," as the pro-Adenauer press has stated with bold cynicism. And that is exactly what we are doing.

The Pentagon-Kennan blueprint for the rebuilding of Germany as a strong military power has become a nightmare for the nations in Europe. "Beware of Germany!" is the cry that echoes in the Chamber of Deputies in Paris as well as in the press all over Europe. The current plan for a resurrected Germany is not regarded by the Europeans as a means of protection, but as the opening of a new road to aggression. No matter how great the fear of Communist aggression might ever be, the possibility that Germany will again become the master over Europe stirs up the memories of the recent horrors to which free Europeans were subjected. With the help and pressure of the United States, Germany may attain that tremendous position of power in Europe and Africa which she could not accomplish through the powerful Juggernauts of the Kaiser and der Fuehrer. The German schemers in Madrid are jubilant about the geo-political perspectives of the future:

"In this extended transitory period, it should prove possible for Germany to build up a new political bloc ('neue politische Einheit') out of Europe, Africa and Latin America. The economic advantages and the political possibilities in such a new power combination would put the United States against the wall. It would then depend entirely on our diplomatic and propaganda finesses when and how we would take over an America enfeebled by its foreign and domestic policies." (Madrid Circular Letter.)

It is a tragedy for the United States and the free world that the German geo-politicians were correct in their contemptuous
assessment of the inexperience of our Washington policy shapers. The clever Germans succeeded in selling their vicious schemes in the disguise of "American geo-politics." In the Madrid Circular letter they boast:

"We are not wholly innocent in the shift of America's post-war policy . . . Future historians will one day reveal the great vision with which responsible leaders of the Third Reich created with confident determination those measures which subsequently smashed the united front of the enemy and made Germany again a much desired partner in a new politico-strategic alliance . . . Thanks, however, to our correct decisions, the situation has changed entirely today. We are now once again in the position to influence the turn of events—today we are again making history . . ."

Are the Germans wrong in their evaluation of post-war history? Are they not on the way to "possess unitedly" Europe and Africa? Germany's final triumph will sound the death knell not only of free Europe, but also of a free and independent America.
AMPLE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THE FOREGOING CHAPTERS attesting to the fact that the Germans, due to their superior geo-political planning, are emerging as the political victors of World War II. As revealed in the German documents, Germany's political leaders show a great respect for the tougher Russians whereas they speak with utter contempt of the Americans, who, because of their unrealistic political attitudes, are regarded as "suckers."

The architects of our post-war policy have failed to recognize the flaws in their theories, though the Germans are fully aware of them. It is time that we discard the blinders which have led us to the present impasse. When we understand the fallacies underlying the present policy, we will then be in a position to devise a new approach to the German problem.
First of all, it is preposterous to believe that Germany, after having recently committed the greatest crime in history, could change within a few years into a peaceful and democratic nation or become a reliable ally of the Western world. How can Western statesmen, after decades of dreadful experiences with Germany, trust the lawless with a policeman's job?

Why did responsible statesmen assume that Germany would not again use her double talk, her trickery, and her intrigues in order to disrupt the unity of the West, to extort concessions without end from the victors and—"at the decisive moment"—would not hesitate to switch over to Moscow? Our failure to be on guard invited the consequences we now face.

The facts on Germany and the historic forces which made her an aggressive nation were clearly understood during World War II. The United States then resolved that it must not happen again. Our political leaders, many historians, experts on foreign affairs, and newspapermen with long and intimate experience in German politics, have told us repeatedly that Germany came back as an aggressive power, due to our failures after 1918. Hundreds of newspaper editorials, and articles, and United States policy statements, testify that during the last war the American people were firmly resolved that Germany must never again have a chance to disturb the peace. The former Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles discussed in his book The Time for Decision the stubbornness with which the German people had always followed their military leaders, and their obsession that "the master race will ultimately triumph."

He adds:

"It must be admitted that almost every act of the Allied nations, subsequent to 1918, strengthened this determination on the part of the German people. The policies of the Western nations played right into the hands of the German military authorities . . . Allied support was given time and again to the old line military organizations because it was thought that these alone could prevent Germany from going
Communist! ... If the Allied Governments in the year 1919 had frankly gone into partnership with the German General Staff, in order to help it carry out its designs, they could not have succeeded better."

Sumner Welles’ criticisms of Allied policy after World War I apply with equal force to what we are attempting today with regard to Germany's economic and military revival.

Walter Lippmann, one of our most experienced analysts in international affairs, stated during the war that American public opinion had become the victim of all kinds of fables and illusions regarding the German problem and that Allied mistakes after World War I were really responsible for the fact that Germany was able to restore her military power "on a scale greater than the Kaiser ever dreamed of." Mr. Lippmann further declared:

"I hasten to state that I shared all these illusions at the time and that it is by no means easy even now to find out what really happened." (New York Herald Tribune, May 16, 1944.)

In several of his columns in 1944, Mr. Lippmann named as the greatest misconception of the Allies after World War I, the naive belief that Germany could be used as a "bulwark against Bolshevism." He warned strongly against repeating this error and stated:

"The paramount object of the settlement with Germany must be to prevent Germany from dominating the Continent and thereby holding the balance of power between the Western Democracies and the Soviet Union . . . For the Germans, to whom the mastery of the Continent is the supreme goal, the war would not have been fought in vain. If thirty years hence Germany dominates Europe and thus holds the balance of power between Russia and the English-speaking nations, German historians will not count this war as a true defeat."

(Herald Tribune, March 30, 1944.)
This is a truly prophetic statement. The only difference between the reality of today and Mr. Lippmann's fears of a resurrected Germany lies in the timetable. Walter Lippmann would never have dreamed that Dr. Adenauer could declare, five years after Germany's defeat, that Germany must lead a Third Power Bloc to hold "the balance of power between Western democracies and the Soviet Union."

If World War II was the result of the failures of Allied policy after 1918, as these experienced observers stated, what will then be the outcome of our present mistakes which are far greater than those committed by the Western powers between 1919 and 1939?

In previous chapters, it was shown how the realistic program for post-war Germany was virtually scrapped shortly after President Roosevelt died. The new approach was essentially no different from the Allied treatment of Germany after World War I. Those occupation officials who were responsible for the "new look" had accepted the German "line" that only Germany could be depended upon to block Moscow's drive toward the West. They had ignored completely the fact that the Germans, regardless of differing political faiths, were united in one principle, that is: Germany's special interest must be served above all else.

It is now becoming clear that the Pentagon-Kennan blueprint for Germany is undermining our position in that country. Let us recapitulate some of the many mistakes that our policy shapers made at the very beginning of our Occupation. Some of our leading generals thought that Nazism was not so bad and they did not regard the Nazi party as being very much different from the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States. Consequently, premature elections were arranged in Germany on the theory that they would automatically infuse the German people with the democratic spirit. In the early days of the Occupation we preached a unified Germany, believing that the Germans would appreciate our solicitude. In like manner,
we extended a helping hand to an assortment of generals, geopoliticians, Ribbentrop schemers, scientists, and technicians. This was followed with a general amnesty to millions of Nazis without prior investigation as to their fitness to return to public life. A "free press" was established for the Germans as another step in the so-called democratization program. However, this press has given its reply in the many articles and editorials which attack the Allies and in a subtle way encourage plots against the Occupation. These actions were capped by a multibillion-dollar rehabilitation program financed by American taxpayers to rebuild Germany's heavy industries. We created unprecedented prosperity in Germany, while the British and other Allied powers stewed in "austerity."

Of all the fallacious steps and plans we devised in regard to Germany, the following three proved to be the most dangerous to our own future:

a) The resurrection of an expanded German heavy industry.
b) The plan for a United Europe with Germany as its main pillar.
c) The reactivation of the German military caste and the planned building up of a new German army.

The creation of a united Europe dominated by a people still obsessed by the traditions of aggressive pan-Germanism is tantamount to suicide for the free world. Twice within a generation, the USA went to war and made great sacrifices in blood and treasure in order to prevent the realization of the pan-German scheme. Now we are confronted with a program that yields to the Germans the very objectives for which the Kaiser and der Fuhrer warred in vain.

From the military point of view, limited rearmament of Germany will be of no value because it cannot defeat the overwhelming military might of the Soviets. Yet, if we create in Europe a strong military power in which Germany constitutes the backbone, this will become a threat to all.
There is another great psychological error in the Pentagon-Kennan blueprint. It is the height of naivete to think that the Germans could appear as the "liberators" among the nations of Eastern Europe or in Russia. There is still the stench of the twenty million tortured and gassed human beings, the memory of the tens of thousands of destroyed villages and towns, and all the horrors with which the German master-race terrified the nations in the East. The rearming of the Germans by the United States is the surest way to unite 150 million people in Eastern Europe and 200 millions in Russia solidly behind Stalin. This development will also have its adverse effect on the free nations of Europe. Indeed our German policy acts as a spur rather than a deterrent to the growth of Communistic influence in the West.

From the strategic point of view, the resurrection of a strong Germany is also a cardinal error. Strength must never be created on the periphery, and not at all in an exposed strategic position such as Germany's.

From the commercial point of view, our efforts to build up Germany as a powerful competitor on the world market is shortsighted in the extreme. By giving the Germans excessive economic power and capacity, we are setting up a most dangerous and ruthless competitor who will use every opportunity to undermine and sap our economic strength. We must bear in mind that the rebuilding of German industry after World War I, with the help of American dollars, not only gave Hitler the basis for an army, but, after his defeat, opened the gates to Communist expansion. The prospect of German economic power breaking up the containment policy is before us. German industry will look out for markets and the Russians can offer German industry prosperous deals in Eastern Europe and in China. These are the fundamental flaws in our present policy toward Germany. If they were eliminated, the policy itself would have to go.

We have shown in the previous chapters that the Pentagon-
Kennan policy helps in fact to realize the plans which our most
revengeful enemies, the German geo-political plotters and the
Ribbentrop diplomats, proposed during and after the war. The
free peoples of Europe and we in the United States are con-
fronted with a daily mounting clanger: The resurrection of a
"new" Germany that continues to fight for the very goals set
down by Hitler . . . From the German plans we know what is
in store for us: The creation of a new Third Power bloc, stretch-
ing over Europe and the whole of Africa and branching out to
Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The New
Third Power bloc will bring, according to German plans, the
economic ruin of the Anglo-Saxon world and ultimately "put
the United States against the wall."

The urgency of the problem needs an immediate re-examina-
tion of our basic policies on Germany. It is clear that we are
rapidly approaching a crisis and we shall have only ourselves
to blame if we are unprepared to meet it. This is not the time
for recriminations. It is time for action based on fact—-and fact
alone. Just as we must avoid appeasement, so must we develop
a flexibility in our diplomacy which will enable us to maneuver
and not be out-maneuvered.

To obtain the facts requisite for a sound and long-range pro-
gram, a re-examination of our German policy should be under-
taken forthwith. It should be scrutinized by the Government
with the full cooperation of the members of Congress who
represent the interests of the American taxpayer.

We must not close our eyes to the sinister developments in
Western Germany today. We must also be alerted to the fact
that the element of conspiracy is a highly regarded asset in the
diplomatic workshops of Germany as well as in the Kremlin.
Both sides are following a time-honored pattern which has been
proven very successful in the past.

The evidence of the conspiratorial trend is conclusive. It
reaches from the secret negotiations of former Ambassador
Nadolny and ex-Chancellor Dr. Wirth to the open statements of betrayal against the West made by Count Rechenberg in the Bundestag—from the clever arguments of the pro-Adenauer spokesmen in Christ und Welt to the plotting of the geo-political master minds in Madrid and Buenos Aires—and from the more polished overtures in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung down to the blunt language of the "Open Letter to Stalin" in the Chicago Bürger Zeitung. We cannot disregard these actions as inconsequential or isolated incidents; on the contrary they are straws in the wind—manifestations of German Realpolitik.

Was Joseph Stalin "pipe-dreaming" when he announced to the world, in October 1952, that Germany and Japan would again become great powers and that war between the capitalistic countries is inevitable? Stalin obviously based his predictions on certain facts which, in all probability, will not be known to the West for some time to come. In any event, Stalin's speculations are based on Germany's plans for a Third Power bloc, the goal of which is to maintain close ties with the Soviets in order to obtain markets in the East, and at the same time isolate and undermine the United States.

Washington's fallacious post-war policy placed Germany in the driver's seat. Today, as in the past, Germany is driving towards Moscow!

Two years ago, we had a "Great Debate" on our Asia policy. Shall we delay the re-examination and investigation of the fallacies of our German policy until the lightning strikes again—until we read the front-page news of the reborn Berlin-Moscow Axis? Let us have a calm but profound debate on Germany now.

The American people have a right to ask for a review of our Occupation policy in Germany, the more so since the issues have never been discussed in any election.

When, in 1950, Senators and Congressmen asked for an investigation of our occupation policies in Germany, Mr. McCloy hurried from Germany to Washington in order to prevent such
At the Crossroads ... a congressional review and investigation. When we made attempts to investigate our policies in Asia, we acted too late because the investigation came after the horse was out of the stable. In the case of Germany, however, we still have the opportunity to re-examine our experiment of "calculated optimism" before we lose complete control of the situation.

While a review of our occupation in Germany would be most helpful for the future, there are certain realistic steps which can be taken on the basis of what we now know in regard to German plans. For example, we still have it within our power to put an end to the blackmail diplomacy of the Bonn Government and we can enforce a housecleaning of the Nazi and neo-Nazis who have wormed their way back into positions of power.

It has not been the purpose of this book to present a new set of principles for a constructive U.S. policy in Europe which will best serve our national interests and those of our Allied friends. To develop such a policy will require a long and arduous process of re-examination, fact-finding, and constructive thinking.

However, insofar as Germany is concerned, we are faced with the following alternatives in the developing of a new policy. We can ask the Russians whether they would be willing to negotiate on Germany on the basis of Byrnes' proposals of 1946 or on some other realistic program that would not compromise our national security or our sense of justice. If we cannot reach an agreement with Moscow on the question of Germany, then we must follow the only other course open to us: That is, the United States should remain in Germany as an occupying power until there is clear proof that a new generation of Germans can be trusted or until we have made the other European powers so strong that they can prevent the resurgence of aggressive German militarism without our help.

One fact should have become clear by now: We cannot rely
on present-day Germany as a bulwark against the East. History has proven that to rely on such a policy would be suicidal.

The bulwark against aggressive Communism must be the United States—and not a people who—"at the decisive moment"—will make common cause with our enemies.
German Documents
The document reprinted below is a secret memorandum issued by the German Geo-Political Center in Madrid. It constitutes a general analysis of the world political situation after the Korean war broke out. The Madrid Geo-Political Center issues secret memoranda of this type from time to time, which are distributed among key German circles in Bonn as well as in other parts of the world. There is no doubt that the Madrid document constitutes something like a blueprint for the foreign policy of the Bonn government. In a larger sense, the Madrid Circular Letter is a general staff plan for a new German approach to divide and conquer the world.

SG 23
Top Secret!
The War in Korea and World Political Possibilities for Germany and Europe

1. The World Situation Five Years After Potsdam
   The war in Korea has brought the world political situation to a climax with such momentum that we must reckon seriously with the possibility of a third world war. The repercussions and the impact of the Korea conflict are unforeseeable at the moment and no predictions can be made as to the possible turn of events.

   Certain political and military factors stand out: Russia has used the five years' interval since the end of the war to strengthen her military preparedness in an extraordinary manner, whereas the United States and the western coalition have neglected their military establishment.
Among the unknown imponderables are the following: secret weapons, new tactics, planning for sabotage, extent of future destruction, choice of theaters of war, and of neutral zones.

The critical world situation compels unemotional and painstaking pondering of all these factors which, in a favorable or unfavorable manner, might influence the future of Germany and Europe. The war in Korea can bring great opportunities to Germany if she follows a prudent foreign policy; in fact, Germany has already gained many advantages thanks to the present war situation. Nonetheless, there is the danger that through false steps or through the chain reaction of events, the whole of Europe will be swamped by a tidal wave of unimaginable destruction. Such an event must be prevented at all cost. Everything today depends on a far-sighted, subtle and quick-shifting policy which must constantly bear in mind not only the future of Germany, but the destiny of Europe as a whole. We must, by all means, prevent a development whereby Europe will be destroyed between the Russian and the American millstones.

2. The Role of Germany and Europe in the Present Crisis

Not merely Germany, but the whole of Europe has been bled white and is not now in a position to act as a decisive factor in world politics. The aim of German policy, and that of Europe as a whole, must be to remain neutral in any new world conflict no matter the circumstances. This is especially important for Germany for she still has a long way to go until she can regain her political freedom and her economic strength to the fullest extent. Germany has exploited the tension between the East and the West to the utmost and she must continue her efforts in that direction. She must endeavor to influence discreetly the shaping of the future. Not only is it decisive how Germany acts in her own interest, but she in turn is also greatly affected by the policies of the other European powers. England and France today are perhaps more dependent on the United States than the still occupied West German Republic.

Europe, on the one hand, is today in an unenviable strategic position, but, on the other hand, it enjoys the advantage of being the geopolitical center astride the Soviet colossus and the U.S.A. Present circumstances make it therefore necessary for Europe to be on guard against both sides in order to avoid being swallowed up by one of the
two colossi. The dollar imperialism is certainly in no way less aggressive or reckless than communism. The British and French, although former "allies" and "victors" feel the impact of that arrogant dollar diplomacy to a greater extent than we Germans whose sympathy they (USA) hope to gain.

Today Western Europe is relegated to the role of a satellite acting on behalf of America. Schuman in France, and Bevin in England, dance to the tune of the piper in Washington. Europe is being used as the playground for the impudent and shameless dollar diplomacy. Thanks to their solid political education, middle class and labor in Germany have been able to grasp the whole situation in time. Occasionally there arises in France and England resentment against the United States also, but, unfortunately, it is too often linked with attacks against Germany.

During the forthcoming months, Germany's foreign policy must be geared to a subtler exploitation of the conflict between the eastern and western blocs. Our aim in the immediate future must be to regain full sovereignty for Western Germany which will eventually result in the restoration of freedom of action to the whole of Europe. With accelerated speed we are approaching the point at which we must liberate Europe from American control. It is Germany's task to take the lead in this campaign. It is up to us to determine the method and the timing.

There is the danger that France or England—perhaps even both jointly—will return to an independent policy. One or the other of these powers might come to an agreement with Russia and, in either case, this would be at the expense of Germany and the United States. Such a possibility must be avoided at all cost. Germany must remain the decisive factor in European politics and it is up to her to give the word at the right time.

German foreign policy must be directed with a view to steering Europe clear from another world conflict. Conditions for such policy are favorable. The European nations long for peace. The self-interests of France and England categorically demand that a new holocaust must be avoided. The interests of the Vatican run along the same lines. Our paramount attention must be devoted to the preservation of German strength and its native potential ("Erhaltung der deutschen Substanz"). World political events could take such a turn that
a situation may emerge in which Russia, North America and a great part of Asia may become the battleground for a third world war, whereas Europe might be spared. Were Russia to give a guarantee to the European countries that she would abstain from attacking them, then the whole of Europe could take a neutral stand in the event of a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The prevalent mood in every country of Europe is against war, and in England broad masses of the people are convinced that the next war will be one provoked by America. If, therefore, we were to succeed in obtaining from Russia a guarantee that she would respect the neutrality of Europe, then the United States could be confronted with a similar demand, and the war could thus be confined to the territories of both great victorious powers and their vassals. In this manner, German strength (deutsche Substanz) and the resources of Europe would be safeguarded against annihilation. Such an outlook may seem fantastic at the moment, but the policy recommended ("realpolitische Zielsetzung") is the only realistic one which should be followed by Europe today. A war of exhaustion between Russia and America, in which Europe could be spared, would automatically result in the upsurge of a third power bloc. If the continent of Europe succeeds in preserving its strength, it would thus regain the leadership in the world. There are reliable reports that such a policy would have the quiet but vigorous support of the Vatican. It is entirely to the interest of the Roman Catholic Church to see to it that the Orthodox Slavs ("schismatisches Slaventum") and the predominant Protestant North American continent, must be weakened for a long time to come.

In view of the present world political situation ("realpolitische Lage"), the policy of orientation towards the West has lost all meaning or sense. A conscious policy of neutrality, going hand in hand with close economic cooperation with the East, would, from a long range point of view, supersede a merely pro-Soviet orientation. The former would finally bring about our freedom, while the last would keep us in the status of vassals.

We must not forget that Germany has always considered orientation towards the West as a policy of expediency or one to be pursued only under pressure of circumstances. Such was the case in Napoleon's time, after 1918, and also after 1945. All of our great national leaders have constantly counseled the long-range policy of
close cooperation with the East; thus, Frederick the Great, Count von Stein, Bismarck, von Seeckt, Brockdorff-Rentzau, and, in the past 30 years, all our leading geopoliticians. By the end of 1940, Hitler's policy had run into a blind alley ("Zwangslage"), and the hard decision had to be made to ensure by means of the sword access to the gigantic sources of raw materials in the East, which Russia would never have delivered voluntarily, and without which we never could expect to force a showdown against the Anglo-American bloc.

Our present policy must be to overcome the consequences of our previous mistakes. An emasculated Germany should never allow itself to be used as a spearhead in an attack against the Russian colossus. This would be an insane act ("Wahnsinnsexperiment") and would spell our final doom, whereas Germany as the exponent of European neutrality could gain far-reaching concessions from the Soviets. As we have pointed out again and again, the Russians have no desire whatsoever to burden themselves with all the difficulties and complex problems of Europe; they would consider a neutral and well-intentioned Europe, exerting its influence also on the Arab world and Latin America, as the best solution.

We must not let ourselves become befogged by Washington's stupid and meaningless slogans about the "Struggle of Democracy versus Communism." The so-called American democracy does not deserve the sacrifice of the bones of even a single German soldier. In the age of regimented and militarized economy, the babbling about democracy and so-called "free enterprise" is such nonsense that we need not squander a single moment in refuting this American propaganda swindle.

What Germany needs in the future is not democracy but a system of statecraft similar to that of the Soviet dictatorship which would enable the political and military elite in Germany to organize the industrial capacity of Europe and the military qualities of the German people for the revival of the German race and the re-establishment of Europe as the power center in the world.


American intervention in Korea is dangerous playing with fire. It could easily become the beginning of a third world war. Up to now Moscow has shown great restraint but it is difficult to guess
what is shaping up behind the facade of the accelerated "peace offensive." The Americans have staked their whole prestige on the gamble in Korea. Even if the Americans should succeed in maintaining a foothold on the southern tip of the peninsula* for an undetermined period of time, they would find it difficult to pull out of the Korean adventure without damage to their prestige. After committing herself to intervention, the United States would not be able to pull out; she would have to show the world her determination to bring about her world order. From the military-strategic point of view, the Korean undertaking entails the greatest risk. Were war with Russia to break out tomorrow, then the Yankees ("Amis") would find themselves caught in the Korean mousetrap. However, from the political point of view, the Korean intervention—camouflaged as a U. N. undertaking—is a very bold move: it isolated Russia and at one stroke created a world coalition of the United Nations against Communism. If the Korean conflict were to expand tomorrow into a world war, then fifty nations would automatically be lined up on the side of the United States against the Soviet bloc. An extraordinarily clever feat!

There is, however, one doubtful element in American planning: do the interests of all countries, great and small, the European as well as the Asian, conform with those of the United States? There are indications that the British have supported United States policy in Korea only halfheartedly. If the Americans are thrown out of Korea, then British prestige in the whole of Asia would suffer; but even if the Yankees should prove victorious, then the hatred of all Asia would be roused with the same intensity against the British as against the Americans. The British view with great distaste the clumsy hand of Washington meddling in their Asiatic affairs. London remembers with great bitterness the noisy pro-Indian propaganda carried on in the United States during the war. London realizes that not Russia but the United States must be blamed as the gravedigger of the British Empire. The United States entered the world war supposedly to save England, but worked with great zeal to junk the British Empire.

* According to this, the memorandum was evidently prepared before the Inchon landing by MacArthur in mid-September, 1950.
The motives for the American adventure in Korea are still shrouded in mystery, but this much is known: Washington waited long for a good opportunity to put its economy on a war footing and to accelerate her mobilization with full speed. The effects of this step on world economy and its political consequences become clearer and clearer day by day: in the course of total mobilization for war, not much will be left of "democracy."

4. The Political and Military Strength of the United States

Reliable observers in the United States have pictured the present state of affairs in that country as follows:

The United States economy is not ready for war. Stockpiling of essential raw materials has only been pursued to a moderate extent. From the military point of view, the United States is not in best trim. Its armed forces are limited and extremely expensive; units ready for combat are barely available; the machinery of the various military services is luxurious and marked by squander and misadministration. The United States is by no means ready for war and has not even entered the phase of secret mobilization. Washington politics show all signs of confusion. There is no real planning, nothing has been thoroughly studied nor has anything been organized from a long-range point of view. According to reports received from the States, the Yankees ("Amis") have a lot to learn. Even in leading military circles there are abysmal illusions in regard to Russia's economic and military strength.

The United States can consider itself very lucky if the war remains confined to Korea. Should Russia desire war, then this would be a most opportune moment for it. Some incident or other could easily be brought about; but for Europe it would be a catastrophe. Today the Yankees ("Amis") have political headaches in every nook and cranny of the world. They are not only trapped in Korea, but they are also worried by the uncertain and hectic developments in China, Japan, Iran, Germany, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Africa. There are deep-rooted differences with Great Britain and France and, above all, the Russian bear is poised to spring at any moment.

The cowboys in the arena of world politics have gorged themselves in all respects. Although they can throw billions of dollars around, they do not possess top-notch statesmen, planners, military leaders,
scientists, nor a people willing to make sacrifices and capable of accomplishing great historic feats. They do not even have an attractive ideal. The crux of American miscalculation is the belief that allies can be bought with dollars. Alliances are not cemented with ideologies but rest squarely on common interests. Alliances too are respected as long as interests remain mutual. But America’s interests do not run parallel with those of Asia or Europe, not even with those of Britain or Latin America. The slogan which stirs the world today is the word "anticapitalism."

The American people, who were untouched by the destructive course of two world wars, are constantly plagued by a guilty conscience. They are bothered by a gnawing doubt as to whether they always make the right decisions. Too often have they miscalculated and, when something goes wrong, they easily fall victim to a hangover. Great decisions can only be made by a well-prepared people with strong nerves. This is the real reason why Americans have an inferiority complex when dealing with us Germans. The Amis in Germany realize that we Germans possess worthier qualities. No wonder then that high-ranking American officers in Germany and in Washington long for German rearmament. They would certainly feel much better if Germany would, within a short time, put 50 to 80 divisions at their disposal.

The higher the difficulties pile up for the Americans, the more favorable become our prospects for successfully overcoming our defeat. The Yankees are willing to pay a high price for our help. This is clear from all confidential reports which we have obtained from circles close to the American High Commissioner.

5. Has Germany an Obligation towards the United States?

Germany has emerged from the cold war as the chief beneficiary. That is our great asset in the ledger of the 5-year period since Potsdam. For the first time in the history of nations it has been proven that clever propaganda, especially when it is camouflaged and directed through other channels,* accomplishes far more than the mightiest army or the best diplomatic service of a smoothly-functioning state. It is a great mistake to assume that Western Germany

* Cf. our confidential report of May 1948: "The Vatican as a political factor in the cold war."
recuperated so quickly thanks to America’s sympathetic concern for us. We repeatedly encounter, especially as expressed by some politicians in Bonn, the idiotic opinion: “But the Americans have put us back on our feet, should we therefore not show our gratitude?” To this our answer is as follows: The Americans put us back on our feet, not purely for altruistic reasons but for their selfish interests and on the basis of clever calculation. It must not be our worry but theirs if in the last resort their calculations prove to be abysmally stupid. We are not wholly innocent in the shift of America’s post-war policy. For us the war has never stopped and, as is well known, in war every ruse is permissible. We cannot repeat too often that Germany never has ceased to carry on the war with political weapons and propaganda, with economic sabotage and other means. In order to protect Germany against total destruction of its military and economic potentials, as planned at Yalta, we blueprinted a bold plan and created a flexible and smoothly-working organization which, at the end of the war, provided the pre-condition for all the gains that by necessity emerged for Germany out of the chaos of the postwar period. All our calculations at that time were not fulfilled without a hitch. Some of our expectations proved faulty. We had to sail around dangerous cliffs and the German people had to suffer for a while even under conditions deliberately created by ourselves. It even seemed at times as though every effort was in vain and that all our hopes had to be given up. Today, however, five years after Potsdam, we can look back with pride on our accomplishments.

Future historians will one day reveal the great vision with which responsible leaders of the Third Reich created with confident determination those measures which subsequently smashed the united front of the enemy and made Germany again a much-desired partner in a new politico-strategic alliance. And all this was accomplished at the time when German leaders had to go through the severe crisis of the oncoming defeat. By no means did the political and military leadership of the Third Reich skid into the catastrophe in an irrational manner as so many blockheads and ignoramuses often tell us. The various phases and consequences of the so-called "collapse" ("Zusammenbruch") were thoroughly studied and planned by the most capable experts ("faehigsten Koepfen"). Nothing occurred by chance; everything was carefully planned. The result of
this planning was that, already a few months after Potsdam, the
c Condition of the victors went on the rocks.

The decision for a Western or Eastern orientation was influenced
by the factors of Realpolitik. In the light of conditions prevailing
in 1945, we could expect from only the West—or rather from the
United States—moderate conditions for an armistice, measures of
relief, and a sympathetic understanding. Only in America did there
exist at that time a small but influential group who had not fallen
victim to the hate and revenge outcry of the Jewish triumvirate
Rosenfeld*-Morgenthau-Baruch, but had maintained in a well-con-
cealed but consistent manner throughout the war its sympathy for
Germany.

The machinery which we had prepared so carefully in advance had
consciously brought about conditions and situations which after the
collapse confronted America's political leaders with the choice of
accepting chaos and Bolshevism throughout Germany, or adopting a
constructive program that would save Germany and the whole of
Europe. Such a plan and such a bold program could only be suc-
sessfully carried out by a politically well-trained people as the Ger-
mans. The twelve years of intense political schooling now proved
to have been of paramount importance. When we take into con-
sideration under what tremendous difficulties and dangers the or-
ganization had to work in an underground manner and directed
from abroad without any protection or backing by any state, carefully
watched and persecuted by agents of a revengeful enemy, then the
successful outcome seems like a miracle. In order to bring the Amer-
icans back to reason and away from Potsdam, we organized chaotic
conditions in a thorough and systematic manner (“haben wir mit
gruendliger Systematik das Chaos organisiert”). It was a subtle
political resistance, seemingly unorganized and seldom visible, but
nonetheless having a deadly effect. The peasants were delivering
almost next to nothing to the cities; no coal was brought up from
the pits, the wheels of industry were not turning, the people came
near to starvation; the monetary systems were disintegrating—there

* The name "Rosenfeld" refers to the late President Roosevelt. It was fre-
quently used by the Nazis, who tried to show in their propaganda that the
President was a descendant of a Dutch Jewish family.
remained nothing for the Yankees to do but to give in and scrap the Potsdam program. Soon thereafter the Western Zone received food supplies, local self-government, extensive economic help, credits for currency reform and, finally, broad political self-determination. Today we are on the last stage towards complete sovereignty.

Through superb planning and disciplined use of the political weapon of quiet resistance, the German people have brought to naught the plans for revenge of the victors. By forcing the Americans to give in, the first broad cracks were caused in the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. As a consequence, not only did the front of our enemies break wide apart, but the Soviets too were forced to abandon their mad program of destruction in Eastern Germany. Thus it was proven that the excellent political skill and remote control of a well-trained people can score such great successes even after total military defeat as have never before been recorded in history. This could only have been achieved by the leaders of the Third Reich through superb planning in the realm of psychological and political warfare within the United States before and even during the war.

Just as Clausewitz declared that war is merely an extension of action by other means, so the German people continued the war after the "collapse" by propaganda and other means. Despite sacrifice and hardship, the German people won this political war along the whole front. It is our great asset in the ledger of geopolitical schooling and planning that five years after Potsdam, the aims of our enemies have been abandoned, Germany's strength has been preserved, and the Fatherland can look forward to a revival rich in possibilities.

The revival of Germany was not a gift of the Americans but exclusively the result of our own farsighted planning. The first overwhelming success of this planning was achieved through our well-organized anti-Morgenthau campaign. We thereby succeeded in undermining Roosevelt's plans of revenge against Germany and created total confusion in Washington. By keeping Germany industrially strong and by gaining the support of influential senators and representatives in the American Congress for our propaganda against the dismantling of large industrial enterprises, we finally succeeded in preserving Germany as the leading industrial power in the heart of Europe. Thus the plans of Potsdam and Yalta came to naught and the period of the cold war began which developed
into a struggle between the East and the West on the decisive question as to who should exploit German industry and within whose orbit Germany's industrial potential should be incorporated. In this way, Germany gained valuable time for further maneuvering. Thus, without a doubt, the correctness of our earliest planning was proved, which anticipated that orientation towards the West would open up great possibilities for the speedy overcoming of our military defeat. In 1945, orientation towards the East would have been totally wrong. It could only have stirred up the West against us and, in view of the deep-rooted hatred of the Russians at that time against everything German, it would have brought common action of our enemies against us and would have spelled "finis" to all our aspirations. Thanks, however, to our correct decisions, the situation has changed entirely today. We are now once again in the position to influence the turn of events—today we are again making history.

Five years after Potsdam, the Yankees are stuck deep in the mud; they are now seeking the advice of our generals whom they formerly called criminals; they come pleading for our help against Russia. That of which we could never convince the world, namely: the injustice of the policy of revenge, was finally accomplished by the Americans themselves who, speculating on German help, have pronounced the necessity for a revision of policy toward Germany. They have even convinced the French and the English of this.

The helplessness of the Americans in the midst of this chaotic situation has caused such confusion that, barely five years after Potsdam, we have obtained as much as—according to the most optimistic calculations—we had hoped to attain in only ten to fifteen years.

6. The Expellees ("Die Heimatvertriebenen").

The millions of expellees have to be regarded as a valuable trump-card in our policy towards the restoration of German power. When our enemies were drunk with victory, they did not recognize the danger of their short-sighted policy of revenge which might one day arise from the banishment of millions of people. The expulsion of 10 million German racial comrades ("Volksdeutschen") was a blessing for the Reich. The expellees strengthened the biological substance of our race ("verstärkten die deutsche Volkssubstanz") and from the beginning they became a valuable asset to our propaganda. The
expellees, discontented with their fate, infused a strong political
dynamism in our demands. Very soon we were able to drown out
the noisy propaganda about German "crimes" with our counter ac-
cusation about the heinous misdeeds ("zum Himmelschreien Un-
recht") committed against 10 million German racial comrades.
Today the existence of many millions of expellees constantly troubles
the guilty conscience of our enemies. Without the pressing problem
of the expellees it would certainly not have been so easy to set
American relief work in motion on behalf of Germany. The refugees
from the East constitute a valuable factor in our coming negotiations
with Russia, especially if we will one day demand the return of the
stolen territories in the East, or if we should insist on adequate com-
ensation in the West.

Those Eastern refugees who settle overseas usually turn out to be
good missionaries for our Germandom abroad. They constitute, even
in countries far away, an asset for the German race, especially if they
stay together in close settlements.

The distress of the refugees has created a common political ground
among all Germans, regardless of political affiliation. The demand
for the restitution of the stolen German territories keeps our political
agitation alive. The militant elements among the refugees are work-
ing according to the best traditions of National Socialism, whereas
the broad masses among the expellees are kept close together in well-
disciplined homeland organizations ("landsmannschaftlichen Organ-
sational").

If the enemy would have kept our racial comrades after the war as
second-class citizens, or even as defranchised subjects in Poland, in
Czechoslovakia and in other regions, it would be far more difficult
for us today to bring the territorial issue of the east on the agenda
again. The expulsion of millions of our racial comrades provides us
with a heaven-sent opportunity to exacerbate the problem of the
bleeding border ("blutende Grenze") and to hammer constantly
for its revision.

7. Weltanschauung and World Power Politics

The great historical accomplishment which overshadows every
other deed of Adolf Hitler was his decision, carried out with iron
energy, to condition the German people into fighting for their great
world political task. The necessity to educate a whole nation for total war had been recognized long before Hitler, but Hitler was the first one who tackled the tremendously difficult problem of getting a firm hold on the people and of organizing them into a unified movement on the basis of National Socialism.

The training which the German nation received during the twelve years of National Socialist leadership has created a firm basis on which German world politics will be able to carry on again in the future. The National Socialist Weltanschauung furnishes the intellectual potential ("geistiges Potential") in the struggle for world supremacy.

The future of the world will be decided by the conquering force of a political ideology. "Democracy" is a wishy-washy term which has found no ear among the German people, notwithstanding the efforts made by the Americans for re-education. No German is willing to fight and die for democracy. The German people, well-trained and steeled under national socialist leadership, are dominated by two sovereign ideas: the concept of a German Reich, and Germany's mission of leadership in the world ("deutsche Fuehrermission in der Welt"). These two ideas have given our people a powerful driving force for the dynamic execution of their world mission. The mystical element and the religious tradition embodied in the concept of the Reich, sparks our political mission and is especially attractive within the Catholic world.*

Even after the collapse, the National Socialist Party continued to work in a camouflaged way ("getart") in dozens of seemingly innocuous societies and groups, in order to keep alive and undiluted the national outlook of the German people. In the same way as many small brooks go toward making a mighty stream, the various nationalist and radical groups in the Zonen-Reich carried out, almost without exception, worth-while and powerful propaganda. Each of these groups had its special task and had to adjust its work in line with certain situations and circumstances. However, it was of chief importance to direct the underlying trend of the patriotic propaganda

* Obviously, this refers to the thousand-year history of the "Holy Roman Empire." There were times when the secular power of the Empire and the spiritual power of the Church interpenetrated each other.
towards the same goal. The more diverse and unconnected these groups appeared on the surface, the less they were apt to arouse suspicion (of the Occupying authorities) that they were directed and influenced by a central organization.

We have placed our confidential agents, observers, and representatives for special assignments in all groups and parties—even among Communist organizations and their fronts. The greater the number of organizations controlled and influenced by us, the more effective will be the results of our work.

The discontinuation of the Nationalist-Socialist press after the collapse deprived us of the most important weapon for national indoctrination. Secret circular letters and leaflets reach only a limited number of party comrades who, in most cases, already knew the directives to be followed and propagated in given situations. The victors had tried to suppress every expression of national feeling. They filled the editorial offices of the licensed newspapers with Jews and traitors. Nonetheless, there were some periodicals which—first abroad and then in the Zonen-Reich—did their best to fight courageously and frankly, sometimes in a cleverly camouflaged manner, for the national interests of Germany.

Praiseworthy work was accomplished by the German press in South and North America. In the past few years some papers in the English and American Zones achieved excellent results in line with our great national aim. The political articles in Die Zeit of Hamburg, and the intelligent advice given by the paper on delicate domestic problems deeply influenced the political thinking of the German people.

In Argentina, Der Weg and the Freie Presse have striven in an extraordinary manner to create a distinct political approach among Germans abroad, as well as in the Zonen-Reich.

The German press in North America, especially the New York Staats Zeitung, proved of great value in battling the hate-psychosis and in its efforts to re-establish close German-American relations. There are also numerous small papers in the United States which, in the midst of the most intense German hate-wave, interceded bravely and fought with unbelievable courage for the resurrection of a united fatherland.

It was most difficult for the German press to deal delicately with
the events of July 20, 1944. The less these events are discussed, the better it will be for Germany's future. A split among the German people on this question would prove disastrous. There are many angles which obviously cannot as yet be discussed openly. There were thousands who had reason, or were even ordered to protect themselves by camouflaging as "anti-Nazis" ("Hitlergegner"). Persons who were at that time reported as having been shot are still among the living today. Let us also bear in mind that Dr. Ley's statement about the "blue-blooded swine"* served the definite purpose of deceiving the enemy. Our leaders must see to it that the ever-recurring discussions about the events of the 20th of July be either stopped or, if possible, passed over lightly. Previous directives remained valid; no information whatsoever should be revealed about the background of that affair.

The convulsive effects of the military defeat have not broken the German spirit. The national tradition is carefully fostered among the youth and the veterans. The biological substance of the German people remained unshaken in its foundation. Our people are ready to be called upon for historic decisions. A nation which has lost two world wars in the short span of 30 years but is already again conscious of its future tasks, can never be defeated. National training and political schooling have conditioned the German people as a first-class instrument for the execution of world politics on a grand style. No other people on earth has such political maturity, fanatical faith, ironclad willpower and flexibility in tactics—not merely to overcome defeat but also to start again from scratch. German tradition and belief in a world mission uplifts the whole German nation. Everyone feels within his deepest consciousness that the great national task—the struggle for world domination—will ultimately be crowned with victory.

The Wehrhoheit** is the chief characteristic of the independence of a state and the freedom of its actions. A nation which has lost its

* This term "blue-blooded swine" was used by Dr. Ley in an inciting speech and refers to those aristocratic circles which were supposedly involved in the plot against Hitler's life on July 20, 1944.

** "Wehrhoheit" is the German term describing a country's exclusive prerogative to determine the size and disposition of its armed forces.
Wehrhoheit is no longer free. After the first world war the victor permitted the Reich a limited Wehrmacht, but our whole national struggle up to 1935 centered around the question of the re-establishment of a German Wehrhoheit. Only then, when we shall again be able to determine in unhampered freedom whether and to what extent we shall rearm ourselves, and when and against whom we may use our armed forces, will we have regained our Wehrhoheit.

We, in all probability, will have attained Wehrhoheit as a result of German rearmament, which will not only be permitted but even urgently desired by the Western powers. The problem of the re-establishment of a German Wehrmacht is a delicate one and requires great cleverness and astute statesmanlike minds in order to make the correct decisions at the right time.

Germany must concentrate all its efforts on regaining her Wehrhoheit. Washington's obstinate efforts to rearm the West German Federal Republic and to make it a strong military partner, within or outside the Atlantic Pact, come as no surprise. In previous circular letters we have frequently mentioned the plans of influential American circles who, even in the midst of war, opposed Roosevelt's policy of revenge and who strongly advocated the preservation of a mighty Germany as a bulwark against the East. The turn of historic events has, however, shown that all the hopes which German leadership placed in the friendly intentions of these personalities in the United States were grossly exaggerated. The systematically whipped up hatred toward Germany incited the American people so thoroughly that those personalities—high ranking military, church leaders, politicians, and captains of finance—who were working for a policy of reconciliation, could express their views only with the utmost circumspection and execute it through time-consuming detours.

The American policy of reconciliation with Germany was very advantageous because it gave us a breathing spell at the very beginning; it was precisely this policy which smashed the allied front. Moscow's goal was the annihilation of the German power-potential—military, political and economic—for good. Yalta proclaimed the aim of a brutal peace Diktat which left the vanquished no hope of revival. To our great misfortune three influential men in commanding positions in the West advocated the same idea of annihilation:
Roosevelt, Morgenthau and Baruch. These men were joined by the German-hater Churchill. Only Roosevelt's death opened the way to those forces who advocated a positive or, at least, a more moderate program towards Germany, and whose blueprints for a postwar world were entirely opposed to those of Roosevelt. These circles recognized in the Russian victory a strengthening of Communism, and they feared its complications and the shattering effects it entailed for the capitalistic system.

These considerations resulted in a plan—first formulated secretly in Washington and later openly discussed, aiming at the creation of a united Europe as a bulwark against Russia with the proviso that a strengthened and rearmed Germany be incorporated in such a combination. What the Americans therefore now expect from us are combat units and the manufacture of war material. That is why Washington, right from the beginning, was not in favor of dismantling the German war potential.

What consequences can be expected for Germany from Washington's present policy? At first we gained great advantages from America's policy. The Morgenthau plan was never really executed; instead, the Americans endeavored to make Western Germany a strong economic, and now even a military bulwark against the East. The help we obtained from America after the war—and this for egotistic and not for altruistic reasons—will bring us to a point where its further acceptance might create great danger for Germany. We are now approaching this point with giant strides. The Americans fondly hope that we will one day repay with our blood all the benefits we received from them. They want us to sign a pact whereby we, as mercenaries and vassals, will back American power politics. The West German Republic cannot and must never give its consent to such a tie-up, which is already proscribed by our exposed geographic position ("exponierte geopolitische Lage"). The American plan would make Germany the spearhead of an attack at the heart of Russia. Germany would thereby become the battlefield in a war of annihilation from which nothing would be spared of the German biological substance. A German statesman who would lend his help to such a criminal act would thus stamp himself automatically as a traitor of the German people. However long we may continue to milk the Americans...
of millions of dollars, there must come the inevitable moment when we shall have to make it crystal-clear to them that we are not willing to join the fight against Russia for American interests. There probably is no danger that we shall become hated by the Yankees for this because they are businessmen and understand very well that we will act only in accordance with our own interests.

How should Germany proceed diplomatically in the present situation? It is openly stated in Washington that Europe cannot be defended without German help. The Americans are becoming insistent and we must give them some hope, but we must at the same time point to the fact that the German people are hesitant and not inclined to defend Europe so long as Germany is treated as a defeated nation. By constantly squeezing concessions out of the victors, we can best prepare the way towards the re-establishment of our Wehrhoheit. During the coming weeks and months we must extract the utmost in concessions. We will therefore not be able to avoid making promises. It is of the greatest importance for the resumption of Germany's respected standing in the world to fight for the re-establishment of German honor. We have to undo the shame of the judgments motivated by revenge (Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, etc.), which the victors executed on the military and civic leaders of the Third Reich. The offerings which the Americans could make in this respect would cost them nothing. To save a few dozen brave men from the gallows and to free a few hundred from the prisons, should not prove too difficult to accomplish if the Bonn Government would take a resolute stand. To obtain such a token of friendship from the Yankees, we could even give them some promises. But there is a difference between mere promises and such commitments as would bind us irrevocably. We must ultimately remain free in our decisions towards all sides, even if we are obliged for reasons of expediency to agree formally to such obligations. We should reap all advantages but never commit ourselves. The Yankees need us today more urgently than ever before. Clever political tactics today could bring about the conditions for the definite acknowledgment of our Wehrhoheit but it must not lead so far that, in case of a showdown, we would have to pull Washington's chestnuts out of the fire. We must pursue Realpolitik, i.e., our honor must be restored and we must regain freedom.
Prospects for the Future

The international unrest and the tension between the East and the West have greatly facilitated execution of our plans up till now. The surprising and rapid revival of the German economy and the debate on the Schuman Plan have, however, prematurely focused the attention of the world on a resurrected Germany. The war in Korea served as a desired diversion. The fact that the Americans would now like us to join them in the defense of Europe and become their ally will thereby enhance our bargaining power with the Russians. The Americans have lost the peace, the cold war, and their entire future, but they are not as yet aware of it. After the failure of their amateurish policies in Asia, the Americans will one day experience a far more painful and devastating smashup in Europe ("einen noch weit peinlicheren Kladderadatsch in Europa"). The outcome will be as we predicted as long ago as 1944: they will rouse the whole world against them. Those dollar-diplomats and cowboys are too untalented to cope with the problem of world politics (Weltpolitik). Their silly chatter that American troops are in Germany for the purpose of protecting occidental Kultur is so idiotic that it could not make the slightest impression even on the most humble stableboy in Germany. We should grab a few more billions from the Yankees' huge dollar-chest and then kick them out (eines Tages an die frische Luft setzen), or simply hand them over to the Russians. A few little hints and threats would perhaps make them scram in time (zum rechtzeitigen Absiegbewegen).

The first phase of our policy of disruption (Sprengungspolitik) is behind us. America's financial assistance can never bring about a permanent solution; on the contrary, it will cause enfeeblement and lead to general corruption. These unpleasant by-products are becoming visible in France and Britain to an ever-increasing greater degree than in truncated Germany. The dollar-diplomats behave as though they were the true lords in the salons of Europe. Germany lost her sovereignty as a consequence of the military defeat. Paris and London, however, sold their birthright for a mess of pottage ("verkauften ihr Hausrecht gegen Dollaranleihen").

The struggle against American bossing (Bevormundung) of Europe will become Germany's main task in the future. We must not merely strive to shake off the shackles with which Washington has
bound us, and labor to regain our freedom of action in the East, but we
must also prepare the whole of Europe for our future mission in
the world. A well-filled breadbasket, sufficient sources of raw mate-
rial and the necessary geopolitical space for strategic maneuverings
("Ausweichmöglichkeiten im geopolitischen Raum") will one day
prove more than ever before to be the most important factors in
deciding Europe's struggle for world mastery.

The strategy of breaking the chains of our enthrallment (Fesseln-
sprengen) is sometimes more daring and dangerous than the most
dashing feat in war. We could, for instance, visualize that through
secret negotiations with Moscow a situation would be brought about
whereby the Yankees could overnight be eliminated as a power factor
in Europe. Such a scheme of course always contains an element of
great danger. Not that such a plan would be impossible of execution,
but there is always the question how far the Russians are to be trusted.

Other schemes would be preferable from a long-range point of
view. We are passing through an interim period of a profound
change in international power relations. Everywhere there emerges
the desire for a new order and an outspoken aversion against dollar
diplomacy. In this extended transitory period, it should prove pos-
sible for Germany to build up a new political bloc ("neue politische
Einheit") out of Europe, Africa and Latin America ("Iberoamer-
ika"). The economic advantages and the political possibilities in
such a new power combination would put the United States against
the wall. It would then depend entirely on our diplomatic and propa-
ganda finesse when and how we would take over an America en-
feebled by its foreign and domestic policies. Such a plan would
have the advantage of preventing a third world war fought between
United States capitalism and the Soviet bloc—a war which would
have the most destructive consequences for the Western world. Such
a design would still guarantee for some time the preservation of the
resources of the Western world and then, greatly strengthened, we
will enter—under Germanic leadership—the phase of a final show-
down, between the white race and the slavic world. In the event
of such a showdown, we must endeavor to bring to our side the
Arab bloc and as many of the Asiatic peoples as possible. Germany—
is in the fortunate position of not having aroused the hatred of Asia.
There we can step in as the leading spokesman for the underdog.
The tenacious work of enlightenment carried out by Germany and Italy in the Arab world is now bearing fruit. Anti-British and anti-American resentment is gaining momentum in the entire Middle East. Britain will not long be able to keep its hold on the Suez Canal, nor maintain her influence in Iran and the rest of the Middle East. The coming revolt of the Arab world will prove another setback for the amateurish world planners in Washington.

A correct evaluation of the Russian problem is important for Germany's future. World War II clearly proved that Germany was not in a position to mobilize the necessary manpower and the tremendous economic reserves to deal the knockout blow which would have destroyed the Slav world forever. Our surprising successes in the Polish and Western campaigns lured our political and military leaders into the belief that they could quickly overrun the Russian armies. And it was demonstrated anew how foolish it was to disregard the wise admonition of Bismarck who, throughout his life, warned us against making Russia our enemy. It will require the greatest diplomatic efforts to lull Moscow's profound distrust of us. The cold war has fortunately relegated the memory of Germany's march into Russia to the background far more quickly than we could ever have hoped. But we must not deceive ourselves; Moscow will not forget the Second World War so quickly.

The present power position of the Slavic world is a geopolitical reality which we must accept, at least for the time being. Germany's future policy should be the quiet penetration of Europe and must aim at consolidating our spheres of interest in Africa and Latin America.* We should avoid as far as possible dangerous propaganda ventures with the expellees which might antagonize the East. Russia may one day be willing to yield or negotiate, but we must never let it come to a struggle for prestige.

Germany's industry will regain its previous position: the markets in East and Southeast Europe, in Latin America and in Africa. China and the rest of Southeast Asia offer us a great future. There we can

* The German memorandum employs the phrase "unsere Interessensphere in Afrika und Lateinamerika," whereas in fact the Germans have not as yet any spheres of interest in these continents. Nonetheless, in their geopolitical speculations they have already made an "Anschluss" with Europe and other continents.
eliminate the British and Americans from competition, especially if we conduct our negotiations with the Soviets in a smart way. Our increasing economic power and ability to elbow our way politically, must be employed alternately. A prudent and undeviating policy will make it possible to establish some day a new political order in the world which will supersede the present colossi—the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Though we are powerless at present, we have nonetheless never permitted ourselves to be disarmed spiritually and scientifically. German scholars are working unremittingly in Germany as well as abroad on great scientific plans for the future. Favorable circumstances enabled us to keep alive the great research organization of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute through a change of name. First-class scientists are working in the fields of interplanetary navigation ("Raumschiffahrt"), chemistry and on cosmic rays. Our scientists, unhindered in their work, have sufficient time and are planning day and night for Germany's future. It is the German spirit ("Geist") that creates modern weapons and that will bring surprising changes in the present relationship of forces.

Economic difficulties will one day plunge the United States down from its present dizzy heights. Such a catastrophe can be brought about through crafty manipulations and through artificially engendered crises. Such maneuvers are routine measures which have already been employed in international power struggle and will be used again and again as long as economic rivals fight for power positions and markets in the world.

It is quite conceivable that America, weakened by a depression, will one day seek support from a resurrected Germany. Such a prospect would open tremendous possibilities for the future power position of a bloc introducing a new order in the world.

This must be our program: be constantly on the alert, evaluate future developments correctly, and miss no opportunities. It is the duty of a vanquished nation to learn from its defeat, to work with unremitting courage and with ever-increasing determination and endurance, and be prepared for a great world political task.

All these possibilities would come to naught if a new world war were to lay Europe waste. It must therefore be our supreme duty to place ourselves in the vanguard of the struggle to keep Europe out
of any future war. If we succeed in this, we will surely gain the trust of the people and undisputed leadership in Europe, not excluding Britain. In such a roundabout way we would be able to establish the foundation for future world leadership. The world is longing today for the millennium. In the role of champion for peace, we would gain stature in world public opinion and create for ourselves an unshakable moral position. The propaganda against German "militarism" would subside entirely, old charges would be forgotten and Europe would then be willing to follow German leadership. Such a policy can be pursued successfully, especially in view of the present attitude of the Vatican. The Pope is a realist in politics ("ist Realpolitiker genug") and knows well enough that, in the age of the Atom bomb, there is too much at stake for the Church and for Europe as a whole.

The Atlantic partners will always be able to find an opportunity to evade their obligations by pointing out that the provocative behavior of the United States has foolishly brought about a conflict for which the Russians cannot be charged as the aggressor and, therefore, all contractual obligations to help become void.

We must do everything possible in accordance with the directives and suggestions given above in order to influence in our favor the political attitude of all groups affiliated with us in Europe, Latin America and the United States. It should also be possible to make it clear to the German element in America what Germany's fate would be were a new world war to annihilate the substance of our race or if a victorious Russia were to upset or delay for a long time our plans for the future.

Completed:

MADRID, Beginning of September 1950.

Distribution (Verteiler):
Dr. M
v. T., Bonn
Rom
Barcelona
Buenos Aires
Z.A.
Directive of the German High Command

on Political Warfare in the U.S.A.

The following directive was issued by the Chief of the Intelligence Division of the German High Command, Admiral Walter Wilhelm Canaris, in 1944. The document lays bare the basic German strategy of scaring the U.S.A. with Bolshevism but—at the same time— recommends a long-range policy of Russo-German collaboration.

SECRET STATE MATTER

OKW—Abwehr

March 15, 1944

At a meeting of the representatives of the Foreign Office, the Security Division, ("SD") and the Department of Defense, ("Abwehr"), the following resolutions were adopted for unified action by all our agents in foreign countries:

1. Utilize to the fullest extent all available possibilities in neutral and enemy countries, in order to support our military efforts with political and propaganda campaigns.

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2. Our goal is to crush the enemy's plan whose object it is to destroy forever the German Reich militarily, economically, and culturally.

The new regulations put into effect by the political leaders for the dissolution and disintegration of the enemy bloc should be carried out more intensely. We must do our utmost to create a state of confusion and distrust among our enemies. Such a state of disunity would enable us to sue for a quick separate peace with either side. While it is true that the efforts made in that direction have failed so far due to the implacable hate policy of Roosevelt and Churchill, it does not mean that some day, under different conditions, the unnatural front of our enemies could not be broken. Roosevelt's electoral defeat this year could have immeasurable political consequences.

The political and military leaders are of the opinion that Germany cannot expect any mercy from the Soviets; on the contrary, should the war take a turn for the worse, we must assume that the Slavs will do everything in order to retaliate against the harsh treatment we have inflicted upon them. In spite of everything, no effort should be spared to stir up, through carefully directed propaganda, political animosity inside the Anglo-Saxon countries which would enrage the Soviets to such a degree that, as a consequence, they would welcome a chance to conclude a separate peace with Germany.

In the event of a negotiated peace, or should we be defeated, Germany would have everything to gain—in the long run—by joining the East.

Right now, the chances for a separate peace with the West are a little better, especially if we succeed, through our propaganda campaign and our "confidential" channels, to convince the enemy that Roosevelt's policy of "unconditional surrender" drives the German people towards Communism.

There is great fear in the U.S.A. of Bolshevism. The opposition against Roosevelt's alliance with Stalin grows constantly. Our chances for success are good, if we succeed to stir up influential circles against Roosevelt's policy. This can be done through clever pieces of information, or by references to unsuspicious neutral ecclesiastical contact men.

We have at our command in the United States efficient contacts.
which have been carefully kept up even during the war. The cam-
paign of hatred stirred up by Roosevelt and the Jews against every-
thing German has temporarily silenced the pro-German bloc in the
U.S.A. However, there is every hope that this situation will be
completely changed within a few months. If the Republicans suc-
ceed in defeating Roosevelt in the coming presidential election,
it would greatly influence the American conduct of war towards us.
The KO-leaders abroad and their staffs have innumerable oppor-
tunities of constantly referring to Roosevelt's hate policy. They
must use in this campaign all the existing contacts and they should
try to open up new channels. We must point to the danger that Ger-
many may be forced to cooperate with Russia. The greatest caution
has to be observed in all talks and negotiations by those who, as
"anti-Nazis," maintain contact with the enemy. When fulfilling
missions, they have to comply strictly with instructions.
(Sgd.) Canaris
German Plan for Psychological Warfare

in the U.S.A.

(Memorandum from Dr. Colin Ross to the German Foreign Office, 1943.)

On July 27, 1943, the German Foreign Office expert on the U.S.A., the geopolitician Dr. Colin Ross, suggested in a fifteen page memorandum a "Plan for an Ideological Campaign in the United States."

Recognizing Germany's inability to bring the war to a victorious end, Dr. Colin Ross proposed the immediate implementation of a carefully planned psychological warfare to undermine the anticipated U.S. military victory. Dr. Ross regarded American public opinion as the weakest link because the American people seemed especially susceptible to scare propaganda hinting that a defeated Germany would join the ranks of Bolshevism. The memorandum, which was addressed to the German Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, von Steengracht, became the guidepost for Germany's highly successful blackmail diplomacy in post-war America. Here follow some significant parts of the memorandum.

2 3 6
PLAN FOR AN IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN IN THE UNITED STATES

The Prerequisites for psychological warfare are:

1. Analyze the spiritual temper of world public opinion.
2. Evaluate correctly the ideological weapons available.
3. Put before the eyes of the world a strategic concept which will impress not only our own people, but also the neutrals and our enemies.
4. Select the most effective tactical methods for the accomplishment of the aim.
5. Co-ordinate the ideological campaign in support of our military and economic warfare.

The more the prospects for outright military victory diminish, the more urgent becomes the necessity for all-out psychological warfare.

In analyzing this problem we can disregard completely the possibility of total victory through military might alone, because in such a case psychological warfare is superfluous. However, in the case of total military collapse, we must continue the struggle by means of psychological warfare until the day arrives when weapons can speak again. In my opinion it is important to point to this ultima ratio now and emphasize it more than ever before. Psychological warfare will prove especially successful in the U.S.A. where many groups (weite Kreise) are fed up with the war.

Under all circumstances we should prepare ourselves for the worst, not in a spirit of defeatism, but in order to cope more effectively with defeatism in the hour of collapse. It is important that we see to it that our enemies, especially the Americans, should not bask themselves in the sun of victory or that they enjoy the role of being the liberators of Europe. Therefore, it is necessary to set up a far-flung organization in every country which, under enemy occupation, must carry on the task from the underground. We must do everything possible to impress upon American public opinion that after the liberation of Europe they will become involved in an endless maze of insoluble contradictions. However great their sacrifices may be they will end up in a blind alley exactly as it happened in 1918 under Wilson's grandiose planning.
GERMANY PLOTS WITH THE KREMLIN

We have to use the argument that if the enemy succeeds in stamping out "Fascism" or "Nazism" there will remain only Bolshevism. Thus, a Germany threatened by the Anglo-Americans with dismemberment, will throw herself completely into the arms of the Soviets, and in that way will make Bolshevism unconquerable.

This is the time to make up the balance sheet and to start with large scale preparation in order to meet the coming invasion. Our defense must not remain limited to military measures alone but must employ every available weapon of psychological warfare. The ideological offensive is the order of the day.
The German Master Plan of 1945

Under the title "Generalplan 1945," several documents had been drawn up in the closing days of the Third Reich which, in June 1945, were captured by the Allies together with the files of the short-lived Dönitz Government in Flensburg. The documents were initialed by Grand Admiral Dönitz and Field Marshal Keitel. The first document outlines a new political movement destined to preserve the German racial principles. Document #2 sketches a new European Order ("Europäische Friedensordnung") which shows a great resemblance with Dr. Adenauer's idea of a United Europe. In Document #3, entitled "The Overcoming of the Catastrophe," the German High-Command emphasizes the mutual advantages of a Russo-German alliance against the West.

Document I
THE GERMAN FREEDOM MOVEMENT

Berlin, April 3, 1945

The German Freedom Movement is based on the racial concept. It was formed during the war as an expression of the front soldier who believed in the tradition of the old National Socialist movement. Faithful to the oath of the Fuehrer, and with fealty to his work, the movement dis-associates itself:

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a) From rotten party bureaucracy.
b) From a self-deceiving Government caste.
c) From a policy of adventure.
d) From political narrow-mindedness ("Weltanschaulichen Starrsinn").
e) From falling back into the capitalistic system.

As much as our power position is endangered from the outside, the vital forces of resistance in our people are not extinguished. Conscious of our responsibility before history and our nation, the leaders of the German freedom movement are determined to struggle against helplessness, confusion, and treachery in order to secure for our children lasting peace during a period of re-construction in which Germany can develop her vital strength.

Document II
THE EUROPEAN PEACE-ORDER

1. Liberation of the German people from suppression and occupation.
2. Repatriation of the expellees (Heimholung der Verschleppten)
3. An integrated German racial community.
4. Elimination of all arbitrary acts by the enemy.
5. European Union on a federalistic basis.
6. Right to racial autonomy.
7. European Common-weal ("Gemeinnutz").
8. European Court of Arbitration.
9. Community of related peoples with the final aim to create a Germanic Reich.
10. Common-wealth between Germany and Bohemia and Moravia.
11. Guaranteed protection of racial groups ("Volksgruppenrecht").
German Documents

Document III
Annex to General Plan 1945
Berlin, April 5, 1945.

THE OVERCOMING OF THE CATASTROPHE

The first page of this document discusses the military situation on the Eastern and Western fronts and then goes on to ponder the chances for a separate peace with Russia:

While practically nothing can be offered to the Western Powers and while therefore negotiations are not possible, a development of vital necessity can be pointed out to the Soviet Union.

A German defeat by the Western Powers means for the Soviet Union only the prolongation of the war through a third World War.

The partition of Germany will be considered in the Soviet Union only as a temporary affair which, because it is unbearable, cannot last long. While Yalta gives Russia a limited influence in Eastern and Southern Europe—it will be constantly contested (by the USA), the influence of the Soviet Union in all of Europe can only be made possible by cooperation on the part of Germany.

A separate peace with Germany and Japan would mean relief for Russia in the East and an elimination of Anglo-American influence in China.

While Anglo-American deliveries to Russia probably will be stopped at the end of the war in spite of the granted credits (lend-lease) there will be considerable opportunities for the Soviet Union through economic cooperation with Europe and Eastern Asia for a long time to come.

While to remain in the coalition of the enemy would mean for the Soviet Union continuous friction with Great Britain and America in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Near East—a coalition with Germany would free for the Soviet Union the road from the Persian Gulf to the oilfields of Kirkuk and to the Mediterranean.

Such a separate peace is possible only by considerable mutual assurances and it can be built up, as things now are, only along the following lines:

a) Germany and the present Soviet Union join together in creating a "Socialist Union." Tying in with the independence of the sixteen Soviet Republics in 1943, the
European peoples form nationally defined, self-governing states, allied through a defense and economic union. Internal forms within the states are to be decided by the people.

b) Germany recognizes the Soviet Republics of Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Macedonia, Greece, and perhaps Turkey.

c) The Western part of Upper Silesia and all the parts of the Warthegau and Western Prussia which were parts of Prussia until 1918 remain German territory. Furthermore, Germany gets a stronger influence in Old Bohemia and in the South-East.

d) Mutual exchange of prisoners of war and civilians including all the deported Germans from Transylvania, Banat, Pommerania, Silesia, East Prussia, etc.

e) Germany gets a free hand in Northern and Western Europe, especially against Great Britain.

f) The whole "Socialistic Union" supports Germany, especially through deliveries of raw materials.

g) Germany supports Soviet Russia in the reconstruction of the war-devastated areas.

Out of these developments the following perspectives for the future can be drawn:

A colossal bloc of world-dominating greatness, economic power, energy and numbers of population would be created from ocean to ocean.

Not only would the danger of future wars for generations be eliminated from Europe but also from the double continent of Eurasia.

The two great peoples, the Russians and the Germans, have extraordinary possibilities for development without collision of their interests.

The chief emphasis in this bloc will shift more and more to the racially superior, intellectually more active and more energetic (people) ; that means to Europe.

Thus would be formed an alliance between the young Socialist forces against the old rotten entrenched powers of the West.
Excerpts from the Pro-Adenauer Press
Deal with Moscow

Excerpts from a front-page editorial of the geo-political weekly Christ und Welt which was published on December 27, 1951, two months before the Soviet Note of March 10, 1952 offered Germany free elections, a reunified Reich and all the trimmings for renazification and remilitarization.

"If Moscow would agree to free elections and the restoration of an independent Germany, that would be a day of greatest joy (hoechster Freudentag) in German post-war history. All other things can then be settled by the newly elected German Government . . ."

(Discussing the prospects of a deal with Moscow, the editorial continues):

"Only under political pressure would Moscow show readiness to return those (Eastern) territories which Russia has already incorporated into her orbit. It would be necessary that we first create a united, healthy, and strong Western Europe in whose name the following offer to the Kremlin could then be made:

"Continental Europe would break away from the Atlantic Pact if the Soviets agree to withdraw their forces behind the Priepet-Marshes 245"
and release not only the Eastern zone of Germany, but the whole of Eastern Europe into the European Union. A United Europe standing on its own feet and possessing its own powerful army, could begin with the development of its colonial empire in Africa. Such a Europe, whatever the ties might be with America, could afford to carry out such an independent policy because it will have the strength of a third power."

* This statement, reflecting the core of Dr. Adenauer's "bold plan," is identical with the suggestion made in the Madrid Circular Letter of September 1950.
The Future of Middle Europe . . .

Excerpts from an editorial in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of March 25, 1952.

"Secretary of State Hallstein deserves the merit to have made visible in his famous Ural-statement* the current which becomes stronger and stronger in the approach of American as well as German foreign policy. . . . That such a current exists in the Bonn Foreign Office has been known for a long time. Occasionally the facts about it have even leaked out to the public . . . According to

* This refers to a statement made by the German Secretary of State, Walter Hallstein who, in March 1952, gave a press interview at the Georgetown University in Washington. When asked by a newspaper man whether his reference to "integration of the whole of Europe" included all the territories "up to the Ural," Herr Hallstein's answer was: "Yes, that is what we mean." The statement caused a sensation the world over. It was first corroborated as an adequate interpretation of Western policy in Dr. Adenauer's Official Party Press Service. After Hallstein was attacked as "irresponsible" by Social Democrats and by Dr. Adenauer's own following, Bonn called the incident "a misunderstanding."
the opinion of those who make top-level decisions, we have only the choice between neutrality and a policy of joining the west and re-arming. The latter policy will enable us, in the coming years, to start negotiations with the Russians on the future of the whole of Central Europe. It is, therefore, unjustified to blame the opponents of the Russian Note that they want to prevent reunification of the Reich. They certainly are for reunification, but only in a far greater framework in which Poland and Czechoslovakia are also mentioned.”
Excerpts from an editorial "German Foreign Policy in the Fall of 1951," in Christ und Welt of November 1, 1951.

"... There is no stronger notion in present-day Germany than the desire not to become involved in another war. Yet, how can we prevent such an entanglement? ... The strengthening of Europe has to be continued until we have reached a certain degree of security. Military preparation alone will not be sufficient. The political and economic unification is of paramount importance and it will result in the growing self-assertion of the Western World.

"There are some advocates of the concept that Western Germany can serve the cause of peace more effectively by proclaiming her neutrality, than by joining the anti-Soviet coalition. We consider this concept to be erroneous under present circumstances ..."

"One of the arguments of the neutralists is that the strengthening of the Western world will bring nearer the danger that one day the Americans will launch a preventive war against the Soviets. Of course, it would be unrealistic to overlook the fact that there are
certain people in the Western World who play with the idea of a preventive war. Their number will certainly increase when, after two or three years, western rearmament has reached its peak . . .

"Nobody, however, can deny that the overwhelming majority of the people here in Europe are opposed to a preventive war, whether it is called for today or in the future, because the Third World War will mean the end of all civilization for Europe. Those who want to prevent such a war should therefore do everything in their power to make the restraining influence of Europe a decisive factor, which can best be done by making Europe strong . . .

"Europe must become healthy and strong in order to protect herself. Her voice should be heard not as a satellite of America, but as an independent in the Western World. The quicker we can achieve that, the better for our future. Only if Europe has a strong army of her own, can her influence tip the scales in the final decisions . . .

"In every community only efficiency will be crowned with success. Yet, who doubts the efficiency of the German people? Certainly not the French. On the contrary, they have the jitters from the thought that they must sit with us in the same boat. They fear that the German oarsmen will pull with such forceful strokes that the others will lose control over the boat . . . Nobody has to gain more from the unification of Europe than the Germans, the most numerous and vital among all European nations west of the U.S.S.R. . . .

"We join the European army not in order to please Monsieur Pleven or Mr. Eisenhower, but because we want a Europe in which we can rely on our own and not have to walk on American crutches . . . German political equality and the elimination of the last remnants of the policy of unconditional surrender will best be assured by the presence of 250,000 to 400,000 Germans in the European Army . . .

"Critics of the Adenauer policy declare that Germany's participation in Western defense will make the partition of Germany a lasting one. Does this argument hold any water? During the last two years, we found out that the policy of orientation towards the West has brought forward far reaching offers from the rulers in the East in regard to German reunification. Those who are really in favor of free election as a precondition for the reunification of Germany, should spur by all means the integration of Western Germany into the Western Community. At every point when the prospectives for
such development diminishes, Moscow immediately hesitates to yield on the question of the Eastern Zone . . .

"The West German Republic can best be compared with a sailboat cruising towards two islands far on the horizon and, in order to withstand strong-blowing winds, it sets its course alternatively to the left and to the right. Will the day then not arrive when we must make a decision on which island to land? Maybe, but it is not certain. Perhaps one of the islands will be washed away by the waves before we reach it . . ."
Under the caption "Foreign Policy Has to Be Flexible," the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of April 3, 1952, made the following statement on German re-unification and neutrality in a front-page editorial:

"Honest opinion has to admit that an armed German neutrality would please broad masses of the Germans, probably the majority. Yet, such a neutrality would not give an absolute guaranty but only a certain protection that Germany would not be dragged into the explosive controversies of the great power blocs . . . Switzerland is already a neutral, and so is Sweden. With a neutral Germany in addition, a broad belt of countries would come into existence stretching from the Alps high up to the Baltic Sea . . .

"There is another idea making the rounds in Bonn Government circles: a European Army should be created with German units included. Simultaneously, negotiations should be conducted to obtain Moscow's consent to German re-unification. The price to be paid to Russia is a guaranty that the European army will never be expanded over a certain limit of strength so that European forces would not
be in a position to launch an attack against Russia. Thus Russia would be granted the right to scrutinize the extent of European rearmament . . .

"The Chancellor himself follows a tremendous bold plan: First rearmament, followed later by talks with the Russians in order to persuade them to remove their armies behind the Bug River. For this goal the Chancellor has been working tenaciously for some time. And because he sticks to his timetable, he is presently opposed to the Russian Note."
The following excerpts are taken from editorials of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, which serves as the mouthpiece of the Bonn Foreign Office:

"Even after ratification of the treaties the door will not be closed for negotiations with the Soviets if they will solve the problem of German unity and Freedom."

"We do not need to call the attention of the experienced men in the Kremlin to the fact that a strong and unified Western Europe can defend its independence against every side. Why should the Kremlin not be interested in such an independence? . . . If the world, which is split today in two parts, could be reshuffled into a number of independent power groups, it may prevent this horrible conflagration for mankind. ... A flexible and prudent Russian policy could, for instance, grant German reunification in exchange for the independence of Europe which could be defended against every side. In such a case the reunification of Germany would become a guarantee for peace. The treaties which are presently signed will not prove to be a curb
toward reunification if the Russians remain interested in such a solution."
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 30, 1952.)

"If we Germans would come to feel that the other (Western) powers, openly or tacitly, try to hinder German equality and reunification, the treaties would quickly turn out to have been built on quicksand . . . The fact that we are tied up with the NATO pact does not make it impossible for Europe, as soon as it is strong enough and the international situation has changed, to become one day independent from every side ('nach alien Seiten unabhängig')."
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 5, 1952.)

"We cannot escape the necessity to tell the Russians what price we are willing to pay if they give up the Eastern Zone ... It would be useful that we start to think about the price which we will have to pay for the re-establishment of German unity."
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 19, 1952.)

"The Chancellor is stubborn but he is a realist ... It is obvious that he follows the correct thesis to do at the same time one thing, namely to increase our strength by cooperating with the West—and not to neglect the other, namely to come to an agreement with the East."
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 23, 1952.)

"Germany knows for sure that in a new war between the great power blocs it will suffer far more than all the others . . . Our foreign policy should assure the Russians that the West European potential will not be employed against the East, a suggestion that can be used as a trade-in for territorial concessions in the East . . . When Stresemann concluded his Locarno Treaty, he made it a condition that no foreign troops should be allowed to march through Germany. Thus Russia must feel sure that during peace time only German troops will be stationed in Germany."
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 10, 1952.)
"Western Germany should follow a policy of cooperation with the Western powers. But this must never lead to a situation in which Germany becomes the battlefield and the Germans the cannon fodder . . . When, however, against all expectations and reasons, the Americans should start an aggression against the East, disregarding our determination and probably those of other Europeans to stay out of the war, then we should not be forced into participation in a war just for the reason the Americans had helped us in our rearmament. In such a case, the superior strength of Europe should then be automatically directed against any disturbance of the peace that comes from the West."

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Sept. 4, 1952.)
[APPENDIX III]

American Documents
Germany's Preparation for a Comeback

I

On March 30, 1945 the U.S. State Department announced that "reliable information collected by Allied Governments clearly indicates that the Nazi regime in Germany has developed well arranged post-war plans for the perpetuation of Nazi doctrines and domination. Some of these plans have already been put into operation and others are ready to be launched on a widespread scale immediately upon termination of hostilities in Europe."

From the official release, the following parts are quoted:

"Nazi Party members, German industrialists and the German military, realizing that victory can no longer be attained, are now developing post-war commercial projects, are endeavoring to renew and cement friendships in foreign commercial circles and are planning for renewals of pre-war cartel agreements. An appeal to the courts of various countries will be made early in the post-war period through dummies for 'unlawful' seizure of industrial plants and other properties taken over by Allied governments at the outbreak of war. In cases where this method fails German repurchase will be
attempted through 'cloaks' who meet the necessary citizenship requirements. The object in every instance will be to re-establish German control at the earliest possible date. German attempts to continue to share in the control and development of technological change in the immediate post-war period is reflected in the phenomenal increase in German patent registrations in foreign countries during the past two years. These registrations reached an all-time high in 1944. The prohibition against exporting capital from Germany was withdrawn several months ago, and a substantial outflow of capital has followed to foreign countries.

"German technicians, cultural experts, and undercover agents have well-laid plans to infiltrate foreign countries with the object of developing economic, cultural and political ties. German technicians and scientific research experts will be made available at low cost to industrial firms and technical schools in foreign countries. German capital and plans for the construction of ultra-modern technical schools and research laboratories will be offered at extremely favorable terms since they will afford the Germans an excellent opportunity to design and perfect new weapons. This Government is now in possession of photostatic copies of several volumes of German plans on this subject. The German propaganda program is to be an integral part of the over-all post-war program. The immediate aim of the propaganda program will be directed at removing Allied Control measures by 'softening-up' the Allies through a subtle plea for 'fair treatment' of Germans and later the program will be expanded and intensified with the object of giving re-birth to all Nazi doctrines and furthering German ambitions for world domination. Unless these plans are checked they will present a constant menace to post-war peace and security."

II

Excerpts of statement by William L. Clayton, former Assistant Secretary of State, to the sub-committee of the Committee on Military Affairs, U.S. Senate.

June 25, 1945

"The second matter I should like to discuss relates to the current and urgent problem of frustrating German attempts to hide abroad a stake for another gamble at world domination."
"The Department of State has abundant evidence that the Nazis, in anticipation of military defeat, made careful plans to carry on in foreign countries a wide range of activities necessary to support an eventual resurgence of German power. For this purpose plans were made, and carried out in part, to transfer abroad sufficient funds and specially trained personnel to carry on pan-German activities, even while the Allied armies were in occupation of Germany.

"The success of German efforts to carry on in foreign countries activities inimical to the United Nations must depend on their ability to mobilize funds to support the execution of their plans. Consequently, they have made strenuous efforts to move abroad assets of all kinds, which can be converted into funds for the financing of hostile activities.

"Our safehaven program is a combined effort of the Department of State, the Treasury Department, and the Foreign Economic Administration to deny to Germany, in the interests of justice and future security, the economic power arising from (a) the organized looting of occupied countries, (b) the flight of German capital in anticipation of defeat, and (c) the German capital investment already located abroad when the war began.

"Our investigations have yielded a considerable amount of information which indicates the schemes and devices which the Germans planned to use in order to safeguard their foreign holdings and transfer additional property abroad. In many cases they have concealed their interests in foreign properties through holding companies as cloaks. In other cases they have abandoned formal voting control but retained a firm grip on manufacturing concerns through domination of technical processes. They have transformed their holdings into bearer shares in order to take advantage of the fact that the title to such shares can be traced only with extreme difficulty. Moreover, the Germans have also taken advantage in some countries of administrative inefficiency and corruption. The extent to which this can be said in every neutral country to have been the fault of private individuals alone is problematical.

"The Germans systematically looted all manner of valuable property, not only to satisfy the esthetic sensibilities of such celebrated collectors as Goering, but to acquire wealth cheaply for concealment abroad."
"Looting reached its all-time low when gold was picked from the teeth of gas-chamber victims. A more subtle form of outright looting was outright 'purchase' with occupation currency from fearful sellers."
On June 22, 1945, Bernard M. Baruch made a statement before the Military Affairs Committee of the United States Senate, from which excerpts are quoted below:

"... No more important question ever will come before you than this one—of how to prevent the revival of Germany's war-making might. It is the heart of the making of the peace: it is the heart of the keeping of the peace.

What is done with Germany holds the key to whether Russia, Britain and the United States can continue to get along.

Is it possible to control and transform a nation of more than 60,000,000 persons, with an economy as intricate and efficient as that of the Germans? I believe it can be done. I know it must be done.

Germany's Third Try

It will not be easy. But if not done, we face the certainty that Germany will make a third try to conquer the world..."
Whether one wants to be "nice" or "harsh" to Germany makes no difference. War must be displaced as Germany's chief business . . .

I have not thought in terms of a "hard" or a "soft" peace. I seek a sure peace.

Therefore I recommend:

Economically, break once and for all Germany's dominance of Europe. Her war-making potential must be eliminated: many of her plants and factories shifted east and west to friendly countries; all other heavy industry destroyed; the Junkers estates broken up; her exports and imports strictly controlled; German assets and business organizations all over the world rooted out . . .

Build up the strength of the United Nations in both Europe and overseas while reducing Germany's over-all industrial and technical power. Only when such a new equilibrium is established will it be safe to re-admit Germany to the family of nations.

We must ready ourselves for a long occupation of Germany—as long as it takes for her spiritual and economic rebirth.

Recover Secreted Assets

When defeat became certain, many of Germany's Junkers, Nazi leaders and war industrialists sneaked abroad assets of every type as reserves for that day in the future when they could try it again. German business abroad has traditionally been an instrument of economic and propagandist war. These assets and organizations should be rooted out and taken over—everywhere. No hocus-pocus. No falling for "dummy" contrivances.

Enemy assets in each country should be used to make restitution to nationals of that country for properties lost or damaged in enemy countries.

Cave Age versus Prosperity

To accept the view that the restoration of German industrial dominance in Europe is inevitable—something we can do nothing about—is to resign ourselves to the return to a new cave age. We might as well begin to put our factories and plants underground.

As a result of controlling Germany, great economic benefits will flow to all of the United Nations. It will open expanded industrial
opportunities to them and agricultural and other products which Germany will not use, will be taken up by other countries. Britain, which after the war will be confronted with a grave need for increasing the volume of her exports to pay for food and raw material imports, will fall heir to many former German (and Japanese) markets. Instead of trading with Germany, the United Nations will have more trade with one another.

The Soviets are bound to question Allied moves as dictated by a desire to rebuild Germany into a buffer against Russia. In turn, the Western democracies will suspect Russia of seeking to communize Germany. The Germans can be expected to resort to every imaginable trick to foment discord among the four occupying nations. They will play one nation against the others, one zone against the next, hoping to break the common unity of the Allies, so controls will be permitted to lapse, giving her a chance to recoup, as after Versailles . . .

In making my recommendations, I have sought only to stimulate action so that we will exercise the leadership which is ours. I would not want to see that leadership which we have held for 150 years now lost to others or wasted through disuse."
On July 10, 1945, Senator Kilgore of the Subcommittee on War Mobilization, submitted the following report to the Senate Military Affairs Committee, a part of which is below set forth:

Mr. Chairman, we have the honor to submit to you a preliminary report on the sub-committee's studies of German resources for a third world war. In its report of November 1944 on Cartels and National Security, your subcommittee found that the Germans systematically engaged in economic warfare as a prelude to military conquest. Our investigations even at that date supported the conclusion that—

The German aggressors have begun to pursue a strategy which they found successful a quarter century ago; they are already deploying their economic reserves throughout the world in preparation for a third attempt at world domination. . . .

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I

Germany in defeat remains a major threat to the peace of the world. The Germans, who have twice within the century launched the most devastating wars, have already set in motion plans for a third attempt to enslave the world. No peace making can be successful which does not at the outset thwart these plans and destroy Germany's potential for war making. This is the indispensable condition to peace in Europe. Lasting world peace requires also the unconditional defeat of Japan and the smashing of her war potential . . .

II

Germany today is better prepared to implement her plot for world conquest than she was at the end of World War I. Her major resources include (1) the world's third strongest industrial economy; (2) tremendous industrial recuperative power; (3) a world-wide network of economic and political reserves and a system of commercial interrelationships penetrating the economies of other nations; and (4) the science of aggression perfected by her leading industrialists, militarists, and politicians to reverse the decisions of the battlefield.

The German War Economy

Germany is an industrial giant whose economy for half a century was developed by the Junker-industrialist clique as an engine of war . . . The strength of Germany's war machine lies not only in her over-expanded metallurgical and chemical industries, but in her enormous industrial flexibility and recuperative power, displayed before and throughout the war ... It appears that if Germany had held out 6 months longer she would have been sending more destructive V-2 bombs to smash the heart of New York. Germany's recuperative power rests on her greatly expanded machine-tool industry, her reserves of skilled scientists and technicians . . . Except for the United States, Germany remains the outstanding machine shop in the world. German science provided the synthetic fuels and rubber which enabled her armies to drive relentlessly over Europe. German scientists and technologists created new and diabolical weapons. . . .
In the period between World War I and World War II, Germany created economic, political, and espionage outposts throughout the world. In the United States, Germany retrieved many of the properties which had been seized during the First World War. She penetrated so deeply into key industries of Latin-American countries that a State Department official testified before the subcommittee that liquidation of the German-controlled enterprises would have crippled the economies of a number of these countries. The Germans also made strong inroads into the economies of Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Portugal, Finland, Bulgaria, and Roumania. German-owned or dominated firms not only served to procure raw materials, increase German trade, and obtain much-needed foreign exchange for Germany, but they acted as centers of espionage and as intermediaries for the financing of Nazi political activities. During the war, in an endeavor to maintain intact its assets in enemy countries, it used the neutral countries as a cloak for German ownership or control.

Despite the strenuous efforts of the United States and the cooperation of a number of the Latin-American countries, the evidence is unmistakable that German influence is still strongly entrenched in this hemisphere, particularly in Argentina. The United States itself may be one of the most important safe havens for German assets. There is over a half-billion dollars of seized assets held in unnamed Swiss accounts, which are now blocked by the United States on reasonable suspicion that these assets may in fact be German.

The Science of Aggression

Leading German industrialists, militarists, and politicians have at their disposal a long and carefully developed science of aggression. This science rests on a series of major deceptions: (a) that the war of aggression is the product of a few Nazi fanatics; (b) that the German economy is a normal civilian economy and should be maintained as such; (c) that the entire network of relationships between German cartels and monopolies of other countries is essential to the conduct of international trade and industrial progress; (d) that German science and German scientists are an instrument of
human progress; and (e) that the Allies have less to fear from Germany than they have to fear from one another.

The evidence shows that German industry has been dominated by a number of combines and domestic monopolies, chiefly in the basic industries, and that the leaders of these combines, together with the Junkers and Nazis, were Germany's principal war makers. Constituting a kind of economic general staff, immediately after Versailles and with the assistance of the Weimar Republic which they infiltrated, they began to consolidate their position within the country and secretly to rearm Germany. By manipulating reparations, by planned bankruptcy, by Government subsidies and tariff protection, and by masterful use of international cartel relationships they disarmed their prospective victims and with the assistance of those prospective victims, perfected their own war machine. Hitler and the Nazis were late comers in these preparations. It was the cartel and monopoly powers—the leaders of the coal, iron and steel, chemical, and armament combines—who at first secretly and then openly supported Hitler in order to accelerate their ruthless plans for world conquest. By 1931 the coal cartel, one of the most powerful industrial combines in Germany, openly placed a royalty on every ton of coal sold, whether domestically or abroad, in order to finance the Nazi Party . . .

A witness before the subcommittee, who only recently interrogated some of Germany's key industrial leaders, now jailed, pointed out that these leaders confidently expect to be rescued from their present plight by powerful British and American friends who were their former cartel affiliates . . . These industrialists remain the principal custodians of Germany's plans for future war.

III

. . . Your subcommittee finds that the German economy was developed as a war economy, and that its vast industrial potential remains largely undamaged by the war; that Germany has a world-wide network—including even the United States—of commercial relationships and economic, political, and espionage outposts which she
could mobilize for another war; that the leading German industrialists are not only as responsible for war crimes as the German General Staff and the Nazi Party, but that they were among the earliest and most active supporters of the Nazis, whom they used to accelerate their plans for world conquest, and that these industrialists remain the principal custodians of Germany's plans for renewed aggression.

The experience of the years following World War I demonstrates conclusively that without the active understanding, support, and participation of the people as a whole, the efforts of a few commissioners and even an army corps can avail nothing against the desperate schemes of a determined and skillful group of German leaders who have thoroughly indoctrinated their own people and systematically deceived the rest of the world.
[APPENDIX IV]

Documents on the Russo-German Relations
In view of the fact that the Bonn Foreign Office appears as the actual continuation of the old Ribbentrop outfit, while Dr. Adenauer's government serves as the respected front playing the "pro-Western" ruse a la Stresemann, it seems appropriate to refresh our minds with a few documents which unmask the geo-political fundamentals that have governed German-Russian relations in the past, and which obviously will serve as a diplomatic guidepost in the future.

In his excellent study German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, Prof. Edward Hallett Carr stressed the vital fact that "during the past two centuries, German-Russian relations have been a key-point in the international politics of the European continent." It is quite natural, therefore, that the former Ribbentrop diplomats in Bonn are conscious of the fact that Germany's greatest diplomatic triumphs were harvested in the days of August 1939, when a trembling Western world was confronted with the Berlin-Moscow non-aggression pact. No doubt Bismarck's re-insurance policy towards the
East, the Rapallo approach of 1922, and Ribbentrop's diplomatic coup of 1939 still determine the diplomatic outlook in the Bonn Foreign Office.

German diplomats are fascinated by the effectiveness of the old see-saw policy which, according to Professor Carr, allows the German government to "manoeuvre freely between east and west, playing off the two rivals against one another, disclaiming any firm or irrevocable commitment to either, extorting concessions from the one by threatening to fall into the arms of the other, and always keeping its own choice open."

This is exactly the formula which the Madrid Circular Letter recommended for Germany's comeback to power, and, in a more refined manner, was urged by the clever editorial writers in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

The Soviet leaders are well aware of the situation and they shape their planning along these world political realities. When General von Seeckt initiated his secret collaboration with the Soviets in the summer of 1920, it was easy for Lenin to make the following predictions before the All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December 1920:

"This country (Germany), bound by the Versailles Treaty, lives in conditions which do not allow it to exist. And in this position Germany is naturally pushed into alliance with Russia . . . . The German bourgeois government madly hates the Bolsheviks, but the interests of the international situation are pushing it towards peace with Soviet Russia against its own will."

Only a year after Lenin had made this statement, the world was stunned by the Rapallo Treaty.

In March 1939, Stalin made a speech with overtures to Germany which, according to Molotov, "had been well understood in Germany and brought about the reversal in political relations." Six months after Stalin's speech, Ribbentrop scored his amazing diplomatic hit in Moscow.

The Nadolny affair in 1949 and the subsequent negotiations between Dr. Wirth and Soviet representatives have laid bare the basic operational factors which determine the relations between West Germany and Russia. The Soviet leaders have a clear conception of the
course of international developments. On the eve of the 19th All-Russian Communist Congress, in October 1952, Stalin predicted that Germany and Japan would again become great world powers. On that occasion he analyzed the past and the future as follows:

"Let us proceed to the chief conquered countries—to [West] Germany, to Japan. These countries are squeezing out a pitiful existence under the heel of American imperialism . . . To think that these countries shall not try again to rise on their feet, to break the 'regime' of the United States and to break forth on the path of independent development— that means to believe in miracles . . . "

"It is typical that it was none other than the United States and England which helped Germany raise herself economically and raise her military and economic potential. Of course the United States and England, helping Germany to rise economically, had in view to direct the risen Germany against the Soviet Union, to use it against the country of socialism. However, Germany directed her forces in the first place against the Anglo-American-French bloc, and when Hitlerite Germany declared war against the Soviet Union, then the Anglo-American-French bloc not only did not unite with Hitlerite Germany but on the contrary, was forced to engage in a coalition with the U.S.S.R. against Hitlerite Germany.

"One asks what guarantee is there that Germany and Japan will not rise again on their feet, that they will not attempt to break out from American slavery and live their independent life? I think that there are no such guarantees. But from this it follows that the inevitability of wars between the capitalist countries remains in force."

Stalin is not talking through his hat. His words will be "well understood" again—in Germany!

One of the ablest observers of the international scene, Walter Lippmann, saw in Stalin's thesis the handwriting on the wall:

"This latest work of Stalin enables us to understand, rather more clearly than before, the respective roles in Soviet meth-
od of conspiratorial secrecy on the one hand and of open
disclosure on the other—and how the two apparently op-
posed procedures are related . . .
"Stalin lays down the thesis that Western Germany and
Japan cannot prosper within the Western camp. They cannot
prosper without access to his world markets—that is to say
to the Soviet orbit. He says that the American policy of hold-
ing Japan and Western Germany within the capitalist market
will cause great conflicts within the Western world . . .
"So much for the open disclosure of Soviet policy, and if we
do not take it seriously, if we dismiss it as mere deception,
we shall merely be deceiving ourselves . . .
"What remains quite secret, what is left hidden in the realm
of intrigue and conspiracy, is how the Soviet government
means to exploit the unsettled, highly problematical situa-
tion of Germany and Japan.
"The publication of this work of Stalin's is, in fact, an adver-
tisement to the Germans and the Japanese that they may
expect to hear more and more from Moscow and Peiping,
to hear a lot publicly, and privately to be hearing even
more . . .
"The stage is being set for a great political struggle—in
which the big stakes are how Germany and Japan will align
themselves as between the Soviet orbit and the Western
world."

There is a well-established pattern in German-Russo relations
which the Western world has to reckon with. The skilled observer
knows that the volcano is smoldering again and that another world-
shaking eruption is in the offing. In the present situation, it seems
appropriate to refresh our memory with the following documents:

The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador
in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
MOST URGENT BERLIN, August 14, 1939—10:53 p.m.
Received Moscow, August 15, 1939—4:40 a.m.
No. 175 of August 14
For the Ambassador personally.

I request that you call upon Herr Molotov personally and communicate to him the following:

1) The ideological contradictions between National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union were in past years the sole reason why Germany and the U.S.S.R. stood opposed to each other in two separate and hostile camps. The developments of the recent period seem to show that differing world outlooks do not prohibit a reasonable relationship between the two states, and the restoration of cooperation of a new and friendly type. The period of opposition in foreign policy can be brought to an end once and for all and the way lies open for a new sort of future for both countries.

2) There exist no real conflicts of interest between Germany and the U.S.S.R. The living spaces of Germany and the U.S.S.R. touch each other, but in their natural requirements they do not conflict. Thus there is lacking all cause for an aggressive attitude on the part of one country against the other. Germany has no aggressive intentions against the U.S.S.R. The Reich Government is of the opinion that there is no question between the Baltic and the Black Seas which cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction of both countries. Among these are such questions as: the Baltic Sea, the Baltic area, Poland, Southeastern questions, etc. In such matters political cooperation between the two countries can have only a beneficial effect. The same applies to German and Soviet economy, which can be expanded in any direction.

3) There is no doubt that German-Soviet policy today has come to an historic turning point. The decisions with respect to policy to be made in the immediate future in Berlin and Moscow will be of decisive importance for the aspect of relationships between the German people and the peoples of the U.S.S.R. for generations. On those decisions will depend whether the two peoples will some day again and without any compelling reason take up arms against each other or whether they pass again into a friendly relationship. It has gone well with both countries previously when they were friends and badly when they were enemies.
4) It is true that Germany and the U.S.S.R., as a result of years of hostility in their respective world outlooks, today look at each other in a distrustful fashion. A great deal of rubbish which has accumulated will have to be cleared away. It must be said, however, that even during this period the natural sympathy of the Germans for the Russians never disappeared. The policy of both states can be built anew on that basis.

5) The Reich Government and the Soviet Government must, judging from all experience, count it as certain that the capitalistic Western democracies are the unforgiving enemies of both National Socialist Germany and of the U.S.S.R. They are today trying again, by the conclusion of a military alliance, to drive the U.S.S.R. into the war against Germany. In 1914 this policy had disastrous results for Russia. It is the compelling interest of both countries to avoid for all future time the destruction of Germany and of the U.S.S.R., which would profit only the Western democracies.

6) The crisis which has been produced in German-Polish relations by English policy, as well as English agitation for war and the attempts at an alliance which are bound up with that policy, make a speedy clarification of German-Russian relations desirable. Otherwise these matters, without any German initiative, might take a turn which would deprive both Governments of the possibility of restoring German-Soviet friendship and possibly of clearing up jointly the territorial questions of Eastern Europe. The leadership in both countries should, therefore, not allow the situation to drift, but should take action at the proper time. It would be fatal if, through mutual lack of knowledge of views and intentions, our peoples should be finally driven asunder.

As we have been informed, the Soviet Government also has the desire for a clarification of German-Russian relations. Since, however, according to previous experience this clarification can be achieved only slowly through the usual diplomatic channels, Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop is prepared to make a short visit to Moscow in order, in the
name of the Fuhrer, to set forth the Fiihrer's views to Herr Stalin. Only through such a direct discussion, in the view of Herr von Ribbentrop, can a change be brought about, and it should not be impossible thereby to lay the foundations for a definite improvement in German-Russian relations.

ANNEX: I request that you do not give Herr Molotov these instructions in writing, but that you read them to him. I consider it important that they reach Herr Stalin in as exact a form as possible and I authorize you at the same time to request from Herr Molotov on my behalf an audience with Herr Stalin so that you may be able to make this important communication directly to him also. In addition to a conference with Molotov, an extended conference with Stalin would be a condition for my making the trip.

RIBBENTROP

During the following days, Ribbentrop urgently insisted on his immediate coming to Moscow in order to sign a non-aggression pact. Molotov, however, was dragging his feet and demanded sufficient time for a "thorough preparation" of such an important pact. A few days later, Ambassador von Schulenburg was instructed to deliver the following telegram from Hitler to Stalin:

The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)

Telegram

VERY URGENT BERLIN, August 20, 1939—4:35 p. m.
Received Moscow, August 21, 1939—12:45 a. m.
No. 189 of August 20
For the Ambassador personally.

The Fuhrer authorizes you to present yourself to Molotov at once and hand him the following telegram from the Fuhrer to Herr Stalin:

Herr Stalin, Moscow. 1) I sincerely welcome the signing of the new German-Soviet Commercial Agreement as the first step in the reordering of German-Soviet relations.
2) The conclusion of a nonaggression pact with the
Soviet Union means to me the establishment of a long-range German policy. Germany thereby resumes a political course that was beneficial to both states during by-gone centuries. The Government of the Reich is therefore resolved in such case to act entirely consistent with such a far-reaching change.

3) I accept the draft of the nonaggression pact that your Foreign Minister, Herr Molotov, delivered, but consider it urgently necessary to clarify the questions connected with it as soon as possible.

4) The supplementary protocol desired by the Government of the Soviet Union can, I am convinced, be substantially clarified in the shortest possible time if a responsible German statesman can come to Moscow himself to negotiate. Otherwise the Government of the Reich is not clear as to how the supplementary protocol could be cleared up and settled in a short time.

5) The tension between Germany and Poland has become intolerable. Polish demeanor toward a great power is such that a crisis may arise any day. Germany is determined, at any rate, in the face of this presumption, from now on to look after the interests of the Reich with all the means at its disposal.

6) In my opinion, it is desirable, in view of the intentions of the two states to enter into a new relation to each other, not to lose any time. I therefore again propose that you receive my Foreign Minister on Tuesday, August 22, but at the latest on Wednesday, August 23. The Reich Foreign Minister has full powers to draw up and sign the non-aggression pact as well as the protocol. A longer stay by the Reich Foreign Minister in Moscow than one to two days at most is impossible in view of the international situation. I should be glad to receive your early answer. Adolf Hitler.

Please deliver to Herr Molotov the above telegram of the Fuhrer to Stalin in writing, on a sheet of paper without letterhead.

RIBBENTROP
On the next day, Stalin gave the following reply:

The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
to the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT Moscow, August 21, 1939—7:30 p. m.
SECRET
No. 200 of August 21
Supplementing my telegram No. 199 of August 21.
Text of Stalin's reply:

August 21, 1939. To the Chancellor of the German Reich, A. Hitler. I thank you for the letter. I hope that the German-Soviet nonaggression pact will mark a decided turn for the better in the political relations between our countries.

The people of our countries need peaceful relations with each other. The assent of the German Government to the conclusion of a nonaggression pact provides the foundation for eliminating the political tension and for the establishment of peace and collaboration between our countries.

The Soviet Government has authorized me to inform you that it agrees to Herr von Ribbentrop's arriving in Moscow on August 23. J. Stalin.

SCHULENBURG

Two days later, on August 23, 1939, Ribbentrop arrived at Moscow and, after a few hours' conference with Stalin, all former controversies between the two totalitarian powers, as well as the harsh epithets hurled at each other, were forgotten. A hastily drawn-up treaty was signed and the "Herren Stalin and Molotov drank repeatedly to the nonaggression pact, the new era of German-Russian relations, and to the German nation."

A week later, the German armies attacked Poland. Soon the conflict embroiled Europe and later dragged in the whole world.