THE ROMANIAN ARMY OF WORLD WAR 2

Text by
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Colour plates by
HORIA ŞERBĂNESCU
Authors’ Note and Acknowledgements
Through a combination of historical circumstances Romania has received little coverage in studies of the Second World War. The not insignificant role of the Romanian Army on the decisive front of the war demands closer attention; and this book offers a concise but comprehensive survey of its uniforms, equipment, organisation and operations. As the first such publication to use substantial Romanian sources it also offers a new perspective on the titanic struggle on the Eastern Front.

We would especially like to acknowledge the generous help of Cristian Craciunoiu, editor of ‘Modelism’ magazine, who introduced the authors to each other; and of Colonel Cristian M. Vladescu, who has done so much to keep alive the study of Romanian uniforms. Also of great assistance have been Colonel Savu, Director of the Muzeul Militar National, and his library staff, Professor Carol Konig, Colonel Ioan Talpes, Cornel and Rodica Scafes, Cristina Craciunoiu and, not least, Ioana Șerbănescu. Their researches and hospitality have made this book possible.

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All photographs are courtesy of the Muzeul Militar National.

Text and Map Abbreviations
In order to condense the maximum information into both text and maps the following abbreviated code has been used.

A Latin numeral indicates an Army Corps.
A number alone signifies an Infantry Division.
Specialist divisions are suffixed by:

c  = Cavalry
M = Marine
a  = Armoured
G = Guard
F = Frontier
m = Mountain
f = Fortress
s = Security
t = Training
d = detachment
mc = mountain command

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INTRODUCTION

From 1941–44 Romania was militarily the third largest European Axis power, had the fourth largest Allied army in 1944–45, and her natural resources were vital to the German war effort.

Romania had fought with the Allies in the First World War and gained the predominantly Romanian populated provinces of Transilvania and Basarabia. However, both contained substantial foreign minorities which generated the hostility of Hungary and the Soviet Union. As a result Romania adopted a defensive posture and sought alliances with similarly threatened powers such as France, Czechoslovakia and Poland. In the late 1930s Romania began to rearm with largely Czech and French weapons but by mid-1940 both had fallen. Romania, with no substantial ally left, was then forced by Germany to surrender Basarabia, Northern Transilvania and Southern Dobrogea with their extensive border fortifications to the USSR, Hungary and Bulgaria. The rest of Romania now had to rely on Germany to guarantee its survival and, with little choice, formally joined the Axis on 23 November 1940. From this point on Romania’s consistent objective, which she pursued with equal vigour in both the Axis and Allied camps, was to regain the territories lost in 1940.

THE ARMY AND THE STATE

In reaction to the territorial losses of 1940 the autocratic King Carol was forced to abdicate on 6 September. A nationalist coalition government was established with young King Mihai as the theoretical Head of State and the armed forces. After suppressing a coup by the fascist Iron Guard in January 1941 real power lay with the ‘Conducător’ (Leader) General de Armătă Ion Antonescu. A strong-willed professional soldier whose ability was respected by Romanians and Germans alike, Antonescu’s pro-Western sentiments were dominated by his pragmatism. Often critical, he remained Germany’s most dependable ally until his overthrow on 23 August 1944.

The Romanian officer corps contained many politically appointed generals and colonels whose abilities were far from adequate and, despite Antonescu’s attempts to purge these elements, the corps was never reduced to unqualified obedience. The generally conservative senior officers did not prove receptive to modern German methods.

General de Corps de Armătă Petre Dumitrescu inspecting the first paratroop company, 15 August 1941. Note the two broad red stripes down his breeches. Immediately behind him is an Air Force general between them is a paratroop lieutenant wearing a Sam Browne over his jump suit and a beret bearing his rank insignia.
although Antonescu did promote able generals such as Dumitrescu, Lascăr and Korne. Junior officers proved much more open to new German methods, their expertise improving markedly as the war progressed, though this was offset by a decline in motivation after 1942. Junior officers led from the front as is evidenced by their proportionally high casualties, but the social gulf between them and the lower ranks and their limited man-management skills caused problems. This was further exacerbated by an archaic and brutal disciplinary system.

The numerically weak corps of NCOs was expanded considerably during the war. While they were competent within a restricted area of expertise, their limited education and training did not allow them to display the full range of initiative expected in a modern army. The hardy peasant soldiers who made up three-quarters of the army were good material, but they lacked the education and industrial morale to adequately conduct or face modern mechanised warfare. It was weaknesses in training, equipment and leadership which, above all, were to compromise their performance.

Romania was essentially pro-Western, its alliance with Germany being one of temporary necessity. Despite the wide difference in the aims, characteristics and capacities of their respective armed forces, a creditable degree of cooperation was initially achieved. This was most apparent in the rapport between Mareșal Antonescu and Field Marshal von Manstein. By contrast, the behaviour of German troops towards their Romanian co-belligerents did at times result in friction and resentment. 54,000 Romanian-born Germans served in the SS and another 15,000 in the German Army and Todt Organisation. The mutual hostility of Romania and Hungary complicated considerably German wartime planning, and frequent border clashes diverted the Romanian 1st Army to watch the Hungarian border.

Mobilisation

Romania re-armed and expanded her active army after 1937 but the territorial losses of 1940 reduced available manpower from 2,200,000 to 1,500,000. This necessitated the disbanding of three infantry (12, 16, 17) and three reserve divisions (26, 33, 34). All specialist divisions were carefully preserved intact. Progressive increases in manpower were achieved by conscripting the liberated populations of Basarabia, Northern Bucovina and Northern Transilvania, by the cancellation of exemptions and by premature call-ups. Reservist strength was boosted by calling up ever older age groups. Draft evasion and desertion grew however, and these measures were thus not fully effective. Furthermore, shortages of heavy weapons prevented manpower increases being translated into new field divisions.

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**EQUIPMENT**

Romania responded to European, and particularly Hungarian re-armament in the mid-1930s, by purchasing or licence-manufacturing a series of modern French, Czech, British, Italian and German weapons. By 1941 Romania could produce mines, grenades, light and heavy machine guns, 60mm and 81mm mortars, 47mm A/T guns, 37mm and 75mm A/A guns and a wide variety of ammunition. In 1942 a 120mm mortar went into production and in 1943 the locally designed Orita 9mm SMG and Resita 75mm A/T gun were introduced. Romania’s choice of weaponry, although sound for the late 1930s, became rapidly obsolete during the war but low rates of import and local production meant this, and much pre-WW1 equipment, had to remain in service. Germany’s weak war industry was unable to supply significant quantities of equipment until 1943–44 and in the interim much captured Soviet equipment was pressed into service. The Soviets greeted Romania’s
defection to the Allies in August 1944 by confiscating much of its best frontline equipment and all captured Soviet weapons. No assistance was received from the other Allies and maintenance of German weapons became increasingly difficult. As a result Romania had to conduct the remainder of the war almost entirely from its own meagre resources. The much reduced 1944–45 divisions and their heavy casualties reflect this.

Romanian infantry became better armed as the war progressed although the introduction and scale of issue of new equipment such as SMGs and snipers’ rifles lagged behind the Soviets and Germans. The divisional artillery and infantry guns were invariably lighter and older than their opponents’, forcing reliance on manpower instead of firepower with consequent heavy casualties. As artillery caused 50 per cent of all casualties on the Eastern Front this was a major weakness. Only the corps and motorised artillery was modern. Until the introduction of limited numbers of 75mm A/T guns in late 1942 there was no effective counter to Soviet KV and T34 tanks and even these were of limited use against the JS tanks of 1944. The decisive contribution of armoured operations on the Eastern Front made this a fatal defensive flaw.

**Mechanisation**

Mechanisation, and particularly the provision of modern armour, was Antonescu’s main preoccupation. Romania’s was fundamentally a horsedrawn army, but the loss of 525,752 horses between 1941 and 1944 from a national herd of 1,268,716 seriously limited even this obsolescent means of transport. In 1938 there were only 34,000 motor vehicles in the entire country, of which about 10,000 were trucks, and only a single Ford assembly plant with a maximum capacity of ten vehicles per day. This severely restricted the army’s ability to mechanise.
Wartime attrition and reparations to the Soviets reportedly reduced vehicle holdings to a mere 3,000 by 1945.

In 1934 a motorised rifle battalion, later to become Antonescu’s bodyguard, was formed to reinforce the cavalry; and in the 1936 manoeuvres two infantry battalions were successfully mounted on buses. The army consequently bought over 2,000 locally assembled Ford 4×2 trucks and imported various four- and six-wheel-drive Škoda, Praga, Tatra, Steyr and Horch trucks and cars to motorise the 3rd and 4th Rifle Regiments, six cavalry regiments, the seven corps artillery regiments and various command, anti-tank, engineer and signals elements. Limited deliveries of Mercedes, Volkswagen, Walter, Bussing NAG and Opel trucks and cars and Czech vehicles continued up to 1944. From 1937 to 1942 numbers of fully tracked Czech Praga T-VI-R heavy artillery tractors were delivered and these were later supplemented by German Sd.Kfz 8 half-tracks.

Romania’s armour was never numerous or modern enough to allow it a major role on the Eastern Front. Romania had possessed some 70 Renault FT tanks since the 1920s. These were supplemented by two Škoda OAvz 27 and 12 Tatra OAvz 30 armoured cars which fled Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and were assigned to corps HQs for reconnaissance. During the late 1930s 1st Armoured Regiment was re-equipped with 126 R-2 (Czech 10.5 ton Škoda S-11-a) light tanks; and in 1940 was combined with the four motorised battalions of 3rd and 4th Rifles and the 1st Motorised Artillery Regiment into 1st Armoured Division. 2nd Armoured Regiment, with 41 French and 34 ex-Polish 11 ton Renault R-35s, remained independent.

From 1939 60 French Renault UE2 chenillettes, known in Romania as the ‘Malaxa’, were assembled locally as a first step toward the creation of an indigenous armour industry. Romania applied to build the Škoda T21 17 ton medium tank in 1940 but the Germans refused a licence. This upset the local balance of power, as they simultaneously gave a licence for the similar T22 to Hungary. Romania’s own Mareşal tank destroyer, named after Antonescu, entered production in mid-1944, only to have the Soviets stop the programme.

During the liberation of Basarabia 1st Armoured Division had considerable operational success, but for the siege of Odessa it was split up and dissipated in the infantry support role. 2nd Armoured Regiment’s undergunned and underpowered R-35s proved inadequate and the unit was relegated to training after Odessa.

When the refitted 1st Armoured Division returned to the front in August 1942 it still had 87 R-2s, but as these were obsolete the Germans delivered ten PzKpfw III Ausf.Ns and ten PzKpfw IVs (Kurz) in October. The division was all but wiped out at Stalingrad and most of its vehicles lost.

By 1942 the six cavalry brigades each included a single motorised cavalry regiment, and until 1943 the reconnaissance squadron of each brigade had four R-1 (Czech 4.2 ton ČKD AH-IV) light tanks. Early in the Stalingrad campaign the 1st and 7th Cavalry Divisions exchanged regiments so that the 7th could become largely motorised. Plans to combine it into a new Moto-Mechanised Corps with 1st Armoured Division were aborted due to the Stalingrad disaster.

As a stop-gap while 1st Armoured Division was rebuilding after Stalingrad the Germans delivered 50 obsolete PzKpfw 38(t)s to 2nd Armoured Regiment,
and these were deployed with the Cavalry and Mountain Corps in the Kuban and Crimea where most were lost in 1943–44. The 6th and 9th Cavalry Divisions lost all their vehicles in the 1944 evacuation of the Crimea and never rebuilt their motorised element.

In 1943–44 the Romanians themselves refurbished over 30 of their captured Soviet T-60 light tanks and at least 20 surviving R-2s and converted them to tank destroyers (Tacams) by mounting Soviet 76.2mm A/T guns. They saw frontline service in August 1944, but the Tacam T-60s were all confiscated by the Soviets in September. They also up-gunned most of the remaining R-35s with captured Soviet 45mm tank guns.

During 1943–44 8th and 5th Cavalry Divisions were to be fully motorised and strengthened by transferring in the motorised regiments of the 1st and 7th Cavalry Divisions. However, due to a lack of vehicles 5th Cavalry were on foot in August 1944. The 1st became an entirely horsed division while the 7th was disbanded to bring the 1st, 5th and 8th up to four regiments each.

1st Armoured Division was rebuilt during 1943–44 and returned to the front in the summer of 1944 equipped with 90 PzKpfw IV Ausf.Hs, StuG IIIIs, Tacams and SdKfz 222 armoured cars. One of its motorised infantry battalions was upgraded to Panzer-Grenadier status by the issue of SdKfz 250 and 251 armoured half-tracks. The division suffered heavily when counter-attacking the Soviets at Iaşi on 21 August 1944. Surviving elements managed to break out of encirclement into the Carpathians and took part in the liberation of Transylvania.

In early August 1944 8th Motorised Division’s 4th Roşiori Regiment was converting to an armoured unit and the division, with some 60 AFVs, was briefly referred to as 8th (or 2nd) Armoured Division until the defection to the Allies later that month. Also within the country the Romanians had 2nd Armoured Regiment, the depot elements of 1st Armoured Division and the Cavalry and Armour schools equipped with an assortment of obsolete Renault FT 17s, R-1s, R-2s, R-35s, PzKpfw 38(t)s and Tacams and a few StuG IIIs and PzKpfw IVs. Combined with 8th Motorised Division and 115th Infantry Regiment into the Moto-Mechanised Corps, they played an important role in the Bucureşti, Ploieşti and Transylvania fighting against the Germans up to October.

The Peace Treaty of 26 October required the disbanding of 1st Armoured and 5th Cavalry Divisions. The Soviets then ordered the surrender of remaining armour to Red Army depots. However, Romania secured Soviet agreement to send 2nd Armoured Regiment to the front in January 1945, equipped with 79 AFVs comprising all working examples of virtually every type previously issued plus some captured Hungarian and German armour. Serviceability was consequently low, and the regiment was reduced to only two runners by the war’s end. It is probable that the unit was deliberately run into the ground by the Soviets under whose direct command it fought and who confiscated its vehicles as they became disabled. Lack of spares progressively reduced much of the 8th Motorised Division to marching.
UNIT
ORGANISATION

Armies
Romania maintained three Army HQs: 1st, 3rd and 4th, two of which were usually in the field. The main combat elements amongst the Army troops were obsolete horse-drawn heavy artillery battalions, and an independent anti-tank regiment which initially included Schneider 47mm guns and Renault UE tractors. Later it had Pak 40 and Reşiţa 75mm guns and Steyr RSO/01 tractors.

Corps
Each of the seven territorial Infantry Corps (I–VII) began the war with 8,000 Corps troops. The main combat elements were a pioneer battalion, a machine gun battalion, a cavalry reconnaissance group and a two-battalion motorised artillery regiment with modern Schneider 105mm and Škoda 150mm guns. By 1944 the Corps troops were down to 6,217 men, the machine gun battalion had gone and a smaller reconnaissance group was more mechanised. Corps often had an air squadron of IAR 39s for reconnaissance, observation and light bombing. An XI Corps existed briefly in 1941.

Infantry Divisions
The elite Guard and Frontier Divisions were organised like the 18 infantry divisions which formed the

Officers of the 9th Roşiori Regt. on campaign in the Caucasus, summer 1942. Note the tent sheets worn as ponchos, and that the rosettes have been removed from the boots.
bulk of the army. Overwhelmingly reservist, initially under-trained, always under-equipped and often poorly led, the line infantry had limited offensive potential but were capable of stubborn defence. However, premature concessions by some units often compromised their neighbours and sometimes provoked a wider collapse. Major Soviet offensives invariably required German intervention and have tended to overshadow the many occasions when local Soviet attacks were repulsed.

From 1941 the organisation of the Romanian infantry division was based on the German model. It had three infantry regiments of three battalions each, a partially mechanised reconnaissance group, a horsedrawn 47mm A/T company, an assault pioneer battalion and two mixed artillery regiments, one with two 75mm battalions and one 100mm howitzer battalion and the other with a single battalion of each. Strength was 17,500.

The 1942 infantry division decreased manpower in favour of more artillery and specialist troops as a result of lessons learnt at Odessa. Each infantry regiment was reduced to two battalions, while the reconnaissance, assault pioneer and artillery battalions were all strengthened and the A/T company added six Pak 97/38 75mm guns in October. Strength was 13,500.

The irreplaceable losses of materiel and specialists at Stalingrad led to an increased infantry component, raising the strength of the 1944 division to 17,200. It reverted to three battalions per infantry regiment while the reconnaissance and assault pioneer battalions were reduced. A second A/T battery of six Pak 40 75mm guns was added and the artillery reduced to two two-battalion regiments, theoretically now including 150mm howitzers.

In 1943–44 each field division had an identically numbered training division with three infantry regiments of two battalions each and a weak artillery battalion of 75mm guns. Strength averaged 6,500.

The 1945 infantry division was much reduced due to equipment shortages and resembled the Soviet rifle division. It again reverted to three two-battalion infantry regiments. The reconnaissance and assault pioneer battalions were reduced to companies and the artillery amalgamated into a single regiment of three battalions with 75mm guns, 100mm howitzers and 120mm mortars. Both A/T batteries were maintained with the locally produced Reșița 75mm A/T gun. Its strength was 9,173.

**Mountain Divisions**

The four brigades, later divisions, of the Mountain Corps had a high regular component and particular expertise in mountain and winter warfare. Each battalion, numbered 1 to 24, was trained to act independently. Battalions 25 and 26 were specialist ski units. The 18th Infantry Division was converted into the 18th Mountain Division in late 1943 and its battalions renumbered 27 to 32, but it reverted to infantry status in 1944–45.

The mountain brigades began the war with two mountain rifle groups of three battalions each and single reconnaissance, A/T and pioneer companies. The single artillery regiment had two battalions with Škoda 75mm and 100mm mountain guns. Their mule-borne artillery was extremely light and they were hard pressed to hold a line in the open steppe; however, they came into their own in broken terrain. Strength was about 12,000.

By 1944 the mountain division had expanded to a strength of 15,896. The artillery regiment had added a third, 75mm, battalion and could have a 150mm battery attached. The reconnaissance and pioneer elements had grown into weak battalions, and there were two 75mm A/T companies.

In mid-1944 the training elements of each division were organised as independent commands numbered 101 to 104 and sent to the front. They each had four infantry battalions and one of artillery. 103 Mountain Command briefly became an ad hoc division in August/September 1944. The 1945 mountain division was very similar to the infantry division except that its infantry remained in two three-battalion groups.

**Cavalry Divisions**

The Cavalry Corps’ six brigades, later divisions, were at the forefront of mechanisation and experienced most organisational change. They acted as mounted or motorized infantry and were essentially regular units. They lacked substantial reserve elements and their strength and quality were partly maintained by
accepting volunteers with their own horses or motorcycles. The 1st, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th and 12th Calărași Regiments provided reconnaissance squadrons for all corps and divisions.

The 1941 cavalry brigade had one motorised and two horsed cavalry regiments each equivalent to a strong infantry battalion, a motorised reconnaissance squadron, a 47mm A/T gun company, a pioneer company and a two-battalion horse artillery regiment with 75mm guns and 100mm howitzers. Strength was about 6,800, growing to 7,600 in 1942 and 8,778 in 1943.

By August 1944 the cavalry divisions were either motorised (8c), horsed (1c), on foot (5c, 6c, 9c) or disbanded (7c). Each had four cavalry regiments, a weak reconnaissance battalion, two A/T companies with 75mm guns, a pioneer company, and a two-battalion artillery regiment with 75mm and 100mm guns which could have an attached 150mm battery. Strength was about 10,000. They also had an identically numbered training division about 3,100 strong.

The Romanian mountain and cavalry divisions were arguably Germany’s most consistently useful allied formation and scored a number of operational successes in their own right. Several were almost continually on operations between 1941 and 1945, building up considerable experience and always retaining some offensive potential, though their weak artillery usually needed supplementing. Both the mountain and cavalry divisions began the war as brigades, but were redesignated divisions in March 1942 as they were as large as the equivalent Soviet and Hungarian divisions.

### ROMANIAN DIVISIONAL ORDERS OF BATTLE 1941–45

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Fortress Division

1st Fortress Division and 2nd Security Division were formed from 1st and 2nd Fortress Brigades which had manned the fortifications lost in 1940; they garrisoned Odessa and the Transnistrian coast in 1942–43. In 1944 106, 115 and 121 Fortress Detachments, each of one artillery and three infantry battalions, were formed from reserve elements of 6th, 15th and 21st Divisions to man the Focşani fortifications. Where divisions raised such independent brigades, commands or detachments it was normal to prefix the original division with number 1.

Reserve Divisions

In 1941 the 25th, 27th, 30th, 31st, 32nd and 35th Reserve Divisions were mobilised but only the last saw action in Basarabia. Their organisation was as for the infantry divisions but their equipment was obsolete. All were soon broken up to make up the 1941 losses of the infantry divisions and form two security divisions.

Security Divisions

1st, and 3rd Security Divisions policed the interior of Transnistria in 1942–43. Each had a standard three-battalion infantry regiment, three lightly armed gendarmerie battalions, a weak reconnaissance battalion and a single 75mm artillery battalion. They and 1st Fortress and 2nd Security Divisions were used to rebuild 5, 9, 6 and 15 Divisions in 1943. The 24th Infantry Division formed in 1943 for essentially security duties had two standard infantry regiments and a single artillery regiment.

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**ROMANIAN DIVISIONAL ORDERS OF BATTLE 1941–45 (continued)**

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(a) Armoured  (m) Motorised  (h) Horsed  (d) Disbanded  (t) Rebuilt from Training Div, Sept 1944  (f) Foot  (p) Disbanded Oct. 1944

Note: The 1945 Artillery Regiments were amalgamated due to equipment shortages.
CAMPAIGNS, 1941–1945

The 1941 Campaign: Odessa

The Romanian 4th Army’s III Corps (11, 15) and V Corps (G, F, 21, 7c) assaulted across the River Prut into Basarabia on the night of 2/3 July 1941, with 35th Reserve Division and II Corps (10, Marine Det.) mounting diversionary attacks on their flanks. As the Germans had attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June surprise had already been lost. The Guard and 21st Divisions captured a bridgehead at Fălticu but were contained in heavy fighting by three Soviet divisions. Further north the 15th, 11th and Frontier Divisions and 7th Cavalry Brigade and a German division made better progress; and 1st Armoured Division was introduced to spearhead the joint advance which retook the Basarabian capital of Chişinău on 15 July. It pushed on to the Nistru (Dniester) by the 26th, forcing a complete Soviet withdrawal across that river.

In northern Basarabia the German 11th Army, which had the Romanian 5th, 6th, 8th, 13th and 14th Divisions under command, advanced even faster, while 3rd Romanian Army’s Mountain Corps (1m, 2m, 4m, 7) and Cavalry Corps (5c, 6c, 8c) rapidly reoccupied Northern Bucovina. Romania lost 4,112 dead, 12,120 wounded and 5,506 missing in Basarabia and Northern Bucovina but had achieved its legitimate war aims against the USSR within a month.

Odessa was the main Soviet Black Sea port and an important communications hub. The Germans needed it captured but lacked the available troops, and so requested Romanian help. After some hesitation Antonescu agreed. This decision to continue into genuinely Soviet territory was one of pragmatic necessity but was greeted by increasing political opposition at home and led to later British and American declarations of war.

On 7 August 4th Army crossed the Dniester and by
13 August a rapid thrust by elements of 1st Armoured Division and 1st Cavalry Brigade had reached the Black Sea coast behind Odessa and isolated it. The Odessa garrison initially comprised the equivalent of five Soviet divisions occupying three concentric rings of hastily built defences, but control of the sea allowed them to be reinforced. By early October the garrison had grown to 86,000 men despite daily casualties sometimes exceeding 2,000 wounded alone.

Initial Romanian plans aimed to take Odessa by 2 September. The first assault on the city was launched on 18 August by I Corps (21, G, F) and III Corps (7, 3, 5, 11) from the north. Some ground was gained and the city's water reservoir was taken, but no breakthrough was achieved. Important success only came when V Corps (13, 15, 1c) joined the assault from the east on the 23rd. In the following days it advanced between 10 and 20 kms, taking 7,000 prisoners and capturing Fontanka on the 28th. From there Romanian heavy artillery was able to shell the vital port area of Odessa. This was the most critical period for the defence, but V Corps was unable to break into the city because the approach funnelled into a narrow and readily defended isthmus.

On 28 August the northern attack was resumed with the fresh XI and IV Corps (6, 8, 14, 7c). Once again ground was gained but no breakthrough made. The Guard and 14th Divisions did force a dangerous salient into the defences at Lenintal, but were unable to exploit it due to a successful Soviet counter-attack on 8th Division on their left flank. The assault was called off on 5 September. Antonescu demanded German technical assistance before he would resume the offensive, but this was to prove insufficient to significantly influence the battle.

A new plan envisaged two preparatory attacks to secure a startline for a final assault on the city itself. On 12 September XI Corps (7c, 8, 14), I Corps (G), III Corps (F, 7) and IV Corps (11, 3) resumed the attack from the north-west. Important advances were made, and on the night of the 14th/15th the Soviets were obliged to fall back on their second line of defence.

Encouraged by this success the Romanians launched their second preparatory attack on the new Soviet position at Dalnik prematurely, and although they resumed it daily until 21 September fierce Soviet resistance stopped them well short of the planned startline for the final assault. They began regrouping for a new attack further south at Tatarka on the 22nd.

On the same day the Soviets counter-attacked V Corps (13, 15) on the passive eastern front. A fresh marine regiment was landed by sea behind 15th Division defending Fontanka while two rifle divisions, one newly landed, attacked V Corps frontally. Caught by surprise, V Corps was pushed back several kilometres and lost over 2,000 men and the vital artillery positions at Fontanka. As a result the proposed attack south of Tatarka scheduled for the 23rd was suspended, and 4th Army went over to the defensive to await significant German assistance expected in late October.
On 30 September the Soviets decided to evacuate Odessa because its supply base in the Crimea was threatened. To conceal this decision they undertook a two-division assault westwards from Dalnik on 2 October. After initially losing some ground the Guard and Frontier Divisions rallied to drive the Soviets back with heavy losses to their startline by evening.

Local probing attacks continued and on 6 October the fresh 10th Division succeeded in capturing a significant lodgement in the Soviet line south of Dalnik. However, the Soviets skilfully withdrew the last of their 86,000 troops on the night of 15/16 October without arousing Romanian or Luftwaffe suspicions. The Romanians moved in the following day, capturing over 7,000 stragglers.

During the siege 4th Army deployed a total of 17 infantry divisions, the armoured division, three cavalry brigades and a fortress brigade, but not all could be committed simultaneously or completely. They included 1st, 2nd and 18th Infantry and 35th Reserve Divisions, 9th Cavalry and 2nd Fortress Brigades which either had passive roles or arrived late. 340,000 troops served, but due to acute supply problems 4th Army’s available strength usually averaged about 160,000.

Although they came close to a decisive victory Odessa was only a partial and expensive success for the Romanians. Some divisions lost more than their original strength, and total losses of 17,729 dead, 63,345 wounded and 11,471 missing largely negated any sense of triumph and prevented much of the line infantry from ever gaining a moral ascendancy over the Soviets. It also exposed the infantry’s poor leadership, training and equipment; and most of the 4th Army was withdrawn to its depots for reorganisation over the winter.

Nevertheless, Odessa represents the nearest thing to a significant success achieved during the war by a minor Axis power independent of substantial German support, and threw Mussolini into a jealous rage. A back-handed compliment to the determination of the Romanian assault was the Soviet declaration of Odessa as a ‘Hero City’. The absence of so many Soviet troops in Odessa greatly assisted the Germans breaking into the Crimea.

Odessa and its hinterland were administered by Romania as ‘Transnistria’ until early 1944. Transnistria was subject to exploitation but not annexed. Notably weak Soviet partisan activity was largely due to the comparatively lax and sometimes enlightened Romanian administration which, after initial severity, oversaw a significant improvement in the well-being of most of the local population in 1942 and 1943 when compared with previous Soviet rule or the neighbouring German administrations. The Fortress Division and three Security Divisions based there were well able to control the territory assisted by locally recruited police and labour corps.

3rd Army’s Cavalry Corps (5c, 6c, 8c) and Mountain Corps (1m, 2m, 4m) had meanwhile been subordinated to the German 11th Army and engaged in mobile operations up to the Dnepr by early September. Romanian engineers there built 30 per cent of the Berislavl bridge, the longest ever constructed under fire, which enabled the German–Romanian advance to continue up to the approaches of the Crimea.

On 26 September 3rd Army was deployed in the Nogai Steppe covering the rear of the German 11th Army attacking the Crimea when it was assaulted by 12 Soviet divisions. Most units held, but 4th Mountain Brigade was partially overrun and German forces had to restore the situation. On 1 October the Germans and Romanians went over to the offensive and on 7 October the opposing Soviet forces were
surrounded, the Romanians taking 6,700 prisoners. By 11 November 3rd Army's losses since June totalled 2,559 dead, 6,366 wounded and 1,913 missing.

3rd Army was then deployed on coastal defence in the Ukraine, but 1st and 4th Mountain and 8th Cavalry Brigades were sent into the Crimea to support the overextended German 11th Army. On 30 December the latter brigades failed to contain a Soviet landing at Feodosiya and the Soviets were able to build up large forces in the Kerch Peninsula. Antonescu immediately made available VII Corps (10, 19, 8c), and with their support the Germans were able to wipe out the Kerch bridgehead in May 1942. In March the cavalry and mountain brigades were redesignated divisions, and later expanded.

In June X Mountain Corps (1m, 4m, 18) joined the German assault on Sevastopol. 1st Mountain Division took the important Sugar Loaf position in mid-June and 4th Mountain Division captured 10,000 prisoners clearing Balaklava in early July.

The Crimea operations were the high point of German–Romanian co-operation thanks to the good rapport between the German commander, Von Manstein, who was sensitive to the limitations of his Romanian troops, and Mareşal Antonescu, who readily made available the necessary Romanian units to release overstretched German formations for offensive operations. Romanian losses were 6,306 dead and missing and 16,735 wounded.

The 1942 Campaign: Stalingrad

As Romania's war aims were more than achieved it took considerable German pressure to secure a promise of 500,000 Romanian troops for the 1942 campaign, and even then a peak of only 382,000 were fielded. Between January and April 1942 VI Corps (1, 2, 4, 20) was placed under the command of German Army Group South. In early May the inexperienced 1st and 4th Divisions had the misfortune to face the first Soviet attempt at a modern armoured offensive south of Kharkov and were badly shaken.

VI Corps was subordinated to 4th Panzer Army for the German summer offensive on Stalingrad. In early August it was involved in heavy fighting crossing the River Aksai south of Stalingrad; and by early September it was deployed on a defensive line covering the southern flank of the German forces assaulting the city. It was later joined by 18th Division and VII Corps (5c, 8c). During October it was subject to several effective Soviet probing attacks which exposed its vulnerability.

By mid-November VI Corps' infantry and artillery were seriously below strength, but each division had to hold 25–40 kms of front. All VI and VII Corps divisions were in the line and the German elements of 4th Panzer Army had to be relied on for reserves. VI and VII Corps came under command of a new 4th Romanian Army from 20 November—the very day they were attacked.

On 10 October General Dumitrescu's experienced 3rd Army HQ was transferred from the Caucasus to command the deployment of the reorganised ex-Odessa divisions north of Stalingrad. The new line was an open steppe, but Dumitrescu was refused German permission to launch an immediate attack in order to drive the Soviets north of the River Don so that it could be used as a much needed anti-tank obstacle. From 20 October 3rd Army began to report Soviet preparations for an attack on its front, but the
Germans were so fixated on capturing Stalingrad that they would only move the chronically understrength 22nd Panzer Division in support.

On 19 November 3rd Army had I Corps (7, 11), II Corps (9, 14), V Corps (5, 6) and IV Corps (13, 1c) in the line and 7th Cavalry, 15th Infantry and 1st Armoured Divisions in reserve. The units were nearly up to strength, and despite extended 20–24 km frontages they had successfully repulsed most Soviet probing attacks.

The supply situation of both 3rd and 4th Armies was difficult as the Germans attacking Stalingrad necessarily dominated rail transport. A shortage of Romanian trucks delayed deliveries from the railheads, and reliance on horded transport necessitated the positioning of supply depots perilously close to the front. Engineering equipment was in short supply, and although the Romanians dug in determinedly most of their front lacked wire or mines. With the onset of winter none of this improved morale, especially in VI Corps. The only redeeming feature was the delivery of six Pak 97/38 75mm anti-tank guns to each division in October.

By engaging the Germans in Stalingrad with minimum forces the Soviets were able to build up large concentrations on their flanks facing 3rd and 4th Armies. With a high proportion of Guards and armoured units they were the cream of the available Red Army, and achieved a crushing materiel and numerical superiority at their points of attack.

On 19 November 3rd Army was attacked from Kletskaya and Blinov. Romanian infantry resistance was unexpectedly determined and the first wave of Soviet rifle divisions failed to break through. As a result the armoured units intended to exploit an existing breach had to fight their way through with unforeseen losses. Several Romanian counter-attacks from 15th Infantry and 7th Cavalry Divisions were driven off but further delayed the Soviets, who fell short of their first-day objectives. Nevertheless, by evening their armour had decisively broken through 9th, 14th and 13th Divisions’ fronts and was beginning to force the neighbouring units to draw back their flanks.

The well-led 11th Division repulsed several infantry assaults and prevented the Soviet right flank widening the breach as planned. 1st Cavalry Division held its front throughout the day. 1st Armoured Division counter-attacked during the night, but its mostly light tanks were unable to tackle the heavier Soviet armour, and it had to be content with preventing the two arms of the Soviet offensive from completely surrounding 5th, 6th and 15th Divisions and elements of the 14th and 13th Divisions which had been consolidated under General Lascâr of 6th Division.

In the following days 1st Cavalry Division was surrounded with the German 6th Army in Stalingrad; 9th Division was subordinated to I Corps, which was lightly attacked and continued to hold its original position. 7th Cavalry Division and parts of 14th Division withdrew behind the River Chir.

Until 23 November 1st Armoured Division managed to offer an escape route for the Lascâr Group, but Lascâr was ordered by Hitler to hold on until relieved by 22nd Panzer Division. However, this weak unit was itself pinned down by Soviet armour and unable to intervene actively. Only 1st Armoured Division, resupplied with fuel by Romanian Ju 52s, and parts of 15th Division managed to break through to 22nd Panzer Division; the remnants of the three formations broke out across the Chir on the 25th,
15th Division's commander being posthumously commended by the Germans. The 27,000 survivors of the Lascăr Group surrendered on the 24th. Throughout December II Corps (1a, 7c, 14, 15) was integrated with German units which stabilised the front on the Chir, and with their support managed to hold the river line.

4th Army's VI Corps was attacked on 20 November. 1st and 4th Divisions were quickly overrun, although once again Soviet tank losses were unexpectedly heavy. General Korne's 8th Cavalry Division rushed north; although it was unable to restore the situation it managed to retain cohesion as it covered the retreat of the remnants of 4th, 1st, 18th and 2nd Divisions, and gave German reinforcements time to stabilise the line in front of 4th Army HQ at Kotelnikovski from the 24th. 5th Cavalry Division hung on to the right flank of the army, while the bulk of 20th Division was trapped with the German 6th Army in Stalingrad.

On 12th December German armour began a counter-attack from Kotelnikovski to relieve Stalingrad with VI Corps (18, 2, 1) and VII Corps (4, 5c, 8c) covering its flanks. However, on 18 December Soviet armour broke through the Italian 8th Army on the left of I Corps (7, 11, 9), which was still on the Don, and began to attack the German division on its right. Mindful of the Lascăr Group's fate I Corps began to withdraw on the 20th without German permission, but was nevertheless surrounded in the following days and most of it destroyed. Further south II Corps fought its way out with German troops. With its left flank collapsing the Germans were forced to withdraw their Stalingrad relief force, and the demoralised Romanian infantry divisions of VI and VII Corps began to disintegrate before the Soviet counter-offensive. 8th Cavalry Division had fought well.

By the end of December few of the units of 3rd or 4th Armies were battleworthy, and they were all withdrawn from the line and repatriated to Romania in early 1943 for rebuilding. 1st Cavalry and 20th
Infantry Divisions were destroyed with the German 6th Army in Stalingrad at the end of January. Von Paulus, 6th Army’s commander, felt that their fighting spirit and leadership deserved special commendation.

Between July and October the Romanians advancing on Stalingrad and into the Caucasus lost 9,252 dead, 28,213 wounded and 1,588 missing. On 19 November 3rd and 4th Armies totalled 228,072 men, but by 7 January 1943 155,010 had been lost, including 12,607 still trapped in Stalingrad.

Most Romanians had been unenthusiastic about serving in the depths of Russia since Basarabia’s liberation in 1941, but it was Stalingrad that destroyed confidence in German victory. Romanian resistance there had been more determined than the Soviets had anticipated but rather less than the Germans had hoped for, and mutual recriminations resulted at all levels.

Bad as Stalingrad was for the Germans, it was a great deal worse for Romania. Romania’s 27 divisions contributed significantly to making Germany’s 1942 strategic offensive in southern Russia possible; but in return German overextension had left 3rd and 4th Armies exposed to the full weight of the Red Army, and Romania consequently lost two-thirds of its field army in a strategic disaster beyond its control.

**The Black Sea Campaigns, 1942–44**

The Cavalry Corps (5c, 6c, 9c) formed the right wing of the German advance into the Caucasus which began in late July 1942. In an independent operation it cleared the coast of the Sea of Azov and then swept south to reach the Black Sea on 12 September, taking the port of Anapa by turning captured Soviet heavy artillery on the other defences. This cut off part of the Soviet 47th Army in the Taman Peninsula and it had to be withdrawn by sea. Thereafter 10th, 16th and 3rd Mountain Divisions and several German divisions were able to cross over the straits from the Crimea unopposed, leaving only the Mountain Corps (1m, 4m) in the Crimea.

On 19 September 3rd Mountain Division launched an attack across the Caucasus Mountains on Tuapse, but after gaining 6 km it was repulsed. On 25 October 2nd Mountain Division, which had entered the Caucasus with German forces in July, launched a surprise attack on Nalchik. In a day and a half it crossed three fast-flowing mountain rivers to capture the city and trap 7,000 Soviets against advancing German armour.

Defeat at Stalingrad forced an Axis retreat from the Caucasus into the Kuban bridgehead around the Taman Peninsula. The performance of the Romanian units there deteriorated and the Germans increasingly deployed them in coastal protection and anti-partisan roles, only placing them in the front line out of absolute necessity. Morale in the 10th and 19th Divisions was so bad that they had to be dispersed among German divisions, but the mountain and cavalry divisions remained more cohesive. On 8 February 1943 the 80,000 Romanian troops in the Kuban amounted to 40 per cent of the Axis forces, and were to suffer 1,598 dead, 7,264 wounded and

![A cyclist showing the basic infantry uniform from the front. Note the paleness of the natural leather ammunition pouches as issued; they darkened with use.](image)
806 missing before final evacuation to the Crimea in October. By that time 1st and 4th Mountain Divisions had also been rotated through the Kuban.

Romanian strength in the exposed Crimea fell further as personnel losses were not replaced. In November 1943 the Soviets cut off the Crimea and made two landings on the Kerch Peninsula. 6th Cavalry and 3rd Mountain Divisions, both considered by the Germans as good units, finished off the southern one at Eltigen on 7 December and took over 2,000 prisoners.

On 8 April 1944 the Soviets attacked 11th Division across the Sivash and broke through in three days of intense fighting. All Axis forces then had to race the Soviets to the only evacuation point at Sevastopol. Romanian troops were several times used as rear-guards, especially in the Yaila Mountains, where 1st and 2nd Mountain Divisions covered the flank of the German V Corps; but by the time Sevastopol was reached most units had disintegrated. Of 64,712 Romanians in the Crimea 42,190 were evacuated by the Romanian Navy and Air Force, as were tens of thousands of Germans. All their equipment was lost.

The Stalingrad and Crimea disasters had cost the Romanians the entire equipment of 24 divisions, and the army had to be almost completely rebuilt. Such losses made it impossible to raise new field divisions during the war. During the summer of 1943 a 24th Division, composed of reserve elements of 11th Division and penal units, guarded the north coast of the Sea of Azov. In September it amalgamated with 4th Mountain Division from the Crimea but retained its number as a deception measure. The demoralised division suffered heavily during the Soviet reconquest of the Nogai Steppe, which led to the isolation of the Germans and Romanians in the Crimea in November 1943, but escaped across the Dnepr.

By December 1943 3rd Army HQ had begun to assemble III Corps (8, 15, 24) in Transnistria. However, no determined attempt was made to defend the territory and Odessa was abandoned to the Soviets on 10 April 1944. 24th Division reverted to being 4th Mountain Division on recrossing the Dneistr.

**The 1944 Campaign: Iași-Chișinău**

The Soviets were now within the Romanian frontier and throughout the summer the Romanian deployment grew, helping the retreating Germans to stabilise the front in Basarabia. Antonescu suggested a controlled withdrawal to the more defensible Carpathian–Danube line which he had prudently been fortifying around Focșani since 1942; but Hitler refused, promising to keep sufficient German forces to protect Basarabia and back up the weaker Romanian armies. However, events elsewhere forced the withdrawal of most German armour, leaving the front vulnerable.

By 19 August 3rd Army had II Corps (9, Marine Det), III Corps (110b, 2, 15) and a German corps (incl. 21, 4m) under command. The neighbouring German 6th Army included 14th Division. Both armies came under the Romanian Army Group Dumitrescu, which had 1st Cavalry Division in its reserves. To its north Army Group Wohler included 1st Armoured, 8th Infantry and 18th Mountain Divisions in reserve. Its German 8th Army included 11th Division and IV Corps (102mc, 5c, 7, 3), while its Romanian 4th Army comprised VI Corps (incl. 5, 101mc), a German corps (incl. 1, 13), V Corps (4, G), I Corps (6, 20) and VII Corps (103mc, 104mc). Romanian morale, already shaken, was further undermined by rumours of peace feelers, and German units, often under Romanian command, were interspersed with the Romanians to brace their resistance.

On 20 August the Soviets attacked both 3rd Army south of Tiraspol and 4th Army north of Iași. After reporting ‘fierce fighting’ they broke through 4th Mountain and 21st Divisions and advanced deep into
the rear of 3rd Army. 3rd Army began a preplanned withdrawal to the Danube line, but was pre-empted by Soviet mechanised forces and naval landings which had nearly surrounded it against the coast by the 23rd. The Soviets reported that 3rd Army fought hard to break out.

North of Iași the Soviets soon broke through parts of V, VI and IV Corps. 1st Armoured and 18th Mountain Divisions put in an immediate counter-attack, but the Soviets had six times as many tanks and they were quickly surrounded. The remnants of 4th Army were thrown back into the Carpathians, and by 23 August the Soviets were deep in the rear of the German 6th and 8th armies which were in immediate danger of being surrounded.

However, if the Romanian 115th, 106th and 121st Fortification Detachments resisted from the fixed fortifications in the Focșani Gap supported by the locally raised III Training Corps (6t, 15t, 21t) and 8th Armoured Division which had been ordered up from the interior with 88mm guns from Ploiești, it was still possible that the Germans, 3rd and 4th Armies might escape to the more defensible Carpathian-Danube line which, unknown to them, was the planned limit of the Soviet offensive. This would have saved the Ploiești oil fields vital to the German war economy.

Antonescu had deployed his entire available field army in a genuine attempt to prevent the Soviets from overrunning the country. Romanian resistance was uneven but Soviet reports confirm that they initially put in some determined, if ineffectual, counter-attacks. The Germans, who had been wrong-footed by Soviet deployments, believed themselves betrayed by the Romanians on 20 August. Elements of the Romanian officer corps had certainly grown increasingly unco-operative during the summer, but significant operational collusion with the Soviets only occurred after 23 August. The Soviet victory was largely due to good planning and execution.

For three years the Romanian Army, for all its failings, had proved Germany’s largest, most effective and most resilient ally on the Eastern Front. Until Stalingrad losses inflicted on the Red Army matched those suffered, but the ratio then swung heavily in the Soviets’ favour. Losses against the Soviets were 71,000 dead, 243,000 wounded and 310,000 missing. Most of the latter died in the field or as POWs.

The August 1944 Defection
Romanian opposition parties, the court, and much of the army had long been in favour of negotiating for peace, and by mid-1944 even Antonescu was seeking terms. However, his plan to negotiate from a position

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**ROMANIA, AUGUST 1944.**

- Romanian-German Front, 20 Aug.
- Soviet Breakthrough, 20-23 Aug.
- Romanian Counter-attacks.
- Front, 23 August.
- Romanian Fortifications
- Soviet Advance, Aug.-Sept.
- Axis Counter-attacks
- Limit of Axis Penetration, Sept.

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of strength was shattered by the Soviet breakthrough, and on 23 August he was arrested by King Mihai, who immediately sued for peace. The Luftwaffe promptly bombed Bucharest, and Romania declared war on Germany on 25 August. Bucharest was rapidly secured by part of the currently converting 8th Armoured Division, guard, paratroop and A/A units, which repulsed a German attack from Ploiești, where the 18th Security Detachment and A/A units were also fighting the German garrison.

Existing plans to counter an invasion by Hungary and Bulgaria had quickly to be extended to deal with the 56,714 German troops in the country and German external intervention from Yugoslavia. However, of 3rd and 4th Armies only those elements of 4th Army which had escaped into the Carpathians were later available to face the Hungarian frontier. Nevertheless, 1st Army improvised an effective defence of the frontiers and interior from the divisions being rebuilt after evacuation from the Crimea (10, 19, 6c, 9c, 1m, 2m, 3m), screened by frontier guard brigades and nine territorial battalions along the Hungarian border.

In early 1943 the Romanians had decided to retain a third of the personnel of each division at its depot. By August 1944 they had built up a shadow army of 17 ‘training’ infantry divisions (Gt, 1t, 2t, 3t, 4t, 5t, 6t, 7t, 8t, 9t, 1t, 13t, 14t, 15t, 18t, 20t, 21t), two ‘training’ cavalry divisions (1ct, 5ct), 4th Training Mountain Division and 1st Training Armoured Division (7,848 strong) in the interior. They were

Romanian engineers clearing Soviet wooden case mines: an excellent illustration of the contrasting textures and shades of the khaki woolen trousers and faded cotton summer tunic, the coarse material of which could resemble hessian. The engineer holding the mine-prodder has applied mud to his helmet; his colleague wears the yellow arm band used to distinguish Romanian from Soviet troops.
An infantry section under training, March 1944. Weapons are ZB 24 rifles, a Beretta SMG and ZB30 LMG. Note the cut of the trousers and the jacket’s cuffs and pocket pleats have been simplified. The immaculate condition of the officer graphically illustrates the exaggerated gulf between officers and men.

very weak in artillery and automatic weapons, but all had some operational capacity.

The Germans failed to appreciate the potential of these measures and were surprised by the effectiveness of Romanian operations after their defection to the Allies. 61,000 mostly rear-echelon Germans were killed or captured in the ensuing fighting for the loss of 8,586 Romanians. The Russians were offered no resistance at the Focşani Gap and were able to complete the encirclement and annihilation of the German 6th and 8th Armies without interference. Accompanied by the Tudor Vladimirescu Division, they were then able to flood across Romania with minimal obstruction, and by mid-September joined the Romanian covering forces on the Hungarian and Yugoslav borders.

Romania’s defection significantly accelerated the end of the war. Bulgaria joined the Allies, Greece and most of Yugoslavia were soon liberated, and considerable losses were inflicted on retreating German forces in the Balkans. The loss of Romanian oil crippled German operations for the rest of the war, and was estimated by one Allied source to have shortened it by up to six months. The Romanians had learnt well from the fiascos of earlier Italian and Hungarian defection attempts and were active agents of their own liberation, extending the results of the Soviet Iași–Chișinău operation far beyond its original ambitions.

The 1944–45 Campaign

1st Army (2m, 3n, 9c, 19, 1t, 1ct) spent early September repulsing Hungarian–German attacks across the western borders aimed at regaining the southern Carpathian passes before the Soviets reached them. In one battle 23 Hungarian tanks were disabled. 4th Army, forming round units retrieved from the Eastern Front or the interior, was similarly engaged in fending off an Axis attack on the southern Carpathian passes from Northern Transylvania. Both armies simultaneously reorganised themselves in the field, adopting a smaller divisional structure and upgrading some training divisions.
From 9 to 25 October, 4th Army’s VI Corps (9, 21, 71), II Corps (8c, 20) and Mountain Corps (1m, 3, 6) with 11th Division in reserve played a major part in liberating Northern Transilvania, as did 2nd, 18th and 103rd Mountain Divisions attached to Soviet forces. Romanian losses from 1 September to 25 October totalled 49,744. Axis losses inflicted included 21,434 killed and captured and many wounded. A belated addition to the armistice imposed by the Soviets in late October disbanded 3rd Army, the Moto-Mechanised, Cavalry, Mountain and three Infantry Corps, and 1st Armoured, 5th Motorised, two cavalry and 13 mountain and infantry divisions.

Between 8 October and 15 January Romanian forces supported the Soviets in Hungary. 1st Army deployed VII Corps (9c, 19) and IV Corps (2, 4) in the initial invasion in October and VII Corps (9c, 19, 2) went on to help storm Budapest in January 1945. The Cavalry Corps (1ct, 1t), 2nd and 3rd Mountain and Tudor Vladimirescu Divisions served in northwest Hungary under direct Soviet command, capturing the city of Debrecen amongst other localities. 4th Army also campaigned across north-east Hungary into Czechoslovakia. In Hungary the Romanians took 21,045 Axis prisoners and 9,744 dead were found on the battlefield; the number of wounded inflicted is unknown. Romanian losses totalled 42,700.

For the remainder of the war 1st Army with VII Corps (9c, 2, 19) and IV Corps (2m, 3m, 10) and 4th Army with II Corps (3, 9, 21) and VI Corps (1c, 11, 18) fought across eastern Czechoslovakia. 8th Motorised Cavalry, 6th Infantry and the Tudor Vladimirescu Divisions fought under Soviet command, while 2nd Armoured Regiment campaigned up to Vienna. The Guard Division made a belated reappearance in April. By 12 May Romanian forces had taken 20,478 prisoners, 2,325 dead had been found and a substantial number wounded. Romanian losses totalled 66,495.

Romanian losses of 169,822 between 23 August 1944 and May 1945 were very heavy but comparable with those inflicted on their opponents. Recklessness liberating Transilvania, atrocious weather and mountainous terrain in Czechoslovakia, the removal of many experienced officers under Soviet pressure and inexperience in the former training divisions all

A corporal in Hungary in November 1944. He carries an Orīta SMG and a combination of MAN and Kysər grenades at his belt.

Note the foliage around the helmet, and the obsolete anklets instead of puttees.
compounded the losses. Furthermore, Romania was obliged to conduct the last nine months of the war entirely from her own limited resources, and severe equipment shortages resulted. Finally, the Soviets, who were wasteful with the lives of their own men, were certainly no less so with the Romanians.

In 1944–45 538,536 Romanians served against the Axis, which placed Romania’s contribution fourth behind the USSR, US and UK, and losses considerably exceeded those of the latter. Yet, despite a contribution far greater than Italy’s, Romania was never granted similar co-belligerent status. Romania regained Northern Transilvania, but Basarabia remained in the Soviet Union as the Moldavian SSR. Antonescu was executed in 1946 and the King forced into exile in late 1947, leaving the Communists in absolute control.

THE PLATES

A1: Mareşal al României Ion Antonescu
Mareşal Ion Antonescu was originally a cavalry officer and normally sported that arm’s uniform with the addition of Mareşal’s rank insignia. As officers had their uniforms made up by their own tailors many indulged in non-regulation variations, especially of the lapels, shoulder straps and pocket flaps. Antonescu had a reputation as a smart dresser and was no exception. He wears the M1941 officer’s cap, distinguishable from its predecessor by its larger crown and narrow cap band; the latter is in the cherry red of the cavalry, while the badge is that of the cavalry with a general’s ‘starburst’ rosette added centrally. The peak bears the double row of gold oak leaves exclusive to general officers. The tunic is the M1934 pattern, of British influence, but the pointed corners to the breast pocket are non-regulation. The shoulder boards are of the stiffened rectangular shape used on formal occasions and bear the Mareşal’s crossed batons rank insignia. Prior to his promotion from general in August 1941 Antonescu had worn that rank’s four gold bars overlaid with the badge of his original unit, the 1st Roşiori Regiment, which consisted of two crossed lances with a horseshoe at their crux. The lapels bear the M1930 general’s collar patches of gold embroidery on a dark red background. The Mareşal also sports the fashionable, but non-regulation, cream riding breeches popular in the cavalry; officially khaki breeches or trousers should have been worn, with two broad dark red stripes down either side of the outer seam and narrow red piping actually over the seam. Antonescu wears all three classes of the Order of Mihai Viteazul, the highest Romanian military award. The second class is worn at the neck, the first as a star on the chest, and the third class from a ribbon on the chest. The latter he won as an outstanding young staff officer in the Great War. On his left pocket is a special German Combined Pilot-Observer Badge in gold with diamonds, apparently given by Goering in early June 1941 in return for Goering’s admission to the Order of Mihai Viteazul. His boots are the standard Romanian cavalry officer’s issue, decorated with a small brass rosette at the top. Antonescu was a short man and reportedly wore raised heels to increase his stature.

A2: Căpitan, General Staff, 1942
Staff officers wore the regulation uniform of their original arm but with gold embroidery on their collar patches and gold aiguillettes on the right shoulder. This căpitan wears the full M1934 uniform with the M1930 Army dagger. Above the right breast pocket he has the M1930 staff college badge, which it was fashionable to wear angled towards the shoulder. The General Staff aiguilettes were of gold or yellow silk, but the War Ministry, Army and Corps ADCs wore them in silver or white silk. ADCs to the King additionally wore a gold sash with red and blue longitudinal stripes diagonally over the right shoulder and running below the Sam Browne belt to the left hip.

A3: General de Armată Petre Dumitrescu, Stalingrad, winter 1942–43
General Dumitrescu was the most experienced senior Romanian field commander of the war and commanded the 3rd Army for almost the entire campaign against the Soviet Union. He wears the universal issue tall lambswool ‘căciulă’ winter hat with his general’s ‘starburst’ cap badge on its front. The căciulă, traditional peasant wear, was issued in a variety of colours: white, black, brown or a combi-
ation of these. It was of a conical shape, but Romanian soldiers showed an infinite capacity to personalise its appearance in use. It failed to protect the ears and neck fully and often had to be worn with a head scarf. Dumitrescu wears the M1934 general officer’s greatcoat with dark red lapels. Regimental officers often lined their greatcoats with wool. Officers also made use of the superior Soviet winter clothing to supplement their own, in this case velenki felt boots and mittens.

A4: Sublocotenent, 20th Infantry Division; Stalingrad, winter 1942–43
This Sublocotenent wears the heavy wool lined watch coat issued in limited numbers to each sub-unit for sentries to wear over their great coat. The helmet was commonly worn over the caciuła, boneta, capela or beret for insulation in winter.

B1: Fruntaş, 13th Infantry Division; Odessa, 1941
This fruntaş is a section LMG gunner and wears the standard M1939 infantry uniform widely worn in 1941. The helmet is the Dutch M23/27 pattern adopted by Romania in 1939 after extensive comparative testing. Pre-war issues had an embossed badge bearing the double ‘C’ monogram of King Carol, as here, but wartime examples were without it. It was painted the greenish shade of khaki also adopted for Romanian Army vehicles. At the outbreak of war it was not yet in universal service and khaki Adrian helmets were still common amongst the artillery, service and reserve troops. The other ranks’ tunic was a simple practical design which was further simplified later when shirt cuffs were adopted. This fruntaş wears the cotton summer tunic, but in winter a woolen tunic of the same cut was worn. With exposure to the sun and repeated washing the summer tunic commonly bleached to a very pale shade whereas the woolen tunic and the woolen trousers worn in all seasons kept their colour well. Soldat, fruntaşi, corporals and sergeant, all conscript ranks, had no collar patches, but all ranks above soldat wore their rank insignia on their shoulder straps. This fruntaş wears a yellow cotton slip-on band edged in blue piping, the infantry colour. Such piping on the other ranks’ insignia was a peacetime practice and decreasingly common during the war, but was the only indication of their arm of service. Soldati of different arms could not be distinguished by insignia. A general order of 1939 stipulated that the army should adopt straight khaki trousers tucked into leather anklets, as shown here. A further order of April 1941 decreed a return to breeches and puttees, so both types of legging were to be seen in the 1941 campaign. However, by mid-1942 puttees were again universal.

The fruntaş is wearing the equipment specified for an LMG gunner: pouches containing the anti-aircraft sight and accessories on the belt and a magazine case and a holstered Steyr M1912 9mm automatic pistol slung over his shoulders. The gunner commonly stuffed extra magazines in his bread bag, while his No. 2 carried others and a spare barrel in a rucksack. The universal issue canvas bread bag was slung over the left shoulder with the standard dark green enamel mess tin fastened to its flap by a web strap. The olive green canvas bag for the M1932 or M1939 gas mask was slung over the right shoulder. An enamel canteen covered in khaki felt was suspended by a clip from the waist belt over the left hip in front of the gas mask. Slung diagonally over his right shoulder is a rolled sheet which formed half of a two-man tent, and could be tied with cord at the neck to form an improvised rain cape. A blanket was often rolled within it. The main weapon carried is the licence-manufactured ZB30 7.92mm LMG which was the standard section weapon throughout the war (and entered British service in modified form as the Bren gun). He also carries the ZB24 rifle bayonet on his right hip and the standard Inemann pattern entrenching tool on the left.

B2: Locotenant, 10th Infantry Division, summer 1943
This officer is the commander of a platoon in the Kuban bridgehead. The ‘bonetă’, very French in style, was adopted in July 1940 and was intended to replace the traditional ‘capela’ field cap. By regulation, officers bore rank devices in gold braid chevrons on the bonetă’s front which were similar to those worn on the shoulder straps, but it was known for the shoulder insignia to be sewn onto the left front of the bonetă, as here. Other ranks had a plain bonetă of a coarser material. In April 1941 the restoration of the capelă was ordered but it only supplanted the bonetă
added a central 'starburst' badge to the beret, while junior NCOs and soldati wore plain berets. This locotenent colonel wears the M1941 officer's tunic with the M1920 ski specialist badge on his sleeve. Above it is the German Crimea Shield; Romanian troops were eligible for both this and the Kuban Shield. Below it is a gold lace wound chevron. Also seen occasionally was the German Mountain Troops' edelweiss badge, probably worn by officers of units subordinated to the German 49th Mountain Corps in the Caucasus. On his left chest he wears the Order of Mihai Viteazul 3rd class, an Iron Cross and the 7th Battalion's badge. Most units had discarded such badges in 1940 as they contained the discredited King Carol's monogram. The plus-four style trousers, puttees, white ankle socks and mountain boots were prescribed for all ranks, but officers often wore standard officer's boots. The pistol is the Beretta M1934.

Ct: Fruntas, 1st Cavalry Brigade; Odessa, 1941

The cavalry tunic was the same as the Infantry's but the cavalry breeches were of khaki wool with reinforced seats and inside legs. The rank insignia's
yellow braid bar is on a khaki slip-on and of the more common unpiped variety. The cavalry wore knee-length black leather boots with spurs. At the top front of the boot a small clip-on brass rosette was worn, but on campaign these were usually removed. The motorised cavalry regiments appear to have worn the cavalry boots without the redundant spurs. However, by the last winter of the war many cavalrymen were operating on foot and infantry boots and puttees were increasingly common. The cavalry and artillery had saddlebags rather than back packs and wore a Y-yoke to support the belt. The Romanian yoke was of natural brown leather and the junction at the back could be either sewn or held together by a black metal ring. German pattern yokes also entered service in 1944. The cavalry carried the same ZB24 rifle as the infantry but some units began the war with the old Mannlicher M1893 6.5mm carbine. The carriage of swords was no longer normal, although in 1941 many cavalrymen still sported the M1906 cavalry sword as here. A Soviet report claims that a unit of 1st Cavalry Division attempted an unsuccessful sabre charge on 20 November 1942.

MG34 team, September 1944. The peaks of the capella (left) have been pressed in. The number two carries an Orjia SMG; his helmet shows indications that the unpopular ex-King Carol's monogram has been scratched out.

C2: Motociclist, 3rd Calarasi Regiment, summer 1942

The Romanian cavalry had historically been divided into regular Roșiori regiments and territorial Calarasi Regiments. By the outbreak of war the only significant difference was in their titles. The Calarasi regiments had traditionally accepted volunteers with their own horses, and in 1940 this was extended to include motorcyclists with their own machine over 250cc or sidecar combination over 600cc; this encouraged a more skilled and better motivated recruit. Motorcycle volunteers were awarded their own badge, seen here on the left breast. The uniform was essentially that of the cavalry. The only additional equipment appears to have been a pair of goggles. Officers and warrant officers of motorised troops should have worn grey collar patches, but many in the newly motorised cavalry regiments preferred to retain their cherry-red cavalry patches. The blue
slip-on bearing a white zig-zag line distinguished secondary school graduates, special reserve officer or NCO obligations. The weapon carried is the old Mannlicher M1893 6.5mm carbine, shortly to be replaced by the ZB24 rifle. Volunteers brought a variety of motorcycles, mostly of German makes; the army standardised on the BMW Type R35 motorcycle and Zundapp KS600 sidecar combination. The white square and ‘U’ (Uscat = land) number plate prefix were typical of all Army vehicles.

Motorcyclists were distributed to reconnaissance squadrons in all divisions and corps. In the summer of 1942 a two-squadron reconnaissance group captured a Soviet divisional HQ, 3,100 troops, 14 guns and 4 tanks in sixteen days, illustrating what Romanian troops could achieve given modern equipment and the opportunity.

C3: Plutonier, 1st Armoured Division, 1943

The khaki cotton overall was prescribed in September 1940 for the whole army to wear on fatigue. In practice only the technical branches seem to have received examples, and they often wore it with a small civilian beret to keep their hair clean. Some wore their rank insignia on this unofficial headgear. The reported use of Czech yellow-ochre overalls early in the war is very possible as the bulk of Romanian tanks until 1943 were Czech. However, for the most part tank crews seem to have worn M1939 infantry-style uniforms during the 1941 campaign and the M1941 infantry style uniform in subsequent campaigns. Their distinguishing feature was a black tank crew beret of the same pattern as that worn by the mountain troops. The silver tank corps beret badge represented a Renault FT17. On the left breast pocket is the silver M1920 tank driver’s badge of a Renault 17 in a laurel wreath; it was not worn by junior other ranks. Grey collar patches were worn by the mechanised units. Romanian senior NCOs wore the Sam Browne waist belt without the diagonal shoulder strap. An order of April 1944 decreed a new tank crew uniform of German cut but this does not seem to have been introduced before Romania’s defection to the Allies. The two motorised Rifle Regiments of the Armoured Division wore the basic infantry uniform.

D1: Soldat, 19th Infantry Division; Budapest, 1945

The căciula’s inadequacies had become apparent during winter 1942–43 and by 1944 a more suitable white woolen cap based on the Russian fleece cap was being widely issued. It differed from the Russian model, which usually had a round, flat crown, in that it fitted the skull closely; this allowed the helmet to be worn over it when the ear flaps were down. The greatcoat is the standard other ranks’ issue. Equipment shortages were becoming acute at this time and captured khaki Hungarian greatcoats and other items were often worn. Obsolete Romanian equipment also reappeared—in this case the old 1930 pattern anklets and Austrian ammunition pouches. The practice of tucking the entrenching tool into the waist belt with the blade over the heart was recommended as an improvised shield. The rifle is the Czech 7.92mm ZB M1924, a Mauser derivative, which entered service in 1935. It was the standard infantry weapon throughout the war although not yet in universal service in 1941. At hand is a Panzerfaust; this German equipment could have been from pre-August 1944 deliveries or captured since.

D2: Soldat, 1st Mountain Division, Sevastopol 1942

From 1941 the Mountain Rifles’ plus-fours were increasingly replaced by ordinary infantry trousers and puttees or the long trousers illustrated. This helmet bears a broad white stripe down the rear, applied to aid night deployments and artillery observers. The lightly equipped mountain troops were not issued with rucksacks and wore the same brown leather yoke as the cavalry. The water bottle is German. Mules were the basis of the mountain troops’ mobility. Shown is the pack used in both the cavalry and mountain corps for the carriage of support weapons. It bears the ZB54 M1937 HMG which was the standard such weapon in all arms and formed the secondary armament on Romania’s R-1 and R-2 tanks. (It entered British service as the Besa tank machine gun.)

D3: Soldat, 25th Ski Battalion, 1942–43

Ski training was widespread among the 24 mountain battalions of the four mountain divisions, but the independent 25th and 26th ‘Schiori’ Battalions,
organised as the 10th Mountain Rifle Group, were the only units exclusively trained and equipped for such operations. Ski units were used in the Crimea, Caucasus and Carpathians, and both battalions formed part of the ad hoc 103rd Mountain Division in late 1944. The complete white snow suit appears to have been exclusive to these units; some were quilted. The weapon is the Beretta M34 SMG wrapped in white lint bandaging for camouflage.

**E: Vânător de Care, 10th Infantry Division, Crimea, 1943-44.**

Unlike the Germans the Romanian infantry did not have anti-tank rifles and had difficulty destroying even the lightest Soviet tanks. Furthermore, Romania’s light anti-tank guns were chronically inadequate against Soviet medium and heavy tanks.

This led to the creation of special two-man tank destroyer teams throughout the infantry and cavalry. Until the introduction of the Panzerfaust in 1944 the means at their disposal were limited and usually required the team leader to reach or mount the tank. Regulations therefore required that they discard any accoutrements likely to restrict movement; however, the wearing of a helmet was compulsory. Picked men in each unit were selected for this role and their risky activity was recognised by the special tank destroyer’s badge seen on the left sleeve. The team leader carried only an automatic pistol for personal protection. He was covered by his No. 2 who carried an SMG. Amongst the more practical options open to him was to detonate a cluster of German stick grenades at a recognised weak point on the tank. On the M1937 tent sheet can be seen its neck-draw string, MAN offensive and fragmentation grenades, two CIAG smoke sticks, a MAN mine, carrying handle and detonators and three Czech Kyser G-34 grenades. The I.D. disc is Romanian.
The paratroop battalion was raised by the Air Force in June 1941, and by 1944 it comprised 8th and 9th Infantry Companies, 10th Support Weapons Company, 11th HQ Company and a depot company. The infantry companies had three rifle platoons with a high proportion of Schmeisser MP40 SMG, a machine gun platoon with ZB53 HMGs, a mortar platoon with Brandt 60mm mortars and an Assault pioneer platoon with flamethrowers. The Support Weapons Company included Bohler 47mm A/T guns and Brandt 81.4mm mortars; HQ Company included a motorcycle reconnaissance platoon. The battalion was to have been dropped by two squadrons of Ju52s (Escadrila 105 and 107). Heavy equipment and non-para-trained personnel could be landed by the 26-plus DFS 230 gliders bought from Germany. The glider tugs were Romanian IAR 39s of Escadrilla 109.

On 23 August 1944 the paratroops were divided into assault groups and quickly destroyed German resistance on the vital airfields around Bucharest. This pre-empted their seizure by the German Brandenburg Regiment, which lost an entire battalion in four giant Me232s shot down attempting airdroppings. However, shortly afterwards the battalion was accidentally bombed by US aircraft and suffered heavy casualties. The unit was dissolved in February 1945, by which time 1,300 paratroops had been trained.

This figure wears the uniform of the August 1944 fighting. The sidecap is standard Air Force officer issue; a small black beret was also worn. Plain grey/blue German paratroop helmets were to have been worn in combat but had to be abandoned when Romanian civilians stoned the unit, mistaking them for Axis troops.

*Brandt 60mm mortar crew of the 1st Cavalry Division, August 1944. This was the standard platoon support weapon. The German helmets were briefly worn by a few cavalry and A/A units in mid-1944, but were quickly discarded when Romania joined the Allies in August. Note the red/yellow/blue arm bands worn in 1944-45, in order to avoid confusion with the khaki-clad Hungarians.*
for Germans. The jump suit was adopted in 1941 and bears Air Force officer rank bars on the cuff. Officers’ collar patches and cap bands were light blue; their rank structure was as for the Air Force and worn on the cuffs. Other ranks wore Army rank insignia on their shoulder straps. The parachutist’s badge of a gold winged parachute with King Mihai’s cipher at its centre was worn above the left breast pocket by officers. Other ranks had a silver winged badge.

F3: Soldat, Marine Infantry Regiment, 1941
The 15th, 16th and 17th battalions of Marine Infantry formed the 1st Marine Detachment with four mobile coastal artillery batteries and a section of patrol boats. They were particularly useful in the unique conditions of the Danube Delta in 1941. While the front was deep in the USSR they remained second-line troops and were equipped as such. However, August 1944 saw a brief period in which they engaged Soviet and German troops in quick succession. The Navy also had coastal artillery and engineer regiments. In September 1944 the mobile elements of the coastal artillery supported the Army in Transilvania.

This Marine wears the M1940 uniform in grey/blue wool with a red foul anchor on the left sleeve; all leather items were black. Like the Army’s, the summer tunic was in cotton and tended to fade. The naval cap was also in grey/blue bearing a black band with ‘Infanteria Marina’ embroidered on it in yellow silk. In combat a grey/blue Adrian helmet was worn; initially it bore an oval plate with the double C monogram of King Carol but this was later removed. The officers wore the Army-style M1934 tunic in grey/blue with Army rank devices. The collar patches were light blue bearing a brass crowned anchor. Their cap was the M1940 Army pattern in grey/blue with a light blue cap band and the line infantry cap badge. In 1943 the marines adopted the Khaki Army uniform. This marine carries the obsolete M1893 Mannlicher 6.5mm rifle and bayonet, with ammunition pouches to match.

F3: Gunner, 5th Anti-Aircraft Brigade; Ploiești, 1944
In 1944 the 1st, 2nd and 3rd A/A Brigades protected the west, east and capital of the country respectively. The 4th A/A Brigade served on the Eastern Front. They were predominantly equipped with Romanian-built Vickers 75mm and Rheinmetall 37mm A/A guns, older imports or captured Soviet guns. Romania’s hundreds of Krupp 88mm and Gustloff
20mm A/A guns were mostly deployed with 5th A/A Brigade around the strategically vital Ploesti oil fields, the third most heavily defended site in Axis Europe. The importance of the oil led the Germans to equip and train the 36,741-strong Romanian A/A artillery to a high standard. After a summer jointly opposing massed USAAF and RAF raids, in which they brought down over 100 aircraft over Ploesti alone, the Romanian and German garrisons of Ploesti were involved in heavy ground fighting against each other following Romania’s defection in August 1944. Subsequently a full Anti-Aircraft Division was deployed with the Army in Czechoslovakia.

The Air Force decree of 1939 established that the anti-aircraft artillery, security companies and aeronautical engineers, who defended and prepared forward air strips, should wear a grey/blue uniform of the same cut as the 1939 Army uniform, and this remained in force throughout the war. The branch distinctions were in the colour of the officers’ cap bands and collar patches: black for the A/A artillery, and black with red piping for the engineers. The A/A officer’s gold-embroidered cap badge was two crossed cannons surmounted by a flaming grenade, and the engineers’ was a classical helmet above a breast plate. Other ranks’ insignia were worn on the shoulder straps like the Army and the officers’ on the cuff like the Air Force. Headgear included grey/blue capélás, M1935 German helmets, and small black ‘basque’ berets, but shown here are the M1939

Officers and men of 1st Armoured Regiment during the Iron Guard coup, January 1941. The tank is an R-2. The officers wear the M1934 uniform with collar patches and beret badge in grey over red; from April 1941 grey alone became the tank corps colour. The other ranks wear the M1939 uniform.
Bohler 47mm A/T guns and Horch 4×4 tractors, 29 August 1941. The horse-drawn Bohler and similar Breda were the most common regimental guns. This motorised battery is probably from Army troops or from the armoured division.

peaked cap and black Adrian helmet. Shorts were sometimes worn. On the left shoulder is a fourragère cord in the light blue and silver colours of the ribbon of the Virtutea Aeronautica medal; entire units could be awarded the Mihai Viteazul, Steaua Romana, Corona Romaniei or Virtutea Aeronautica military orders, and all ranks were entitled to wear the appropriately coloured fourragère.

F4: Soldat, 9th Cavalry Division, winter, 1944–45

In late 1942 Romania ordered 800,000 helmets from Germany. Some of these reached service with elite cavalry and mountain units by mid-1944. They were only withdrawn in early 1945. It is presumed that they were in Romanian olive/khaki. The white, non-resersible winter snow cape with hood was introduced in late 1943 and widely worn in the winter of 1945–46. Schmeisser MP 41 also entered service in 1943–44. 9th Cavalry Division operated on foot during the campaign against the Axis, hence the infantry boots and puttees.

G1: Sergent, Palace Guard Battalion, June 1941

The Guard Division was formed in 1930 by King Carol II to reward regiments of the Bucharest garrison which had aided his return to the throne in that year. Its organisation was the same as an ordinary infantry division but it tended to receive better-qualified conscripts and new equipment first. This combined to make it an elite unit in practice as well as in name, and it spearheaded the 1941 Prut crossing and many assaults on Odessa. These cost it almost its entire initial strength. In 1942 and 1943 it formed part of 1st Army observing the Hungarians, but was returned to the front in 1944. The Soviets made sure that none of this politically hostile unit escaped their Iaşi-Chișinău offensive in August even though its depot battalions were already fighting the Germans in Bucharest. The Guard Division was rebuilt and returned to the Czech front in April 1945. After the war it was the focus of the declining royalist presence in the Army. Apart from the units in the Guard Division there existed a Horse Guard Regiment, a Palace Guard Battalion, the 2nd Guard Pioneers and 3rd and 4th Guard Artillery Regiments.

This sergent wears the basic infantry uniform but with Guard distinctions. By October 1941 the Guard Division uniform had become almost indistinguishable from that of other infantry units, only the crown on the belt plate continuing to betray Guard status. The aiguillettes and white collar patches also disappeared. The ZB24 rifle and bayonet are carried. The Virtutea Militar medal worn was the highest award for other ranks.
G2: Frunțaș, Frontier Guard Sniper; Hungarian Border, 1944

Romania had long had a corps of Frontier Guards to patrol its extensive, frequently shifting and often ill-defined borders. They were long-service troops whose training emphasised field and marksmanship skills, and they and the mountain rifles were reckoned to be the best infantry. In June 1941 there were eight Frontier Guard regiments, three of which were concentrated in the elite Frontier Guard Division with the 1st and 2nd Frontier Guard Artillery Regiments. The division was in the forefront of the Odessa attacks and suffered very heavy losses. In 1942 it was redeployed to Timisoara to watch the sensitive Hungarian border. Two further Border Guard regiments were formed at this time, and in late 1943 the division was dissolved and the whole corps reorganised into five two-regiment brigades. Total strength reached 43,849. To back them up nine territorial battalions were formed along the Hungarian border. In August/September 1944 the Frontier Guards gave good service, delaying German and Hungarian thrusts across the border and participating in the reconquest of N. Transylvania up to the national border. The Frontier Guards also had a mounted regiment and a boat section to cover border rivers.

This sniper wears the obsolete M1930 uniform that continued to be worn throughout the war on Romania’s ‘passive’ Balkan borders. The aiguillettes and collar patches are in the Frontier Guard’s lime green. The ZB24 rifle was modified to take a German telescopic sight in 1943. The standard ZB24 differed from the Mauser 98k primarily in having a thicker metal butt plate and a straight bolt.

G3: Engineer; Odessa, 1941

This engineer wears the M1939 uniform and carries the Romanian MAN M41 portable mine detector.

Colonel, warrant officer and men of Mareșal Antonescu’s bodyguard regiment at a field altar on 24 August 1942. The men’s aiguillettes and the officer’s cap band, collar and cuff patches were red. The rakish angle of the officer’s cap was very fashionable.
The long canvas bag hanging from his belt stowed the two sections of the handle; the head could be screwed to the rear cover of the back pack. The detector was only effective against metal mines, so behind him he has a mine prodder for detecting wooden-case mines. As he advanced he laid a white tape to mark the path cleared. Note the wire cutters at his waist. On his left hip he carries a bayonet, the most effective implement for clearing round a mine, especially when crawling under enemy observation. The nature of the siege of Odessa made mine warfare countermeasures an early Romanian priority.

**Hi: Sergent Conducător’s Bodyguard Regiment, summer 1944**

One of the units particularly effective in suppressing the Iron Guard coup was an independent motorised rifle battalion which had been formed in 1934 and attached to a cavalry division. From 1941 it became Antonescu’s bodyguard. It was of the standard infantry structure with three rifle and one machine gun companies, numbered 1 to 4. As the war progressed it expanded to regimental size, and received official Guard status in 1943. By August 1944 the 2nd Battalion had 5th Rifle Company; 6th Armoured Company, with six obsolete Renault FT17 tanks and a mortar platoon; 7th Anti-Tank and Anti-Aircraft Company, with at least four Schneider 47mm and four German 50mm anti-tank guns and eleven 20mm anti-aircraft guns; and 8th Specialist Company, with assault pioneers and flamethrowers. A third battalion had three companies of cadets and three of recruits. The regiment’s training was geared towards instant reaction to any threat to the Conducător. When Antonescu was arrested by the King on 23 August 1944 he was unescorted, and the regiment thereafter honoured its higher oath to the King. It was immediately renamed the 115th Infantry Regiment and all insignia associated with the Mareșal were discarded. Its training was most useful in rounding up Germans in the capital, and it suffered the earliest and heaviest Romanian casualties in the Bucharest fighting. It later fought in Transilvania before being dispersed among other mechanised units.

The regiment’s uniform was essentially that of the

*Ski troops, 24 January 1943. The officer using the field telephone wears the mountain rifles' 'silver pine needle cluster' badge in his beret. The white snow smocks and leggings were peculiar to 25th and 26th Ski battalions.*
Royal Guard units but with red instead of white facings, aiguilletes, collar and cuff patches and officer’s cap bands. The other ranks continued to wear the Rifles’ beret. The officer’s cap badge was of the standard pattern but with Antonescu’s initials, ‘I.A.’ in its centre; the shoulder straps of officers and senior NCOs also bore these initials. The mortar carried is the Romanian-made Brandt 60mm, the standard company support weapon throughout the war. It was provided with a sling and normally carried on the back. At his waist the mortarman carried a leather pouch containing the sensitive mortar sight and a small pick for bedding in the base plate. He holds an ammunition case. The prescribed personal weapon was a sub-machine gun.

**H2: Iron Guard Legionary Comandant, January 1941**

The ultra-nationalist Iron Guard, formed in 1927, was essentially the Romanian fascist movement and followed the paramilitary example of its Italian and German models. It had limited popular support, but its influence was strengthened as German power grew. The latter imposed the Iron Guard on Antonescu as a government coalition partner from September 1940 until its failed coup against him in January 1941.

The uniform of the legionaries, as the Guardists were popularly known, consisted of a green shirt with fall collar and four bone buttons, two patch breast pockets but no shoulder straps. The neck was tied with a thin black lace bow. The Sam Browne belt was frequently worn to give an air of military discipline. The trousers were to be black but no pattern was specified and a variety of civilian styles were worn, some in other dark colours. The legionaries were normally bare-headed and could often be distinguished by unusually long hair for the period, unlike the Army which was close-cropped. In late 1940 an uncomfortable Antonescu was seen in Iron Guard
uniform with a khaki bonetă of the Army pattern bearing the Iron Guard’s triple cross on the left front. The legionaries were organised in cells (or ‘nests’) with their own rank structure. This Commander is distinguished by the gold chevron above a five-pointed star on his left breast pocket. His weapon is a Schmeisser MP28/11 sub-machine gun secretly supplied in considerable numbers by Himmler’s SD. At his feet is the Iron Guard standard with its triple cross emblem. Hitler kept the Iron Guard leader, Horia Sima, and 300 senior legionaries in Germany throughout the war as a potential alternative government. After Romania’s defection in August 1944 they were set up in Vienna as government in exile, and tried to form and officer two very understrength SS regiments from Romanian labourers and trainees trapped in Germany. After a few days of operations in February 1945 they proved totally unreliable and were redeployed as labour units.

**H3: Caporal, Tudor Vladimirescu-Debreţin Volunteer Division, autumn 1944**

The Tudor Vladimirescu Division was raised by the Soviets in October 1943. The bulk of its personnel were ex-POW ‘volunteers’ whose alternative was probably death in captivity. Many of its leaders were exiled Communists who successfully politicised the personnel. It was organised and equipped as a Soviet rifle division. The division first saw action in August 1944 when it was rushed into Bucharest with the leading Soviet troops on the 29th. This ‘liberation’ was more apparent than real as the city had already been completely in the hands of the Romanian Army for several days. The division went on to experience heavy fighting in Transilvania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, winning a battle honour at Debrecen. For political reasons the unit operated under Soviet rather than Romanian Army command. A second such unit, the ‘Horia, Closca și Crișan’ Volunteer Division, became operational just after the end of the war. Only on 22 August 1945 were they integrated into the Romanian Army. From August 1944 the Soviets had deliberately run down all Romanian specialist units. By late 1947 the rest of the army had
been reduced to four infantry divisions whereas the Tudor Vladimirescu and Horia, Cloșca și Crișan Divisions had been upgraded to armoured and mechanised status respectively. Their virtual monopoly of armour was influential in the eventual Communist takeover in 1947–48.

Where available, Romanian uniforms were worn, but necessarily an increasing proportion of Soviet clothing came to be used, though with Romanian collar patches and rank insignia. The figure illustrated is a corporal with the infantry collar patch. The rest of his clothing is Soviet. The Soviet sidecap was favoured over Romanian headgear and carried the division’s badge in white metal at its front. The divisional badge was also worn in cloth on the upper left sleeve. Armament was entirely Russian because the division was fully integrated into the Red Army order of battle, in this case the PPSh M1941 submachine gun with triple magazine pouch.

H4: Labourer, Armata Muncii: Transnistria 1943
The Armata Muncii was a labour corps raised in Transnistria in late 1942. It was administered directly by the Transnistrian Government but officered by invalided Romanian regulars or reservists. Its structure, training and discipline were military but the rank and file were not armed. The uniform colour probably reflects Todt Organisation influence.

Capitan of the Tudor Vladimirescu Division. He wears the Romanian other ranks’ winter tunic with side pockets, collar patches and stiffened shoulder straps added. The division’s badge is worn on the left sleeve and on the front of the Soviet forage cap.

Notes sur les planches en couleur

A1 Képi d’officier M1941, bandeau rouge pâle de la cavalerie, badge de la cavalerie, avec en addition, "starburst" de général, et galon feutre de chèvre de général sur la visière. Tunique M1934, acetate personnellement, de coupe individuelle: pattes d’épaule de rang; ecussons de col de général; culotte qui avait grande vogue mais non réglementaire, et sur laquelle manquent les pièces rouges de général; les trois classes de l’oré de Mihai Viteazul; badge doré de pilote allemand, un cadeau de Göring. A2 Uniforme réglementaire avec broderie et aiguillettes de col, dorées, d’officier d’état-major; badge d’état-major de général à droite sur la poitrine; deux chevrons, l’un dans l’autre, sur la manche. A3 Le commandant de la 3e Armée porte la "caciula", bonnet d’hiver en laine d’agneau, le manteau d’officier général aux revers rouges, et des gants et bottes de feutre russes, pris à l’ennemi.

B1 Uniforme d’infanterie M1939, pour gradés de rangs inférieurs et casque de type hollandais; note la touche d’été en coton de couleur pâle avec pantalons kaki plus foncé portés en toute saison. Le rang est indiqué par la bande jaune de la patte d’épaule, quelques fois avec passepoil dans la couleur de la branche de service - le bleu pour l’infanterie. Les rangs jusqu’à celui de sergent ne portaient pas d’écusson de col. D’ici le milieu de l’année 1942, culotte et bandes molletières remplacèrent ces pantalon et quétroon. Les mitrailleurs utilisant des mitraillettes légères ZB39 portaient des sacs à munitions spéciaux et un pistolet Steyr M1912. Sac à pain,

Farbtäfeln


1: Marshal Ion Antonescu
2: Capt., General Staff, 1942
3: Gen. Dumitrescu, winter 1942-43
4: Lt., 20th Inf. Div., winter 1942-43
1: Pte. 1st Class, 13th Inf. Div., 1941
2: Lt., 10th Inf. Div., summer 1943
3: Lt. Col., 7th Mountain Rifle Bn., 1942
1: Pte., 1st Cav. Bde., 1941
2: Motorcyclist, 3rd Calarasi Regt., 1942
3: Tank crew, 1st Armd. Div., 1942
1: Pte., 19th Inf. Div., 1945
2: Pte., 1st Mountain Div., 1942
3: Pte., 25th Ski Bn., 1942-43
1: Tank-killer, 10th Inf. Div., 1943-44
2: Lt., 4th Parachute Bn., 1944
3: Pte., Marine Inf. Regt., 1944
4: Fighter pilot, 3rd Air Corps, 1944
1: Major, 1st Cav. Div., 1944
2: Assault pioneer, 1944-45
3: Gunner, 5th A/A Bde., 1944
4: Pte., 9th Cav. Div., 1944-45
1: Sgt., Palace Guard Bn., 1941
2: Sniper, Frontier Guards, 1944
3: Engineer, Odessa, 1941
1: Sgt., Conducator's Bodyguard Regt., 1944
2: Commandant, Iron Guard, 1941
3: Cpl., 'Tudor Vladimirescu-Debretin' Div., 1944
4: Labourer, Armata Muncii, 1943