The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan:
The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics

S. V. R. NASR

University of San Diego

The past two decades have witnessed a notable escalation in sectarian violence in Pakistan. Since 1979 doctrinal disputes between Sunnis (who constitute the majority of Pakistan's population) and Twelver Shi'is (who number between 15% and 25% of the population, and are to be distinguished from Islami'ili, Khoja and Bohri Shi'is) has given place to full-fledged sectarian conflict. Militant Sunni and Shi'i organizations have carried out assassinations and bombing campaigns that have killed political rivals as well as children and the innocent at prayer in mosques. In the first seven months of 1997 alone—the year when sectarian conflict reached its apogee—one hundred people died in such attacks in Punjab. The violence escalated further when in the first ten days of August 1997 (immediately preceding the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the country's independence) another seventy people were killed in incidents of sectarian violence. Sectarian forces have incited riots (that in 862 incidents between 1989 and 1994 claimed 208 lives and injured another 1,629); and have engaged in armed conflicts (that for instance, in a five-day 'war' in 1996 in Pachinar in Northwest Pakistan, in which the combatants used mortars, rocket...
launchers, and anti-aircraft missiles, claimed the lives of some 200 people). These actions have polarized communities, and undermined civic order and political stability (most notably when a bomb on the eve of the 1997 elections killed nineteen Sunni militant leaders in a courthouse in Lahore) (see Table 1).

Sectarian violence has taken center-stage as militants vie to assert the preeminence of their religious communities, gain control of the Islamist discourse and define the nature of state–society relations. Probing the reasons for the rise of sectarian violence can shed much light on changes in the ideology and practice of Islamism in Pakistan. It can elucidate the manner in which changes in the intellectual and social function of traditional centers of Islamic education and the ulama that they produce, have interacted with regional and domestic politics to create a new style of Islamist activism with a different approach to the question of the role of Islam in politics. The probe will also explicate the manner in which interactions between the state and its Islamist and ulama clients since 1977 have precipitated conflicts within Islamist circles and among the ulama over the right to represent Islam in Pakistan. These conflicts have produced new patterns of interaction between ulama and Islamists, and given rise to discourses of power among them which have been important in giving shape to the new style of Islamist activism. This paper will examine these issues with reference to the rising Sunni militancy.

The Role of Madrasahs

The phenomenon of militant sectarianism, especially among Sunnis, is closely associated with the proliferation of madrasahs and daru’il-‘ulums (Islamic seminaries) across Pakistan, and especially in Punjab. Increasingly, madrasah students and graduates have become active in local and national politics, as well as in the push to Islamize state institutions. More ominously, they have also become prominent in militant movements. Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf’s international Islamist network; Harakatu’l-Ansar’s (Movement of the Helpers [of the Prophet]) campaign in Kashmir; the Taliban’s in Afghanistan, and the anti-Shi‘i crusade of the Sunni Tahrik (Sunni Movement), Tanzim-i Da‘wah (Organization of the Call) Lashkar-i Jhangvi

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3 The official death toll was ninety-five; the actual number according to eyewitness estimates stood at 200. Newsline (Karachi) (Oct. 1996), p. 72.
# Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>150 Shi'i killed in Gilgit by vigilante Sunni mobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>assassination of Shi'i TJP(^a) leader, Arif Husaini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>assassination of Sunni SSP(^b) leader, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>assassination of Iranian cultural attaché in Lahore</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>assassination of Sunni SSP leader, Israr-ul-Haq Qasimi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1991</td>
<td>18 Sunni SSP workers killed in Gilgit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1992</td>
<td>15 killed and 40 injured in Peshawar in rioting during Shi'i Muharram ceremonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1994</td>
<td>6 killed and 21 injured in attack on Shi'i mosque in Multan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January–February 1994</td>
<td>5 retaliatory assassinations of Shi'i and Sunni leaders in Punjab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1995</td>
<td>8 Shi'i killed and 17 injured in attack on a Shi'i mosque in Karachi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1995</td>
<td>20 Shi'i killed in attack on 2 mosques in Karachi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1995</td>
<td>12 Shi'i killed and 28 wounded (including children) in a bomb blast at a mosque. 7 more Shi'i and Sunnis were killed that night in rioting.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 1996</td>
<td>12 Sunni SSP workers killed in Karachi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1996</td>
<td>Over 200 killed in five days of Shi'i–Sunni fighting in Pachinar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1996</td>
<td>21 Sunnis killed in attack on a mosque in Multan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1996</td>
<td>27 Sunnis (mostly children) were killed in an attack on a Sunni mosque in Multan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1996</td>
<td>assassination of 2 Shi'i TJP leaders in Lahore and Multan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>assassination of Shi'i SM(^d) leader, Murid Abbas Yazdani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1997</td>
<td>19 Sunni SSP leaders and workers killed in a bomb blast at a court house in Lahore. The blast killed SSP leader, Ziau'l-Rahman Faruqi, and seriously injured his second in command, A'zam Tariq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1997</td>
<td>torching of Iranian cultural centers in Lahore and Multan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January–May 1997</td>
<td>assassination of 75 Shi'i municipal leaders and prominent community figures in rural Punjab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1–10, 1997</td>
<td>70 people killed various incidents of sectarian violence in and around Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1997</td>
<td>Five Iranian military personnel assassinated in Rawalpindi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1998</td>
<td>22 killed and 50 injured in an attack on a Shi'i religious ceremony in Punjab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1998</td>
<td>15 killed in two days of sectarian violence in Hangu, NWFP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{a}\)Tahrik-i Ja'fariyah Pakistan (Pakistan's Shi'i Movement).
\(^{b}\)Sipah Sahabah Pakistan (SSP, Pakistan's Army of the Companions of the Prophet).
\(^{d}\)Muhammad's Army.
(Jhangvi’s Army), Sawad-i A’zam-i Ahl-i Sunnat (Majority of Sunnis), Sunni Council, Sunni Jam’iat-i Tulabah (Sunni Student Association), Pakistan Sunni Ittihad (Pakistan Sunni Alliance), Tahaffuz-i Khatm-i Nubuwwat (Protection of Finality of Prophethood), the Pakistan Shariat (Islamic law) Council, and the Sipah-i Sahabah Pakistan (SSP, Pakistan’s Army of the Companions of the Prophet) have all begun in and around militant madrasahs, and recruit from among their students and graduates.

Why and how traditional Islamic educational institutions have become embroiled in militancy and violent activism brings to the fore interesting questions about the changing social and political role of Islamic educational institutions, their relation to the political uses of Islam by the state and the Islamist opposition to it, and the interface between a changing and expanding state and traditional spokesmen of religion. In 1947 there were 137 madrasahs in Pakistan. Today even the smallest divisions of Punjab have just as many, and Pakistan as a whole has an estimated 8,000. The proliferation of madrasahs belonging to Deobandi, Brelwi and Ahl-i Hadith schools of Sunni Islam, began in the mid-1970s, and has continued at a phenomenal pace since. In Punjab, where the rise in numbers has been most notable (see Table 1), the number of madrasahs increased three and a half times between 1975 and 1996, from over 700 to 2,463.6 Of the 2,463, 750 were classed as aggressively sectarian.7 In Lahore the increase was from 75 to 324, and in Faisalabad, which is today one of the principal centers for militant madrasahs, the increase was from a handful to 112.8

In its first phase, between 1975 and 1979, the rise in the number of madrasahs was supported by a flow of funds from the Persian Gulf monarchies. Governments of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates had viewed the turn of Pakistan’s politics towards the Left in the late 1960s and early 1970s with alarm, and supported all kinds of Islamic activities with the aim of strengthening Islamic institutions and ideology as a bulwark against the Left. By 1973 Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was able to assuage those fears as he cultivated close ties with Persian Gulf rulers and purged his party of

4 Herald (Karachi) (Sept. 1992), p. 34.
8 Ibid.
### Table 2
**Madrasahs and their Students in Punjab in 1996**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>No. of madrasahs</th>
<th>Deobandi M/S</th>
<th>Brelwi M/S</th>
<th>Ahl-i Hadith M/S</th>
<th>Shi’i</th>
<th>‘Religious Criminals’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>143/17,892</td>
<td>136/18,336</td>
<td>41/5,524</td>
<td>4/373</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>83/8,367</td>
<td>64/8,307</td>
<td>6/417</td>
<td>16/442</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujranwala</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>36/3,632</td>
<td>87/7,400</td>
<td>13/1,712</td>
<td>4/373</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faisalabad</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>47/1,163</td>
<td>39/5,027</td>
<td>18/3,141</td>
<td>8/700</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sargodha</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>68/6,158</td>
<td>64/6,427</td>
<td>9/1,318</td>
<td>8/341</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>127/1,888</td>
<td>159/10,798</td>
<td>27/2,620</td>
<td>12/660</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.G. Khan</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>133/8,816</td>
<td>174/9,593</td>
<td>24/1,829</td>
<td>30/669</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhawalpur</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>335/32,204</td>
<td>493/29,308</td>
<td>36/2,319</td>
<td>19/746</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,463</strong></td>
<td><strong>972/80,120</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,216/95,196</strong></td>
<td><strong>174/18,880</strong></td>
<td><strong>101/4,304</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,40</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*M is number of madrasahs and S the number of students.
The category is as reported by the police.
The 80 were mainly from Jhang.
its leftist elements. Still, the support for Islamic activism in Pakistan continued unabated, mainly because that support had found its own momentum, and the linkages between Islamic organizations and groups in the Persian Gulf monarchies and those in Pakistan had become entrenched, and operated independently of government control.

This was especially the case when it came to the support of madrasahs and Islamic education projects. Here links between Saudi and Pakistani ulama, and Sunni activists—as was also the case between Shi'i madrasahs in Pakistan and Iranian ulama—and their respective educational institutions were largely voluntary, and produced strong religious and intellectual bonds that became embedded in institutional contacts and networks of patronage. In 1996 of the 2,463 registered madrasahs 1,700 were receiving financial support from outside Pakistan.10

The linkages also fitted into Saudi Arabia's larger agenda of controlling Islamic intellectual and cultural life across the Muslim world through such institutions as Rabitah Alam-i Islami (Islamic World League), and to promote its own vision of Sunnism through patronage of Islamic education in the Muslim world. That the recipients of Saudi support in Pakistan were Sunni madrasahs would in time make the patronage also relevant to Saudi Arabia's anti-Iranian regional policy.

The Afghan war in the 1980s too was important in this regard as it once again raised the prospects of communism reaching the shores of the Arabian Sea. The response of Persian Gulf states was very much the same: providing generous support for all manner of Islamic activities to strengthen Islamic identity in Pakistan, and this time also to help train activists who would be willing to fight in the war.11 These funds found their way to madrasahs, and, as will be seen below, helped create a whole new genre of madrasahs—ones that

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were equally if not more concerned with jihad (holy war) than with religious scholarship.

In addition, the increase in the numbers of Pakistanis who worked in various Persian Gulf states following the rise in the price of oil in 1974 translated into generous zakat (alms tax) and other contributions to madrasahs, or Islamic organizations, preachers, ulama, and lay Islamist activists who would funnel those funds into existing madrasahs or found new ones. There exists a direct link between socioeconomic changes that labor migration brought about and the transformation of the sociopolitical role of madrasahs.

The Impact of the Zia Regime and State-led Islamization

The military regime of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq (1977–88) was also instrumental in bringing about changes in both the number and character of madrasahs. The Zia regime was deeply committed to Islamization, and throughout its decade-long rule over Pakistan created numerous Islamic social and political institutions, anchored a good measure of public policy-making in Islamic ideology, and opened various government agencies to Islamist activists.12 As a part of the Islamization initiative, the government provided financial and other support to madrasahs, and enabled Islamic parties, social groups, and ulama to do the same.13 Most notably, from 1980 onwards, madrasahs became notable recipients of zakat funds that the government collected. In 1984, for instance, 9.4% of zakat funds went to the support of madrasahs, benefiting 2,273 madrasahs and 111,050 students.14 Even after some cuts in funding and a crack-

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down on many madrasahs in 1996 the government was providing $3.5 million a year to various madrasahs.\textsuperscript{15}

The Zia regime also encouraged the proliferation of madrasahs by increasing opportunities for employment of their graduates in government agencies and state institutions. Recruitment into government service, however, went hand-in-hand with changing the social and intellectual functions of traditional Islamic education. In 1979 the National Committee on Dini Madaris (Religious Schools) produced a report which encouraged madrasahs to reform their curricula in order to be more relevant to the needs of the changing society and economy.\textsuperscript{16} The conclusions of the report raised the ire of the traditional ulama who were the first to respond. Mawlana Yusuf Ludhianwi, among others, rejected the need to modernize madrasah curricula and emphasized the fact that madrasah education was to be judged in terms of the quality of Islamic scholarship that it produces and not its utility for the modern sectors of society.\textsuperscript{17}

In 1982 the government followed on the 1979 report by announcing that it would view madrasah certificates as the equivalent of formal school certificates if madrasahs were willing to undertake certain reforms in their curricula.\textsuperscript{18} The announcement opened the door for madrasahs to recruit from a broader spectrum of students, and through them, to play a more central role in society as well as in national educational and political institutions.

With the government willing to provide financial support and accommodate their graduates, many madrasahs began to look beyond training ulama to provide the Islamizing state with its new 'Islamic bureaucracy.'\textsuperscript{19} The traditional view, and the central role played by the \textit{dars-i nizami} (a syllabus for the education of the ulama that has been widely used in madrasahs since the eighteenth century)\textsuperscript{20} began to give way to a new approach as numerous older

\textsuperscript{16} Malik, 'Islamization,' pp. 9–10.
\textsuperscript{17} Muhammad Qasim Zaman, 'The Reform of the Madrasah in British India and Pakistan,' unpublished paper presented at the Rockefeller Foundation, Duke University, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and North Carolina State University's 'Transformations of the South Asian Islamicate Community in the 19th and 20th Centuries' conference in May 1996.
\textsuperscript{18} Malik, 'Islamization,' pp. 11–12.
\textsuperscript{19} The government also established the International Islamic University in Islamabad with the financial assistance of Saudi Arabia for this very purpose.
\textsuperscript{20} On the \textit{dars-i nizami}, see Barbara Metcalf, \textit{Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 31; and Shaikh
and new madrasahs responded to the government’s call, and some were actually established to do so. For instance, Brelwis established a new network of madrasahs, the Ziau’l-Qur’an (Light of the Qur’an) in response to the government initiative. The government thus created a new educational arena which the madrasahs were encouraged to dominate.

Various Ulama organizations and parties, as well as self-styled Islamist parties, also looked to new madrasahs to help them expand their base of support. Greater role for madrasahs in national education would produce a citizenry that would more likely vote for Islamic parties and consider Islamic ideology an appropriate anchor for the conduct of politics. General Zia may have seen in madrasahs the possibility of changing the character of the Pakistani electorate and strengthening Islamic parties—which were closer to his regime—to the detriment of the secular national parties, such as Pakistan’s Peoples Party, that were likely to oppose his regime. He had hoped that the results of the 1985 elections would bear this out. In those elections Islamic and right-of-center candidates did well, although not as well as Zia had hoped.

While government funding allowed new madrasahs to be created and older ones to be expanded, it was the employment opportunities that the government provided that brought in the students that were needed for making the expansion of madrasah education possible. The number of madrasah graduates jumped from 1,968 in the 1978–80 period (just before the provision of zakat funds and introduction of equivalency of certificates) to 3,601 in 1984–85.21 Whereas 5,611 ulama had been trained in Pakistan in the 1960–80 period, 6,230 were trained in the 1981–85 period alone.22

So notable was the impact of the government initiative that Islamist and self-styled Islamic groups—whose members were predominantly lay and had received modern education—began to establish madrasahs of their own. The vision of reform and revival (tajdid’u ihya’) of Islam that is at the heart of Islamist ideological perspective has taken shape around a disdain for the institution of ulama, and the madrasahs and curricula that has produced them.23 For instance,


21 Malik, ‘Islamization,’ p. 16.


the Jama‘at-i Islami’s (Islamic Party) influential founder and chief ideologue, Mawlana Sayyid Abu‘l-A‘la Mawdudi (d. 1979), had been particularly critical of the ulama, and had been instrumental in establishing the authority of lay Islamist thinkers. In 1976 the Jama‘at opened its first madrasah, the Ulama Academy in Lahore, and in 1980 began to establish a network of madrasahs across Pakistan which by 1990 numbered 75. The Jama‘at has also introduced a madrasah for women, the Jami‘atul-Muhsinat (Society of the Virtuous) to train women preachers—a new religious office that the Jama‘at hopes will give it an advantage over the traditional ulama in spreading its influence.

Other Islamic activists such as Israr Ahmad or Muhammad Tahir-ru’l-Qadri followed this lead and anchored their religiopolitical enterprises in newly-founded madrasahs. Hence, Ahmad’s Khuddamu’l-Qur’an (Servants of the Qur’an) and Qadri’s Minhaju’l-Qur’an (Path of the Qur’an) took the form of madrasahs, which combine Islamist activism with a traditional style of education. The madrasah model vests the self-styled activists with the trappings of the authority of the ulama, an institution they hope to replace but whose power and social standing they covet.

The Islamist and self-styled Islamic organizations adopted the madrasah model to benefit from generous government funding, and the possibility of infiltrating government agencies and state institutions, and to expand their base of support. More likely, however, they saw in the proliferation of madrasahs the potential for the established schools of Sunni Islam to dominate the Islamic discourse, not only in mosques (where they have been dominant), but in government agencies and in the modern social and intellectual mediums where lay Islamists had set the tone for debates over Islamism and Islamization. By encouraging reform of madrasah curricula and look-


ing to them as a source for its 'Islamic bureaucrats,' the state had made the institution of ulama central to Islamization. It had initiated the ulama to the Islamist discourse and by so doing also universalized Islamism as Islam.

The centrality of madrasahs to state-led Islamization meant that the ulama would remain in control of Islamic learning at a time when Islam was poised to define public policy and lay claim to modern sectors of the economy and society. It also meant that they would develop a more prominent role, laying claim to Islamism and its central role in state and society after 1980. The state thus helped create an ulama wing of Islamism, which would increasingly assert itself at the cost of the lay Islamist thinkers and organizations. The proliferation of madrasahs, their reform and new mandate, therefore amounted to a competition between various Islamic and Islamist institutional and intellectual traditions for the control of the Islamization process.

Unable to prevent the entry of ulama into their domain pursuant to the changes in the madrasah curricula, Islamist organizations and groups such as the Jama'at began to challenge the ulama for the control of mosques and their audience—to operate in the domain of the ulama and share in their growing role in Islamization. Consequently, differences between ulama and Islamists have diminished as they have been intruding into each others' territories and adopting the rhetoric, style, and symbolism of authority of the other. As ulama have become Islamists and Islamists have turned ulama, the narrower definitions of their respective religiopolitical authority, function, and arena of activity have given place to a broader and more all-inclusive Islamic/Islamist conception.

The reform of curricula changed the character of many madrasahs and hence their graduates. The quality of madrasah education declined, the concern for excellence in mastering traditional subjects was no longer important, and instead ideological outlook took over. Although this is not true of the far fewer older and prestigious madrasahs, such as the Deobandi Korangi Daru'l-'Ulum of Karachi, it is generally true of most of the newer madrasahs that cropped up in the 1980s and 1990s, and were instituted and managed by low-ranking preachers or ulama. As madrasahs accepted that training 'Islamic bureaucrats' and activists was more central to their mission than producing veritable ulama they began to modernize and politicize. In North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchis-
tan, owing to the proximity of the Afghan war, madrasahs also began to militarize, in many cases combining traditional religious education with a modern military one.

In the late-1980s and early 1990s democratization changed the political climate and slowed the pace of Islamization, and economic recession reduced employment opportunities. As a result, the promised jobs for the graduates of madrasahs did not materialize, leading most to join the ranks of the frustrated unemployed.

Throughout the 1980s the Islamization regime favored the higher-ranking ulama. They received government patronage and occupied high offices. The benefits did not trickle down very far. Lower-ranking ulama, preachers, and recent madrasah graduates were not direct beneficiaries of the Islamization process. Their expectations were raised, but never satisfied. When democracy ended the Islamization era in 1988 the lower rungs of the ulama were expected to go back to their traditional functions in managing local mosques and Islamic institutions. Sectarianism began to shape around what Mumtaz Ahmad has termed, the 'revolt of the petty-ulama.' Using the rural mosques, madrasahs, and Islamic institutions under their control, and using sectarianism as an Islamic ideology of mobilization, autonomous from the control of the higher-ranking ulama and their institutions and parties, the lower-ranking ulama began to stake out their own claim to power and wealth—satiating appetites for power, status and wealth that Islamization had whetted but left unsatisfied.

Since the lower-ranking ulama, and especially those among them who were recent graduates of madrasahs were less steeped in knowledge and were more political, and many had got their education at new madrasahs that did not offer high standards in traditional education, many would not be able to follow the career path of the traditional ulama, nor were most trained to desire such a career path. If and when they became preachers or ulama, they used the minbar (pulpit) to pursue political agendas. The new breed of ulama and preachers often refused to follow the lead of the established ulama parties or traditional madrasahs, preferring to join smaller militant organizations. For instance, many of the graduates of the Brelwi Ziau‘l-Qur’an madrasahs did not join the main Brelwi party,

Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Pakistan (Society of Ulama of Pakistan, JUP), preferring the militant Sunni Tahrik instead.

That the new breed of madrasah graduates were nominally of the ulama, but had a claim to politics and were jihadist in outlook—they had bought into the rhetoric of the Afghan war, and many now view the Taliban’s conquest of Afghanistan as the model to follow—pushed them in the direction of militant activism. In a state with ongoing ethnic, civil, and socioeconomic conflicts, with a preponderance of guns and a ‘Kalashnikov culture’, this militancy soon turned violent. A prime example here is the escalation of violence in sectarian conflict in the Kurram valley in NWFP; where in the summer of 1996 in Pachinar in a five-day armed conflict some 200 people lost their lives. There had existed socioeconomic grievances between Shi‘is and Sunnis regarding control of fertile land and proceeds from the fecund tomato crop. The manner in which such grievances translated into an outright sectarian war, however, had to do with the fact that the older Shi‘i and Sunni ulama and preachers had been replaced with recent graduates of militant madrasahs, whose activism had served to harden sectarian identities and promote militancy. Sermons had become more vitriolic and mosques were used as arms depots. The proximity of the region to the Afghan conflict had also helped with both the arms build-up by the two sides, and the propensity to use violence.28

Many of the frustrated madrasah graduates also quickly became ensnared in the web of criminal activities in Pakistan, from the heroin trade between NWFP and Karachi, to extortion, kidnapping and even robbery in Punjab. Militant activists, petty-ulama and even madrasahs began to receive support from criminals—who patronized or joined sectarian organizations, and at times helped establish sectarian madrasahs and armed bands. In return, sectarianism provided a religious cover for criminal activities. Authorities have been hard-pressed to crack-down on criminals who are members of sectarian organizations; for arrests and prosecutions are viewed as harassment of Islamic organizations, and the accused are seen as ‘martyrs’ in the cause of Islam.

In addition, sectarian groups enjoy the support of the larger mainstream Islamic parties, such as Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam (Society of Ulama of Islam, JUI), which hail from the same intellectual tradition, or with whom the sectarian forces have been in alliance.29 The

support of the larger parties has in the past translated into immunity from prosecution for all those associated with sectarian activities. That immunity, needless to add, has been a boon for criminal activity.

This process also transformed madrasahs from intellectual institutions into political ones. Madrasahs became the recruiting and training grounds for religiopolitical activist organizations. In some instances, they also become lucrative financial concerns. This has given a whole new dimension to sectarian posturing. It has made sectarianism a means to a financial end, and militancy a form of 'rent-seeking.' For instance, Saudi and Iraqi sponsorship of sectarianism has led sectarian groups to try to out-do each other in rhetoric and violence in the hope of receiving increasing shares of the flow of funds from the Persian Gulf.

Financial considerations have also influenced internal politics of sectarian movements. The size of the financial endowment of SSP’s madrasahs has been so great that after the assassination of its first two leaders (Jhangvi and Qasimi) in 1989 and 1991, factional conflicts over the control of the purse and the madrasahs ensued. The losing faction then split, forming a new sectarian organization with its own madrasah(s), and the hope that it would replicate SSP’s financial success and political power. Lashkar-i Jhangvi was, for instance, formed in such a manner in 1990 by Riaz Basra, and soon exceeded SSP in assassinations and use of violence. Although the divisions have been real they have not necessarily produced completely separate organizations. SSP has continued to maintain close ties with its splinter groups, some of which have collapsed back into SSP, while others remain only nominally independent.

Patronage of madrasahs went a long way in legitimating the state’s Islamization policies just as it extended its control over important and interconnected networks of Islamic education, and local level political authority and social control. Hence the rise in the importance of madrasahs was part of the dialectics of expansion of state capacity, and in some measure, the indigenization of the post-colonial state in Pakistan. Its consequence, however, was not only to increase the number of madrasahs, but to change their character, bring them into politics, and create a dangerous class of religiously-inclined, militant, unemployed, frustrated, and half-educated youth.  

RISE OF SUNNI MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN

Moreover, the reform, politicization and proliferation of madrasahs also created new axes of conflict with the state. The declining opportunities for madrasah graduates created new pressures on the state and even began to create difficulties in its relations with the various Islamic groups and parties. After the conclusion of the Afghan war the government found it exceedingly difficult to shut down the most militant madrasahs and to demobilize Mujahedin units that were attached to them. The continuation of the Afghan campaign through the Taliban, which are in their entirety madrasah based, and the dispatch of many fighters to Kashmir, allowed the government to postpone contending with the militant madrasahs. It has, however, further aggravated the situation as the scope of madrasahs' military role has increased. For instance, as part of the Taliban and Kashmir efforts most guerilla war training bases run by the Jama’at-i Islami or the Afghan leader, Gulbedin Hikmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami (Islamic Party), have been handed over to Deobandi Taliban and Harakatu’l-Ansar, thus further entrenching the political and military roles of the madrasahs and their graduates. Furthermore, the very notion of the Taliban (literally, madrasah students) has made madrasahs and their products more central to discussions about Islam’s claim to politics and the state, and the ulama’s role—as opposed to lay Islamists—in carrying out an Islamic revolution and setting up an Islamic state. The following remark by a mob leader during a recent strike by madrasah students in Karachi is instructive in this regard: ‘Do not think of us as weak. We have ousted Soviet troops and infidels from Afghanistan, we can do the same in Pakistan.’\footnote{Herald (Dec. 1997), p. 64.}

The Zia regime’s attempt to extend the state’s control over madrasahs by making them dependent on the state for both their finances and employment opportunities for their graduates eventually translated into resistance. Most Islamic groups, parties, and ulama who oversaw madrasahs welcomed state patronage but not the control that came with it.

As the attention of ulama parties, and the Deobandi JUI and Brelwi JUP in particular, has been focused on politics and the struggle for power, they have come to view their religious communities as landlords do their constituencies, as political jagirs (fiefdoms). This has led the ulama parties to emphasize distinctions between the various schools of Sunni Islam as a means of entrenching religiopolitical identities, and thereby tightening their hold over their
‘jagirs’. Madrasahs play a central role in demarcating the boundaries of the ulama parties’ constituencies. Through indoctrination, and by providing the basis for organizational networks, madrasahs have served the political interests of ulama parties, and helped transform their relation to their respective religious communities—from one that is rooted in distinct interpretations of faith to a patron–client relationship. For this reason direct control of madrasahs has been of paramount importance to ulama parties, and they have been willing to defend it tooth and nail against state intrusion—especially when that intrusion was in the name of Islamization.

As early as 1982 various ulama began to complain that reliance on zakat funds, disbursed by the government, had reduced voluntary contributions to madrasahs, which at times exceeded government contributions, and could at any rate jeopardize madrasahs’ relations with society. Mufti Mahmud, the influential Deobandi alim, and leader of JUI, who was personally close to Zia and his Islamization regime, at one point asked Deobandi madrasahs to refuse zakat funds, lest his party and the Deobandi establishment lose control of their madrasahs to the state. A number of ulama in Sind declared government funding to be a form of political bribe and hence objectionable. Still others, who sought to shut down altogether the flow of government funds to madrasahs, declared that the funds should not be accepted on religious grounds. For the fact that the state had made zakat donations compulsory and assumed the right to collect the funds, and also that the funds are held in interest-bearing accounts, violates Islamic law.

As the state’s control over madrasahs grew, Islamic groups and parties began to show their unhappiness by opposing government policy-making. Since they were hard-pressed to challenge the government’s Islamization policies they began to criticize the government on a host of other issues. The result was that the scope of Islamic opposition to the state expanded as did the purview of Islamist groups’ political activism. The expansion of state control over Islamic institutions therefore broadened the scope of the state’s competition with Islamist parties over policy-making, right to interpret Islam, and control Islamic institutions.

Regional Politics and the Rise of Sectarianism

From the outset the proliferation of madrasahs, and the change in their sociopolitical role had a sectarian dimension. First, they coincided with the Iranian revolution and greater Shi‘i activism in Pakistan. Zia’s Islamization was largely a Sunni affair, and hence viewed Shi‘i activism as a threat.\textsuperscript{35} This became apparent when Shi‘is refused to submit to Zia’s zakat law, and following large-scale and violent demonstrations by some 25,000 Shi‘i demonstrators from across Pakistan on July 5, 1980—which shut-down the capital, Islamabad—received exemption from it. That Shi‘i demonstrators defied martial law ordinances to rally against the zakat law, and that they increasingly relied on support from Tehran to organize and assert their demands even created certain unhappiness in the military. As a result, the exemption from the zakat law was followed by introduction of a provision to the constitution which made condemnation of the first three caliphs of Islam (Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman)—reviled in popular Shi‘i ceremonies—a legal offence. It is, moreover, argued that the martial law administrator of Punjab, General Ghulam Gilani, deliberately turned a blind eye to growing Sunni militancy, and the rise of armed bands centered in madrasahs after 1980, to address the ‘problem’ of Shi‘i resurgence.\textsuperscript{36} The result was anti-Shi‘i militancy and violence, which reared its head first in Karachi in April 1983, when Sunni militants attacked two Shi‘i Imambarahs (Shi‘i place of worship associated with commemoration of martyrdom of Shi‘i Imams), precipitating serious clashes.\textsuperscript{37}

The state’s capitulation to Shi‘i demands was seen by advocates of Islamization as nothing short of constricting the Islamic state and diluting the impact of Islamization. State-led Islamization was in effect being reduced to ‘Sunni’ Islamization which undermined the universalist claims of the entire process. Many among Sunni Islamist activists argued that Pakistan’s Shi‘i were in no position to carp

\textsuperscript{37} On April 12, 1983 the Sunni activists attacked Markazi Imambarah in Liaquatabad, producing clashes that led to the arrest of 135 people by the police. On April 15 there was another attack on an Imambarah in Golimar; cited in Syed M. Zaidi, ‘Shi‘i Activism in Islam: An Overview,’ unpublished manuscript, p. 36.
about ‘Sunnification’ of Pakistan since Iran had made Shi'i law into state law with no exemptions afforded to its Sunni minority.

The formation of the Shi'i Tahrik-i Nifaz Fiqh-i Ja'fariyah (the Front for Defense of Ja'fariyah [Shi'i] law, TNFJ) and the Imamia (Shi'i) Student Organization (ISO) in 1979 (as would also be the case when the militant Sipah-i Muhammad [Muhammad's Army] was formed in 1991) were seen as signs of hardening of Shi'i identity—which led Sunni Islamizers to conclude that owing to the Iranian revolution they would not be able to win over Shi'is and integrate them into their promised Islamic social order—their disloyalty to Pakistan and its Islamic ideology. In addition, such actions by Shi'i activists—emboldened by the Iranian revolution and the prodding of the Islamic Republic's envoys to Pakistan—as demanding the removal of Bab-i Umar (Umar's [the second Muslim caliph, much maligned by Shi'is] Gate) in Jhang created antagonisms towards Shi'is at the local and popular level as well.

The threat to the Islamization process became more palpable as the exemptions led to an increase in the number of Pakistan's Shi'is. Pakistanis who wished to distribute their inheritance according to Shi'i law—which favors women more—or avoid paying zakat to the government declared themselves Shi'is. Many Shi'i families who had been close to Sunnism gravitated back to their faith for the same reasons. The apparent rise in the number of Shi'is—and the faith's newly acquired position as a haven from state-led Islamization—was disheartening to General Zia and his Islamist allies. In addition, TNFJ and ISO's adoption of the Iranian model of aggressive oppositional activities was perceived as a threat to both the state and the Sunni establishment. The rise of the charismatic and widely-popular Allamah Arif Husaini (d. 1988) to the helm of TNFJ also

created consternation among many who viewed him as a potential Pakistani ‘Khomeini.’

As a result, anti-Shi’i tendencies began to surface among Sunni Islamist groups and find their way into the ethos of the burgeoning madrasahs. The Zia regime looked to madrasahs to entrench Sunni resistance to the greater assertiveness of Shi’is. Some argue that the Zia regime was in fact instrumental in organizing madrasah students into militant Sunni organizations in order to counter the rising tide of Shi’i militancy. One of the first of such organizations was the Anjuman-i Sipah-i Sahabah (Society of Companions of the Prophet) which later became the Sipah-i Sahabah Pakistan (SSP). Sectarianism and its institutionalization in madrasahs thus had strategic importance for the state.

Saudi Arabia and Iraq too were concerned about Shi’i activism in Pakistan and what they saw as Iran’s growing influence there. The two Arab countries were then involved in a bitter campaign to contain Iran’s revolutionary zeal and limit its power in the region—since then Saudi Arabia has sought to harden Sunni identity in the countries surrounding Iran, a policy which extends into Central Asia, and which in turn depends on the efforts of Pakistani sectarian groups. As one observer remarked of the pattern of funding of madrasahs in Baluchistan and southern NWFP after 1980: ‘if you look at where the most madrassahs were constructed you will realize that they form a wall blocking Iran off from Pakistan.’

Pakistan was an important prize in the struggle for the control of the Persian Gulf, as well as for erecting the ‘Sunni wall’ around Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iraq therefore developed a vested interest in preserving the Sunni character of Pakistan’s Islamization. In so doing, Saudi Arabia approached its long-standing clients among Pakistan’s Islamists, groups such as the Jama’at-i Islami, in the hope of creating a strong anti-Shi’i Sunni political and organizational front. Islamist parties had always been critical of Shi’ism; they had, however, shied away from vitriol against Shi’ism, or moving beyond theo-

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39 Many Pakistani Shi’is in fact believe that Husaini was assassinated by the powers-that-be for that very reason.
40 Zia still sought to placate Shi’is and Iran through symbolic gestures. For instance, between 1985 and 1988 the Speaker of the National Assembly was a Shi’i, S. Fakhr Imam; and throughout the 1980s, Shi’i generals held prominent positions in the military, albeit none were placed in charge of sensitive operations.
41 This charge is often leveled by Shi’i community leaders, and is echoed by some of my interlocutors in the military as well.
42 *Herald* (Sept. 1992), p. 34.
logical disputes to treating Sunni–Shi‘i differences as communal rivalries.

In fact, mainstream Islamists have always refused to be identified as ‘Sunni’, and had treated Shi‘ism in the same vein as they treated traditional schools of Sunni thought. For Islamists, the central issue of concern has been Islam versus ‘un-Islam’ and not Sunni versus Shi‘i. Hence, from Abu‘l-Kalam Azad (in his early writings) to Mawlana Mawdudi, to Muhammad Tahiru’l-Qadri and Javid Ahmadu’l-Ghamidi, generations of Islamist thinkers have sought to reinterpret and appropriate—rather than denounce and invalidate—Shi‘i myths and doctrines in a manner that would bring Shi‘ism into the ambit of their ideological perspectives. Islamism here has sought to be inclusive. Azad approached the martyrdom of Husain ibn Ali (the Shi‘i imam who was killed at the Battle of Karbala in 680) with great respect, according it religious and historical significance just as he sought to distance it from the passion and symbolism that the Shi‘i associate with it. Mawdudi interpreted that martyrdom as a struggle of Islam in the path of justice and for the establishment of an Islamic state. He eviscerated the story of the Battle of Karbala of all the symbolism, myth and meaning that Shi‘is associate with it, transforming it into an Islamist episode that presaged his own. More recently, the influential pro-Islamist Urdu journal, *Qaumi Digest* (National Digest) has followed the same approach in treating the life and thought of the first Shi‘i imam (infallible leader), Ali ibn Abi Talib (d. 661), as has a book by the rector of the Nadwatu’l-Ulama in Lucknow in 1989.

In addition, Mawdudi, who was a dominant force in Islamist thinking early on, was also critical of the early caliphs, notably Uthman and Mu‘awiyah (d. 680). His book, *Khilafat ‘u Mulukiyat* (Caliphate and Monarchy, 1966) raised the ire of Sunni ulama and activists, but had the effect of keeping Islamism away from hardened sectarian identity, and open to some elements in Shi‘i interpretations of early

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Islamic history. In later years, as sectarian tendencies hardened positions on Shi‘ism, Mawdudi’s treatment of both Shi‘ism and the early caliphs was denounced, and he was accused of being a closet Shi‘i.48

The mainstream Islamists, and the most powerful organization among them, the Jama‘at, refused to change course and become embroiled in sectarianism.49 In fact, since 1988 mainstream Islamist groups have pushed hard for ending sectarian confrontations, arguing that the violence has been damaging to the cause of Islamism. Islamist leaders, for instance, viewed with alarm Benazir Bhutto government’s anti-madrasah proclamations in 1994–95, and efforts by her Interior Minister, General Nasirullah Babur, to place restrictions on madrasahs, all in the name of ending sectarian violence.50 The Jama‘at-i Islami’s leader, Qazi Husain Ahmad met with Iran’s President Rafsanjani in 1995 before bringing together all Islamist parties under the umbrella of the Milli Yikjahati Council (Council of National Unity) to end sectarian conflict and reconcile SSP and Shi‘i militants.51

Saudi Arabia therefore looked elsewhere for its anti-Shi‘i front, to self-styled Islamist thinkers such as Muhammad Salahu‘ddin or Israr Ahmad,52 and more important, the Ahl-i Hadith ulama. The Ahl-i Hadith is a puritanical school of Sunni Islam, which, much like Wahhabism, has been strongly opposed to Shi‘ism.53 Some Ahl-i Hadith ulama such as Abdu‘l-Ghaffar Hasan of Faisalabad, who had taught at the Medina University, had direct ties with Saudi Arabia. In addition, Saudi assistance helped establish new Ahl-i Hadith madrasahs, and to provide an inroad into the Afghan war for the Ahl-i Hadith through such madrasahs as that of Mawlvi Husain Jamalu‘l-Rahman in NWFP and southern Afghanistan.54 Hence, proliferation of madrasahs and the greater power and prominence that comes with it

48 I am indebted to Mumtaz Ahmad for this information which he had gathered through numerous interviews with ulama and Sunni activists.
49 Personal interview with Jama‘at leaders, Qazi Husain Ahmad, Khurram Murad, Khurshid Ahmad, and Chaudhry Aslam Salimi.
50 Herald (June 1995), p. 46.
51 On the council see Herald (June 1995), pp. 46–50. When Qazi Husain Ahmad arrived at the funeral of SSP leaders killed in a bomb blast in Lahore in January 1997, he was man handled by the crowd and branded a sell-out for having sought to bring about a reconciliation between SSP and the Shi‘i militant organizations.
52 See, for instance, Israr Ahmad, Sanihah-i Karbala (The Karbala Tragedy) (Lahore: Maktabah-i Markazi Anjuman Khuddamu‘l-Qur‘an, 1983).
became tied to involvement with the Saudi Arabian sectarian project.

With Saudi encouragement, self-styled Islamist thinkers and the Ahl-i Hadith mounted a strong anti-Shi' movement through publication of books and pamphlets, and magazines such as Takbir, sermons in mosques (notably, Israr Ahmad's popular Friday sermons in Bagh-i Jinnah park in Lahore) and activism centered in madrasahs.\(^{55}\) Thinkers like Israr Ahmad and Allamah Ihsan Ilahi Zahir, the chief of Jam'iat-i Ulama-i Ahl-i Hadith (Society of Ahl-i Hadith Ulama), formulated the first anti-Khomeini critiques from within Islamist/Islamic circles, but, more important, began to produce a new style and language in criticizing Shi'ism, one that depicted that branch of Islam as outside the pale of the religion, and began successfully to transform doctrinal and theological disputes into communal ones.\(^{56}\)

The line of attack became increasingly focused on Shi'is as a people and not Shi'ism as an interpretation of Islam. Zahir's book, *Shi'is and Shi'ism*, published in Lahore in 1980 and subsequently translated into Arabic and English and distributed across the Muslim world by Saudi Arabia became the most celebrated effort in this genre. Zahir's views continue to appear in Ahl-i Hadith publications, such as *Muhaddith* (Lahore), *Tarjumatu'l-Hadith* (Faisalabad), *Sahifa-i Ahl-i Hadith* (Karachi), *al-Aitisam* (Lahore), *Ahl-i Hadith* (Lahore), and *al-Badr* (Sahiwal), and play a role in fanning the flames of sectarianism.\(^{57}\)

It became customary for sectarian leaders to name their sons Mu'awiyah and Yazid (d. 683)—the first two Umayyad caliphs whom the Shi'is hold responsible for the martyrdom of their early leaders, Ali ibn Abi Talib and Husain ibn Ali, and who had not heretofore enjoyed respect among Sunnis either.\(^{58}\) In fact, eulogization of the two Umayyad caliphs soon became an important part of the new language of anti-Shi'ism, implying that having opposed and killed the two Shi'i leaders—the first of whom was the fourth caliph and the son-in-law of the Prophet, and the second the Prophet's beloved grandson, facts that are difficult to gloss over for Sunnis who are dedicated to exact emulation of the Prophet's life—they ought be

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\(^{55}\) The government has begun to view stopping the dissemination of this literature as central to ending sectarian strife; *Nawa'i Waqt* (Lahore), Aug. 29, 1997.

\(^{56}\) See, for instance, Mawlana Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan, *Din Main Ghulluw* (Extremism Within Religion) (Karachi: Ribatu'l-Ulum'u'l-Islamiyah, 1983).

\(^{57}\) Ahmad, *Revivalism*, p. 17.

\(^{58}\) For instance, both Israr Ahmad and Mawlana Haqnavaz Jhangvi named their sons Mu'awiyah and Yazid, and Israr Ahmad insisted on celebrating his daughter's wedding on the Shi'i day of mourning for Husain ibn Ali, Ashura (tenth of Muharram).
venerated by Sunnis as defenders of the faith against infidels.\(^{59}\) A popular SSP slogan in its campaign during Shi‘i Muharram commemorations was: ‘\textit{Shi‘a kafir . . . Yazid kay munkir}’ (Shi‘is are the infidels, when was Yazid a denier [of truth of Islam]).\(^{60}\)

The titles of the new genre of anti-Shi‘i books that would dominate the scene from this point on attest to the change in attitudes toward Shi‘is: \textit{Shi‘i Hazrat ki Qur’an se Baghavat} (Revolt of Shi‘is Against the Qur’an),\(^{61}\) \textit{Din Main Ghulluw} (Extremism Within Religion),\(^{62}\) or \textit{Shi‘i Hazrat ki Islam se Baghavat} (Shi‘is’ Revolt Against Islam).\(^{63}\) In 1994 SSP would increase tensions when one of its leaders, A‘zam Tariq, would openly assail Shi‘i imams.\(^{64}\) This was a new chapter in Sunni polemics against Shi‘ism, one which is not free of controversy, as many Sunnis hold the family of the Prophet (ahl al-bayt) in high esteem. SSP would then introduce the \textit{Namus-i Sahabah} (Honor of the Companions of the Prophet) bill in the National Assembly, which sought to add the name of the four Rightly-Guided caliphs (632–661) to the list of those covered by the Blasphemy Law. The intention was greatly to limit the scope of popular Shi‘i commemorations during which aspersions are cast on the first three caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman), for usurping Ali’s right to the caliphate. This was to lay the grounds for declaring Shi‘is as a non-Muslim minority.

The Ahl-i Hadith’s anti-Shi‘i campaign eventually precipitated a confrontation with the militant Shi‘i organizations, which soon turned violent. Shi‘i activists sought to silence the Ahl-i Hadith ulama through a number of bomb blasts, most notably one on March 23, 1985 that killed Zahir, who had become the most vocal anti-Shi‘i and anti-Khomeini voice among Ahl-i Hadith ulama. It became evident that the Ahl-i Hadith did not possess the organizational capacity, nor the social base, to confront the more sizeable Shi‘i community and its more formidable organizations. Although Ahl-i Hadith ulama, such as Sajjad Mir, and Ahl-i Hadith students and organizations like Irshad’u Da‘wah (Guidance and Call [to Islam]), and its militant off-shoot, Lashkar-i Tayyibah (Army of the Pure),


\(^{61}\) Azhar Nadim, \textit{Shi‘i Hazrat ki Qur’an se Baghavat} (Revolt of Shi‘is Against the Qur’an) (Lahore: Tahrik-i Nifaz Fiqh-i Hanafiyyah, nd).

\(^{62}\) Hasan, \textit{Din}.

\(^{63}\) Azhar Nadim, \textit{Shi‘i Hazrat ki Islam se Baghavat} (Shi‘is Revolt Against Islam) (Jhang: Anjuman-i Sipah-i Sahabah Pakistan, nd).

\(^{64}\) \textit{Herald} (May 1994), p. 46.
continue to play a prominent role in articulating Sunni sectarianism, the Ahl-i Hadith were soon overshadowed by Deobandi organizations that surfaced to carry on with the anti-Shi‘i campaign.

In 1984 the Deobandi alim, Muhammad Manzur Nu‘mani of Lucknow in India, wrote Irani Inqilab: Imam Khumayni aur Shi‘iyyat (Iranian Revolution: Imam Khomeini and Shi‘ism). The book, which was prefaced by the popular Indian alim and rector of Nadwatul-Ulama of Lucknow and Nu‘mani’s friend of many years, Sayyid Abu‘l-Hasan Ali Nadwi (popularly known as Ali Mian), accepted the claims of the Iranian revolution to represent true Shi‘i faith, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s to be the undisputed leader of all Shi‘is—although most Indian and Pakistani Shi‘i ulama then were students of Ayatollah Abu‘l-Qasim Khu‘i of Iraq who flatly rejected the validity of Khomeini’s views and the ideology of the Iranian revolution—only to point to the revolution’s excesses as proof that Shi‘ism was outside the pale of Islam. Owing to the high rank of its Deobandi and Nadwi authors, the book quickly made a stir. It was translated into English in India, Arabic and Turkish; and was soon also published in Pakistan in both Urdu and English. The book made Deobandis central to the ongoing sectarian confrontation in Pakistan.

Nu‘mani’s views were shaped in the context of Shi‘i–Sunni conflict in Lucknow, and his arguments drew on the tradition of anti-Shi‘ism in the Deobandi school of thought. Deobandis had always maintained a belligerent attitude toward Shi‘ism, and in the 1940s the Deoband Daru‘l-Ulum (seminary) had issued a fatwa (religious decree) which declared Shi‘is as infidels (kafrs). That fatwa was later endorsed by senior Deobandi ulama in Pakistan. Throughout the 1970s Deobandi journals in Pakistan, such as al-Haq (Akora Khattak), al-Bayyanat (Karachi), al-Balagh (Karachi), Tarjumanul-Islam (Lahore), and Khuddamuddin (Lahore), printed inflammatory articles against Shi‘ism, going so far as demanding a separate electorate for Shi‘is. Still, given Nadwi’s prominent role in the Saudi

68 Muhammad Munir, From Jinnah to Zia (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1979), p. 46.
70 Cited in ibid., p. 13.
Rabitah Alam-i Islami, there was strong suspicion that the Persian Gulf regional politics too, played a role in the writing of the book and the rise of Deobandi interest in the sectarian confrontation.

In Pakistan, politics within the Deobandi community was pushing it in the direction of anti-Shi'i sectarianism. Competition for power between JUI factions in the early 1980s had grown intense. The protagonists had sought to establish their credentials and claim to power within JUI through acid vituperations against Shi'ism. The growing importance of anti-Shi'ism to Deobandi politics, and the vacuum created within JUI owing to factional rivalries opened the door for a rise of militant sectarian organizations from amidst Deobandis.

In 1983 mawlanas Salimu'llah and Isfandiyar of the Deobandi Sawad-i A'zam-i Ahl-i Sunnat launched anti-Shi'i movements in Karachi with the financial backing of Iraq. These efforts would, however, pale before the Anjuman-i Sipah-i Sahabah (later renamed Sipah-i Sahabah Pakistan, SSP) which was formed in Jhang, in Pakistan's Punjab, as a semi-autonomous division of the dominant Deobandi political institution, JUI. SSP was formed by Mawlana Haqnavaz Jhangvi (1952-89), a local Deobandi ulim of low rank, and the JUI Deputy-Amir (Leader/President) of Punjab. SSP had close ties with JUI, and especially with the faction led by Mawlana Sami'u'll-Haq. Although SSP was semi-autonomous, and in 1986 it would completely break with JUI over its advocacy of violence against Shi'is, they shared—and continue to share—many of their rank-and-file members and office-holders. Still, SSP was developed as an autonomous organization that was dedicated to militant anti-Shi'i sectarianism.

SSP proved far more capable and willing to engage the militant Shi'i organizations. It built on the Ahl-i Hadith rhetoric, demanding that Shi'is be declared kafirs (infidels). The senior SSP leader, A'zam Tariq, for instance, declared that, 'agar Pakistan main musalman bun kar rahna hey, tu Shi'a ko kafir kehna hey' (if Islam is to be established in Pakistan, then Shi'is must be declared infidels). More important, SSP incited violent riots in Jhang, and later in Multan and Kabirwala in southern Punjab, Peshawar (NWFP) and Karachi (Sind). One of its splinter groups, the Lashkar-i Jhangvi, retaliated

71 Ibid., p. 15.
72 Aghaz (Karachi), March 26, 1983.
73 See a biographical sketch of Jhangvi in Herald (March 1990), pp. 39-40.
74 Herald (March 1995), p. 36b.
for assassinations carried out by Shi'is with assassinations of its own, the most important of which was that of the Iranian cultural attaché in Lahore in 1990.75 Although a number of its leaders were killed in its confrontation with Shi'i militant groups, notably, Mawlana Jhangvi in 1989, Mawlana Israru'l-Qasimi in 1991 and Ziau'I-Rahman Faruqi in 1997 (in a bomb blast that killed 19 and severely injured Faruqi's second in command, A'zam Tariq) the organization has continued to grow in importance and power.76

The regional implications of SSP's campaign is reflected in that it has sought to involve Iran directly in the sectarian conflict. When Mawlana Jhangvi was assassinated in 1989, SSP chose to retaliate by killing Iran's cultural attaché in Lahore—as opposed to attacking a Pakistani Shi'i target. Again, in 1997 when a bomb blast killed and injured several SSP leaders and members in a court house in Lahore, the party's response was to set Iranian cultural centers in Lahore and Multan on fire. SSP's actions have been directed at portraying Pakistan's Shi'is as agents of a foreign country, mobilizing Pakistan's Sunnis against Iran, and complicating relations between Islamabad and Tehran, all of which served Iraqi and Saudi policies in the region. The anti-Iranian aim of Sunni sectarianism became clearer in September 1997 when five Iranian military personnel were assassinated in Rawalpindi. The Iranian and Pakistani governments depicted the assassination as a deliberate attempt to sour relations between the two countries.77

With the rise of the Taliban, who like SSP are Deobandis, and who hail from the same madrasah structure and networks—and even training camps in NWFP and southern Afghanistan—the scope of SSP's strategic and political ties with Persian Gulf regional politics has expanded, and its penchant for violent action increased. It is reputed that the Taliban commander, Mulla 'Umar, routinely called on Deobandi madrasahs across Pakistan to provide him with recruits whenever Taliban troops had to be bolstered.78 The Taliban have in addition strengthened SSP's ideological position and strategic

76 Conflicts over local power structures and land are also at the heart of sectarian conflict in Kurram valley of NWFP. The Pachinar confrontation of 1996 was directly tied to disputes over land, and the fact that the most fertile land in the Kurram valley belongs to the Shi'is who profit far more from tomato production in the region: Newsline (Oct. 1996), p. 75.
77 Dawn (Karachi), Sept. 20, 1997.
importance, greatly enhancing the significance of the organization and expanding its potential role in Pakistan politics in general and the Islamist circles in particular.

The SSP has complemented its campaign of violence against Shi'ism with a drive for a role in provincial and national politics. It has contested in national elections since 1988, and was represented in the national and Punjab provincial assemblies, and Punjab government between 1993 and 1996.

The rise of SSP has in effect instituted a new form of Islamist politics in Pakistan, one which is more militant, violent, and sectarian—equating Islamization with a 'cleansing' of the society and polity of Shi'is. It arose in response to Shi'i assertiveness and owes its prominence to Iraqi and Saudi patronage, but it has gradually found a role and political agenda that is indigenous. It has also helped establish sectarian militancy in the Islamist discourse and praxis in Pakistan. Anti-Shi'i violence is meant to serve as a trigger mechanism, mobilizing Pakistani public opinion, militating political choices, and strengthening Islamic tendencies. Militant Sunni groups have so far failed to realize these aims. They have, however, succeeded in creating a specific consciousness about the 'Shi'i problem' in popular Islamic piety, as well as in the Islamist discourse—thus hardening attitudes about Shi'ism.

Sectarianism and the Sunni Middle Classes

Although Persian Gulf regional politics served as an important impetus in the rise of Sunni militant organizations, local sociopolitical factors have become equally important in explaining their growth and influence. The SSP was formed in the Jhang district of Punjab, and since 1986, urban centers in that region: Jhang city, Sialkot, Sargodha, Gujranwala, Chiniot, and especially Faisalabad have been the centers for militant madrasahs, and the scene of most of the sectarian violence.

Jhang politics has long been dominated by Shi'i landed families whose constituencies have included both Shi'is and Sunnis. Rural politics here has largely worked through the clientalist ties between the landlords and the peasants, and has not until recently reflected sectarian identities. Throughout the late-1970s and the 1980s—owing to population pressure and labor-remitances from the Persian gulf—the urban centers of Punjab grew in size, and also quasi-urban
areas developed on the edge of agricultural lands. Urbanization has meant changing patterns of authority, especially because these urban developments have been dominated by Sunni middle classes and bourgeoisie—traders and merchants who are tied to the agricultural economy but are not part of the rural power structure. The Sunni middle classes in the burgeoning urban centers in the region from the 1970s on—and especially with the greater prominence of the post-partition migrants from India, who do not have the same ties with the landed elite—have looked for a say in local politics.

With this the feudal hold over Jhang has come under pressure. Increasingly the Sunni middle classes and bourgeoisie have emphasized sectarian identity as a means of loosening the hold of the Shi'i landed elite over Sunni peasants. In the first national elections in Pakistan in 1970, in Jhang, opposition to the popular Shi'i landlord, Colonel Sayyid Abid Husain who was running as an independent, sought to make political capital out of his faith. From that point on, the Shi'i identity of the landed elite became a factor in Jhang politics. It did not, however, significantly change the calculus of the region's politics until the late 1980s.

SSP and its founder Mawlana Jhangvi build on the earlier anti-Shi'i tendencies in Jhang politics. SSP fashioned itself as a champion of Sunni peasants, fighting oppressive Shi'i landlords, who control close to 65% of the land in the district.80 SSP combined sectarianism with populism in the context of local politics to create a base of support for itself in Jhang. The party's strategy here is reminiscent of the Anjuman-i Ahrar-i Islam's (Society of Free Muslims) in the 1950s.81 The Ahrar then combined socialist rhetoric with anti-Ahmediya vitriol, arguing that the minority community—and its alleged wealth and prominence—was responsible for the misery of the poor.82 The Ahrar succeeded in fomenting anti-Ahmediya riots in Punjab in the 1953–54 which initiated the marginalization of that community in Pakistan.83

Whereas nationally SSP fought for an Islamist cause, in Jhang it was posing as the vanguard force for the frustrated urban Sunni

79 Zaman, 'Sectarianism in Pakistan,' p. 705.
80 Ibid., p. 19.
82 Ibid., pp. 132–3.
middle classes, which could see in sectarianism a powerful tool with which to break the hold of the Shi‘i landed elite over Jhang’s politics. The growth in the size of urban centers in and around Jhang by the mid-1980s had made the urban Sunni middle class’s claim to power stronger.

Mawlana Jhangvi started-off his organization with the proclamation that Jhang was in the hold of landlords, who abused their peasants and lived licentious lives. The landed elite were able to perpetuate their domination because of the prevalence of obscurantist practices (*rusum-i jahiliyyat*)—Shi‘ism in general, as well as those Sunni customs and mores that may lead to acceptance of Shi‘ism by Sunnis. This refers to Sunni participation in Muharram commemorations, and also to sociopolitical institutions that can tie Sunni peasants to Shi‘i landlords. For instance, the prominent Shi‘i landlord of Jhang, Faisal Salih Hayat (against whom SSP have contested elections), is also a *makhdum* (a hereditary keeper of a shrine)—an institution that wields great authority among Sunnis as well. The status of makhdum gives Hayat certain control over Sunni peasants. In contending with Hayat, therefore, weaning Sunnis away from following makhdums and pirs in general—and denouncing those institutions as *rusum-i jahiliyyat*—has been just as important as denouncing Shi‘ism. Emancipation from feudalism has gone hand-in-hand with discovery of true Islam and exposing the falsehood of Shi‘ism.84

The opposition to the feudal elite was also evident in SSP’s decision to use the assassination of Mawlana Jhangvi to mobilize public opinion against the Shi‘i rural elite. Jhangvi was killed by militant Shi‘i activists who followed the TNFJ or one of its factions, and not the landed elite; and ultimately SSP itself pointed the finger at Iran. Initially at least, however, the party organized a strong campaign against the prominent Shi‘i landed elite of Jhang at the time, Faisal Salih Hayat (a Pakistan Peoples Party member of the National Assembly from Jhang and a minister in Benazir Bhutto’s cabinet), Sayyidah Abidah Husain (Colonel Husain’s daughter, who was then an independent member of National Assembly allied with the Islamic Democratic Alliance), Amanu’llah Siyal, and Sardarzadah Zafar Abbas. SSP was hoping to use the anger over Jhangvi’s death to weaken the Shi‘i landed elite regardless of the fact that they had no

complicity in Jhangvi's assassination. An important implication was that all Shi'is (and especially those in positions of authority) were guilty.

Two years after the formation of SSP, in 1988, Mawlana Jhangvi ran in national elections against Sayyidah Abidah Husain; Jhangvi lost by 8,000 votes. In the elections of 1990 SSP did better, winning one of the five seats from Jhang to the National Assembly and one of the ten seats from the district to the Punjab Provincial Assembly. In the 1993 elections SSP fielded candidates as a part of the Mutahhidah Dini Mahaz (United Religious Front) coalition, winning one seat each in the national and Punjab provincial assemblies (it then joined the Punjab government when its member of the provincial assembly, Shaikh Hakim Ali, became a provincial minister). SSP did not participate in the 1997 elections.

It was apparent that SSP's power in Jhang city was not disputed, but its weak performance in other Jhang constituencies showed that its influence had not spread beyond the urban centers. In 1993 SSP won 46.8% of the Jhang City (NA-68) seats that it won, but tallied 6.3%, 4.9%, and 3% in other Jhang contests. In fact, SSP has since done better in other urban centers in Punjab, and notably southern Punjab—where Sunni middle classes compete for power with Shi'i landlords—and has been able to show its presence in Peshawar and Karachi more than in rural Jhang. Its ability to end the Shi'i feudal hold has therefore been limited; a fact which attests to the resilience of traditional structures of authority in the face of Islamist challenges.

Still the spread of its influence to other urban centers of Punjab shows that its promise of empowering urban Sunni middle classes is popular. The Sunni urban middle classes and bourgeoisie have been a strong source of financial support for SSP's activities and especially the madrasahs that produce the foot soldiers in the sectarian conflicts. For instance, the Anjuman-i Tajiran (Association of Merchants) in Punjab and also in NWFP has supported SSP, and their activities have overlapped.85

The middle class base of support is complemented by the urban poor and new migrants, among whom SSP has been active, providing them with services and an ideology and common bond that can sustain them in their new urban setting.86 It is for this reason that

Faisalabad, the fastest growing urban center in Punjab—which is now the second largest in that province after Lahore—is also the seat of the most militant madrasahs. As such, SSP and its politics have spearheaded the Sunni middle classes’ struggle for empowerment, just as they have provided a new language of politics for the rapidly growing urban centers through which migrants can be integrated into urban social life.

**Proliferation of Madrasahs and the Deobandi Ascendancy**

The increase in the number of madrasahs since the mid-1970s has been evident among all schools of Sunnism, and in some cases and periods more among the Brelwis than others. Nor have the Deobandi madrasahs been the only ones to engage in sectarianism; for instance, JUP leader, Mawlana Shah Ahmad Nurani, was one of the most notable anti-Shi‘i voices in Sind in the 1970s, and the militant Sunni Tahrik (Sunni Movement) is Brelwi, and the Ahl-i Hadith as a whole have lent support to anti-Shi‘i activism. Still the rise in the number of Sunni madrasahs, and especially their role in militant sectarianism has become enmeshed with an ongoing and much older struggle for power within Sunnism, and is tied to the larger phenomenon of Deobandi ascendancy in Pakistan and beyond.

Before the partition, the most prominent Deobandi political organization, Jam‘iat-i Ulama-i Hind (Society of Indian Ulama, JUH) and its leader, Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani (d. 1957), supported the Congress party and opposed the creation of Pakistan. As a consequence, Deobandi ulama were not prominent in the Pakistan movement, and the movement as a whole—and by extension, the institution of the ulama—have had a difficult relationship with Pakistani nationalism. In 1945 a group of Deobandi ulama who were not active in JUH formed the Jam‘iat-i Ulama-i Islam (JUI) in order to preserve their influence over their followers in the future state of Pakistan. The leader of this break-away faction was Mawlana

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Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani (d. 1952), who would become the don of Pakistani ulama in the early years of the state, and would leave his imprint on debates over an Islamic constitution.\(^{89}\)

The emergence of JUI and Uthmani's leadership gave the impression that Deobandis in Pakistan were all followers of Uthmani, and that the Deobandi establishment in Pakistan were in their entirety following JUI's lead. That facile conclusion obfuscated the complexity of the Deobandis' relations to politics as a whole, and their place in Pakistan. To begin with, owing to JUH's activist role in Indian politics, a fissure had surfaced in the ranks of the Deobandis in the 1940s over the extent and nature of ulama's involvement in politics.\(^{90}\) Those who favored an active role in politics in support of the Congress party and who were close to JUH, came to be known as the 'Madani group'—after JUH's leader, Husain Ahmad Madani. Those who eschewed political activism in favor of greater attention to scholarship and involvement in the religious life of the community, or supported only a limited role for politics in the religious mission of the Deobandi school, came to be known as the 'Thanwi group' after the eminent Deobandi alim, Ashraf Ali Thanwi (d. 1949).\(^{91}\) The Thanwi group was not altogether insouciant toward politics as its members to varying degrees dabbled in politics, and some later helped form JUI, and took part in partition politics, and later Pakistani politics.\(^{92}\) Thanwi group's politics would, however, remain subsumed under the greater attention that it paid to purely religious and scholarly concerns, and would not dominate its vision of an Islamic order. For the Thanwis, unlike the Madanis, politics never

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\(^{90}\) In religious circles in Pakistan today the division among Deobandis is widely acknowledged, and the terms 'Madani group' and 'Thanwi group' are used with frequency by Deobandis themselves as well as members of other religious organizations and traditions.

\(^{91}\) For an exposition of Thanwi's views on politics, see Mawlana Muhammad Taqi Uthmani, 'Hakimu'l-ummat ke siyasi afkar' (Political Ideas of the Sage of the [Islamic] Community [Ashraf Ali Thanwi]), *Al-Balagh* (Karachi) (March 1990), pp. 23–53. It has also been argued that 'Thanwi group' refers to Mawlana Ihtishamu'l-Haq Thanwi who was Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani's close associate after the partition; Kennedy, *Jami'iyatul Ulama-i Islam*, pp. 364–5. Still, popularly the term 'Thanwi group' draws legitimacy by claiming connection to Ashraf Ali Thanwi rather than Ihtishamu'l-Haq Thanwi, who at any rate belonged to Ashraf Ali's school of thought.

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became a vocation, nor an integral component of their religious practice and mission, nor did they view the realization of their religious aims to be predicated on success in the political arena, although they did favor a state in which Muslims could live according to Islamic law—which led them to support the Pakistan movement. The Madanis have been closer to Islamism in that for them politics plays a central role in their conception of their religious mission, and control of the political domain has come to dominate their definition of the ideal Islamic order.

Uthmani had been close to the Thanwi group, as had many of the important figures in the JUI in its early years. In fact, that Uthmani had little involvement in JUH owing to his aversion to politics is what enabled him to form JUI and create a Deobandi base of support for the Pakistan movement, and hence keep Deobandis relevant to the new state.

It is important to note, however, that Madani had enjoyed wide support among many Deobandi ulama and their followers in the territories that would become Pakistan. Many of his students were in Punjab, Sind, and NWFP, where they did not support the cause of Pakistan, and fought against it in such watershed events as the referendum over the future of the NWFP in 1947. In fact, so strong has been Madani’s popularity among the Deobandis of NWFP that, when the current leader of the Jama’at-I Islami, Qazi Husain Ahmad, was elected to his office in 1987, the Jama’at made much of the fact that his father had been a devotee of Madani and had named Qazi Husain Ahmad after Husain Ahmad Madani.

The pro-Madani Deobandis assumed a passive role after the creation of Pakistan. They, however, remained influential in Deobandi madrasahs and gradually became active in JUI. In fact, those Deobandi madrasahs in Pakistan that were controlled by the Madani group, such as the Binuri madrasah in Karachi remained closely associated with Deobandi madrasahs in India, and continued to follow the leadership of Madani and JUH, although not openly. That they were politically-inclined meant that they could not remain apolitical in Pakistan, even though they had opposed its creation. That the Madani group was more keen on politics than the Thanwi group

94 Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation, p. 95.
meant that it would eventually consolidate its hold over political activities and organizations of Deobandis. By the 1970s this had come to pass. Mawlana Mufti Mahmud, the powerful leader of JUI in the 1970s and the 1980s—who oversaw the party’s greater politicization during that period—had been a student of Madani, as was his second-in-command at the time, Mawlana Ghulam Ghawarzi—as was the father of the other important JUI leader of the post-1970s period, Mawlana Sami ‘ul-Haq. The leadership and much of the rank and file of both factions of the JUI today are classified as members of Madani group, and militant expressions of Deobandis from the SSP to the Taliban to the Harakatu’l-Ansar too are offshoots of the Madani group.

The ascendancy of the Madani group in Pakistan coincided with its greater prominence in India in the 1970s. In 1957 Qari Muhammad Tayyib succeeded Husain Ahmad Madani at the helm of the Deobandi establishment. Tayyib was close to the Thanwis in that he emphasized scholarship over political activism in Deoband’s conception of its socioreligious role. In the late 1970s Qari Tayyib’s position came under attack from Madani’s son, Mawlana Asad Madani, who was active in Indian politics and wanted to consolidate his hold on the Deobandi establishment in order to further his interests in the political arena. Asad Madani challenged Qari Tayyib’s authority, and finally, with the help of the Indian government, and after receiving support from mawlanas Mufti Mahmud and Sami ‘ul-Haq (who came from Pakistan to mediate the dispute), Asad Madani formally took over the management of the Deoband madrasah, and with that, the Deobandi establishment. With this victory the more political Madani perspective once again dominated Deobandi madrasahs and institutions in India, thus supporting the ascendancy of the Madani group in Pakistan as well.

Although Husain Ahmad Madani and JUH had opposed the creation of Pakistan, and had denounced it in the strongest religious language, their followers were eager to participate in Pakistan’s politics. Mufti Mahmud is reputed to have argued to his followers that, ‘We are fortunate that we had no role in the sin of creation of Pakistan, but being here we have every claim to its politics and future.’

96 The Thanwi group has continued to criticize the overt political activism of the Madani group; see, for instance, Thanwi, ‘Hakimu’l-ummat,’ pp. 23–53.
97 I am indebted to Mumtaz Ahmad for the details of this episode.
98 Cited in two separate interviews with Deobandi ulama who chose to remain anonymous.
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Still, that line of reasoning may have gone over more easily within the walls of Deobandi madrasahs than in the public arena. The legacy of JUH’s politics made it difficult for its followers to participate openly in Pakistan’s politics.

The Madani group’s entry into Pakistani politics therefore followed a circuitous route. It was premised on a two-tier strategy; first, to create a space in the political arena in which it could become active; and second, a drive to dominate the Islamic discourse as well as Islamic institutions and structures of authority in Pakistan. The two strategies are separate although interrelated.

Uthmani and his followers became involved in politics only reluctantly and then over general discussions about the Islamic constitution. In so doing they established links with Islamist forces such as the Jama’at-i Islami, and were even content with following their lead in creating an ‘Islamic’ space in the political arena. The Madani group refused to follow the lead of Islamist groups like the Jama’at. Bitter altercations between Mawdudi and Madani before the partition cast their shadow on the relations between the Jama’at and Madani group; but more important, their penchant for political activism led them to covet the Islamists’ position. In addition, issues of importance to the Madani group were not always the same as those that gathered the interest of other Islamist parties. For instance, in the late-1960s when the Jama’at-i Islami and its ilk were fighting against the Left, and focused on the demand for the Islamic state, many in the Madani group supported Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s campaign for power, because his anti-imperialism and populism were in tune with JUH’s politics in the years leading to the partition.

The Madani group also chose not to become directly involved in the debate over the Islamic constitution—which could have put its own record on Pakistan on trial—but to focus instead on the role of minorities in Pakistan, turning it into a wedge issue that would gain entry for them into the political arena, but which would not place them in the position of directly laying claim to the state—which they did not deem it prudent to do at this point.

The Shi’i and Ahmediya communities—and the Brelwis among the Sunnis—had been far more involved in the Pakistan movement than Deobandis. Many of the Muslim League’s early leaders and patrons such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah, M. A. Ispahani or Raja Mah-

99 On Mawdudi and Madani’s debates over support for Congress party see Nasr, Mawdudi, pp. 32–3; Qureshi, Ulema in Politics, pp. 330–9.
mudabad were Shi‘is; as were M. A. Bugra, H. S. Suhrawardi, I. I. Chundigar—all prime ministers—and Iskandar Mirza, both of whom were governors general, and the latter also president. The numbers of Shi‘is among various ranks of bureaucrats, Muslim League activists and leaders were far more numerous. The Ahmediya too were prominent among Muslim League supporters and the bureaucracy that founded the new state. The most notable Ahmediya among the leadership of the Pakistan movement was Sir Chaudhry Zafar u’llah Khan, a senior Muslim League leader and Pakistan’s first foreign minister.

The Madani group looked to the role of the Ahmediya in Pakistan as the issue with which it could mobilize support and find a political base. The campaign was led by the Anjuman-i Ahrar, which was by large a Deobandi organization, and which like JUH had been allied with the Congress party and opposed Pakistan, at least until 1947. Popular Ahrar spokesmen such as Mawlana Ahmad Ali Lahori of the old city of Lahore were notable local Deobandi ulama. In the new state, the Ahrar found anti-Ahmediya activism as the only means of finding a role in politics.

The minority issue was useful in that it shifted focus from what had been the role of Madani group leaders in the creation of Pakistan to what was the role of ‘non-Muslims’—how the Ahrar characterized the Ahmediya—in Pakistan. By shifting focus from their own political legacy to the ‘Islamicity’ of the state and its leaders, the Madani group was hoping to alter the balance of relations between Pakistani nationalism and those Deobandis who had opposed Pakistan, and to change the central questions in Pakistan’s politics to their own advantage, and therefore to be able to appropriate the fruit of the struggle that they had opposed. The concern for the Islamic purity of the state would rehabilitate the Madani group. For it may not be entitled to a role in a state whose creation it had opposed, but it was certainly entitled to participate in an Islamic cause—against the Ahmediya—which transcended questions of nationalism and loyalty to Pakistan. In effect, the Madani group was saying that the Ahmediya (and later Shi‘is) may have helped create Pakistan, but because Pakistan is to be an Islamic state, they cannot possibly have a central role in its affairs, and conversely the ulama—the Madani group to

100 Chief Martial Law Administrator between 1969 and 1971, General Yahya Khan; and prime ministers, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971–77), and Benazir Bhutto (1988–90 and 1993–96) can be added to this list.
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be precise—must dominate its cultural, social and political life, because they are the most qualified to do so, regardless of the legacy of their pre-partition politics. Hence, the status of minorities (and later Shi‘is) appropriately served the greater political objectives of the Madani group.

The Ahrar had a history of anti-Ahmediya activism. What made its campaign successful was, however, the fact that Deobandi ulama as a whole had been among the Ahmediya’s strongest opponents. For instance, Uthmani himself had written a book against the Ahmediya in 1924. In fact, the generally apolitical Thanwi group was more likely to become embroiled in a political campaign if it involved the Ahmediya than one which was for an Islamic state—for the former was an ‘Islamic’ issue concerning ‘who is a Muslim,’ whereas the latter was a more directly political one. This allowed the Madani group to take the lead in Deobandi politics. Deobandi ulama, and soon also Brelwis joined the fray, and the campaign to Islamize Pakistan was reduced to relegating the Ahmediya to the status of a non-Muslim minority, all under the leadership of the Madani group.

Jama‘at-i Islami’s Mawlana Mawdudi tried without success to retain control of Islamist politics by arguing that the anti-Ahmediya campaign was unnecessary because the Islamic constitution would deal with minorities and the Ahmediya among them, and in the meantime the riots were likely to damage the campaign for an Islamic constitution. Not only Mawdudi failed to persuade Uthmani of this, but he was unable to restrain the Deobandis within the Jama‘at-i Islami, such as Shaikh Sultan Ahmad. It was only after Mawdudi realized that he was losing control of the Islamist movement that he decided to join the anti-Ahmediya campaign.101

With the anti-Ahmediya campaign the Madani group managed to marginalize an important religiopolitical community—which was finally declared a non-Muslim minority in 1974—rehabilitate itself politically, find a strong presence in JUI and Deobandi politics in Pakistan, and shift the Islamic and political discourse in a manner that would allow former opponents of the state to now lay claim to it. By making the ideology of the state—to be gauged through the role of minorities in it, rather than its constitution as the Jama‘at argued—a central political issue, and by posing as the protectors of Pakistan’s Islamicity, the Madani group ensconced itself in Pakis-

101 For a discussion of this issue see, Nasr, Vanguard, pp. 131–41.
tan's politics. It is important to note that many in the leadership of sectarian groups, Mawlana Jhangvi included, had been involved in the anti-Ahmediya campaign, especially in the early 1970s.\(^{102}\)

Through sectarianism the Madani group and its various offshoots are now extending their claim to the state. SSP is serving the same function that the Ahrar did in the 1950s, mobilizing popular support against a minority, all in the name of preserving the Islamic essence of the state, but in effect to consolidate further the position of the Madani Deobandis in Pakistan's politics. Sectarianism is therefore a continuation of the anti-Ahmediya campaign in that it serves the same function for the same religiopolitical group.

At face value, the focus of the Islamization process during the Zia period was on state institutions, law, and constitutional issues. At a more fundamental level, however, Zia and his allies sought to take over structures of authority—especially at the local level—through Islamization. This meant defining Pakistan as a Sunni state, which in turn meant charging sectarian forces to penetrate rural structures of authority. In the Zia regime, therefore, the Madani group found a patron and an ally in its drive for power.

By 1996 the rising power of SSP was complemented with the rise of the Deobandi Taliban in NWFP and Afghanistan and the Harakatu'l-Ansar in Kashmir, all of which replaced older Islamist guerilla groups tied to the Jama'at-i Islami. The Jama'at viewed the prominence of these groups and their replacement of the pro-Jama'at groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir, as a mark of the increasing Deobandi domination of the Islamist scene, a conclusion that was also shared by Brelwi leaders.\(^{103}\)

One Brelwi response was the Sunni Tahrik, which was perhaps an attempt at stymieing the Deobandi onslaught by becoming involved in sectarianism. The dominant Brelwi establishments, those under the leadership of mawlanas Shah Ahmad Nurani—who had earlier led anti-Shi'i movements in Karachi—and Abdu'ssattar Niyazi, however, joined hands with Qazi Husain Ahmad of the Jama'at-i Islami, and the leadership of Tahrik-i Ja'fariyah Pakistan (the old TNJF) to form the Milli Yikjahati Council. Under the guise of bringing about sectarian peace, the Jama'at, Brelwis and Shi'is were hoping to form an anti-Madani group coalition. The Milli Yikjahati Council also appealed to remnants of the Thanwi group among the Deobandi

\(^{102}\) Zaman, 'Sectarianism in Pakistan,' p. 692.

\(^{103}\) Interviews.
ulama for support. The Thanwis, although not active in the political scene, have shown some concern with the radicalization of Deobandi madrasahs. When Mawlana Muhammad Manzur Nu'mani of Lucknow issued a fatwa (religious decree), declaring Shi'is as infidels (kafirs), the Korangi Daru'l-'Ulum madrasah in Karachi refused to accept the fatwa as valid.\textsuperscript{104}

Sectarianism and the proliferation of madrasahs has also been an aspect of rivalry between Deobandis and Brelwis for control of rural areas, especially in Punjab. In NWFP and northern Baluchistan Deobandis have always been strong, and with the exodus of Afghans into those regions—and with the help of the Saudi and Pakistani intelligence agencies—their hold over those regions has become further consolidated. In Punjab and Sind, however, Brelwis and Shi'is have been more prominent in the rural areas, as have traditional religious leaders affiliated with rural shrines—pirs and sajjadahnishins. The sectarian campaign has been directed at the Shi'is and has aimed to teach the masses the true faith. As Muhammad Qasim Zaman observes, SSP's anti-Shi'i campaign is also an articulation of a distinct interpretation of Sunnism.\textsuperscript{105} Denunciation of Shi'ism goes hand-in-hand with propagation of 'true' Sunnism, which is in effect directed at undermining the Brelwis and the pirs. SSP's journal, \textit{Khilafat-i Rashidah} (Rightly-Guided Caliphate), seeks to rationalize and reform rural Sunnism, weaning it away from its traditional beliefs and practices and anchoring it in a Deobandi world view. Furthermore, as Sunnism is defined in terms of anti-Shi'ism, then those most active against the Shi'is—SSP and Deobandis—should lead and define Sunnism. In effect, SSP is a means of augmenting the power of Deobandi ulama and extending their reach into areas where they have traditionally been weak, rural areas of Sind and Punjab.\textsuperscript{106}

Since 1996 SSP has pursued a more concerted drive at penetrating rural Punjab. It has begun systematically to eliminate Shi'is from positions of authority at the municipal level in the province, as well

\textsuperscript{104} Interviews.

\textsuperscript{105} Zaman, 'Sectarianism in Pakistan,' pp. 699–705.

\textsuperscript{106} It is interesting to note that from 1942 on, the Muslim League too had sought to develop political control in Punjab by entering the rural areas and wresting control of its power structure from the landed elite and pirs. In its bid to convert local power structures into Muslim League ones it used \textit{biradri} networks and local factional divisions; Ian Talbot, \textit{Freedom's Cry: The Popular Dimensions in the Pakistan Movement and Partition Experience in North-West India} (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 85–6.
as those who enjoy positions of prominence in small divisions and towns. In this campaign, between January and May 1997, SSP assassinated seventy-five Shi'i figures. The assassinations mark a turning point in SSP's campaign of violence. Until recently, SSP attacked only TJP or SM leaders and workers, Shi'i mosques, and other Shi'i communal facilities. Government officials were not targets of SSP's attacks. Now the party has begun systematically to eliminate Shi'is from positions of authority in Punjab. There is little doubt that SSP's campaign is now directed at the state—the party has taken upon itself to cleanse governmental institutions from Shi'is. In many regards this policy resembles the drive to eliminate the Ahmediya from government positions in the 1950s.

SSP's challenge to the state fits the general posture of the rising Deobandi activism in Pakistan. On February 15, 1998, Mawlana Fazlur Rahman, a leader of JUI—whose father, Mufti Mahmud was a student of Madani—responded to the possible government attempts to shut down madrasahs in the following manner:

A particular ruling class who has been ruling over the people for the last 50 years has usurped the right of Pakistan as a sovereign state. This ruling class is a carry-over of the British masters, and has turned Pakistan into its own fiefdom. Speaker of the National Assembly welcomed the Queen Elizabeth, saying, 'Like my forefathers, I too am a loyal to the British Crown'. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, whose forefathers were not in the picture at that time, thanked the Queen for bestowing freedom to Pakistanis. This ruling class had divided the country and one of its representatives, Nawaz Sharif says Pakistan was created in the name of Islam, but its rulers have failed in enforcing it in the country.

Not only is the sharp edge of Fazlur Rahman's vitriol directed at the state, but his reference to the British legacy, and its ties to the creators of Pakistan, echoes Husain Ahmad Madani's anti-British rhetoric and characterization of the leadership of the Pakistan movement.

The electoral performance of SSP indicates that its impact on rural areas has been limited. Still, its campaigns do mobilize Sunnis, and as such, purport to change relations between Shi'is and Sunnis on the one hand, and alter the structure of rural authority, on the other. In this, it threatens other Sunni schools of thought and traditional Muslim leaders. The rise of the Taliban and the Harakatu'l-Ansar in recent years has suggested that in fact SSP and its role in

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107 *Economist*, May 10, 1997, p. 34.
Punjab are mere pieces in a larger picture. There appears to be a region-wide radical Deobandi resurgence in the making—something akin to the Wahhabi explosion in the eighteenth-century Arabian peninsula—extending in the form of an arc from India through Pakistan and Afghanistan into Central Asia. It is closely tied to Saudi Arabia both intellectually and financially. Its influence, however, extends further. In one Deobandi madrasah alone in Faisalabad in 1996 this author encountered seventy Malay students—mostly from Kelantan, Terengganu and Kedah provinces in Malaysia, and some from the Pattani region in Thailand, and Java and Sumatra in Indonesia—who are being trained as ulama. Their interest in a Deobandi education has no doubt been kindled by the example of Nik Abdu'l-Aziz, the chief minister (Mentari Besar) of the Malaysian state of Kelantan—a leader in the ulama-based Partai Islam Se-Malaysia (Islamic Party of Malaysia, PAS)—and a Deobandi alim trained in India. The Deobandi education that the young Malays will go through in Faisalabad is, however, quite different from the one that Nik Abdu'l-Aziz received in India.

**Conclusion**

The rise of Sunni militancy in Pakistan has followed fundamental changes in the role of religious education, as well as the role of ulama in society and politics. These changes occurred in the context of the Zia regime's Islamization initiative and the increasing tensions between Shi'is and Sunnis owing to the stand-off between Iran and its Arab neighbors in the Persian Gulf. They, however, purport to more. Sunni militancy has become a constituent element in the struggles of domination in rural districts between the traditional elite and the rising middle classes on the one hand, and in the attempt to integrate new migrants into the social fabric of the growing urban areas, on the other. At a different level, Sunni militancy has become a facet of the greater prominence of the Deobandi tradition—and one wing of it in particular—in Pakistan. This process began in 1947 and has gone through many stages, and adopted many forms. In sectarianism it has found a powerful tool to further its cause, to dominate the Islamist discourse at the cost of lay Islamist parties such as the Jama'at-i Islami, and to constrict its rival Sunni traditions, the rural religious leadership, and Shi'is. This has in turn instituted a particular discourse of power—one which is predicated
on demands for religious and communal purity—in Islamist circles. This discourse is likely to continue to determine relations between Sunnis and Muslim as well as non-Muslim minorities. Most recently, the sharp edge of Sunni militancy has turned against Pakistan’s Christian minority.¹⁰⁹

The sociopolitical functions of sectarianism among Sunnis, and its implications for changing the nature of religious education, the role of Islam as well as that of the ulama in state and society, and the direction that Islamism is likely to take from here on, all point to the complex nature of relations between the Islamist discourse, the varied Islamic/Islamist traditions that are prevalent in Pakistan, the state, and the dominant social structure of the country.

¹⁰⁹ In May 1998 following a Christian bishop's self-immolation in protest to treatment of Christians in Pakistan some fifty activists attacked a Christian neighborhood in Faisalabad, burning houses and shops; see the *Dawn* between May 9 and 13, 1998.
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