INTRODUCTION

The first volume of this study – MAA 297, Russian Army of the Seven Years War (1) – covered the infantry component of the mid-18th century Russian army. This volume concentrates on the cavalry, both the regular troops and irregular forces such as the Cossacks, and considers their composition, nature and effectiveness. It also outlines the state of the Russian train of artillery, which was seen as the premier branch of the army and dominated Russian military doctrine throughout the 18th century. The artillery would maintain this status until at least 1917, if not to the present day.

Reforms to the army immediately prior to the Seven Years War created severe problems for Russian commanders; their effects had not yet begun to take full effect, but their influence was enough to put the army in some state of disarray. As a result, the Russian army entered the war with Prussia somewhat wrong footed.

The disarray was most apparent in the cavalry arm, where changes of organisation, tactics and even role had been undertaken in 1756. The ability of the army to recover from this in the crucible of war is a major part of this story. Experience gained during the early years of the war was rapidly assimilated and put to good use. Organisation and tactics were changed to produce a more effective army, one that was capable of inflicting upon Frederick the Great what was probably his greatest defeat, and one whose forces could even capture Berlin.

By the end of the war and the accession of the Empress Catherine II (‘the Great’), the army and its actions had placed Russia among the foremost European military powers, a position enjoyed by the country ever since.

CHRONOLOGY

Covering Russian operations during the Seven Years War. Note that all dates are in the modern (Julian) calendar, for ease of reference.

1757

Spring Apraxin’s army still in winter quarters in Livonia.
April Frederick the Great’s Prussian army invades Austrian Bohemia.
August Russian army of 55,000 enters East Prussia. Lehwaldt’s army intercepts with 25,000 Prussians.
30 August Battle of Gross-Beeren. Russian army surprised but beats off Prussian attack and holds field.
September Apraxin approaches Konigsberg, then inexplicably orders a withdrawal. French army advances on Magdeburg.
December Apraxin relieved of command and dies of a seizure shortly afterwards.

1758

January Fermor appointed as commander of Russian army. East Prussia invaded in winter campaign and Konigsberg captured.
May Russians begin march through Poland towards the middle Oder R.
June Frederick’s Prussians invade Austrian Moravia and besiege Olmutz.
August Fermor with 43,000 men reaches Oder R at Kutzrin and commences siege. Frederick’s force marches from Olmutz to Kutzrin
with 37,000 men. Frederick crosses Oder R above Kutztrin and outflanks Fermor’s army. Russians draw up in defensive position near Zorndorf, on east bank of river.

25 August Battle of Zorndorf. Fermor holds Frederick to a draw in an inconclusive bloodbath. Neither army capable of continuing the fight.


October Austrians besiege Dresden, but retreat over border when Frederick approaches with main army. Russian army withdraws to winter quarters in East Prussia. Russians attempt half-hearted siege of Colberg, then continue to withdraw.

1759

May Fermor replaced by Saltykov. Russian army prepares to renew offensive. Plans drawn up to co-operate with Austrian army in middle Oder R area.

June Saltykov marches towards Oder with 55,000 men, including Cossacks.

July Russians outmanoeuvre Prussian blocking force of 30,000 men.

23 July Battle of Paltzig. Wedel’s Prussians are decisively beaten by Saltykov, who fights an exemplary defensive battle.

August Russians occupy Frankfurt-on-Oder and control river crossings. Austrians send Loudon and 24,000 men to link up with Russian army. Frederick marches to intercept both armies, crossing to the east of the Oder R. Russians and Austrians link up and adopt a defensive position near Kunersdorf.

12 August Battle of Kunersdorf. Frederick and 50,000 Prussians are decisively beaten. Frederick narrowly avoids capture by Cossacks.

September Attempts to link up main Russian and Austrian armies fail. Austrians invade Saxony and capture Dresden. Russians march to Glogau but need siege train to take city.

November Battle of Maxen. Small Prussian army defeated by Austrians in Saxony. Russians withdraw to winter quarters in East Prussia.
1760

Spring Saltykov and 60,000 Russians gather at Posen, in Poland.
June Austrians invade Silesia. Battle of Landshut. Local Prussian army defeated.
July Austrians capture Glatz. Frederick marches army to Silesia.
26 July Russians begin marching towards middle Oder R.
15 August Battle of Leignitz. Frederick defeats Austrians. Austrians retreat from Silesia.

September A second half-hearted siege of Colberg is attempted and abandoned. Saltykov resigns due to ill health. Fermor temporarily appointed to command.
26 September Joint Austro-Russian raid on Berlin launched, led by Totleben (Russian).
9 October Berlin’s defences stormed, city captured and ransomed. City then abandoned.
October Buturlin assumes command of the Russian army.
3 November Battle of Torgau. Frederick defeats Austrians in a bloody battle.
15 November Russian army withdraws to winter quarters in East Prussia.

1761

January Buturlin’s Russian army prepares for a fresh campaign. Totleben undertakes operations in Pomerania and threatens Colberg.
February Totleben inexplicably withdraws army in face of minimal opposition.
June He is arrested on charges of treasonable dealings with the enemy. Russian army begins march towards upper Oder R area.
July Buturlin reaches Oder R and links up with Loudon and 70,000 Austrians.
August Frederick’s army forced into defensive position at Bunzelwitz. Stalemate.
September Lack of supplies forces allies to abandon siege of Bunzelwitz camp. Chernyshev’s Corps is attached to Austrian army, and they storm Schweidnitz. Rumiantsev’s Corps besieges Colberg.
October Remainder of army withdraws to its winter quarters in East Prussia.
16 December Colberg surrenders to Russians.

1762

January Frederick gives orders to sue for peace, when:
6 January The Empress Elizabeth dies, succeeded by pro-Prussian Emperor Peter III.
16 March Peter III signs armistice with the Prussians.
2 May Armistice converted to peace treaty and pact of co-operation.
June Russia places troops at Frederick’s disposal, and Cossack raids ordered against Austrian Moravia. Peter III orders plans drawn up for war with Denmark. East Prussia and Colberg returned to Prussia.
8 July Empress Catherine seizes power in palace coup, backed by the guards. Peter III forced to abdicate.
August Peter III killed or assassinated in staged brawl. Empress Catherine has supreme power. War weary, she ratifies peace treaty with Prussia.
1763

February Treaty of Hubertusburg ends Seven Years War. Status quo maintained in Central and Eastern Europe.

RUSSIAN CAVALRY, 1725-1740

In 1725 Russian cavalry comprised a guard cavalry regiment (Leib Regiment), 30 line dragoon regiments and three regiments of horse grenadiers. Peter the Great refused to raise heavy cavalry regiments because of his belief that the dragoon was the ideal regular cavalryman for use in Eastern Europe. This was based on a combination of tactical doctrine, geographical considerations and the availability of horses capable of bearing heavy cuirassiers within Russia. This force was augmented, when required, by calling out the Cossack hosts, providing, at least on paper, a force of over 40,000 irregular light cavalrymen.

Following Peter the Great’s death, and the subsequent brief reigns of his wife, the Empress Catherine, and the Emperor Peter II, the throne passed into the hands of the Empress Anna in 1730. Her succession was assisted by the guard regiments, to whom she owed a debt of gratitude and from whom she learned a valuable lesson in the political power of the Russian military. To create her own power within the army she raised a third guard infantry regiment (Ismailovski) and a squadron of horse guards, who quickly amalgamated with the Leib Regiment, thereby ensuring their loyalty. For her military council she relied on a group of foreign officers in Russian service, principally Baron Burchard Christoph Munnich, who in 1732 became president of the war college, the senior military post in Russia. Many of his reforms are covered in MAA 297, and they can be summarised as a remodelling of the army along Prussian lines.

One of Munnich’s first changes concerned cavalry: ‘The Russian army has never possessed any other category of horse... than dragoons. Several other armies, however, and especially that of Imperial Austria, own regiments of cuirassiers, which have proved more effective than other kinds against the Turks... Since light cavalry regiments are incapable of withstanding regiments of heavy cavalry or cuirassiers with advantage, the Military Commission considers that, in the present time of peace, we should establish ten cuirassier regiments of this kind, mounted on German horses.’ (Baiow, 1906.)

In 1731 the Vyborgski dragoon regiment became the Munnich cuirassiers. In the following year the Nevski dragoon regiment became the Leib cuirassiers, and the Iaroslavski dragoons the 3rd cuirassiers. A shortage of suitable mounts made the conversion process a slow one, and only one
one further regiment was raised before the Empress Anna’s death in 1740. That year the Kazanski dragoon regiment became the Holstein cuirassiers. The horse grenadier regiments were amalgamated into the line dragoons, and a new dragoon regiment was raised to keep the dragoons at a level of 30 regiments.

New regulations concerning cavalry drill and tactics were also introduced in 1731, stressing the current German doctrine that cavalry units should trot into action in order to maintain cohesion. These regulations remained in force until the eve of the Seven Years War, placing Russian cavalry at a serious disadvantage when opposed by the Prussians, who by then had developed a more aggressive doctrine, involving charging into contact. This and the backlash against Munnich’s ‘German’ reforms after 1741 would hinder the development of Russian cavalry in the crucial decades before it embarked on its war with Prussia.

THE EMPRESS ELIZABETH’S CAVALRY

Guard Cavalry

Since 1721 the Russian monarchy had been protected by a mounted guard regiment, Peter the Great’s Leib Regiment. It was used primarily for ceremonial purposes, and once amalgamated with the Empress Anna’s horse guards, it became a potent political force within the Russian court. The unit was the Garde à Cheval regiment (1741). Its primary role was to protect the empress, and it was never really seen as an operational military force, unlike the guard infantry regiments, who were only retained in St Petersburg throughout the war due to a combined fear of a direct attack on the capital and the chance of a military coup. The regiment was used extensively on ceremonial occasions, and it performed the majority of imperial escort duties.

All cavaliers in the ranks of the unit were regarded as officers in their own right, and command was given to senior Russian noblemen more for their abilities in court rather than for any military prowess they exhibited. Reputedly, the Empress Elizabeth rewarded handsome young guards officers with promotions and titles for acts that were linked more to sexual than military prowess, a habit continued by the Empress Catherine.

On certain state occasions the Leib Company, a ceremonial foot unit of the Imperial Guard, provided a mounted escort for the empress, commanded by a major-general and with the ranks made up of guard captains and lieutenants. Although not really a pure cavalry formation, the Chevalier Garde of the Leib Company maintained its own stable and was provided with special
uniforms for the rare occasions when it was used. Both of these guard units participated in the overthrow of the pro-Prussian Peter III in the coup orchestrated by the future Empress Catherine II (‘the Great’) in 1762.

**Cuirassiers**

The rationale behind the formation of cuirassier regiments in the Russian army has already been mentioned. Before 1756 these regiments were trained to engage in shock combat, but still retained an earlier function of having a fire combat capability. The 1731 cavalry regulations laid down that cuirassiers should be armed with carbines and pistols, and that these should be discharged in the face of the enemy immediately prior to engaging them in close combat. The new regulations of 1756 dropped this as a viable military manoeuvre, and instead saw the cuirassier as the shock troop _par excellence_ of the army. Despite this, throughout the war Russian dragoons were equipped with pistols and carbines in addition to the sword, although in action the use of the former was consigned to skirmishes and when performing piquet duty. Once the problems of providing suitable mounts had been resolved, Russian cuirassiers performed their role admirably, and were regarded as the most useful troops on the battlefield, after the artillery that is; the latter were always seen as the premier force within the army.

**Dragoons**

The mainstay of the Russian cavalry throughout the 18th century were the dragoon regiments – medium cavalrymen mounted on smaller horses than those encountered in western European armies. While other armies saw their dragoons, at least for the most part, as true cavalrymen, the Russian army still retained elements of the Petrine notion that the dragoon should function equally well as a dismounted musketeer, a cavalryman capable of engaging the enemy in mêlée and as a kind of irregular cavalryman who could scout, perform piquet duty, harass the enemy and supplement the Cossacks in their traditional role. This multiplicity of roles was enshrined in the Petrine cavalry regulations as well as in the ‘Prussian’ guidelines for cavalry, issued by Munnich in 1731.

The reorganisation of the cavalry and the introduction of new regulations in 1756 came at a bad time for the Russian dragoons. They were being forced to re-evaluate their role on the eve of their entrance to a major European war. Their tardiness in adapting to their new role and the lack of enthusiasm shown by their officers in reorganising and retraining their men meant that at least during the first two years of the

---

*Note on the naming of cuirassier regiments*

The Leib cuirassier regiment was originally the Nevski dragoon regiment; it was changed in 1732.

The Federalovich cuirassier regiment (also known as the Imperial Crown Prince regiment—Albesse Impérale) began as the laroslavski dragoon regiment, becoming the 3rd cuirassier regiment in 1732, the Bevern cuirassier regiment in 1733, the Braunischweig cuirassier regiment in 1738, and the Holstein-Gottorp cuirassier regiment in 1742; it was finally renamed in 1752.

The 3rd cuirassier regiment started as the Vyborg dragoon regiment, became the Munnich cuirassier regiment in 1731 and was finally renamed in 1756.

The Kazanski cuirassier regiment was first the Kazanski dragoon regiment, but was re-named the Kurland cuirassier regiment in 1740. Its name was changed back to the Kazanski regiment (this time as cuirassiers) in 1756.

The Kievski and Novotrotsky cuirassier regiments were both converted directly from dragoon regiments 1756 but took their names with them.
conflict they could not be fully relied upon to perform their military duties to full effect. Therefore, out of the 20 dragoon regiments which existed in 1757, only three saw service in the war. These were the ones who most readily adapted to their new roles (namely the Tverski, Tobolski and Arkhanguelogorodski dragoon regiments).

**Horse Grenadiers**

Although Peter the Great’s army contained three regiments of horse grenadiers, all were disbanded in 1726. Originally, these regiments had drawn on the horse grenadiers who formed a constituent part of every dragoon regiment – around 100 men per regiment, organised as a separate company. When the horse grenadier regiments were dissolved, this organisation was re-adopted, so that every dragoon regiment contained a horse grenadier company. The men chosen for its ranks were meant to be the best of the regiment, and so became an élite company. In action the grenadiers were meant to function as normal dragoons and to operate as either dismounted grenadiers in storming parties or as a form of mounted shock unit. However, how this was supposed to be used was never explained fully in either the Petrine or the 1731 codes of drill and tactics for the cavalry.

Following the adoption of the Cavalry Reorganisation Commission findings in 1756 (set up to examine the cavalry arm and to bring it into line with current European tactics and organisation), many of the deficiencies of the Russian cavalry arm were brought to light. One of the most glaring of these was the poor quality of the dragoon regiments, and their inability to stand up to the regular heavy cavalry of rival military powers (i.e. Prussia). One of the commission’s recommendations was that a form of ‘super-dragoon’ be created; that the specialist horse grenadier regiments which had been disbanded 30 years before be restored. The idea of taking these straight from the ranks of the horse grenadiers already in the dragoon regiments was rejected, since that would have reduced the already low combat abilities of those regiments. Instead, it was decided to convert six regiments of dragoons to horse grenadier regiments. This was carried out in the autumn of 1756 and the regiments chosen were the Astrakhanksi, Kargopolski, Narvski, St Peterbourgski, Rijski (Riga) and Riazanski dragoon regiments. From the outset these new regiments were seen as shock troops whose main task was to support the cuirassiers in engaging the enemy with l’arme blanche.

**Hussars**

After a relatively unsuccessful attempt by Peter the Great to build up a force of Serbian hussars, no other irregular alternative to the native Cossack host was contemplated until late in 1741. Baron Munnich decided to reorganise the militarily dormant Siberian Hussars and to expand the troop type by raising fresh units – the Grouzinski (Georgian), Venguerski (Hungarian) and Moldavski (Moldavian) hussars. By advocating this policy he was taking advantage of the fresh waves of Orthodox Christians who were fleeing from Turkish aggression and seeking refuge within the Russian Empire in these border areas.

This same drive to provide a more reliable alternative to traditional Cossack levies also led to the creation of the Chuguevski Cossacks, a per-
manent Cossack unit which functioned as a kind of alternative Cossack hussar unit. By the late 1750s a fresh wave of Orthodox Christian communities was providing manpower sufficient to raise further regiments in Slovakia (Slobodski hussars), Macedonia (Makedonski hussars), Serbia (Jolty, or 'yellow', hussars) and Bulgaria (Bolgarski hussars). Further, freshly settled Orthodox communities in Serbia (New and Slavonic Serbia) proved a fertile source for recruitment, and fresh hussar regiments were formed, organised by a trio of pro-Russian Serbian colonels. Four regiments were raised from these areas, the 1st and 2nd Novosersbski and the 1st and 2nd Slavianoserbski hussars.

Almost all men recruited into the Russian hussar regiments originated from outside the borders of the Russian empire, and Russian recruiting drives continued in Poland, the Austrian empire and, most productively, in the disputed border areas between Austria and Turkey in the Balkans.

Although these hussars adopted an irregular style of warfare, Rumuntsayev forced them to adopt the cavalry codes and tactics of 1755, which required them to be ready to charge home at the gallop and at sword point when required. During the war with Prussia, it is to the credit of hussar formations that they combined both the irregular forms of warfare as practised by the Cossacks and the battlefield ability of heavier cavalry.

**Garrison Cavalry**

Among the 74,548 troops of the Garrison army stationed in military provinces and fortresses throughout the Russian empire, only 5,000 were cavalrymen, organised into four dragoon regiments. These were stationed in the military districts of Kazan, Azov, Astrakhan and Siberia, one
regiment in each area. The principal duties of garrison troops combined
the roles of police and border guards, although they also assisted in tax
raising, recruitment and the rounding up of deserters.

On paper the regiments consisted of 1,077 men divided into five
squadrons (four squadrons from 1741). The troopers were paid by
raising revenue for their upkeep from within their military district. All
the dragoon regiments were stationed in provinces on the south-eastern
corners of the Empire, where the large spaces involved made cavalrmen
an essential part of the security of the province.

The major threats facing these troops were Turkish invasion, Cossack
revolt or raids by Asiatic light horsemen from beyond the fringes of the
military provinces. During the period no such major threat materialised in
these provinces, so the effectiveness of these troops was never really tested.

Garrison dragoons were issued with the same blue coats as regular
dragoons, although they were never issued with vests. They would also have
been last in line when new weapons were being issued to the army, and
there is a strong probability that local or ethnic weapons may have been
used to supplement those issued by the provincial army commissariat.

**The Russian Army at the Battle of Kunersdorf (12 August 1759)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line Infantry</th>
<th>Corps of Observation</th>
<th>Cavalry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Musketeers</td>
<td>Combined Grenadiers</td>
<td>Cuirassiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volgodski</td>
<td>1st Musketeers</td>
<td>P. Fedorovitch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevski</td>
<td>3rd Musketeers</td>
<td>3rd Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazanski</td>
<td>4th Musketeers</td>
<td>Novotroitski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azovski</td>
<td>5th Musketeers</td>
<td>Kazanski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pernaki</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kievski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Moskovski</td>
<td></td>
<td>Horse Grenadiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizovski</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kargopolski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibiriski</td>
<td></td>
<td>St Peterbourgi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viatiski</td>
<td></td>
<td>Riazanski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouglitzki</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kievski</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aperchenoki</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dragoons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostovski</td>
<td></td>
<td>Toboleki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pskovski</td>
<td></td>
<td>Archanguelogorodski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belozeroki</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Njeigorodski</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hussars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novgorodski</td>
<td></td>
<td>Serbski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grouzinski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grenadiers</td>
<td>Venguerski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Grenadiers</td>
<td>1st Novoserbski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd Grenadiers</td>
<td>1st Slavianoerbski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Grenadiers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4th Grenadiers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CAVALRY ORGANISATION
AND TACTICS

Organisation
All Russian cavalry regiments were organised into five squadrons, each of two companies. The squadrons were numbered from one to five, and the companies from one to ten, with the first squadron containing the first and sixth companies, the second squadron the second and seventh and so on. The major difference between cuirassier, dragoon, horse grenadier and hussar regiments lay in the strength of the company, with cuirassier companies being smaller and hussar companies larger than those of other cavalry formations. Each company was further divided into two platoons.

Full paper strength for a cavalry company is outlined below. Figures in brackets represent the strengths of cuirassier and hussar companies where they differ, with cuirassier strengths on the left and hussar strengths on the right.

| 1 Captain       | 2 Sergeants       | 2 Musicians (1/0) |
| 1 Lieutenant    | 5 Corporals (3/4) | 0 Grenadiers* (0/0) |
| 1 Cornet        | 16 Non-combatants | 82 Troopers (69/80-180) |
| 1 Sergeant-Major|                  |                   |

* One company in each ten-company dragoon regiment was designated a horse grenadier company. Note that in addition to the men from the companies, there was the regimental staff, which amounted to 30-40 officers, musicians and non-combatants. The senior regimental officer was the colonel, assisted in turn by a lieutenant colonel, a premier major and a second major.

The paper strength of a cuirassier regiment was therefore around 800 men, that of dragoon and horse grenadier regiments around 1,000 men and hussar regiments anything from 900 to 1,900 men. The variety in the number of troopers serving in hussar regiments reflects the recruitment policy for these regiments. For example, the 1st and 2nd Slavianoserbski hussar regiments were organised as double-sized regiments because they were originally earmarked as a frontier force to protect against Turkish attack, these extra numbers would have been needed to police their designated area.
In 1759 the 1st regiment was sent to join the main field army, although it appears that only part of the regiment was present, so its overall size would have resembled that of other hussar regiments. Similarly, the Serbski, Venguerski, Grouzinski and Moldavski hussar regiments were recruited before 1741, and had a smaller complement than later hussar regiments. The remaining regiments appear to have had a total paper strength of around 1,200 officers and men. The single company in each dragoon regiment of horse grenadiers should not be confused with grenadiers from the horse grenadier regiments, who belonged to their own distinct units.

Of course, the paper strength figures only bear a passing resemblance to the actual number of cavalry each regiment could really put into the field during the Seven Years War. Disease, desertion, the long distances from recruiting centres and enemy action all took their toll. A further problem was the supply of suitable horses. Remounts for the cavalry were in short supply, particularly horses that could be used by the heavier cuirassiers. From an extrapolation of figures from selected army returns during 1757-9, it appears that many cavalry units not only lacking remounts but also did not actually have sufficient numbers of horses to mount their complement.

Not only did Russian cavalry units take part in the 1757 campaign at below 80% of full strength, but it also appears that in 1758 at least some regiments could mount only four of their five squadrons. By 1759 this was recognised by the War Commission, and the fifth squadron was designated the supply squadron, providing men and mounts for the parent regiment when required. It also acted as a processing body and training camp for all new recruits.

**Russian Cavalry Regiments during the Seven Years War**

(Listed in order of seniority. No regimental numbers were allocated during this period. An asterisk after the name denotes a regiment that participated in the Seven Years War).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guard</th>
<th>Dragoons</th>
<th>Hussars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Garde à Cheval</td>
<td>Moskovski</td>
<td>Serbski (Serbian)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troitzi</td>
<td>Vladmirski</td>
<td>Grouzinski (Georgian)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novgorodski</td>
<td>Novgorodski</td>
<td>Venguerski (Hungarian)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olonezski</td>
<td>Sibirski</td>
<td>Moldavski (Moldavian)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pekovski</td>
<td>Tverski</td>
<td>Slobozki (Slovakian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permski</td>
<td>Viatski</td>
<td>Makedonski (Macedonian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novotroitski</td>
<td>Nijegorodski</td>
<td>Jotly (The Yellow Hussars)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rostovski</td>
<td>Bolgarchi (Bulgarian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arkhanguelogorodski</td>
<td>1st Novosersk (New Serb)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Azovski</td>
<td>2nd Novoserski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingermanlandski</td>
<td>1st Slavianserski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Volgofski</td>
<td>(Slavonic Serbian)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iarshagorski</td>
<td>2nd Slavianserski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tobolski</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revelski</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loutzski</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Manpower and Mounts

While the cavalry were seen as the weakest arm of the Russian army throughout the early to mid-18th century, next to the guard regiments it was considered as the most prestigious posting for young officers. While the training of artillery and engineer officers was advanced for its time, and even infantry officers were increasingly imbued with a spirit of professionalism, this does not appear to have been the case for cavalry officers. When the new cavalry reforms were introduced in 1756, only the Rijski (Riga) horse grenadiers and the cuirassier regiments were taught the new tactics and drill; the remaining regiments continued with the already extant ‘Prussian’ system of 1731. The unwillingness of cavalry officers to learn then implement the reforms demonstrated a lack of professionalism which was to have serious consequences during the early years of the war with Prussia.

Given that lack of suitable horseflesh was a problem for the army, particularly of heavier horses, required by the cuirassier regiments, efforts were made by army administrators to improve the horses used by the cavalry just prior to the Seven Years War. While the mounts used by Peter the Great’s army had been seen as inferior to those used by Western armies, the policy introduced by Baron Munnich was to import horses from elsewhere in Europe, and use the less robust Russian horses for garrison cavalry and hussars. This, combined with the development of military stables in Russia itself, increased the quality of mounts available, and, at least in time of peace, provided them in sufficient quantity.

During the Turkish campaigns of the 1730s the army exhausted its supply of horses and was forced to buy large quantities from Austrian suppliers. The repeat of this purchase during the winter of 1758-59 prevented a crisis shortage. Campaigns in Poland, and the large distances travelled during the campaigning season, were enough to exhaust available supplies at a greater rate than had been anticipated. During 1758 carriage horses were bought in the Baltic provinces to mount the cuirassiers, but until 1760 many cuirassiers were forced to ride the smaller horses used by the dragoons.

Cavalrymen were recruited in the same way as infantry (see MAA 297), and troopers allocated according to the quotas sent to recruitment centres from the War Commission. Within these tight confines a degree of latitude was allowed, at least by 1756, when it was noted that attempts were made to increase the quota of cavalrymen to be recruited from certain provincial areas at the expense of the infantry quota. Prime cavalry areas appear to have been Little Russia (Byelorussia and Severia) and the Ukraine. Greater Russia was not renowned for producing good riders, although its serfs produced high quality infantrymen.
Tactics

The cavalry arm of Peter the Great’s army was essentially an all-dragoon force. It was only in 1732 that the first cuirassier regiment was introduced into the Russian army, and the only hussar regiment was an irregular force used as border guards. Tactical doctrine was therefore to use the arm as pure dragoons as well as cavalrymen. This was ideal, given the defensive nature of the Petrine strategy during the war against Sweden, and dragoons were well suited to operating in the vast distances and poor terrain of the theatre of operations. Firepower was emphasised more than riding into contact, partly as a means of avoiding head-on clashes with the better trained and more experienced Swedish cavalry.

It was only when Baron Munnich decided to create cuirassier regiments in the western European style that this policy had to be revised. This took time; during the Turkish campaigns of the 1730s the army relied on firepower, and only dragoons accompanied the main army. In action they dismounted and took shelter in the massive infantry squares that had been devised by Munnich to counteract the superiority of Turkish light cavalry.

The ‘Prussian’ code of 1731 advocated the use of cuirassiers and dragoons to seek mounted action, with the tactical unit being the squadron, drawn up in three ranks. Russian officers in dragoon regiments trained their units to charge (at least at the trot) in preference to standing and firing, and the tactic of discharging firearms immediately before closing with the enemy was abandoned.

The next major revision of tactical doctrine took place in 1756, based upon the findings of the Cavalry Reorganisation Commission. Russian dragoons were regarded as being completely unsuitable for mounted combat against other European cavalry, and the aim was to make the Russian horse at least the equal of that employed by other armies.

This review introduced the concept of charging into contact:

‘The whole activity and strength of the cavalry... consists in the bravery of the men, in the good employment of the sword, in firm and compact formations and in a ferocious impact delivered at a fast gallop...’ (Shuvalov, from the Vorontsov Papers, 1870.)

Cavalry regiments would deploy into a line of squadrons, with the first (colonel’s) squadron in the centre. The flanking squadrons of the regiment would be commanded by the lieutenant-colonel (on the right) and the senior major (on the left). In the attack the formation would move forward at the trot, speeding up to a canter at 400 paces and then a wild gallop at 100 paces, swords
extended in a full-blown charge. This applied to cuirassier, horse
grenadier and dragoon regiments alike. Although hussar regiments were
trained in these tactics, they were not expected to be used against a
formed enemy of heavier horse.

This offensive policy was still being introduced when the war began,
and although practised by the cuirassier regiments, most dragoon and
horse grenadier units were unwilling or unable to implement these
charges during the first two years of the war. The delivery of cavalry
firepower was still used as a tactic by Russian dragoons, and lack of
training by their officers was evident, at least in 1757.

"They are very slow to form their squadrons, and they deliver the
charge at nothing faster than the trot. When the order comes Halt!
Dress! you might find twelve or more ranks piled up in one spot, while
in other places there will be room for a whole platoon to drive through.
On these occasions they open fire by entire ranks, but with such con-
fusion that I still do not know what they really intended to do, for the
whole regiment subsides into a heap, where many of the horses stumble,
and decant their riders from the saddle...". (Lambert, from the Vorontsov
Papers, 1870.)

Although dragoons were seen as ineffective, horse grenadiers were an
improvement, although they shared with regular cavalry the problem of
poor quality mounts. They functioned as regular cavalry, with the addi-
tional tactical role of being used as a mounted storming party, designed
to destroy enemy strongpoints and attack fortified settlements
encountered in the line of march. The new regulations stipulated that

The Siege of Colberg 1761, from
a contemporary print. The town
in the upper right was blockaded
by the Russian navy, and ringed
by a line of siege positions, all
about a mile from the town walls.
Secondary positions (lines of
contravellation) and regimental
campments are located in the
bottom left of the map.
(Collection of Dave Ryan,
Partizan Press)
they would form a reserve in battle, and would, at least in theory, charge home against the enemy.

In early 1759 General Petr Semenovich Rumyantsev (1698-1777), as commander of the cavalry, made squadron commanders personally responsible for the training and mounting of their men, and forced the adoption of the 1756 cavalry guidelines. This paid dividends in the summer battles of Paltzig and Kunersdorf (1759); the Russian cavalry formations defeated their Prussian counterparts.

Although they were trained in the new tactics, little was expected of the hussar regiments, and their main tactical role was basically to act in a slightly more reliable manner than the Cossack host accompanying the army.

**Employment**

When the Russian army marched into East Prussia in 1757, it included 7,000 cavalrymen and 16,000 Cossacks. The majority of the Cossacks took no part in the Battle of Gross-Jagersdorf (1757), but small cavalry brigades occupied the flanks of the main army. Although no offensive cavalry action was taken, the 4,000 cavalry on the left flank (part of General Sibilsky’s advance guard) supported the infantrymen as they repulsed a Prussian mounted attack, after a Cossack force had feigned a retreat to draw the enemy onto the waiting line of Russian musketeers.

A screen of 3,000 Russian cavalry on the right flank was easily swept away by a determined Prussian charge largely due to try to stand and fire at a charging enemy. This was hardly a glorious start to the war for the cavalry arm.
In the following year, at the Battle of Zorndorf (1758), the Russian horsemen showed that the situation had improved. Advances by Prussian infantry first on the Russian right then the left flank were dispersed by two Russian cavalry charges, each involving between 20 and 24 squadrons. Both were then routed by a countercharge by Prussian heavy cavalry, but not before heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy foot.

By 1759 the situation had improved still further, and Rumiantsev's improvements were making themselves felt. At the Battle of Paltzig, Cossacks and hussar regiments hung around on the army flanks, threatening to envelop any flanking attack on the main Russian line. Brigades of two to three regiments of cuirassiers and horse grenadiers stationed behind the main battle line were used as an effective mobile reserve, breaking up successive Prussian infantry and cavalry attacks, albeit after the latter had been disrupted by Russian artillery fire and musketry.

The next month, at the Battle of Kunersdorf, the Russian army, supported by an Austrian division, inflicted a crushing defeat on Frederick the Great. The climax of the battle came when, deciding that his infantry was making no impression on the fortified Russian line, Frederick launched the bulk of his cavalry in a large flanking attack. As it deployed it came under heavy flanking artillery fire, and was then hit by a combined Austrian-Russian cavalry charge led by the Austrian general Loudon. The Prussian horse retreated, sweeping the remains of their own infantry along with them. Three regiments of Russian hussars and the Don and Chuguevski Cossacks pursued the enemy from the field, the Cossacks overwhelming the Prussian Life Cuirassiers in the process and almost capturing Frederick himself. The Russian cavalry arm had at last come of age.

Although the campaigns of 1760 and 1761 saw no full-scale battles, lesser conflicts included Russian cavalry and Cossacks raiding Berlin (1760), and dismounted Russian horse grenadiers assisting the Austrian storming of Schweidnitz (1761) and engaged in a mobile campaign against Prussian cavalry which threatened to cut off the Russian army besieging Colberg from its lines of supply (1761). When the Empress Catherine seized the throne, in 1762, she became supreme commander of a large, professional and veteran army, and its cavalry arm was no longer inferior to its European equivalents. It was at last a force which could be relied upon, at least in the regular cavalry units.

**COSSACKS**

**Organisation**

Although the Cossacks saw themselves as a military people and structured their society accordingly, by the mid-18th century agrarian social organisations and the Russian class system had made inroads into traditional Cossack society. Traditionally 'cossack' (kazak) referred to a collection of self-administering communities, located on Russia's southern and south-eastern borders, that formed a buffer zone between Russia and Turkey. Each Cossack group or 'host' was organised into a miniature army (voisko). Each voisko was administered by an assembly who appointed a leader (ataman) from their ranks. This selection had to
be approved by the Emperor or Empress before being officially ratified.

For both administrative and military purposes, the voisko was sub-divided into regiments (starshinii) led by a regimental commander (starshina). Although these were still for the most part elected Cossacks, increasingly Russian army officers were appointed to lead these units, particularly when serving with the main field army. Each starshina was based and recruited in a particular geographical area, and bore its name (eg Slobodskii, Azov, Bakhmut). Starshinii were in turn divided into squadrons (sotnias – meaning ‘hundreds’) of between 100 and 200 riders. Although foot cossacks were raised, these were used solely in the Ukraine to guard against Turkish raids. These sotnias were in turn subdivided into troops (kurens) of 25-50 men.

**Cossack Hosts during the Seven Years War**

**Little Russia** (Ukraine): Ten regiments, noted as the least effective of the Cossack hosts. They were described by contemporary observers as ‘spiritless’. Although responsive to the wishes of their Russian commanders, they were of limited military value.

**Zaporozhe** (Lower Dnieper River): Six regiments, formed from a bachelor society and regarded as some of the most ferocious Cossacks available, although resentment of Russian authority made them difficult to control. The regiments which participated in the war were considered largely unmanageable as a military body, preferring to plunder rather than assist the main army.

**Don** (Lower Don River): 22 regiments. They formed the mainstay of Cossack forces during the campaigns of the Seven Years War. Although the Cossacks themselves were well regarded, their leaders were seen as being of poor quality.

**Terek** or **Black Sea** (Crimea): Of an unknown number, they were largely involved in carrying on an irregular war with the Turks, although at least one combined regiment fought in the war against Prussia.

**Yaik** (Urals): Of an unknown number, they were fiercely independent of Russian authority. At least one combined regiment made its way to Poland and Germany to campaign in the latter stages of the Seven Years War.

Munnich attempted to organise Cossack units along more regular lines, but without much success. One regiment, the Chuguevski Cossacks, was raised during his campaigns against the Turks, from a combination of Cossacks and baptised Kalmuks, and was issued with red uniforms. Although more reliable than ‘irregular’ Cossack formations, these ‘regular’ Cossacks only amounted to 1,245 men, a fraction of the available Cossack body of over 70,000.
When ordered to report for service, Russian statutes laid down that each Cossack should furnish himself with a sabre, one or two pistols, ideally a musket, and a lightweight lance (12-15 feet long). On campaign he rode one horse and led another behind him, switching mounts regularly.

**Character and Employment**

A later British observer reported that they were ‘a cruel horde of plunderers, preying alike on friends and foes... never constrained by an inconvenient sense of moral obligations’. Other observers were more charitable, commenting on their fiercely independent nature.

The Cossack role on campaign was to act in support of the army, as scouts, foragers, harriers and ambushers, a screen through which enemy scouts could not penetrate. In performing this role they have been described as a ‘swarm’, which in theory covered a large area well in front and on the flanks of the main army when it was on the march. They were ill-suited to standing up to regular cavalry, but on the few occasions they were called upon to fight with the main army, they performed effectively. In these cases the role given to them was to serve as a pursuit force, saving the already spent dragoon and hussar formations from further combat. If a main enemy body was detected they would be ordered to shadow it, hopefully reporting its movements and denying it the chance to scout. More commonly, the Cossacks hindered both sides by plundering and razing the countryside in the area of operations. All 18th-century armies needed to forage to some extent, so it did allow Cossack parties to isolate and attack small enemy bodies and to pick off stragglers.

In some instances, the ability of Cossack formations to harass the enemy had unexpected results. During the Battle of Gross-Jagersdorf (1757) a Prussian cavalry charge against a body of Don Cossacks led to a pursuit in which the Cossacks drew the enemy cavalry upon a waiting line of Russian infantry and artillery.

One serious drawback of Cossack units on campaign was the lack of control over them. As they were not paid but were seen as performing a form of feudal service, they sought financial reward from the countryside, burning and looting, often without check. Within the relatively tight confines of eastern Prussia this could be kept in check, but when Cossack forces were operating in Poland and Prussia, it became more of a problem; they antagonised the local population and gave the Prussians a valuable propaganda weapon. It also reduced their ability to screen the army, as their formations disintegrated into small bands outside the effective control of their commanders.

In 1758, Prince Charles of Saxony observed: ‘They proceed a little way in front of the advanced guard, moving very sluggishly at that,
and they do not attempt to reconnoitre to the side of the route, which means that the army could well be exposed to an unexpected enemy attack on the march. They have no officer with the understanding or capacity to render reports detailing the position or strength of the enemy army...'. (Vorontsov Papers, 1860.)

This lack of discipline and control was partly to blame for the army being outmanoeuvred and surprised during the Zorndorf campaign (1758). During the raid on Berlin (1760), Major General Totleben kept a tight rein on his Cossacks, using them to frighten the Berliners into submission by threatening to unleash them. This was one of a number of occasions when the threat of Cossack depredation was used as a political or military tool by 18th-century Russian commanders.

Asiatic Cavalry

The Russian government supplemented its body of irregular horse by occasionally hiring non-Cossack horsemen from the eastern fringes of the Russian Empire. Kalmuks from the area around Astrakhan and Bashkirs from Siberia were employed during the campaigns against the Turks in the 1730s, and up to 2,000 Kalmuks and a similar number of other Asiatic horsemen took part in the opening campaigns of the Seven Years War. It was thought that their Asiatic appearance would instil fear into the German population of East Prussia. Their appearance was certainly unusual to Western eyes:

'They are of low stature, and are generally bow-legged, occasioned by their being so continually on horseback, or sitting with their legs below them. Their faces are broad and flat, with a flat nose and little black eyes, distant from each other like the Chinese. They are of an olive colour, and their faces full of wrinkles, with very little or no beard. They shave their heads, leaving only a tuft of hair on the crown.'

Although some may have been equipped with firearms, even as late as the early 19th century their principal weapon was the composite bow, and their archery was reputedly very effective.

CAVALRY UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT

During this period the Russian army displayed a singular uniformity in dressing, if not in equipping its troops. Unlike most other cavalry units in Europe, little or no attempt was made to distinguish one regiment from another; there were no distinctive cuff colours, piping or vest colours, and the only way to differentiate between regiments of the same troop type was by regimental badges and by the flags carried by the units. This was a policy which most likely followed the austere approach to
uniforms adopted by Peter the Great, where clothing and equipping a vast new army was considered more important than the need to tell units apart at a distance. The exception were the hussars, whose flamboyant uniforms were at odds with those of the remainder of the regular army.

**Cuirassiers**

The cut of the cuirassier coat was similar to that of the infantry regiments, horse grenadiers and dragoons; a standard pattern was set for the whole army. The coat was made from 6mm thick chamois leather, a material derived from the buff coats worn by heavy cavalrymen at the start of the century and before. The coat was lined with red cloth. Cuffs were slit at the outside and turned back, gauntlet fashion, then stitched in place at the inner edge. On the service coat, no cuff buttons were used. A 6cm wide fold-down collar, cuffs and turnbacks were lined in red, then edged with a white lace band.

Officers had an additional double band of gold piping on the collar and gold edging around the coat and vest instead of white and buff. The example studied by the author was secured down the front by metal hooks and eyes, which were largely invisible when the coat was worn.

Beneath the coat a collarless sleeved red cloth vest was worn, also secured by hooks and eyes. The vest was edged at the front and bottom by a 5cm wide buff leather reinforcing strip. On campaign it appears that the heavy coat was left with the regimental baggage, and only the vest was worn beneath the cuirass.

Breeches were of close-fitting buff coloured cloth, secured below the knee by two iron buttons. Although officers were issued with red breeches, it appears that on campaign they wore the same pattern as their men. White woollen stockings covered the base of the breeches, and were secured by a black leather gaiter. The cuirassier wore a type of riding boot, of German style, which was issued to all Russian cavalrymen except hussars. It extended above the knee, with a fake turn-down top stitched on and stepped at the back. All boots were black leather and square toed. For dismounted duties shoes were issued to all cavalrymen.

Unlike a number of armies, there were no campaign overalls, but a blue garrison coat, similar to that worn by dragoons, was worn when not on active duty. A light blue collared cape with a red collar and lining was also issued. It extended below the knee and was secured around the neck by a hook and eye. As with the infantry and dragoons, a black cloth stock was worn around the neck, serving as a protection against chaffing from the breastplate riding up and possibly from sword cuts.

The headgear provided was of the same pattern of black felt tricorne issued to the rest of the army.
except those of cuirassiers were fitted with an iron secret, stitched to the inside of the tricorne through a series of eight holes. The tricorne itself was decorated with a 5cm wide gold trim and a white bow secured by a copper button. For officers it had additional gold tassels hanging from the corners. Plain chamois leather gloves were worn by all ranks when in action. Officers also wore a black sash under the cuirass with three thin gold horizontal stripes as a further means of identification.

Equipment consisted of a cuirassier pattern broadsword with a black leather scabbard and copper grip and fittings. It was attached to a buff leather swordbelt slung over the right shoulder and worn over the coat and cuirass. Over the opposite shoulder a carbine sling was sometimes worn, so that the carbine, when attached to the spring hook, hung from the right hip. When mounted, carbines were carried muzzle down with the muzzle fitting into a small leather cup just forward of the right-hand pistol. The cup was secured to the saddle by a black leather strap.

Although regulation pistols of the 1745 pattern were carried by all regular cavalrymen throughout the war, no such uniformity appears to have existed for carbines. Examples in the Historic Museum in Moscow average 128cm in length, with an 18mm bore. It appears that shortened muskets in the dragoon fashion were also carried, as were musketoons, which were issued in small numbers and at random to each regiment in 1758. Ammunition was carried in special pouches fitted to the inside of the pistol holster flaps, each side carrying 12 carbine, 12 pistol rounds and an assortment of gun tools.

The cuirass was secured by buff-leather crossstraps covered with iron plates, and extended from lugs on the chest over the back and then was tied around the front of the breastplate by means of a strap. The imperial cypher was carried on the front of the breastplate in copper relief. Those issued to officers differed by having a gold variation of the front cypher plate, a red lining extending as a frill beyond the arms and neck of the breastplate and a white lace trim covering the lining rivets around the edge of the cuirass.

Other equipment consisted (in theory) of an ovoid water bottle covered in calf leather, horse blankets, a provision bag, a forage sack and a mantle sack. A British observer in 1757 records that all Russian cavalrymen lacked even these basic items, and were reduced to looting what they could from the enemy. The situation appears to have been remedied the following year, when supplies of cavalry equipment reached the army from the forward depot at Posen.

Horse furniture consisted of a red cloth shabraque and red holster covers, both undecorated. Those of officers bore a gold trim and had the imperial monogram in the rear corners of the shabraque. Horse blankets varied in colour, with grey as standard. The cape was carried rolled at the back of the black leather saddle.
1: Garde à Cheval Chevalier
2: Garde à Cheval Officer
3: Horse Grenadier
1: Cuirassier Officer
2: Cuirassier
3: Dragoon, summer campaign dress
1: Dragoon Officer
2: Dragoon
3: Dragoon trumpeter
1: Hussar, Serbski regiment
2: Hussar, Grouzinski regiment
3: Hussar, Venguerski regiment
1: Volga Cossack
2: Don Cossack
3: Kalmuk
1: Artillery Officer
2: Artilleryman
3: Artillery bombardier
1. Carassier standard, Novotrotzki regiment
2. Regimental dragon standard, Arkhangelskoevodskii regiment
3. Company dragon standard, Tobolski regiment
1. White Guard Chasseur standard
2. Colour Guard à Cheval regiment
3. Regimental horse grenadier standard
St. Petersburg regiment
Dragoons and Horse Grenadiers

Dragoons wore the same basic pattern of uniform as the cuirassiers, or for that matter the infantry. Their coat was cornflower blue, with the lining, cuffs, turnbacks and button-hole slits all in red. It was secured at the front by eight plain copper buttons. Cuffs were folded back and secured by three copper buttons on each sleeve. The turnbacks were held together by a hook and eye fastening, and there was a false button on either side of the coat.

Officers always wore their coats without turnbacks, and had side pockets with three buttons securing the flaps. Their buttons were gold plated rather than copper.

A long-sleeved vest of buff coloured cloth was worn, with a cornflower blue small turnover collar and cuffs. The turnback on the cuffs was pinned close in to the sleeve by three copper buttons. The vest was secured down the front using hooks and eyes (or eight buttons for officers). As with the coats, the vest had no pockets, except for officers, where the pockets were fastened in the same manner as their coat pockets.

Breeches were of the same close-fitting chamois leather pattern as was issued to the cuirassiers, as were the boots, stock, stockings and cape. Dragoon gauntlets were of chamois leather with an upper reinforcing band of red leather, while officers wore shorter, non-reinforced gauntlets. The tricorne had a white trim and a white bow secured by a copper button. Tricornes of dragoon officers had a gold trim, with black and gold tassels suspended from the corners.

Equipment issued to dragoons differed markedly from that of the cuirassiers. The sword belt was worn around the waist infantry-style, and was made of buff leather with iron fittings. An infantry style cartridge box was slung over the right shoulder, secured in place by a shoulder strap 5cm wide and then fastened by a copper button. There was a central imperial cypher in copper on the front flap of the black leather box. A carbine sling fitted over the left shoulder of the dragoon, of the same pattern as that issued to cuirassiers. In dragoon regiments shortened versions of the standard infantry muskets were issued in place of carbines. This reflects the dismounted role for which Russian dragoons were still actively trained. In addition to the rail to fit the carbine sling, dragoon muskets were fitted with a black leather musket strap.
The dragoon sword was of a similar pattern to the broadsword issued to cuirassiers, with an eagle head pommel, a half basket guard and an elongated quillon. Officers carried an infantry pattern shortsword. In addition to the sacks and baggage carried on cuirassier horses, dragoons were issued with a 90cm long picket post fitted with an iron ring and a field kettle. Every third man also carried an entrenching tool. Horse furniture was identical to that of cuirassiers, with the exception that both the shabraque and the pistol cover were blue, while those of horse grenadiers were yellow.

Horse grenadiers wore the same uniform and carried the same equipment as dragoons, with the exception of grenade pouches and their headgear, which was an infantry-style grenadier’s mitre instead of a tricorn. It had a copper plate on its front bearing the regimental crest surrounded by four flaming grenades. Tricorneres, as worn by the dragoons, were issued in 1760. Instead of a cartridge box, horse grenadiers were issued with grenade boxes of black leather, with a copper frontplate that bore the regimental crest (or sometimes the imperial eagle) surrounded by flaming grenades. A small rectangular waistbelt cartridge pouch was fitted to the belt and worn over the belt buckle, bearing a similar regimental crest.

**Hussars**

Hussars wore the most colourful uniforms in the army, with each regiment identified by distinctive colours. All regiments shared certain characteristics of dress, including a cloth jacket or dolman with either tin or copper buttons. A small upright collar was bordered in the regimental lace colour. The front of the dolman was decorated with ‘Hungarian’ frogging (double loops on either side of the centre), with...
a central row of eight buttons. A lace chevron decorated each sleeve. A black stock was also worn around the neck.

The dolman was worn with a black fur-edged, braided pelisse which could be worn as a jacket or slung over the shoulder and secured by cord straps. Officers wore versions of these with grey fur trim and gold lacing. Trousers were also Hungarian in style, with a large loop decoration on each leg, although plain leather breeches were also worn on campaign.

Boots were black for enlisted men and yellow for officers, and Hungarian in style. The waist-sash had contrasting coloured blocks in set regimental colours. Two types of headgear were worn: either a fur busby with hanging cords and tassels and topped by a hanging cloth bag, or a mirliton (a tapering conical cap with an extended upturned brim).

Equipment included a sabretache in regimental colours and bearing the imperial cypher. It was suspended from the left hip by black leather straps, while a swordbelt in either black or buff leather was hung under the pelisse. Sword patterns appear to have varied, but examples in the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Russian Hussar Uniforms during the Seven Years War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serbski Hussar Regiment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolman Blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelisse Blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lace Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fur Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breeches Blue, black lace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headgear Black busby, blue bag, cords and tassels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sash Black and blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabretache Blue, with black border and monogram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabraque Blue, with black zig-zag border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moldavski and Novoserbski Hussar Regiments</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolman Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelisse Blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lace Blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fur Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breeches Red, blue lace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headgear Black busby, red bag, cords and tassels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sash Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabretache Blue, with red border and monogram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabraque Black, with yellow zig-zag border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Venguerski Hussar Regiment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolman Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelisse Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lace Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fur Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breeches Red, black lace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headgear Black busby, with black cords and tassels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sash Black and red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabretache Red, with black border and monogram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabraque Red, with black zig-zag border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grouzinski Hussar Regiment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolman Yellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelisse Yellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lace Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fur Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breeches Red, yellow lace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headgear Black busby, red bag, cords and tassels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sash Yellow and red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slobodski Hussar Regiment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolman Blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelisse White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lace White on dolman, blue on pelisse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fur Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breeches Blue, white lace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headgear White mirliton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sash Blue and white</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabretache White, with blue border and monogram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabraque White, with blue zig-zag border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Makedonski Hussar Regiment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolman Light blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelisse Light blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lace Yellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fur Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breeches Red, yellow lace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headgear Red mirliton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sash Light blue and red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabretache Light blue, with red border and monogram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabraque Light blue, with red zig-zag border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slavianserbski Hussar Regiment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolman Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelisse Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lace Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fur Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breeches Red, black lace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headgear Black busby, red bag, cords and tassels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sash Green and red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabretache Green, with black border and monogram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabraque Green, with black zig-zag border</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Bolgarski and Jolty Hussar Regiment                |
| Dolman Yellow                                      |
| Pelisse Yellow                                     |
| Lace Black                                         |
| Fur Black                                          |
| Breeches Red, blue lace                            |
| Headgear Black busby, red bag, cords and tassels   |
| Sash Green and red                                 |
| Sabretache Green, with black border and monogram   |
| Shabraque Green, with black zig-zag border         |
Kremlin armoury include sabres in the Hungarian style, with curved blades and simple stirrup hilts. Many extant swords and scabbards appear to be decorated with cabalistic symbols. Blade lengths average 80cm. All fittings are copper, with iron scabbard fittings. Pistols were worn in saddle holsters or tucked into belts, and were of the standard 1735 model. Horses carried Hungarian-style shabraques with slightly rounded fronts and pointed rear edges.

CAVALRY STANDARDS

Garde à Cheval
The premier cavalry regiment in the army was presented with five standards, one white (colonel’s standard) and four with red fields. (See Plate H for details.) One was carried by each of the five squadrons of the regiment, with the first squadron bearing the colonel’s standard.

Cuirassier Regiments
The first squadron of each regiment carried a white standard; the remaining companies were issued with a coloured version. All the standards of the cuirassier regiments were of the same design and measured 60cm by 70cm. The exception was in the central cartouche carried on the breast of the Imperial eagle. Each regiment bore its own emblem (see MAA 297) and the same emblem was used for infantry and cavalry regiments who shared the same name. The only two exceptions (cavalry regiments without infantry counterparts) were the Novotroitzki regiment and the Leib regiment. The former is illustrated in Plate G; the latter emblem was a gold crown over green laurels on a red field. The oval area inside the laurel wreath was also gold.

The field colours of the standards for the regiments were:

Green Leib Regiment, Kazanski, Novotroitzki
Blue P Fedorovitch
Light Blue 3rd Cuirassiers
Red Kievski

Dragoon Regiments
Dragoon standards resembled those issued to infantry, although they were slightly smaller, measuring 150cm by 150cm. (After all, the Petrine doctrine was essentially to use them as pure dragoons, and this role persisted in Russia long after the rest of Europe came to regard them as cavalrmen.) The white (colonel’s) standard bore an Imperial eagle design similar to that of the infantry standard, and the remaining four coloured standards followed the infantry style by displaying the regimental crest. These patterns are illustrated in Plate G. The white standard also carried the regimental crest in a cartouche within the breast of the imperial eagle. Not all these regimental crests were listed in MAA 297, and the ones relating to purely cavalry regiments are listed in the opposite table, along with those relating to cuirassier and horse grenadier regiments. The field colour of the coloured standards varied by regiment.
Green Arkhanguelogorodski, Vladmirski, Ingermanlandski, Permski, Revelski, Sibirski, Tobolski and Troitzki
Blue Volgodski, Viatski, Moskovski and Tverski
Light Blue Loutzski and Niijegorodski
Red Azovski, Olonetzski and Lambourgski
Orange Novgorodski and Pskovski
Yellow Rostovski

Horse Grenadier Regiments

Although there has been some debate as to whether these regiments were issued with standards, recent evidence from Russian museums indicates that they were. They followed the pattern for dragoon regiments: the standards resembled those of the infantry. One white standard and four coloured were issued to each regiment. The field colours of the coloured standards were as follows:

Green Kargopolski, St Peterbourgski
Blue Riazanski
Light Blue Narvski
Red Astrakhanski
Yellow Rizhski (Riga)

It appears that no standards were issued to Hussar regiments or to Cossacks. The latter may have carried some informal standard, as occurred during the Petrine period, but nothing more than circumstantial evidence supports this.

Regimental Crests of Cavalry Regiments with No Infantry Namesakes

The (g) and (s) symbols refer to whether the cartouche holding the crest is gold or silver.

Olonetzki (s)
A cross of black chain-shot is surmounted by a white cloud. A mailed arm extends from the cloud holding a blue shield. The field is yellow.

Revelski (s)
Three blue lions wearing golden crowns on a yellow field. The crest is surmounted by a child wearing a white robe and a golden crown.

Tverski (g)
A silver throne surmounted by a gold crown. Green cushion on seat. Red field.

Lambourgski (g)
A white eagle on a white rock. Golden sun set in a blue sky.

Kargopolski (g)
A white lamb on top of a natural coloured funeral pyre. The sky is blue and the ground green.

Rizhski (g)
A red gateway flanked by two turrets with white conical roofs. This is flanked by a pair of black eagles. The gate is surmounted by a gold cross, crown and crossed keys. The sky is blue and the ground green.
ARTILLERY

Developed for Tsar Peter I’s new-modelled army in 1700, the artillery arm of the Russian army held a pre-eminent position in the armed forces, from its inception until the present day. Its creator as a military force was James Bruce, a Scotsman who produced a battle-winning tool from scratch. It was the Russian artillery that proved the decisive element at the Battle of Poltava (1709) and secured the safety of Russia from foreign invasion, and Peter the Great was fully supportive of its prestige and professionalism. Under the reforms of the Baron Munnich, a greater emphasis was placed on the use of regimental guns (3-pdr.s) and on developing professional skills. Engineers were attached to artillerymen in the same administrative structure, and both were the responsibility of the master general of the ordnance. At the start of the Seven Years War, that post was held by Petr Shuvalov.

Organisation

When the Russian army took the field against Prussia at the start of the Seven Years War, it contained a substantial complement of artillery and engineers:

- 2 artillery regiments (1 Field artillery; 1 Regimental artillery)
- 1 observation corps field artillery train
- 1 ‘secret’ howitzer corps
- 3 siege (fortress) artillery trains
- 1 engineer regiment
- 1 pontoon company

Many of these formations were administrative rather than practical military formations. On campaign they were grouped under the control of the general of the ordnance accompanying the main field army, and he would deploy them as he saw fit. The exceptions to this were the siege...
trains and the howitzer corps, which could only be used with Shuvalov’s direct authorisation. Although the observation corps train was part of his ‘private’ army, he relinquished control of it to the commanding general of the army rather than to his subordinate, the general of the ordnance creating a rather confusing and divisive system of higher control, and the system only really worked well following the army reforms of 1760.

The Artillery Regiments

Following Shuvalov’s reforms of 1757, the Russian army had two regiments of artillery, each with two battalions. The first was designed to provide massed batteries in action, and contained 208 medium and light guns. The second provided regimental artillery, and fielded 456 3-pdr. guns and coehorn light mortars. Both were administrative rather than military formations. The next administrative level of artillery unit was the company, and each regiment contained two of bombardiers and eight of cannoneers. A cannoneer company consisted of 136 men, including three officers headed by a captain, a gun commander (senior NCO), two sergeants, 40 cannoneers and 80 fusiliers. The bombardier company was larger, with 212 men. It had the same number of officers, 45 bombardiers and 145 getlangers (labourers or matrosses). Four regimental guns were attached to individual regiments, with a mix of bombardiers and cannoneers from different companies, the cannoneers working the guns and the bombardiers the mortars. The mortars were soon dropped from active service and as ‘secret’ howitzers began to replace 3-pdr.s, the former became the responsibility of bombardiers and cannoneers alike. A third field artillery regiment was created during the winter of 1759-60.

The Observation Corps Field Artillery Train

This was organised by Shuvalov to support his corps of observation in Livonia, and contained regimental artillery, with an extra stiffening of mortars (24 3-pdr.s, and 384 coehorn mortars). By 1758 the mortars had been abandoned and the guns replaced by ‘secret’ howitzers. A four-gun battery was attached to each regiment, with the remaining four guns kept in a replacement pool. The train was disbanded during the winter of 1759-60.

The ‘Secret’ Howitzer Corps

Crewed by a corps of bombardiers, this unit contained five companies, each with 14 Shuvalov ‘secret’ howitzers. After the 1758 campaign the howitzers were augmented by seven unicorns per company, and on the field they operated in three gun batteries, each containing two howitzers and one unicorn. Each company contained four officers, 28 bombardiers, 112 getlangers, 14 cannoneers and 164 fusiliers. The unit was renamed the Bombardier Corps during the winter of 1758-9, and formed the basis of the 3rd regiment of artillery in 1759-60.
The Siege (Fortress) Artillery Trains

Organised into three trains (or parks), those of St Petersburg, Kiev and Belgorod, they took no part in the war apart from a small park of 16-18- and 24-pdr.s. and 57 mortars, which remained in Konigsberg throughout, due to lack of horses. The total of the three trains amounted to 120 heavy guns and 340 assorted mortars. Because it remained uninvolved, siege warfare such as the attacks on the fortresses of Kutzrin and Colberg was conducted by the field artillery regiments, whose guns were not really suited to the task.

The Engineer Regiment

Commanded by a colonel of engineers, the regiment was divided into three companies, one each of miners, pioneers and skilled labourers. Each company contained around 250 specialist engineers, supported by 50 officers, NCOs, wagoneers and ancillary staff. Their chief responsibility was to provide field fortifications for the main army. This involved the engineer company being ‘lent’ the assistance of infantrymen as unskilled labourers. In effect, they formed the trained core who supervised the main army when field engineering was required. As such it was accompanied by a large logistical tail, and in an inventory of 1759 the regiment was recorded as holding over 6,000 shovels and 5,000 pick-axes.

The Pontoon Company

Logic dictates that this formation should have been controlled by the commander of the engineer regiment. Instead, it formed an independent body, drawing its manpower from the Russian navy. As most of the rivers in Poland and Western Russia run north-south, it was seen as a vital component of the army, and could supply 90 pontoons, with all the timber required for bridging operations. The naval lieutenant in charge commanded 56 men, including 30 sailors and a collection of boatswains (for carpentry) and armourers (for blacksmithing). Unlike the engineering company, it was completely self-contained, performing its duties without outside assistance. Collapsible canvas pontoons replaced the wooden pontoons in 1759, greatly improving the mobility of the unit.

Equipment

The regular artillery pieces – 3-pdr. regimental guns, 6-pdr.s., 8-pdr.s. and 12-pdr.s. – were all similar to other weapons of the time. There was no set pattern for the type of barrel, and a mixture of the older designs of the master founder Wilhelm de Hennin and the more modern designs of Mikhail Danilov and Petr Shuvalov were found in the field. Compared to western European armies, the pieces were more heavily reinforced, allowing more powerful charges to be used but hindering mobility. Similarly no set pattern existed for carriage design: the master general of the ordnance stipulated parameters and then allowed individual contractors or even regimental commanders to produce carriages within them. The four sizes of artillery pieces were issued with limbers supplied by the master general’s department, and pulled by two, seven, nine and 15 horses respectively. All barrels were bronze, and the carriages were painted with a red lead paint (producing a brick red colour), with all metal fitted painted black. Each piece was accompanied by two small ammunition wagons carrying 120 rounds of ball and 30 rounds of canister.
The ‘Secret’ Howitzer

Unlike the artillery arm of other European nations, the Russians included a variety of unusual or experimental guns in their field artillery park. The ‘secret’ howitzer designed by Shuvalov had an oval rather than a round bore.

‘Since the piece scattered its small shot widely, it was called the ‘secret’ howitzer, and nobody was allowed to see the muzzle, which was shielded by a copper lid, which in turn was fastened by a lock.’ (Danilov, 1842.)

The 18-calibre long barrel was designed to act like a shotgun, spraying a flat swathe of canister rounds parallel to the ground. Loading was a slower process than for normal guns, and a number were lost at Zorndorf (1758) when they were charged by cavalry between discharges. Although the main projectile was the tin canister containing 168 musket balls, canisters containing 48 larger lead balls were provided for firing at targets of between 300 and 600 yards range. Split shot, shells and starshells were also provided, producing what must have been regarded as a spectacular, but ultimately faulty weapon and a logistical headache. Despite problems, the effect could be devastating, and a Prussian officer reported that they could sweep away a whole platoon with a single round. These howitzers were used by the howitzer corps and the corps of observation, and in 1759, 181 pieces replaced the more reliable 3-pdr. of the regimental artillery. By the following year it was decided that conventional artillery was better suited in the regimental role, and the howitzers were re-issued to the field artillery batteries.

The Unicorn

The Unicorn (Odnorog) was designed by Danilov, with Shuvalov’s blessing. This stubby weapon (10 calibres long) had a conical breech and was a cross between a cannon, a howitzer and a mortar. Sizes were measured by the Russian pound (pud), where one pud equals 40 pounds. The first to see service in 1758 was the $\frac{1}{8}$ pud (8-pdr.), later followed by $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, 1 and 2 pud versions. Although it carried the same range of canister shot as the ‘secret’ howitzer, it was capable of firing ball, and was quicker to load. It was also light and easy to manoeuvre, although problems created by the conical chamber and therefore the strength of the required powder charge reduced the velocity of its shot and therefore its effectiveness.

The unicorns of $\frac{1}{8}$ pud and under were issued to the regimental artillery; the remainder were attached to the ‘secret’ howitzer corps until it was disbanded. Further light unicorns formed four-gun horse artillery batteries from 1758, one attached to each cavalry brigade. By 1759 the larger unicorns coming into service had begun to replace the 6-pdr. guns of the field artillery (1st regiment). Rather than removing these from service completely, many appear to have become the responsibility of the 2nd regiment, being used as regimental pieces. A further light unicorn was assigned to each regimental artillery battery of the field army.

The Mortar

Mortars were issued in a variety of sizes, from the baby coehorn mortar (6-pdr.) used to augment regimental firepower to 2, 5 and 9 pud mortars used by the siege trains. In addition, Bliznyatki (four baby mortars grouped on a single bed) were issued to the army in 1757, but were dis-
A 24-pdr artillery piece, one of the mainstays of the Russian siege train. Also shown are its associated tools (rammer, sponge and worm) and associated shot. (Collection of Fort Nelson)

carded with the rest of the mortars by 1758. It appears that at least some small mortars were retained and mounted on each side of regimental field carriages as a form of extra firepower. It is unclear whether this was the fate of all the coehorn mortars or whether it was a temporary field modification.

**Employment**

The superiority of the Russian artillery arm over their Prussian counterparts was first demonstrated during the battle of Gross-Jagersdorf (1757), where the use of a rapidly deployed battery of field guns commanded by a Major Tyutchev repulsed fierce attacks by Prussian cavalry and infantry. This was the kind of close-quarter fighting for which the ‘secret’ howitzer had been designed, and it performed well. However, the next year at Zorndorf unsupported field guns were overrun and captured.

Both the dedication of the gunners who fought on until cut down and the skill of Russian artillery commanders such as Borozdin (and later Tolstoi and Glebov) were commented on by Prussian observers. The losses at Zorndorf eventually benefited the Russian artillery arm, since it forced Shuvalov to reconsider the rather haphazard organisation and logistical support.

Although the regimental structure was maintained for administrative purposes, the field artillery was reorganised into four administrative brigades (replacing the five companies), then into operational batteries of varying sizes. Batteries of up to 24 guns were attached to the front battle line of the army, with smaller nine-gun batteries supporting the second line. Further batteries formed a reserve artillery park.

From 1760 Major-General Glebov commanded the field artillery and Colonel Tyutchev (the hero of Gross-Jagersdorf) the regimental pieces. As manpower was in short supply, the corps of observation was disbanded, and the soldiers were re-assigned as artillerymen, meaning the Russian artillery no longer had to rely on spare infantrymen to operate its guns. During the winter of 1759-60 the arm was reorganised into
three regiments, having absorbed the bombardier corps as well as the corps of observation. All were now controlled in the field by the major-general of artillery.

The mass of ammunition wagons cluttering the battlefield during the early campaigns of the war was replaced by a system where only one wagon supported each gun; the remainder formed a mobile supply depot well behind the guns, and ammunition was brought forward when required.

In 1760 Glebov issued new rules of engagement, designed to provide the army with the most effective artillery support possible. Large pieces opened up a cannonade at 1,500 yards, and were joined by howitzers, unicorns and regimental guns at 1,000 yards. At 500 yards all guns switched to canister. The small-ball canister used by howitzers and unicorns was reserved until the enemy were at point blank range. In attack the howitzers and unicorns were to fire shells over the heads of the advancing Russian troops, taking advantage of their capability of indirect fire.

By the start of the campaigning season of 1760, the Russian army boasted a dedicated, powerful and professional artillery arm, equipped with 218 cannon, 168 howitzers and 224 unicorns in the field artillery units, and 175 cannon and 21 unicorns assigned to the regimental artillery. This powerful artillery component would remain a cherished feature of the Russian army, giving them artillery support far beyond that expected by other European armies until the present day.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

This is only a selection of the works which cover aspects of the Russian army of the Seven Years War. Unfortunately, little is available in English.

Bairov, A., Russkaya Armiya v Tsarstvovanie Imperatritsy Anny Ioannovnyi, 2 vols (St Petersburg, 1906)
Bruce, P.H., Memoirs of Peter Henry Bruce, Esq. (London, 1782)
Cook, J., Voyages and Travels through the Russian Empire, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1770)
Danilov, M.V., Zapiski Artillerii Maiora Mikhaila Vasilevicha Danilova (Moscow, 1842, reprinted from 1771)
Duffy, C.D., Russia’s Military Way to the West (London, 1981)
Korobkov, N., Semiletneya Voina (1756-1762gg) (Moscow, 1940)
Maslovskii, D.F., Der Siebenjährige Krieg nach Russischer Darstellung, 3 vols (Berlin, 1888-93)
Mediger, W., Moskauer Weg nach Europa (Brunswick, 1952)
Mollo, J., Uniforms of the Seven Years War (Poole, 1977)
Mollo, J., Uniforms of the Imperial Russian Army (Poole, 1979)
Pengel, R.D. & Hurt, G.R., Russian Uniforms and Flags of the Seven Years War, 2 vols (Birmingham, 1976-80)
Rambaud, A., Russes et Prussiens. Guerre de Sept Ans (Paris, 1895)
Stein, F., Geschichte des Russischen Heeres (Hannover, 1885)
Viskovatov, A.V., Peremeny v Obmundirovanii i Voornzhenii Voisk Rossiskoi Imperatorskoi Armii, 30 vols (St Petersburg, 1844-56)
Zweguintzow, W., L’Armee Russe (Paris, 1967)
Arkhiiv Knyazya Vorontsova (Vorontsov Family Papers) (Moscow, 1870-95)
PLATE A
A1: Garde à Cheval Chevalier The Garde à Cheval were less of a military unit than a palace guard, used for ceremonial duties. Their parade dress was their service uniform. All chevaliers wore cuirasses when on duty, although an undress cornflower blue coat was also provided (not illustrated). Musicians wore a red version of the service uniform without the cuirass, and decorated with gold-edged swallow nests and chevrons on the sleeves. Side drummers also wore red cloth aprons to protect their uniform.
A2: Garde à Cheval Officer Although all members of the Garde à Cheval held commissions, regimental officers wore similar uniforms to the men but with gold instead of yellow trim. A gala coat was also issued for certain events of red cloth with blue collar, cuffs and turnbacks and decorated with gold lace. When units of the Leib Company (a guard foot unit) were mounted for special occasions, they wore a similar uniform, but the cuirass was replaced by a red tabard bearing an embroidered relief Imperial eagle inside a star, in black and gold.
A3: Horse Grenadier Horse grenadiers wore a similar uniform to dragoons, with the exception of their headgear. The tricorne was replaced by a grenadiers mitre, resembling those issued to foot grenadiers, and bearing the regimental crest on the frontplate. In 1760 the mitre was replaced with a tricorne similar to those issued to cuirassiers, complete with an internal metal secret. Note the addition of a grenade box, fuze holder and waistbelt cartridge box to the standard dragoon equipment.

PLATE B
B1: Cuirassier Officer Cuirassier officers were distinguished from their men by a number of features. These included gold piping on their collars, gold tassels on their tricorner, gold lace on their vest and coat and red breeches instead of buff (although buff breeches appear to have been worn on campaign). As with all other officers, a sash was worn, in this case underneath the cuirass. In addition, their cuirass was more highly decorated than those of their men, with red velvet padding and white lacing covering the rivet holes.
B2: Cuirassier The chamois leather coat issued to cuirassiers harked back to the days of buff coats, and was secured using hooks and eyes. The cuirass was a simpler version of that issued to cuirassier officers, and horse trappings lacked the officers gold trim and Imperial monograms found on the rear of the shabraque and on their holster covers. Cuirassiers were issued with a straight broadsword, and although also issued with carbines, this was seen as their main offensive weapon.

BELOW A modification employed during the winter occupation of East Prussia in 1757/8 was the placing of artillery pieces onto sleds, in this case the gun being a 3-pdr. Conventional harnesses and traces for horses were modified to fit the new arrangement. (Collection of Fort Nelson)
B3: Dragoon, summer campaign dress. Although the uniform worn by C3, represents the standard dress of the dragoon, during the summer campaigns of the Seven Years War, it was common for both infantry and cavalry to leave their heavy coats with the regiments baggage wagons. Therefore this figure more correctly represents the dress of the Russian cuirassier at Zorndorf and Kunersdorf than the dragoon in full uniform shown in the next plate.

PLATE C
C1: Dragoon Officer. These, the standard cavalry type in the Russian army, were issued with a uniform modelled exactly along infantry lines. This was the case for officers as much as for men. Officers wore their coats without turnbacks, with the officer's sash worn over the waistcoat and beneath the coat.

ABOVE Cross-section of a parapet, taken from a mid-18th century artillery manual. This is the kind of field fortification which was used by the Russian army in most of its engagements during the Seven Years War. (Author's collection)

As the coat was plain, the distinctive markings indicating officer status were limited to the tricorne, coat pockets and waistcoat. An infantry-style smallsword was worn suspended from a waistbelt and associated hangers.

C2: Dragoon. This figure illustrates the uniform worn by enlisted men. The uniforms of non-commissioned officers were distinguished by the addition of gold lace around the tricorne, and a single gold stripe on the collar edge. Rank stripes were also worn on the cuffs; one stripe for non-commissioned standard bearers, two for quartermasters and corporals and three for sergeants. The distinguishing marks for NCOs of other cavalry types were the same.

C3: Dragoon trumpeter. Each Dragoon regiment on paper contained 34 musicians, including 23 drummers. Dress distinctions included shoulder swallows and chevrons, and those attached to horse grenadier units also wore the grenadier's mitre. The use of drums was another reflection of the traditional view of dragoon regiments as mounted infantry. Drums were cream with oblique red and blue stripes on the rim and carried a copper regimental crest. Trumpeters, such as the figure shown here, were directly attached to the regimental commander where they were used to audibly transmit his orders.

PLATE D
D1: Hussar, Serbski regiment. The premier hussar regiment in the army, the Serbski regiment served in most of the major engagements of the Seven Years War. Each hussar regiment was distinguished by the colour of breeches, pelisse and dolman, as well as by waist sash. The pelisse was either worn or draped over the shoulder and secured around the neck. This latter style would have been more common during the summer campaigns of 1757-61.

D2: Hussar, Grouziniski regiment. Horse furniture for hussars differed from those of other cavalry units in that the hussar shabraque was in the Hungarian style, meaning it was larger and tapered to a point at the rear. The uniform colours of each regiment were reflected in the colours of the shabraques. Note the sabre, a standard pattern issued to
husser regiments in 1752, and modelled on those issued to husssars in the Austrian army. Unlike the husssars in other armies, Russian husssars were not issued with carbines and had to rely on their issued pistols and sabre when in action.

D3: Hussar, Venguerski regiment The standard husssar uniform shown here was modified for officers, NCOs and musicians. Fur on officers uniforms was grey rather than black, all lacing was in gold and yellow boots replaced the black versions worn by the other ranks. NCOs were distinguished by the addition of a gold collar border and gold rank chevrons on the sleeve of the dolman. The uniforms of musicians were embellished by swallow nests and sleeve chevrons in the regimental facing colour.

PLATE E
E1: Volga Cossack Apart from the Chuguevski Cossacks, who were issued with red uniforms, no official dress was

BElOW The regimental standard of the Artillery Regiments. The same pattern was used by all regiments. White damask field, a brown eagle, a bronze cannon with red carriage, green ground and a gold scroll. (After Pengel and Hurt)

issued to cossack units. A number of sotnia commanders issued their men with their own uniforms, although no detailed record of these were kept. This figure represents one of these semi-uniformed cossacks, wearing a kaffan cut in the traditional cossack style but coloured and cut in the same manner as those issued to the Chuguevski unit. The busby was the first piece of uniform issued to cossack irregulars during the reign of Catherine the Great.

E2: Don Cossack This figure represents the typical dress of a cossack during the Seven Years War, and wears a traditional kaffan. Common kaffan colours appear to have been brown, tan, cream, dark blue and grey. Each cossack was responsible for reporting for service with his own weapons, which usually included a light lance, sword, dagger, pistols and a musket. Oriental and Turkish influences are readily apparent in traditional cossack weapons, and serious attempts to standardise armament post-dated the Seven Years War.

E3: Kalmuk These asistic irregular horsemen served as auxiliaries in the Russian army during the war, and their unusual appearance was noted by western observers. This figure wears an embroidered silk tunic, a silk, fur-trimmed
cap and pointed Turkish boots. The appearance of Kalmuks remained the same throughout the 18th century, as did their preferred armament. His bow, arrows, quiver and sword are based on examples held in the Russian Museum, St Petersburg.

**PLATE F**

**F1: Artillery Officer** Officers wore the same basic uniform as their men, but with the addition of gold instead of copper buttons and a gold lace trim on the tricorne. Bombardier officers wore a mitre, with a gold front plate. In February 1759, red vests were replaced with white ones, with gold lacing around the edges and pocket flaps. Both officers and NCOs had gold trim around their coat edges. Engineer officers wore the same uniform, but with silver buttons instead of gold.

**F2: Artilleryman** Before February 1759, gunners wore red coats with black collar, cuffs and turnbacks. After this date, the standard coat was shortened, and modified by the addition of wide black lapels, as shown. Although the addition of white side tassels to the tricorne was stipulated in the new regulations, it appears that these were not worn when on active service. Artillery fusiliers wore the same uniform, but in addition they were issued with infantry cartridge pouches and muskets, for the last ditch defence of the artillery batteries.

**F3: Artillery bombardier** Bombardiers wore an identical uniform to artillerists (cannoneers) and artillery fusiliers, but with the addition of a mitre, which resembled those worn by Russian grenadiers but with a smaller copper front plate, bearing an Imperial eagle flanked by Mars and Minerva above a trophy of arms. On active service it appears that the tricorne was worn by bombardiers, and after 1759 it completely replaced the less practical mitre.

**PLATE G**

**G1: Cuirassier standard, Novotroitski regiment** The first company in each regiment (part of the first squadron) carried white standards, the other companies bearing coloured standards, such as the one depicted here. The pattern was the same for both white and coloured standards. The only variation between regiments was in the field colours of the coloured standards of the various regiments, and in the regimental crest, carried in the oval cartouche mounted on the chest of the Russian Imperial eagle. Measurement: 28-inches high, 24-inches wide.

**G2: Regimental dragoon standard, Arkanguelogorodski regiment** Standards issued to the dragoon regiments of the army were identical to those issued to infantry regiments, except that those issued to the former lacked the corner flames found on infantry standards. The white (regimental or colonel's) standard of each regiment bore the regimental crest carried on the breast of the Imperial eagle. This example depicts an archangel smiting the devil with a fiery sword. Measurement: 60 inches high, 60 inches wide.

**G3: Company dragoon standard, Tobolski regiment** The standards borne by the remaining companies of a dragoon regiment after the first company all had coloured fields, the colour varying between regiments. The regimental crest was carried within a large central cartouche, this example depicting the victory obelisk of the Tobolski regiment. The pattern of the crown surmounting the cartouche varied between regiments, and was of the same pattern as outlined in the listing of infantry standards (MAA 297). Measurement: 60 inches high, 60 inches wide.

**PLATE H**

**H1: White Garde à Cheval standard** The regimental standard of the premier cavalry regiment of the army displayed an Imperial eagle bearing the crest of the city of Moscow on its breast. This was represented by an equestrian St. George spearing the dragon. The gold monogrammed letter 'E's in the four corners of the standard stood for the Empress Elizabeth, who was also the honorary colonel of the regiment. Measurement: 28-inches high, 24-inches wide.

**H2: Colour Garde a Cheval regiment** The remaining companies of the Garde a Cheval regiment carried coloured standards with a red field. The central monogram represented the Empress Elizabeth I's 'E' and '2', and was of the same pattern as found on bronze cannon cartouches. The monogram 'E' for Elizabeth was also borne in the four corners. Measurement: 28-inches high, 24-inches wide.

**H3: Regimental horse grenadier standard, St. Peterbourgski regiment** Horse grenadier regiments carried the same types of standards as dragoon regiments. This is a white (regimental or colonel's colour) standard, carried in the leading squadron of the unit. The emblem of St. Petersburg (a victory rostrum and crossed anchors) is carried in the central cartouche. Coloured (company) standards bore the same device, again with field colours and regimental crests varying between regiments. Measurement: 60-inches high, 60-inches wide.