The Pentagon Papers
Gravel Edition
Volume 2
Chapter 5, "US-GVN Relations, 1964-1967," pp. 277-407.
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1971)

Section 2, pp. 323-369

G. THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE AND ITS FOLLOW-UP, JUNE, 1964

The Honolulu Conference met on short notice with an air of urgency; principals included McNamara, Rusk, Lodge, Taylor, and Westmoreland. Presentations of the current situation preceded consideration of additional measures to be taken. Lodge briefed those present on the political status. He said the situation could "jog along," but he thought that some external action would be a big lift to South Vietnamese morale. Lodge's prediction was more optimistic than later events, in August, proved justified; he said "if we bombed Tchepone or attacked the [NVN torpedo] boats and the Vietnamese people knew about it, this would . . . unify their efforts and reduce [their] quarreling." In reply to a question by Rusk, he opposed the idea of a more formal joint USG/GVN organization at the top; McNamara hoped that a more formal organization would evolve. Lodge felt that the USG/GVN relationship was harmonious, and that GVN was responsive to advice. He liked the present methods of dealing with them. Westmoreland called the military picture "tenuous but not hopeless" and added that a few victories were badly needed. Both were more optimistic than was the prevailing Washington view.

All present agreed that the emergence of a hostile government or anarchy would be a major threat to the U.S. position. The fear of this threat undoubtedly helps explain the USG's persistent hesitancy to apply leverage to GVN.

Westmoreland circulated a working paper calling for moderate increases in U.S. personnel, both civilian and military, for eight critical provinces. He reported that the GVN had recently responded to massive advisory pressure by increasing the tempo of their military operations. He felt they would similarly respond to a continuing advisory program oriented toward pacification. Both Lodge and Westmoreland rejected, as both unwise and unacceptable to GVN, any major plan for "inter-larding" or "encadrement" which would move U.S. personnel directly into decision-making roles. Their opposition ended conference consideration of the proposals advanced by the Sullivan memorandum.

In a long draft memorandum, dated June 13, 1964, Sullivan added some further insight into US/GVN relations and into the views of Lodge and Westmoreland about national priorities, beyond what is shown in the CINCPAC record of the Conference.

    In attempting to accomplish many of these programs, we have encountered resistance both from the Vietnamese and from our own U.S. Mission. Ambassador Lodge . . . fears that the increased introduction of Amercans would give a colonial coloration to our presence there and would cause the Vietnamese to depend more and more on our execution of their programs. The Vietnamese . . . have some fear of appearing to be American puppets . . . Finally, there is some indication that they are reluctant to associate themselves too closely with the Americans until they feel more confident of ultimate American intentions.

    At the current moment, there is great doubt and confusion in Vietnam about U.S. determination . . . As a leading Saigon newspaper said on June 12: "We must be vigilant and we must be ready to meet any eventuality so as to avoid the possible shameful sacrifice and dishonor to our country as in the past."

    Given this sort of atmosphere in South Vietnam, it is very difficult to persuade the Vietnamese to commit themselves to sharp military confrontations with the communists if they suspect that something in the way of a negotiated deal is being concocted behind their backs. Consequently, many of the actions which we are pressing on the South Vietnamese are flagging because of this uncertainty...

    Both Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland, at the Honolulu Conference expressed the opinion that the situation in South Vietnam would "jog along" at the current stalemated pace unless some dramatic "victory" could be introduced to put new steel and confidence into the Vietnamese leadership. General Westmoreland defined "victory" as a determination to take some new vigorous military commitment, such as air strikes against Viet Cong installations in the Laos corridor. Ambassador Lodge defined "victory" as a willingness to make punitive air strikes against North Vietnam. The significant fact about both . . . suggestions was that they looked toward some American decision to undertake a commitment which the Vietnamese would interpret as a willingness to raise the military ante and eschew negotiations begun from a position of weakness.

    While it is almost impossible to establish measurements of Vietnamese morale, we are able to say that there is not at the current moment a single galvanized national purpose, expressed in the government leadership and energizing all elements of the country with a simple sense of confidence.

The selective Westmoreland plan offered hope and was sufficiently general to avoid specific opposition. The conference agreed that Saigon should complete the plan and work urgently on its implementation.

Several more minor decisions were made on unilateral matters. "Czar" powers for information were put in the hands of Zorthian. It was agreed that the DCM should be strengthened with a "truly executive man," and there was to be a clearing-of-decks on the military side in Saigon through reductions in social activities and cut-downs in dependents. None of these measures was expected to affect the dubious prognosis for the next 3-6 months. The best that could be hoped for was a slight gain by the end of the year.

There was serious discussion of military plans and intelligence estimates regarding wider actions outside South Vietnam. Subjects included the conduct of military operations in Laos, a major build-up of forces, and planning of possible air strikes against North Vietnam. The conclusion reached was that the somewhat less pessimistic estimate of the present situation afforded the opportunity to further refine these plans.

    The conference concluded that the crucial actions for the immediate future were (1) to prosecute an urgent information effort in the United States toward dispelling the basic doubts of the value of Southeast Asia which were besetting key members of Congress and the public in the budding "great debate," and (2) to start diplomatic efforts with the Thais, Australians, New Zealanders, Philippines, and the French on matters within their cognizance which impinged on our effort in South Vietnam.
    Upon his return to Washington, the Secretary of State cabled Saigon a specific listing of the Washington understanding of the ten actions that were to be taken to expand U.S. and Vietnamese activities in the super-critical provinces. The gist of the actions is as follows:

    (1) Move in additional VN troops to assure numerical superiority over VC.
    (2) Assign control of all troops in province to province chief.
    (3) Develop and execute detailed hamlet by hamlet "oil spot" and "clear and hold" operations plans for each of the approximate 40 districts.
    (4) Introduce a system of population control (curfews, ID papers, intelligence network).
    (5) Increase the province police force.
    (6) Expand the information program.
    (7) Develop a special economic aid program for each province.
    (8) Add additional U.S. personnel

        320 military province and district advisors
        40 USOF province and district advisors
        74 battalion advisors (2 from each of 37 battalions)
        ----
        434

    (9) Transfer military personnel to fill existing and future USOM shortages.
    (10) Establish joint US/GVN teams to monitor the program at both national and provincial level.

The message concluded by asking Saigon to forward specific proposals to effect these decisions and a time schedule, "earliest." The plan to give province advisors a petty cash fund received so little support that there is no mention of it in either CINCPAC or the State Conference Record.

Upon his return to Saigon on June 4 Ambassador Lodge went straight from the airport to call on General Khanh. While Lodge mentions in his report that the subject of low ARVN strength was raised as a matter to be improved upon, the main thrust of his talk with Khanh was to hint that the USG would in the immediate future be preparing U.S. public opinion for actions against North Vietnam. Khanh was reported to be eager to learn more about the details.

On June 13, Saigon replied to the State request for specific proposals. A MACV study had been completed on point 1 and the RVNAF would be approached. On point 2, it was noted that RF and PF were already under the province chiefs; ARVN would be approached on province command of regulars. A wordy description of "concept" spoke to the remainder of State's ten points. It provoked a long series of specific questions from Washington about the 8 provinces, asking in sort, "How soon can action be initiated?"

On June 25, COMUSMACV sent his request to JCS for an increase of 4,200 U.S. personnel to implement this expanded advisory effort. He viewed these as efforts to "influence the successful planning and execution of the National Pacification Plan." Subsector advisors were to be "a general reinforcement of the pacification effort at district level." Consequently, the MACV terms of reference for subsector advisors were developed to provide that teams would extend the capabilities of USOM and USIS. Guidance was intentionally not specific.

The same day General Westmoreland reported that, with the Ambassador's concurrence, he had called on General Khanh to discUss three military matters:
(1) Augmentation of advisors at battalion level and extension of larger advisory teams to most districts; (2) The urgent need to coordinate pacification efforts in the provinces surrounding Saigon; and (3) The necessity of moving a regiment to Long An (the pacification show-case) as soon as possible. General Khanh's reply was very receptive and agreeable on all matters.

On June 26, Lodge sent his last message as Ambassador reporting that he and General Westmoreland had that day met with General Khanh and had reached "general agreement" on the concept, scope, and organization set forth in the Saigon reply of June 13 (referred to above).

Meanwhile the proposal for a province advisors' fund reappeared in a new form, and won quick approval. USOM agreed that AID should spend $200,000 from its contingency funds for direct purchase of piasters, to allocate to sector advisors for small expenditures (usually less than $25 at a time). The funds were to buy local materials and services for projects using AID commodities; and their use was to be coordinated with the Vietnamese Province Chief. By subsequent US/GVN agreement, all uses of these funds and commodities, and requisitions of the commodities from Saigon warehouses, required unanimous approval of a three-man ("troika") Provincial Coordinating Committee consisting of the Province Chief, the U.S. AID Provincial Representative and the MACV Sector Advisor. The troika sign-off had already applied to the commodities, as the means to the U.S. veto on their use mentioned above in Section A. Except for a high-level agreement each year on the size and overall allocation of these resources, Saigon allowed the Provinces full freedom of action in their use. The intent of this arrangement was to permit prompt action on urgent projects, unaffected by the delays in the GVN administration that plagued regular GVN operations. It also interfered with corrupt misuse of the AID commodities and of purchase piasters.

II. AMBASSADOR TAYLOR'S FIRST SEVEN MONTHS: PLANNING FOR "BOMB NORTH" AMID TURBULENCE IN THE SOUTH

A. AMBASSADOR TAYLOR'S INITIATION, JULY, 1964

Ambassador Taylor arrived in Saigon amid the start of planning to extend the war outside the borders of South Vietnam. Rusk had discussed the options with Khanh on June 1, and the participants of the Honolulu Conference had mulled them over further. Although there was no formal decision to recommend new operations in Laos or North Vietnam, there was an atmosphere of expectation. A joint State-Defense message on June 27 authorized joint planning with the Vietnamese Joint General Staff for cross border operations in Laos; on June 30, Westmoreland discussed it with General Khiem, who agreed to initiate joint planning.

Taylor came with a letter of support from the President that cleared up any previous doubt about the Ambassador's control over MACV:

    I want you to have this formal expression not only of my confidence but of my desire that you have and exercise full responsibility for the effort of the United States in South Vietnam . . . I wish it clearly understood that this overall responsibility includes the whole military effort in South Vietnam and authorizes the degree of command and control that you consider appropriate.

Either the letter was intended to prevent confusion of authority such as existed among Lodge, Felt, and Harkins, or the expectation of greater militarization of the war made it appropriate to appoint Taylor Ambassador and to give him unchallenged authority.

Taylor met Khanh and presented his credentials on July 8. Khanh promised him "the frank cooperation of a soldier." He said the U.S. should not merely advise, but should participate in making and implementing plans; in this he still held the view he had expressed to Taylor when he, Khanh, was still a Corps Commander. (By referring to Zorthian's contacts with the Minister of Information, Khanh made it clear he had the brain trust idea in mind.) However, he noted that this degree of involvement should be kept secret, because of the criticism it would attract if known. They discussed Minh's trips around the country, and agreed these were useful and constructive. Finally, Taylor stressed the importance of Vietnamese unity and resolve.

The next day Taylor called on the three Vice Premiers, Hoan, Do Mau, and Oanh, and received the civilian point of view. Hoan did most of the talking, saying that civilian politicians like himself wanted the Army to be supported by the people, but that Khanh and the MRC were difficult to work with: The ruling generals control everything. He said the II Corps Commander lived like a playboy, and that the people were outraged; "ever since we came to power we have been telling population we are soon going to have change, but it never comes. The people are becoming impatient." Moreover, he said, something must be done to raise the standard of behavior of the armed forces toward the population. Taylor received these views diplomatically.

For a while there was a serious effort to go through with close meshing of USOM and GVN planning. On July 17 USOM met with Khanh, Hoan, Oanh and others as a group, which Khanh designated the National Security Council. They discussed joint planning and further meshing of US/GVN organizations, putting the stamp of approval on the arrangement in the Ministry of Information. On July 23 Taylor met Khanh and discussed a second meeting of the NSC. Khanh said the Vietnamese had some difficulty in adjusting their ministerial organization to the requirements of meshing with the U.S. mission subdivisions. Taylor responded that reciprocal adjustments were possible. Planning and discussion of cross-border operations continued actively. Offensive guerrilla operations in Laos were a major idea; small operations had already begun into North Vietnam, under OPLAN 34A. In the meeting on July 23, Khanh told Taylor he wanted to intensify the operations under 34A and to start air strikes against North Vietnam. He said again, as he had to Rusk on June 1, that he didn't like to look forward to the long, indecisive pull of the in-country pacification program, and doubted that the Army and the people would carry on indefinitely.

The events of July 19-23 made it clear that GVN was straining at the leash; it started public lobbying for cross-border operations. On July 19 Air Marshal Ky spilled the beans to reporters on plans for operations into Laos. Khanh committed a similar indiscretion at a "Unification Rally" on the 19th, and these were followed by GVN press releases and editorials in the Saigon press urging a "march to the North." All these leaks directly violated Khanh's promises to Rusk on June 1. Taylor spoke to Khanh sharply about them, and pointed out that they could be interpreted as a campaign to force the USG's hand. Khanh insisted that such a campaign was the furthest thing from his mind; and then confirmed that it was exactly what he had in mind. Following a long, eloquent repetition of his remarks of other occasions on Vietnamese war-weariness, he asked: Why does not the USG recognize that the appearance of North Vietnamese draftees among the prisoners taken in the I Corps meant that the war had entered a new phase and the USG and GVN must respond with new measures? He said Vietnamese spirits had been raised by President Johnson's firm statements earlier in the year (specifically, Los Angeles, January 21), but that following them nothing had happened. The effect was wearing off, and the communists would conclude they were only words. Then Khanh took the offensive and complained to Taylor that U.S. officials were contradicting him in public statements. For example, MACV had denied that there was an invasion of I Corps by DRV units, as Khanh had claimed in a speech at Danang. Zorthian soothed him by saying that MACV merely corrected a misquotation of one of MACV's own officials; Taylor said no U.S. official would knowingly contradict Khanh.

Taylor took all this patiently, as he did an intelligence report that said Khanh was trying to incite the USG to action against North Vietnam. (The report also said that Ky was saying privately that the GVN should go it alone, because the USG was stalling on account of the U.S. election.) USOM conjectured that Goldwater's nomination had precipitated the "go North" movement. Moreover, within two hours after Khanh's long meeting with Taylor, the Ministry of Defense let fly another press release in the teeth of USOM disapproval, when Khanh ordered the Ministry to reject Zorthian's suggested changes. The only explanation offered was that GVN was extremely sensitive about appearing to be a U.S. puppet.

In an analysis of these events, Taylor argued for tolerance and patience with GVN, and showed no hint of a desire to get tough. He noted that political sniping and maneuvering pressed Khanh to do something dramatic to bolster his support. Taylor feared the GVN might get tired and want to negotiate if they could not get the U.S. more involved. He proposed joint contingency plan-fling for bombing North Vietnam as a means to cool GVN off and to reopen communications with them.
In a long conversation on July 24 Khanh discussed his political problems with Taylor and asked him point blank if he should resign. Taylor flatly said no, that the USG still supported him and definitely wanted no further change in GVN. Khanh then asked for a declaration of support and for pressure on the generals to continue to support him; Taylor agreed. (Comment: Much of Khanh's political problem still revolved around Minh, who had long had good relations with Taylor. This relationship may have worried Khanh, and led him to approach Taylor in this way. However, it may have merely been a way to keep up the pressure on USG on the matter of bombing North. A couple of days later Khanh was again grumbling publicly about being a U.S. puppet.)

In response to Taylor's discussion of GVN motives and of ways to make them happy, State authorized him to tell Khanh the USG had considered attacks on North Vietnam that might begin, for example, if the pressure from dissident South Vietnamese factions became too great. He must keep this confidential. It said to tell him that the USG position had not changed, and that it never excluded the possibility of wider action. When Taylor brought this matter to Khanh for discussion, they first agreed on a GVN announcement of an increase in U.S. personnel and discussed the press leaks on going North. Khanh then took the offensive, complaining to Taylor about press stories suggesting the USG was negotiating with the Chinese through the Pakistani Government, behind the back of GVN. Taylor soothed him by saying that the USG was merely letting China know how firm our policy was. When Taylor asked Khanh his views of U.S. policy, Khanh said he wanted pressure on the North, meaning a bombing campaign. Taylor replied with the position that State had authorized on joint planning. Khanh acted pleased and surprised, promised to think it over, and promised to hold it tightly. He also said he wanted to reorganize GVN to strengthen his own position; Taylor asked for specifics, and urged him not to do anything drastic that would stir up trouble.

B. THE TONKIN INCIDENTS AND THE POLiCY PROGNOSES, AUGUST, 1964

Within a week, North Vietnamese PT boats attacked the U.S. destroyer Maddox, in admitted retaliation for an attack by South Vietnamese boats on two North Vietnamese islands. Then a disputed further attack of North Vietnamese PT boats on the Maddox and the Turner Joy on August 4 provoked a U.S. retaliatory raid on the main North Vietnamese PT boat base and its support facilities. The raids lifted GVN's spirits, as expected, and encouraged Khanh to clamp down internally. On August 7, he proclaimed a state of emergency, the idea he had been discussing for some time with both Lodge and Taylor. He reimposed censorship and restricted movement; but he left politicians and potential coup-plotters alone. Also on August 7, the U.S. Congress in joint session passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

On August 8, Westmoreland discussed overall joint planning with Khanh; the question of combined command came up, and Westmoreland mentioned the example of Korea. Both agreed to postpone this issue.

On August 14, State directed Saigon to avoid actions that could be called provocative, like the DESOTO patrols (which the Maddox and the Turner Joy had been doing when attacked) and 34A operations. State noted that the U.S. retaliatory raid's effect on GVN's morale would be temporary, and took a pessimistic view of the USOM reports:

    Mission's monthly report (Saigon 377) expresses hope of significant gains by end of year. But also says Khanh's chances of staying in power are only 50-50, that leadership . . . has symptoms defeatism and hates prospect of slugging it out within country, that there will be mounting pressures for wider action "which, if resisted, will create frictions and irritations which could lead local politicians to serious consideration negotiated solution or local soldiers to military adventure without U.S. consent" . . . Our actions of last week lifted . . . morale temporarily, but also aroused expectations, and morale could easily sag back again if VC have successes and we do nothing further.

The cable went on to state that an essential element of U.S. policy was to devise the best possible means of action--minimum risks for maximum results in terms of SVN morale and pressure on DRV. In the context of a possible new Geneva conference on Laos, its prognosis was that pressure on the North would be the main vehicle for success:

    Basically solution in both South Vietnam and Laos will require combination military pressure and some form of communication under which Hanoi (and Peiping) eventually accept idea of getting out. Negotiation without continued military action will not achieve our objectives in foreseeable future . . . After, but only after, we have established clear pattern pressure hurting DRV and leaving no doubts in South Vietnam of our resolve, we could even accept conference broadened to include Vietnam issue. (Underlining in original.)

On the touchy aspect of US/GVN relations, it simply said:

    Joint US/GVN planning already covers possible actions against DRV and the Panhandle. It can be used in itself to maintain morale of GVN leadership, as well as to control and inhibit any unilateral GVN moves.

The Taylor reply to the above message differed only in emphasis.

    ....Underlying our analysis is the apparent assumption of DepTel 439 (which we believe is correct) that the present in-country pacification plan is not enough in itself to maintain National morale or to offer reasonable hope of eventual success. Something must be added in the coming months.

    Statement of the problem--A. The course which U.S. policy in South Vietnam should take during the coming months can be expressed in terms of four objectives. The first and most important objective is to gain time for the Khanh government to develop a certain stability and to give some firm evidence of viability. Since any of the courses of action considered in this cable carry a considerable measure of risk to the U.S., we should be slow to get too deeply involved in them until we have a better feel of the quality of our ally. In particular, if we can avoid it, we should not get involved militarily with North Vietnam and possibly with Red China if our base in South Vietnam is insecure and Khanh's Army is tied down everywhere by the VC insurgency. Hence, it is to our interest to gain sufficient time not only to allow Khanh to prove that he can govern, but also to free Saigon from the VC threat which presently rings it and assure that sufficient GVN ground forces will be available to provide a reasonable measure of defense against any DRV ground reaction which may develop in the execution of our program and thus avoid the possible requirement for a major U.S. ground force commitment.

    A second objective in this period is the maintenance of morale in South Vietnam, particularly within the Khanh government. This should not be difficult in the case of the government if we can give Khanh assurance of our readiness to bring added pressure on Hanoi if he provides evidence of ability to do his part. Thirdly, while gaining time for Khanh, we must be able to hold the DRV in check and restrain a further buildup of Viet Cong strength by way of infiltration from the North. Finally, throughout this period, we should be developing a posture of maximum readiness for a deliberate escalation of pressure against North Vietnam, using January 1, 1965, as a target D-Day. We must always recognize, however, that events may force us to advance D-Day to a considerably earlier date....

    In approaching the Khanh Government, we should express our willingness to Khanh to engage in planning and eventually to exert intense pressure on North Vietnam, providing certain conditions are met in advance. In the first place before we would agree to go all out against the DRy, he must stabilize his Government and make some progress in cleaning up his operational backyard. Specifically, he must execute the initial phases of the Hop Tac Plan successfully to the extent of pushing the Viet Cong from the doors of Saigon. The overall pacification program, including Hop Tac, should progress sufficiently to allow earmarking at least three division equivalents for the Defense in I Corps if the DRV step up military operations in that area.

    Finally, we should reach some fundamental understandings with Khanh and his Government concerning war aims. We must make clear that we will engage in action against North Vietnam only for the purpose of assuring the security and independence of South Vietnam within the territory assigned by the 1954 agreements; that we will not repeat not join in a crusade to unify the North and South; that we will not repeat not even seek to overthrow the Hanoi Regime provided the latter will cease its efforts to take over the South by subversive warfare.

    With these understandings reached, we would be ready to set in motion the following:

        (1) Resume at once 34A (with emphasis on Marine operations) and Desoto patrols. These could start without awaiting outcome of discussions with Khanh.
        (2) Resume U-2 overflights over all NVN.
        (3) Initiate air and ground strikes in Laos against infiltration targets as soon as joint plans now being worked out with the Khanh Government are ready....

    Before proceeding beyond this point, we should raise the level of precautionary military readiness (if not already done) by taking such visible measures as introducing U.S. hawk units to Danang and Saigon, landing a Marine force at Danang for defense of the airfield and beefing up MACV's support base. By this time (assumed to be late fall) we should have some reading on Khanh's performance.

    Assuming that his performance has been satisfactory and that Hanoi has failed to respond favorably, it will be time to embark on the final phase of course of action A, a carefully orchestrated bombing attack on NVN, directed primarily at infiltration and other military targets .

    Pros and cons of course of action--A. If successful, course of action A will accomplish the objectives set forth at the outset as essential to the support of U.S. policy in South Vietnam. I will press the Khanh Government into doing its homework in pacification and will limit the diversion of interest to the out-of-country ventures . . . It gives adequate time for careful preparation estimated at several months, while doing sufficient at once to maintain internal morale. It also provides ample warning to Hanoi and Peking to allow them to adjust their conduct before becoming over-committed.

    On the other hand, course of action A relies heavily upon the durability of the Khanh Government. It assumes that there is little danger of its collapse without notice or of its possible replacement by a weaker or more unreliable successor . . . Also, because of the drawn-out nature of the program, it is exposed to the danger of international political pressure to enter into negotiations before NVN is really hurting from the pressure directed against it.

    Statement of the Problem--B. It may well be that the problem of U.S. policy in SVN is more urgent than that depicted in the foregoing statement. It is far from clear at the present moment that the Khanh Government can last until January 1, 1965, although the application of course of action A should have the effect of strengthening the Government internally and of silencing domestic squabbling. If we assume, however, that we do not have the time available which is implicit in course of action A (several months), we would have to restate the problem in the following terms. Our objective avoid the possible consequences of a collapse of National morale. To accomplish these purposes, we would have to open the campaign against the DRV without delay, seeking to force Hanoi as rapidly as possible to desist from aiding the VC and to convince the DRV that it must cooperate in calling off the VC insurgency.

    Course of action--B. To meet this statement of the problem, we need an accelerated course of action, seeking to obtain results faster than under course of action A. Such an accelerated program would include the following actions:

    Again we must inform Khanh of our intentions, this time expressing a willingness to begin military pressures against Hanoi at once providing that he will undertake to perform as in course of action A. However, U.S. action would not await evidence of performance.

    Again we may wish to communicate directly on this subject with Hanoi or awaiting effect of our military actions. The scenario of the ensuing events would be essentially the same as under Course A but the execution would await only the readiness of plans to expedite, relying almost exclusively on U.S. military means.

    Pros and cons of Course of Action B. This course of action asks virtually nothing from the Khanh Government, primarily because it is assumed that little can be expected from it. It avoids the consequence of the sudden collapse of the Khanh Government and gets underway with minimum delay the punitive actions against Hanoi. Thus, it lessens the chance of an interruption of the program by an international demand for negotiations by presenting a fait accompli to international critics. However, it increases the likelihood of U.S. involvement in ground action, since Khanh will have almost no available ground forces which can be released from pacification employment to mobile resistance of DRV attacks.

    Conclusion: It is concluded that Course of Action A offers the greater promised achievement of U.S. policy objectives in SVN during the coming months. However, we should always bear in mind the fragility of the Khanh Government and be prepared to shift quickly to Course of Action B if the situation requires. In either case, we must be militarily ready for any response which may be initiated by NVN or by CHICOMS.

    Miscellaneous: As indicated above, we believe that 34A operations should resume at once at maximum tempo, still on a covert basis; similarly, Desoto patrols should begin advance operating outside 12-mile limit. We concur that a number of VNAF pilots should be trained on B-57's between now and first of year. There should be no change now with regard to policy on evacuation of U.S. dependents.

    Recommendations: It is recommended that USG adopt Course of Action A while maintaining readiness to shift to Course of Action B.

C. THE RISE AND FALL OF KHANH'S CONSTITUTION

In a state of euphoria after the U.S. reprisals, Khanh broached the subject of a new constitution with Taylor on August 12; presumably this was what he had in mind on July 27 when he mentioned reorganization (above, p. 328). He proposed three branches of government beneath the MRC. The Assembly would have 90 appointed members and 60 elected; Khanh would be the President (and Minh wouldn't). Taylor urged Khanh to go slowly, and to handle the matter gently. Taylor feared renewed political instability if sweeping government changes were announced; but Khanh said that the country could not progress under the existing government. Taylor expressed his scepticism, but objected no further than to caution Khanh on the need to explain these changes adequately in advance.

On August 14, after an NSC joint planning session, Khanh showed Taylor a rough English translation of his proposed new constitution. Taylor expressed reservations:

    We found it brusque in language and suggested to Khanh that in present form it could raise criticism in U.S. and world press. We stressed to him that internal problems of acceptance in Vietnam were his own affair, and we could only offer observations on the objective issue of international reactions.

Khanh allowed Sullivan and Manful to work briefly with his drafting committee, the same day, but they worked in such haste that they had little influence. Taylor commented:

    We conclude that Khanh and his military colleagues have decided that this sort of change is indispensable. It is of course still not determined what General Minh's view will be. We have considered possibility of seeking legal aid from Washington to review this charter, but feel this would not repeat not be useful because this document departs so widely from U.S. experience and because time is so short, we have decided that our best efforts would be devoted to (1) making wording of document less brusque and more palatable both in VN and abroad, and (2) assisting in proclamation and other sources of public relations nature explaining necessity for this sort of change. Whether we like it or not, this is the constitutional form which the MRC repeat MRC fully intends to impose, and we see no repeat no alternative but to make the best of it.

When Khanh secured MRC approval of the final draft on August 16, they also elected him President, displacing Minh. Khanh had earlier complained to Taylor that he had kept Minh, a big source of trouble to him, only at Lodge's urging, as indeed he had. Inasmuch as Khanh had seized power using charges against four generals and using unproved allegations against Minh, and inasmuch as Minh was still a popular figure, Khanh was bound to regard Minh as a threat to his personal prospects.

For several days following the announcement of the new constitution, a head of steam built up among students and Buddhists. There is no sign that the Embassy did anything to anticipate or head off the coming trouble, other than the previously mentioned words of caution that Khanh disregarded. On August 21, student demonstrations broke out. Violence built up in the streets, organized and orchestrated by the Buddhists and the VC.

Taylor called on Khanh on August 24 in his Dalat retreat to tell him how seriously the Embassy viewed the demonstrations. The discussion revolved around "public information" and completion of arrangements for the new government. Khanh agreed to announce the members of the new government by Thursday, the 27th, and to meet the Buddhist leadership to hear their complaints and to try to enlist their help. He also promised to meet some student demands, to crack down on the demonstrations, and to enforce the old mobilization decrees plus new ones.

State responded to these events with a public announcement of support for Khanh in more direct language than any previously used:

    The United States government fully recognizes the need for national unity in South Vietnam and is, therefore, supporting the Khanh government as the best means of building such unity at the same time that the war effort is being prosecuted. Obviously anything of a divisive nature is neither in the interest of the Vietnamese government nor its people.

That evening Khanh met three top Buddhist leaders in Saigon, after they refused to go to Dalat. Their principal demands, among eight, were the immediate abrogation of the August 16 charter and the holding of free elections by November 1, 1965. Khanh made the mistake of telling them he would have to consult the Americans.
Taylor and others met Khanh at 1:00 a.m. August 25. Observing diplomatic propriety, Taylor said his tentative personal views as an interested third party were that Khanh should not knuckle under to a minority group on such an important issue as the August 16 charter, especially under an ultimatum. Khanh agreed and proposed to issue a more limited proclamation immediately (which he did at 5:00 am.) that would meet certain concerns of the Buddhists and students.

Khanh's proclamation promised to revise the constitution, diminish censorship, rectify local abuses of government, and permit orderly demonstrations. The Buddhists and students were not satisfied; they formed a mob outside his office, to which he spoke briefly without further concession. The mob failed to disperse, and the authorities left them alone. Then without advance notice, military headquarters (Khanh) announced that afternoon that Khanh had resigned, that the August 16 charter would be withdrawn, and that the MRC would meet the next day to choose a new Chief of State and would then dissolve itself.

Taylor had made it clear to Minh, Khiem, Lam and Khanh that the U.S. favored retaining Khanh as head of the GVN. Both Tn Quang and Tam Chau, fearing a Dai Viet takeover, supported Khanh. Aligned against Khanh were elements of the military angered by Khanh's "down with military dictatorship" statement made from a truck top and the Dai Viet (including Khiem, Hoan and Minh) angered by his appeasement of the Buddhists.

On August 26 and 27, the MRC met, while violence erupted in the streets of Saigon. The evening of the 27th they announced that a triumvirate consisting of Generals Khanh, Minh, and Khiem would rule as an interim government while they tried to form a new one. Khanh withdrew to Dalat, and Vice-Premier Oanh became acting Prime Minister. Violence continued, and coup rumors became especially active.

On August 29, a State Department official briefed the press, interpreting events. He said Buddhists and students interpreted the August 16 charter as a return to Diemism and repression; in meeting their demands the MRC had worried some Catholics, but balanced things out by creating the triumvirate with all views represented. He said the charter had not been the USG's idea, but that we had been consulted and had urged delay. The demonstrations did not contain appreciable anti-Americanism, he said, nor did they arise from differences between the "go North" feelings of the military and refugee Cathotics, on the one hand, and neutralist sentiments of students and Buddhists, on the other. However, the cable reporting the press conference to the Embassy showed concern on both these latter points.

D. GVN ACQUIRES A CIVILIAN FLAVOR, AND THE USG REVIEWS PRIORITIES

On August 29th, Vietnamese paratroopers armed with bayonets restored order in Saigon. Khanh rested in Dalat; Taylor called on him on the 31st to try to persuade him to return to Saigon quickly to prove he was in charge. West-moreland went to see Khanh the next day to urge him to keep ARVN on the offensive and to press on with Hop Tac and other pacification; in exchange for reassurances, Westmoreland revised a previous position and promised that U.S. advisors through MACV would alert Khanh to unusual troop movements. Westmoreland also obtained reassurances from General Khiem. Rusk suggested a letter from President Johnson urging Khanh to return to Saigon, and then cabled the text of such a letter. A Dai Viet coup attempt was blocked by the junior members of the MRC, who had now become powerful. Several Generals went to Dalat to persuade Khanh to return as Prime Minister, which he promised to do in a few days. Khanh did return to Saigon on September 4. Minh was to be chairman of the triumvirate, and would appoint a new High National Council to represent all elements in the population. The Council was to prepare a new constitution and return the government to civilian leadership within a month or so. Khanh was taking the line that he wanted to get the Army out of politics. When Taylor cautioned Khanh, just before the latter's return to Saigon, that an all-civilian government would be too weak and would tend toward neutralism, Khanh replied that the Army would be vigilant. Taylor again advised Khanh to lay the groundwork better before any more changes in government structure. When the Triumvirate announced the creation of the NHC, they also ended the state of emergency and press censorship, which they had declared on September 6.

On the morning of September 6, as he was leaving for Washington, Taylor sent Rusk a full review of the crisis and of its effects on the Embassy-State military and political appraisal of mid-August. He said that the USG now had to give up on the idea of using a plan for pressures on the North as leverage to get the GVN to press on with pacification, and should go ahead with these pressures in the hope that they would raise Vietnamese morale enough to keep up their war effort:

    ....While we must be disappointed by the political turmoil of recent days, we cannot consider it totally unexpected. The very nature of the social, political and ethnic confusion in this country makes governmental turbulence of this type a factor which we will always have with us.

    What has emerged from these recent events is a definition within fairly broad limits of the degree to which perfectability in government can be pushed. It should be remembered that the recent fracas started when Khanh sought to make his broad and cumbersome government more tractable and more effective. His motives were of the best even though his methods were clumsy. But now, after this recent experience at government improvement we must accept the fact that an effective government, much beyond the capacity of that which has existed over the past several months, is unlikely to survive. We now have a better feel for the quality of our ally and for what we can expect from him in terms of ability to govern. Only the emergence of an exceptional leader could improve the situation and no George Washington is in sight.

    Consequently, we can and must anticipate for the future an instrument of government which will have definite limits of performance. At the very worst, it will continue to seek a broadened consensus involving and attempting to encompass all or most of the minority of popular front. This amalgam, if it takes form, may be expected in due course to become susceptible to an accommodation with the liberation front, which might eventually lead to a collapse of all political energy behind the pacification effort.

    At best, the emerging governmental structure might be capable of maintaining a holding operation against the Viet Cong. This level of effort could, with good luck and strenuous American efforts, be expanded to produce certain limited pacification successes, for example, in the territory covered by the Hop Tac plan. But the willingness and ability of such a government to exert itself or to attempt to execute an all-out National pacification plan would be marginal. It would probably be incapable of galvanizing the people to the heightened level of unity and sacrifice necessary to carry forward the counter-insurgency program to final success. Instead, it would look increasingly to the United States to take the major responsibility for prying the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese off the backs of the South Vietnamese population. The politicians in Saigon and Hue feel today that the political hassle is their appropriate arena: The conflict with the VC belongs to the Americans.

    We may, therefore, expect to find ourselves faced with a choice of (A) passively watching the development of a popular front, knowing that this may in due course require the U.S. to leave Vietnam in failure; or (B) actively assuming increased responsibility for the outcome following a time-schedule consistent with our estimate of the limited viability of any South Vietnamese government.

    An examination of our total world responsibilities and the significance of Vietnam in relationship to them clearly rules out the option of accepting course (A). If we leave Vietnam with our tail between our legs, the consequences of this defeat in the rest of Asia, Africa, and Latin America would be disastrous. We therefore would seem to have little choice left except to accept course (B).

    Our previous views on the right course of action to follow in South Vietnam are set forth in EMBTEL 465. The discussion in this present cable amounts to a recognition that course of action A repeat A of EMBTEL 465 no longer corresponds with the realities of the situation. Recent events have revealed the weakness of our ally and have convinced us of the improbability of attaining the level of governmental performance desired under course A before embarking on a campaign of pressure against the DRV. We are forced back on course of action B with certain revised views on timing.

He went on to recommend that escalating pressures on the DRV begin around December 1.

Taylor brought with him General Westmoreland's assessment of the military situation; it included a look at the political situation from a completely different viewpoint from Taylor's:

    ....1. In preparation for your trip to Washington, I thought it might be useful to give you my assessment of the military situation. In subsequent paragraphs I outline in some detail the rather substantial progress which we have already made and, more importantly, the great potential for additional progress. I also describe military problem areas. These, as you know, are many; but all are susceptible to solution assuming that political stability can be achieved, and that armed forces, particularly the Army, remains intact and unified in its purpose. Under the present circumstances, however, the continued solidarity of the armed forces is in doubt. As all else depends on holding the armed forces together, I address this matter first.

    The Key Military Issue.

    2. It seems to me there are certain conditions which must be met in order to preserve the structure and effectiveness of the RVNAF:

        A. The officers of the RVNAF must be protected against purge, solely by reason of religious or political affiliation. The Commander in Chief, the officers of the Joint General Staff and commanders down the line, must be given some assurance that their careers and reputations will not be sacrificed, for political expediency to the ambitions or interests of political or religious blocs.
        B. The Officers' Corps must be assured that its members will not be punished or expelled from the armed forces if they faithfully execute the orders of constituted authority in connection with the maintenance of law and order. They must be assured that their superiors will not accede to the arbitrary demands of pressure groups whose interest it is to destroy the discipline of the armed forces and to render ineffective the forces of law and order.

    3. If I interpret correctly the events of the past two weeks, neither of these minimum conditions have been met. To the contrary, actions best calculated to destroy the morale, the unity, the pride and confidence of the armed forces have transpired in a manner which leads me to believe that a relative free hand has been given to those who aim to destroy the armed forces. The demands of the Buddhists for the resignation of the Commander in Chief, the Chief of Staff, Commander of II Corps, the Prefect of Saigon and the Director of National Police, to name a few, appear to be blows directed at the heart of the security forces which stand between the Viet Cong and victory. I cannot believe that it is in the interests of the Nation to accede to these demands. To the contrary, I am persuaded that acceptance is a formula for political and military disaster. While aware that the insurgency cannot be overcome by military means alone, I am equally aware that without a strong military foundation no program will ever achieve victory. I am concerned that the Government of Vietnam has already moved some distance down the wrong road in dealing with its Armed Forces. I do not know whether the Armed Forces will collapse or whether, finding the present course intolerable, they will make a desperate move to regain power. Neither course of action is compatible with the objective we seek.

In Washington, Taylor, Rusk, McNamara and Wheeler reached a consensus that (1) Khanh and GVN were too exhausted to be thinking about moves against the North, (2) GVN needs reassurance, and (3) Khanh is likely to stay in control, but not to get much done on the pacification program. There followed NSAM 314, whose main point was that "first order of business at present is to take actions which will help strengthen the fabric of the GVN."

E. THE HNC GOES TO WORK AMID FURTHER TURBULENCE

Helping strengthen the fabric of GVN proved to be easier said than done.
Another coup attempt on September 13 failed when Ky and Thi, along with other young officers, supported the existing government. The USG opposed the coup, and also opposed overt violence to suppress it; in particular, USG opposed VNAF bombing of Saigon, which was threatened at one point when the coup generals gained control of much of the city. When Khanh and Ky asked for U.S. Marines, the USG refused; State authorized a strong line in favor of the Triumvirate, and against internecine war:

    (A) It is imperative that there not be internecine war within VN Armed Forces.
    (B) The picture of petty bickering among VN leaders has created an appalling impression abroad.
    (C) The U.S. has not provided massive assistance to SVN, in military equipment, economic resources and personnel, in order to subsidize continuing quarrels among SVN leaders....
    (G) Emphasize that VN leaders must not take the U.S. for granted.

    2. In line with above you should make it emphatically clear whenever useful, that we do not believe a Phat/Duc government can effectively govern the country or command the necessary popular support to carry forward the effort against the VC. U.S. support for the GVN is based on the triumvirate and its efforts to bring about a broadly based and effective government satisfactorily reflecting the interests and concerns of all groups.

After the coup failed, the Embassy pressed Khanh to exile the coup leaders quietly; and in the upshot they were acquitted of the charges against them.

A fresh problem blew up on September 20 when Rhade tribesmen in four CIDG camps advised by U.S. Special Forces revolted against Saigon's authority. It arose from a long-festering mistrust and contempt between the Montagnards, encouraged by the VC, and the lowland Vietnamese. This problem also vexed US/GVN relations, because the U.S. Special Forces advisors generally got along well with the tribesmen, and some may have sympathized with them; and in particular, it added to Khanh's suspicions of U.S. intentions. Two or three Rhades had become officers in ARVN, and Westmoreland suggested using them as intermediaries with the rebelling units; but Khanh turned the idea down flat. He also declined to make concessions to Montagnard discontent. Then Taylor sent General DePuy as his intermediary to tell the Rhades they were off the payroll until they submitted to GVN authority. This move produced a temporary settlement, but trouble continued to boil up for another two or three weeks.

The High National Council began its deliberations on September 24; Taylor took the occasion to comment that Khanh conceded too much to organized pressure groups. Noting that GVN effectiveness and morale had virtually collapsed, he disliked the purely civilian makeup of the Council, and hoped that it would take its time about writing a permanent constitution. GVN set a deadline of October 27 for this exercise. Watching on the sidelines, here as at other times, Taylor opposed unsettling change, and opposed excessive civilian influence because of their presumed factionalism and lack of fervor in prosecuting the war.

F. THE HNC INSTALLS CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP, OCTOBER, 1964

The view that bombing the North was the key to success received a fresh airing, this time in a public revelation of what USG was thinking. Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy said in a speech delivered in Tokyo on September 30 that such bombing would cut down the threat to GVN in a matter of months.

Early in October, Khanh succeeded in exiling General Khiem, a member of the triumvirate, whom he had suspected of instigating the September 13 coup attempt; Khiem became Ambassador to the U.S.

As the HNC deliberated, State sent Taylor its guidance on the USG position during the formation of the new government-to-be:

    1. We concur that we must . . . avoid any public espousal of charter or people, although we will undoubtedly be charged in any event with considerable responsibility for the selection of the form and personnel of any new government . . . We cannot privately disclaim any preference for individuals or form of government because of our intense interest in seeing a new government having sound organization, able members, and broad basis of popular support. We also want to avoid any private impression that we are dumping Khanh and that as far as we are concerned everything is up for grabs....
    2. As seen from here, evolving political situation in Saigon contains at least two major problems for U.S. EmbTel 1054 strongly suggests HNC is leaning toward parliamentary form of government with all the weaknesses which were so apparent in the French 4th Republic. The second problem, highlighted in EmbTel 983, is to avoid a sharp split between the only real powers in the country, the military, and the civilian HNC. This split could occur over form of government or its personnel. U.S. must try to bring stable government of persons acceptable to both military and civilian.

Thcn there followed three suggestions on form of government and a paragraph on people.

    7. Finally, there is a delicate problem, during this transition period, in our relations with General Khanh and his military supporters. The present truth is they hold such power as exists in SVN. Their acceptance is prerequisite to any successful constitution of a new government. Our problem is that we must not abandon one horse before there is another horse which can run the course. I would suggest: That you have full and frank discussion with General Khanh about how he sees the development of the situation so that what we ourselves do is in consonance with the consensus among military and civilian leadership which it is now our highest purpose to build . . . The important thing is that during this period we not find ourselves in a position where there is no one with whom we can work.

Meanwhile, Minh allied himself with the High National Council to put provisions for civilian control in the new constitution opposed by Khanh and the now powerful junior membership of the MRC. Taylor tried to persuade them to resolve their differences quietly, and to make sure a widely acceptable document was cleared all around before publication. Thinking that things were more likely to get worse rather than better, Secretary Rusk suggested that the USG should prefer Khanh and the "Young Turks" to Minh and the HNC:

    Bob McNamara and I have following reaction to political moves you have reported during last week.

    A struggle seems to be developing between Minh and HNC on one hand and Khanh and Young Turk military on the other. Between these two groups it seems to us our best interests are served if Khanh comes out on top . . . Problem is to get government with Khanh in a leading role, ideally as chief executive unless some strong civilian shows up who is not now apparent. At least Khanh should remain as leader of Army with coequal position to civilians in a government, whose mandate will run for at least 18 months . . . We believe it should be made clear that U.S. does not repeat not support Minh as powerful chief executive.

    This is consensus here and we would much appreciate your comment.

Once again the policy was to limit change and to limit civilian influence. Taylor replied:

    The views which you and Bob McNamara express . . . are very much the same conclusions we have reached and acted upon here.

Minh expected to be the new Chief of State and to name the Prime Minister. Taylor talked to him about the selection problem, saying that he wished to be consulted. Minh asked Taylor's view of Saigon's Mayor Huong and of Minister of the Interior Vien. Taylor diplomatically gave his very high opinion of Vien. State urged Taylor to use his influence freely while he could still influence the shape of the new government.

The High National Council finished on schedule on October 27, and surprised the Embassy by electing its chairman, Phan Khac Suu, an elderly and respected politician, to be the new chief of State. Religious group leaders pressured the HNC into this decision at the last minute. Taylor had hoped and expected Minh would be elected; although the action met Khanh's promise in August that the military would get out of politics. Khanh and his cabinet resigned and went into caretaker status. The HNC stayed on as the legislative body. Taylor tried to make the best of it, but protested to Suu about the failure of the HNC to consult him about Suu's election; Suu responded by discussing the composition of the new cabinet with him, naming Huong as Prime Minister. Taylor also gave Suu the usual polite lecture about the need for strong government. State went along reluctantly with the new government; Khanh and the Young Turks also went along.

G. A QUIET NOVEMBER, 1964

At the end of October, the VC staged a mortar attack on the Bien Hoa air base, destroying several U.S. aircraft and killing four Americans. Taylor urged a reprisal bombing like the one in August following the Tonkin Gulf incidents, but Washington declined to approve. Huong told Taylor he hoped the U.S. would respond, in a meeting to consult on Huong's pending cabinet appointments, but the issue was already decided and Taylor had to discourage the idea.

The new cabinet froze out Minh, no doubt to improve the palatability of the new government to the dominant group in the MRC. Minh then packed up and went abroad on a good will tour; Taylor found the cash cost to the U.S. running high, but recommended paying it. In his overall assessment of the balance of power in the new government, Taylor thought that the MRC had allowed civilians to get power (as promised in August) because the MRC feared mob violence, and thought it expedient to let the civilians make a mess of it so that military rule would again become acceptable. That is, he hoped and expected that a military return to power would become widely acceptable. Taylor thought the overall political prospects were "faintly encouraging." Commenting in reply, State once again emphasized the accepted links between U.S. commitment and GVN morale and efforts:

    A key element in either the immediate program or the long-range course of action will be the nature of our discussions with the GVN. Sullivan has impressed on us the seriousness of SVN doubts as to U.S. intentions....More basically, we believe no course of action can succeed unless we are able to stiffen GVN to set its house in order and take every possible measure for political stability and to push forward the pacification program.

These links received a full airing between Taylor and State and between Taylor and Huong. To State, Taylor said:

    We have had a great deal of discussion here as to the minimum level of government required to justify mounting military pressure against the North. I would describe that minimum government as one capable of maintaining law and order in the urban areas, of securing vital military bases from VC attacks, and giving its efforts with those of USG. As Reference B indicates we do not expect such a government for 3 to 4 months . . . perhaps .not then if the current attempts to chip away at the Huong government continue. . . . However, if the government falters and gives good reason to believe that it will never attain the desired level of performance, I would favor going against the North anyway. The purpose of such an attack would be to give pulmotor treatment for a government in extremis and to make sure that the DRV does not get off unscathed in any final settlement.

In his conversation with Huong, the latter requested:

    That I obtain a reaffirmation of U.S. policy toward VN. Huong referred to U.S. action in Gulf of Tonkin and the lift in morale VN had received at this display of determination by the U.S. to strike against the North. Subsequently, however, U.S. had appeared to emphasize almost exclusively necessity considering war within SVN itself. I responded that reciprocal responsibilities were involved. On the GVN side it was essential that a stable government be established capable of directing affairs of the Nation and particularly of directing the national pacification effort....Should his government demonstrate it was capable of achieving satisfactory degree of government stability and effectiveness a wider range of possibilities would undoubtedly be open for discussion . . . Huong indicated his complete understanding of the situation.

At this time another case of non-consultation blew up. RVNAF reorganization plans had passed back and forth between the MRC and MACV since July. Then, on November 10, the MRC produced a plan that differed materially from the last one MACV had seen, Huong signed it, and it was published on November 11 before MACV could review it. Westmoreland and Taylor both protested to their respective contacts in the strongest terms; the decrees were withdrawn, changed to MACV's satisfaction, and reissued.

On November 26, Westmoreland squelched an apparent coup planned by Ky. He heard of unusual activity at VNAF headquarters and asked Ky to his office. Ky bluntly stated a case for a change of leadership. Westmoreland said:

    After patiently listening to the foregoing, I informed Ky in no uncertain terms that the U.S. government would not support a change of command by other than orderly and legal process. (This statement was cleared in advance with Ambassador Johnson.) Ky was obviously impressed by my statement and said that he would not take action for three months, but if the situation continued to deteriorate he would be constrained to act in national interest.

This episode was the first sign of Young Turk action against the new government, and the first recorded sign of Ky's own ambitions. The U.S. reaction underlined the USG's opposition to sudden change without broad support, even though it was expected that the military would return to power eventually.

H. A LECTURE AND A PROGRAM FOR GVN

NSAM 314, September 10, which had called for actions to strengthen GVN, had set wheels in motion toward spelling out a U.S. program within SVN to complement the contemplated actions against the North. Taylor returned to Washington for consultations at the end of November. In the NSC, he argued that a strong message to GVN about its problems would most likely produce the optimum response. He said a threat by the U.S. to withdraw unless they improve would be too much of a gamble. There was no discussion of intermediate leverage or sanctions between this extreme threat and none at all. The discussion also highlighted the fear that GVN might collapse or be replaced by neutralists who would ask the U.S. to withdraw; all agreed that neutralism could not be accepted, and that the U.S. should minimize this risk by full backing of the existing GVN.

Taylor returned to Saigon with an approved statement and program for GVN that embodied his principal recommendations. Its public aspect was an across the board increase in the approved strengths of all elements of RVNAF and the paramilitary, in support of the Hop Tac pacification plan and its out-growths that had been in the works since July. Its unannounced aspect included a rationale showing a clear shift of emphasis from the views at the highest levels that had developed in the first half of the year. As presented to GVN, it said:

    It was the clear conclusion of the recent review in Washington of the situation in South Vietnam that the unsatisfactory progress being made in the Pacification Program was the result of two primary causes from which many secondary causes stem. The primary cause has been the governmental instability in Saigon, and the second the continued reinforcement and direction of the Viet Cong by the Government of North Vietnam. It was recognized that to change the downward trend of events, it will be necessary to deal adequately with both of these factors.

    However it was the clear view that these factors are not of equal importance. First and above all, there must be a stable, effective Vietnamese Government able to conduct a successful campaign against the Viet Cong even if the aid from North Vietnam for the Viet Cong should end. It was the view that, while the elimination of North Vietnam intervention would raise morale on our side and make it easier for the Government of Vietnam to function, it would not in itself bring an end to Viet Cong insurgency. It would rather be an important contributory factor to the creation of conditions favoring a successful campaign against the Viet Cong within South Vietnam.

    Thus, since action against North Vietnam would only be contributory and not central to winning the war against the Viet Cong, it would not be prudent to incur the risks which are inherent in an expansion of hostilities until there were a government in Saigon capable of handling the serious problems inevitably involved in such an expansion, and capable of promptly and fully exploiting the favorable effects which may be anticipated if we are successful in terminating the support and direction of the Viet Cong by North Vietnam.

Then it went to the point:

    ....In the view of the United States, there is a certain minimum condition to be brought about in South Vietnam before new measures against North Vietnam would be either justified or practicable. At the minimum, the Government in Saigon should be able to speak for and to its people who will need special guidance and leadership throughout the coming critical period. The Government should be capable of maintaining law and order in the principal centers of population, assuring their effective execution by military and police forces completely responsive to its authority. The Government must have at its disposal means to cope promptly and effectively with enemy reactions which must be expected to result from any change in the pattern of our operations.

    To bring about this condition will require a demonstration of far greater national unity against the Communist enemy at this critical time than exists at present. It is a matter of greatest difficulty for the United States Government to require great sacrifices by American citizens on behalf of South Vietnam when reports from Saigon repeatedly give evidence of heedless self-interest and shortsightedness among so many major political groups.

As a quid pro quo, it said:

    .....While the Government of Vietnam is making progress toward achieving the goals set forth above, the United States Government would be willing to strike harder at infiltration routes in Laos and at sea. With respect to Laos, the United States Government is prepared, in conjunction with the Royal Laos Government, to add United States air power as needed to restrict the use of Laotian territory as a route of infiltration into South Vietnam. With respect to the sea, the United States Government would favor an intensification of those covert maritime operations which have proved their usefulness in harassing the enemy. The United States would regard the combination of these operations in Laos and at sea as constituting Phase I of a measured increase of military pressures directed toward reducing infiltration and warning the Government of North Vietnam of the risks it is running.

    .....If the Government of Vietnam is able to demonstrate its effectiveness and capability of achieving the minimum conditions set forth above, the United States Government is prepared to consider a program of direct military pressure on North Vietnam as Phase II.....

    As contemplated by the United States Government, Phase II would, in general terms, constitute a series of air attacks on North Vietnam progressively mounting in scope and intensity for the purpose of convincing the leaders of North Vietnam that it is to their interest to cease aid to the Viet Cong and respect the independence and security of South Vietnam

In short, the USG offered to add some of its aircraft immediately to the Vietnamese ones already bombing the Laotian corridor, in exchange for a GVN promise of a shift to more energy and effectiveness; then when such energy and effectiveness actually became visible, the USG promised, the USG would begin bombing North Vietnam.

The program included the following areas in which progress would aid pacification and would measure the GVN's effectiveness:

    1. and 2. Increasing RVNAF, paramilitary, and police to and above existing authorized strengths.
    3. Better performance by civilian and military officials.
    4. Speeding up budgetary procedures and spending in the provinces.
    5. Strengthening the province chiefs.
    6. Strengthening police powers.
    7. More vigor in Hop Tac.
    8. After a delay, "review cases of political prisoners from previous regimes."

To leave no doubt about what it wanted, the program said:

    Better performance in the prosecution of the war against the Viet Cong needs to be accompanied by actions to convince the people of the interest of their government in their well-being. Better performance in itself is perhaps the most convincing evidence but can be supplemented by such actions as frequent visits by officials and ranking military officers to the provinces for personal orientation and "trouble shooting." The available information media offer a channel of communication with the people which could be strengthened and more efficiently employed. The physical appearance of the cities, particularly of Saigon, shows a let-down in civic pride which, if corrected, would convey a message of governmental effectiveness to their inhabitants. Similarly, in the country an expanded rural development program could carry the government's presence into every reasonably secure village and hamlet.

    If governmental performance and popular appeal are significantly improved, there will be little difficulty in establishing confidence in the government. However, this confidence should be expressed, not merely implied. It is particularly important that the military leaders continue to express public confidence in the government and the firm intention to uphold it. While not giving an impression of submitting to pressure, the government might explore honorable ways of conciliating its most important opponents among the minority groups. The United States Government is prepared to help by oral statements of support and by further assistance to show our faith in the future of South Vietnam.

Taylor, Westmoreland, and Johnson met Huong, Deputy Premier Vien, and namese group politely suggested that they did not know what the USG meant Khanh on December 7 to present them with the new U.S. program. The Viet- (sic) by a stable effective government able to campaign successfully against the Viet Cong, and able to speak for and to its people. Moreover, they noted that the U.S. program said nothing about Viet Cong use of Cambodia. At the next meeting, on December 9, Taylor gave them the paper "Actions Designed to Strengthen the Government of Vietnam," covering the eight areas of desired progress and measures of GVN effectiveness listed above. The Prime Minister replied that the issue of political prisoners from previous regimes was a very delicate matter; Khanh said there was no problem about military support of the existing government. Taylor cabled President Johnson that the USG proposals:

    have been received with an understanding reasonableness in the light of the current situation but without great enthusiasm since they necessarily omit some of the more dramatic actions which the Vietnamese desire.

The only decisions reached were for joint study and consultation. This was the last time the USG tried to set GVN performance preconditions for U.S. force use and deployments. Its effect, if any, was the opposite of that intended.

I. THE GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT VANISHES, AND TAYLOR CONFRONTS THE GENERALS

A new threat of crisis boiled up immediately; first, the leading Buddhists declared their opposition to the government and went on a forty-eight hour hunger strike. Huong stood fast, but then the Young Turks picked a fight through a sudden demand that the HNC dismiss nine generals and thirty other officers. (These included some, like Minh and the "Dalat" generals expelled by Khanh, who no longer had jobs but still held their rank and received Army pay.) Taylor backed Huong and the HNC against all corners, and tried to get Buddhists and others to support them. The HNC refused to retire the 39 officers. But the Young Turks, playing for Buddhist support, would not be denied. In the early morning hours of Sunday, December 20, they arrested twenty-two or more officials and politicians, including several members of the HNC, and made dozens of other political arrests. They also created an "Armed Forces Council" over or replacing the MRC, to consolidate their power.

Through Huong and indirect contacts, Taylor found out about the dissolution of the HNC several hours before Khanh announced it at a press conference; and one hour before the conference Khanh spoke to Taylor about it. Taylor protested in the strongest terms, but without effect; Khanh went ahead with the announcement. Taylor and Johnson also met with the Young Turk leaders, Ky, Thieu, Thi, and Cang, and gave them a stern lecture, speaking, as he later put it, "as one soldier to another." As recorded just afterward by the U.S. participants, the meeting went as follows:

    .....AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Do all of you understand English? (Vietnamese officers indicated they did, although the understanding of General Thi was known to be weak.) I told you all clearly at General Westmoreland's dinner we Americans were tired of coups. Apparently I wasted my words. Maybe this is because something is wrong with my French because you evidently didn't understand. I made it clear that all the military plans which I know you would like to carry out are dependent on governmental stability. Now you have made a real mess. We cannot carry you forever if you do things like this. Who speaks for this group? Do you have a spokesman?

    GENERAL KY: I am not the spokesman for the group but I do speak English. I will explain why the Armed Forces took this action last night.

    We understand English very well. We are aware of our responsibilities, we are aware of the sacrifices of our people over twenty years. We know you want stability, but you cannot have stability until you have unity....

    But still there are rumors of coups and doubts among groups. We think these rumors come from the HNC, not as an organization but from some of its members. Both military and civilian leaders regard the presence of these people in the HNC as divisive of the Armed Forces due to their influence.

    Recently the Prime Minister showed us a letter he had received from the Chairman of the HNC. This letter told the Prime Minister to beware of the military, and said that maybe the military would want to come back to power. Also the HNC illegally sought to block the retirement of the generals that the Armed Forces Council unanimously recommended be retired in order to improve unity in the Armed Forces.

    GENERAL THIEU: The HNC cannot be bosses because of the Constitution. Its members must prove that they want to fight.

    GENERAL KY: It looks as though the HNC does not want unity. It does not want to fight the Communists.

    It has been rumored that our action of last night was an intrigue of Khanh against Minh, who must be retired. Why do we seek to retire these generals? Because they had their chance and did badly.....

    Yesterday we met, twenty of us, from 1430 to 2030. We reached agreement that we must take some action. We decided to arrest the bad members of the HNC, bad politicians, bad student leaders, and the leaders of the Committee of National Salvation, which is a Communist organization. We must put the trouble-making organizations out of action and ask the Prime Minister and the Chief of State to stay in office.

    After we explain to the people why we did this at a press conference, we would like to return to our fighting units. We have no political ambitions. We seek strong, unified, and stable Armed Forces to support the struggle and a stable government. Chief of State Suu agrees with us. General Khanh saw Huong who also agreed.

    We did what we thought was good for this country; we tried to have a civilian government clean house. If we have achieved it, fine. We are now ready to go back to our units.

    AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I respect the sincerity of you gentlemen. Now I would like to talk to you about the consequences of what you have done. But first, would any of the other officers wish to speak?

    ADMIRAL CANG: It seems that we are being treated as though we were guilty. What we did was good and we did it only for the good of the country.

    AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Now let me tell you how I feel about it, what I think the consequences are: first of all, this is a military coup that has destroyed the government-making process that, to the admiration of the whole world, was set up last fall largely through the statesman-like acts of the Armed Forces.

    You cannot go back to your units, General Ky. You military are now back in power. You are up to your necks in politics.

    Your statement makes it clear that you have constituted yourselves again substantially as a Military Revolutionary Committee. The dissolution of the HNC was totally illegal. Your decree recognized the Chief of State and the Huong Government but this recognition is something that you could withdraw. This will be interpreted as a return of the military to power....

    AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Who commands the Armed Forces? General Khanh?

    GENERAL KY: Yes, sir....

    GENERAL THIEU: In spite of what you say, it should be noted that the Vietnamese Commander-in-Chief is in a special situation. He therefore needs advisors. We do not want to force General Khanh; we advise him. We will do what he orders....

    AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Would your officers be willing to come into a government if called upon to do so by Huong? I have been impressed by the high quality of many Vietnamese officers. I am sure that many of the most able men in this country are in uniform. Last fall when the HNC and Huong Government was being formed, I suggested to General Khanh there should be some military participation, but my suggestions were not accepted. It would therefore be natural for some of them now to be called upon to serve in the government. Would you be willing to do so?....

    GENERAL KY: Nonetheless, I would object to the idea of the military going back into the government right away. People will say it is a military coup.

    AMBASSADOR TAYLOR and AMBASSADOR JOHNSON: (Together) People will say it anyway.....

    AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: You have destroyed the Charter. The Chief of State will still have to prepare for elections. Nobody believes that the Chief of State has either the power or the ability to do this without the HNC or some other advisory body. If I were the Prime Minister, I would simply overlook the destruction of the HNC. But we are preserving the HNC itself. You need a legislative branch and you need this particular step in the formation of a government with National Assembly....

    AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: It should be noted that Prime Minister Huong has not accepted the dissolution of the HNC....

    GENERAL THIEU: What kind of concession does Huong want from us?

    Ambassador Taylor again noted the need for the HNC function.

    GENERAL KY: Perhaps it is better if we now let General Khanh and Prime Minister Huong talk.

    GENERAL THIEU: After all, we did not arrest all the members of the HNC. Of nine members we detained only five. These people are not under arrest. They are simply under controlled residence....

    AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Our problem now, gentlemen, is to organize our work for the rest of the day. For one thing, the government will have to issue a communique.

    GENERAL THIEU: We will still have a press conference this afternoon but only to say why we acted as we did.

    AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I have real troubles on the U.S. side. I don't know whether we will continue to support you after this. Why don't you tell your friends before you act? I regret the need for my blunt talk today but we have lots at stake....

    AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: And was it really all that necessary to carry out the arrests that very night? Couldn't this have been put off a day or two?

    In taking a friendly leave, Ambassador Taylor said: You people have broken a lot of dishes and now we have to see how we can straighten out this mess.

Amid the hustle and bustle of meetings between MACV officers, Embassy officials, and their Vietnamese counterparts, Khanh and the Young Turks, stood fast.

On the next day, December 21, Taylor suggested to Khanh that he resign and leave the country. This meeting brought to a head the Khanh-Taylor personal feud which then became public and continued for the balance of Khanh's tenure. Taylor's report of the meeting said his suggestion that Khanh leave the country came in response to Khanh's asking whether he should leave. But Khanh told a different story to the AFC, who were still smarting from the sharp interchange that Ky, Thieu, Thi and Cang had had with Taylor. Immediately they accused Taylor of interfering in GVN affairs. Commenting afterward, he said:

    If the military get away with this irresponsible intervention in government and with flaunting proclaimed U.S. policy, there will be no living with them in the future.

State supported Taylor in taking a strong line to bring the situation under control. It approved a Westmoreland proposal, sent by military channels to State, that Huong get the credit for dismissing Khanh and that MACV should bargain with the Armed Forces Council to offer a quid pro quo for reinstating the HNC. State spelled out the quid pro quo in detail:

    In support of your efforts persuade military to at least partially undo damage [Sunday's] actions, we have also been considering possible leverage we might apply in event you conclude it was necessary.

    If dispute continues unresolved, most obvious action might be withholding approval any pending U.S. assistance actions and letting this become known. You are in best position to evaluate whether these would impress generals or conversely hurt Huong's position. In addition, following steps aimed more specifically at military have occurred to us:

        1. Suspend operation Barrel Roll--not certain it would affect generals--might have wrong impact on Hanoi--obviously generals couldn't be told because that would imply commitment to resume if they behave.
        2. Instruct all or selected Corps or division advisors make known our dissatisfaction, perhaps suspending for time being further contacts with counterparts.
        3. Stand down FARMGATE.
        4. Suspend logistical airlift where critical supply shortages do not exist.

    On balance, we inclined believe none except possibly 1st and 2nd steps would produce desired results. Obviously any would hamper over-all war effort, especially if continued for very long.

    We have also considered and rejected possibility of cutting essentials POL and direct military supplies. Similarly we do not favor suspension or interruption CIP, since it would primarily affect civilian confidence in Huong government.

Although Khanh talked to Taylor about travel arrangements for himself and several other generals on the 22nd, the Young Turks had their backs up (or were convinced they could do what they pleased), and all stood fast. Khanh having rallied the military behind him, attacked Taylor for his undiplomatic actions. He spoke to the nation attacking communism and colonialism, the latter an inference to the domineering position of Taylor. In a message to the President on the 22nd, Taylor commented:

    Generals acting greatly offended by my disapproval of their recent actions privately expressed to four of their number and resent our efforts to strengthen Huong government against their pressures. One unfortunate effect has been to drive them closer to Khanh who has sensed the opportunity to solidify his position.

He feared Khanh would air the quarrel publicly. Rusk cabled support:

    I wish to compliment you on the vigor with which you have pursued this issue of unity since your return from Washington.

But Taylor backed off from the sanctions idea. Possibly still hoping that Khanh would go, he said there was no need for action but that the option should be kept open. In particular, he saw no value in suspending the bombing of Laos.

Also on the 22nd, while talking to Taylor of leaving, Khanh met with the Young Turks and agreed to break openly with Taylor by seeking his recall. State continued to back a tough line with them, and rejected Taylor's suggestion of a diversion in the form of a reprisal bombing on North Vietnam for the Brinks BOQ bombing early in the week.

    Hanoi would hardly read into it any strong or continuing signal in view overall confusion in Saigon . . . There might be suspicion, at least internationally, that BOQ bombing was not in fact done by VC."

Taylor urged Huong to insist on restoration of the HNC and declare the generals insubordinate if they refused. Khanh and the generals attacked Taylor publicly on December 23, as Taylor had feared, charging him with insulting them and abusing his power. Then on December 24, Taylor responded in kind, telling the press his version of the December 20 confrontation, and suggesting that Khanh had outstayed his usefulness.

Khanh then threatened privately to declare Taylor persona non grata; the Embassy replied that asking Taylor to leave was equivalent to asking the U.S. to leave. The implied threat of U.S. withdrawal was enough to stop the Khanh move, if he was ever serious about it. Taylor then suggested that Alex Johnson and the generals should form an ad hoc joint arbitration committee to resolve the differences between Khanh and Taylor. The idea was evidently novel enough to distract Khanh and the generals or to satisfy their dignity; it disconnected the buttons that had been pushed when Khanh and Taylor each said he wanted the other to leave the country. The ad hoc committee never met, but the proposal generated calm discussion between the Embassy and the generals for several days and allowed them to cool off gracefully.

However, the basic issue of the future of the HNC and of civilian government remained unresolved. Huong consulted with Taylor continuously, and followed some of his advice, but stopped short of taking the strong public stance he urged. On December 31, Taylor said to Washington that the USG might have to accept a military government in Saigon, though he said that Khanh must not head it. He said that plans for "Phase II" (bombing the North) should take into account various possibilities within GVN. Although Taylor had earlier favored the military's return to power, he objected to the means and to the timing of their present action.

J. ONGOING PROGRAMS, SECOND HALF 1964

While the political crises of Ambassador Taylor's first six months in Saigon built up to comic opera proportions, MACV and the country team struggled valiantly to conduct business as usual.

In March, MACV J-1 had completed a comprehensive review of ARVN personnel policies, the Murday Report, and forwarded it to JGS for action. A tally at the end of the year indicated progress on only 16 of 28 specific recommendations. One that received no response was the suggestion that the officer appointment base be expanded. In May, the Secretary of Defense had ordered COMUSMACV to develop, jointly with GVN, procedures for programming pacification operations with time-phased requirements for manpower and money. A joint, combined (MACV-USOM-GVN) committee was established. It had completed a programming document in June. After approval by RVNAF and MACV, joint US-GVN teams visited each Corps to acquaint selected personnel with the documents. As of August 31, fewer than half the provinces had submitted pacification plans; so the teams again visited each province to reinstruct province chiefs and sector advisors. All province reports were finally received by October. In July, the first Senior Advisors Monthly Report (SAME) was submitted. These put MACV in a better position to advise, and in October it sent a detailed letter of deficiencies to CINCRVNAF.

A joint combat effectiveness inspection team started its work, and at year's end the ARVN IG faced the question whether the refresher course at the National Training Center was needed for two battalions declared ineffective by COMUSMACV. In October, U.S. advisors to RVNAF units submitted the first semi-annual report of their personal observations of the treatment and use of MAP equipment. Deficiencies were noted in a letter to JGS. In one instance it was found that ordnance vans were being converted into rolling quarters for generals. After a threat to withdraw the vans, the fault was corrected and the vans were returned to their authorized use.

On October 5, COMUSMACV forwarded to the Embassy the report of a month-long study instigated by the Ambassador on how to revitalize the entire civic action program. It recommended that a USOM-USIS-MACV study group develop a joint, integrated mechanism to guide and coordinate civic action. The groups' recommendations were to provide a basis for discussions with the Vietnamese on how best to channel and revitalize the combined civic action effort.

On the subject of command relationships, JCS looked ahead to the possible deployment of U.S. ground forces and anticipated operational control of RVN forces in combined operations. However, that idea would be dropped later.

Following a Taylor-Khanh agreement to launch "Hop Tac" on October 1, USOM and the Vietnamese NSC met on September 25 to discuss pacification, after which Taylor commented:

    In general, I consider the meeting was satisfactory continuation of our bilateral effort and that top priority is at last being given to Hop Tac operation. Also that general result of meeting focused attention on priority problems. The pay-off will be quality of follow-up.

State suggested decentralization of pacification control to Corps and Province, to bypass the central government; USOM disagreed. MACV contacted all senior RVNAF officers and found them taking a responsible attitude toward continuing the war effort; however, MACV noted that the coup leaders had talked the same way just before the September 13 coup attempt. Therefore MACV was candidly sceptical.

In response, a COMUSMACV memorandum of November 14 entitled "Assumption by US of Operational Control of the Pacification Program in SVN," states his position on the US role and is indicative of his later views on combined command. He recognized that any plan to encourage GVN in its efforts should include measures for developing US approved plans, as well as means for controlling money and people during execution of plans, and he envisaged an arrangement whereby GVN agencies would be provided complete planning guidance. He saw a danger of exerting influence over GVN which might be interpreted as excessive and which might boomerang on US interests. Instead, he suggested, "as a less drastic alternative, the Hop Tac idea might be extended to each of the other three tactical zones."

As discussed more fully in Re-emphasis on Pacification 1965-67, Hop Tac (working together) was formally proposed at a high level in the US government by Ambassador Lodge on his way home in July 1964. Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland implemented the idea. It tied together the pacification plans of the seven provinces around Saigon to insure security and extend government control. A headquarters for US Hop Tac elements was established in Saigon. The Vietnamese set up a parallel organization primarily to satisfy the US, for their group had no authority or influence.

Meanwhile, the US/GVN study and planning activity continued and gave the impression of accomplishment. A US/GVN Survey Team reviewed RVNAF structure requirements for supporting the GVN National Pacification Plan. After visits to each corps headquarters, it proposed two alternative force increases, one to achieve progress in priority one Hop Tac areas, the other to attain more overall progress. On November 24, COMUSMACV formally requested approval of the first alternative from CINCPAC while at the same time the US Embassy recommended approval to the State Department. Meetings of USOM/NSC mentioned above (pp. 326 and 332) continued till December 5, after which the crisis of the Ambassador's return and its sequel stopped all pretense of joint pacification planning for several weeks.

But the Joint General Staff accepted all MACV suggestions on how RVNAF should be employed to improve the pacification program and issued its implementing Directive A-B 139 as a Christmas present on December 25, 1964, in mid-crisis.

The USMACV staff reviewed the RVN Defense Budget for 1965 and US Mission approval was received in late 1964. However, on order of the Ambassador, due to the political crisis, MACV withheld the budget from GVN until January 13, 1965.

K. JANUARY, 1965: PRELUDE TO THE BOMBING

The first week of January was filled with comings and goings with the issue of the HNC's dissolution still unresolved. The Embassy supported Huong publicly and privately, but stopped short of threatening U.S. withdrawal and admitted indirectly to Huong that the U.S. might be forced to accept military government. Then on January 7, the generals backed off slightly and reached a compromise solution, which they announced January 9 amid rumors of a military takeover. The Armed Forces Council and Khanh agreed to release the HNC prisoners and to continue backing civilian government, referring to their August promises; the civilian GVN would convene a new civilian group to legislate and write a new constitution, preparatory to Assembly elections. Taylor saw the statement before its release, and accepted it as the best available compromise. It was followed by a statement agreed on January 11 to patch up US/GVN relations, at which time Khanh agreed also to put several of the Young Turks in the cabinet. The crisis seemed to be over.

However, the end was not yet in sight. The Buddhists started demonstrating and demanding that Huong resign. On January 14, Taylor reacted to Khanh's proposals on the new cabinet by suggesting that he was moving with unseemly haste. Taylor received a complete cabinet list on January 18, and Khanh conferred with Westmoreland on the effects of cabinet roles for the generals on the 19th. Cabinet installation was scheduled for the 19th. However, at almost the last minute Khanh asked for postponement of the cabinet installation, saying afterward that Huong had defaulted on promises to change some of the civilian ministers. Leading Buddhists went on another hunger strike, and a new crisis built up; in Hue the USIS building was sacked and burned, and the USIS building in Saigon was sacked. On the 24th, they demanded that all Vietnamese businessmen, night clubs, etc., refuse to sell to Americans, and a majority apparently complied. On the 25th, Khanh, having allied himself with the Buddhists, told Deputy Ambassador Johnson that Huong and President Suu wanted to resign and let the military take over, as demanded by the Buddhists. Johnson replied that the Buddhists must not be allowed to veto the government, and that the military must not take over.

Then on January 27, the AFC voted no confidence in the Suu-Huong government and directed Khanh to take charge and resolve the crisis. Taylor's comments to State made it clear that events were entirely out of his control; again he objected to the means and to the timing of the military return to power. When he raised the possibility of non-recognition, State authorized him to use his own judgment but advised him to play along with Khanh for the time being, while scouting around for fresh options. Although Suu was technically ousted, he stayed on at Khanh's request; and Oanh again became acting Prime Minister.

In the midst of the crisis Westmoreland obtained his first authority to use U.S. forces for combat within South Vietnam. Arguing that the VC might go for a spectacular victory during the disorders, he asked for and received authority to use U.S. jet aircraft in a strike role in emergencies, subject to Embassy approval in each instance. This move finessed all previous ideas of using potential U.S. force commitments as leverage to bring the GVN into line; but these ideas had no doubt been abandoned anyhow.

III. THE U.S. ENTERS THE WAR: FLAMING DART TO THE STEADY INFLUX OF U.S. FORCES, JUNE, 1965

A. "PHASE II" BEGINS AND COUPS CONTINUE, FEBRUARY, 1965

While the Embassy stood by doing what little it could to undercut Khanh's personal position, VC attacks on the American advisors' barracks at Pleiku, and on three other installations, provided the pretext for US/VNAF bombing attacks on infiltration staging areas in the southernmost province of North Vietnam, February 7-8. Acting Prime Minister Oanh spoke for GVN during the coordination of the attacks and announcements. (The raids were called reprisals, as was the subsequent raid on February 12 following the attacks on the American barracks at Quihon.) U.S. dependents were ordered to leave SVN.

McGeorge Bundy was in town, and in keeping with the going tactics, stayed at arms length from Khanh, though meeting him and the generals socially. As an aside at this point, Taylor gave one last blow to the idea that cutting off the flow of help from the North would turn the tide of the war against the VC: He remarked that perhaps the smell of victory within six months would now lead Khanh to take over again.

On his return to Washington, McGeorge Bundy wrote a Memorandum to the President, dated February 7, 1965. In evaluating the U.S. team and policy, he stated, "U.S. mission is composed of outstanding men and U.S. policy within Vietnam is mainly right and well directed." However, he proceeded to point out two important differences between his current assessment and that of the mission. Taylor had concluded that: (1) the Khanh government was impossible to work with, and (2) the Buddhists (Khanh's ally in the recent struggle) must be confronted and faced down, using force if necessary. Bundy disagreed on both points, stating that Khanh was still the best hope in sight in terms of pursuing the fight against the communists and that the Buddhists should be accommodated and incorporated rather than confronted.

With respect to the scheduled reprisal actions, he stated, "For immediate purposes, and especially for the initiation of reprisal policy, we believe the government need by no stronger than it is today with General Khanh as the focus of a raw power, while a weak caretaker government goes through the motions. Such a government can execute military decisions and it can give formal political support to joint US-GVN policy. That is about all it can do." He further stated that reprisal actions themselves should produce a favorable reaction which would provide an opportunity for increased U.S. influence in pressing for a more effective government.

He acknowledged the latent anti-American sentiments in the country and their potential explosiveness, as had been evidenced in Hue the preceding week. He noted that these feelings limited the pressure that the U.S. could bring to bear on ambitious forces like Khanh and the Buddhists.

On February 9, Taylor again firmly recommended that the program of continuo~is graduated attacks on North Vietnam should begin. Nothing but political turmoil had followed his early-December attempt to induce the GVN to do better by promising these attacks as a quid pro quo. Now he disregarded this idea, and spoke only of the hope that the attacks would convince North Vietnam to abide by the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, and would unify and encourage the South Vietnamese. On February 13, State cabled authority to begin the plan of graduated strikes with Vietnamese participation. It directed Taylor to get GVN approval and to get their agreement to appear at the UN if that should prove necessary; the condition of stopping the bombing would be the halting of aid by North Vietnam to the VC.

State's guidance to Taylor on political matters was that the U.S. hand should not be too obvious in the government-shuffling outcome and that the power of the Buddhists and of the military must be reflected in the new government being formed. After two political hopefuls failed to round up enough support, Quat formed a cabinet starting February 16. The AFC chose to keep Suu as Chief of State and appointed a National Legislative Council of twenty members balanced to represent all interests including the military. The Buddhists quietly acquiesced in the new government, installed just in time to be greeted by a coup attempt.

On February 19, a new coup group (consisting of Thao and Phat among other neo-Diem proponents) seized most of Saigon, Tan Son Nhut airfield, and the radio station. In this instance, as in September, 1964, MACV had to intervene to stop Ky's threat of VNAF bombing; this time it would have been the airfield, with several thousand Americans in the area. By midnight the leading members of the AFC had rallied forces and faced down the coup group; and the next day they voted Khanh out. On February 24, Khanh left the country; the Embassy and Saigon settled back in relief. The bombing phase of graduated pressures on the North (Rolling Thunder) began, and the decision to land Marines at Danang was in the works. Taylor now opposed the introduction of U.S. combat forces in SVN-except for base security. His acquiescence in the Marine deployment to Danang was in large part due to Westmoreland's strong recommendation to do so.

B. THE CONTINUING CIVILIAN INTERREGNUM AND FIRST U.S. GROUND FORCES, MARCH-MAY, 1965

For several weeks an unaccustomed calm settled over US/GVN relations. The USG white paper on Vietnam issued February 28 without prior clearance with GVN caused no visible upset. The proposal to land the first two BLT's of Marines received prompt approval in an amicable atmopshere in the first few days of March, and the III MEF became the III MAF without fanfare. An abortive Buddhist "peace" movement died away, and religious groups generally laid low.

Following a State message expressing renewed concern, the USOM resumed meetings with the Vietnamese Internal Security Council (an enlargement of its old NSC) on February 27 to discuss pacification.

    It was agreed that both sides would prepare joint proposals for accelerating pacification and for solving manpower problems and go forward together in program for effective execution of agreed programs.

At a March 13 meeting, General Thang gave a "pessimistic but realistic" account of Binh Dinh Province, and Quat said measures would be taken to prevent the situation from spreading. The USG and GVN reverted to the pattern of a year earlier of urging and advice politely received.

Throughout early 1965, it was evident that Pacification plans were failing. Even Hop Tac was at a standstill. When a stop gap allocation of 3 million piasters per province was made, pending release of regular funds, province chiefs were reluctant to spend the funds. They wanted specific authority and direction from higher authorities.

Planning continued unabated between MACV and GVN. Development of a revised budget began on March 6, 1965, when guidelines for budget preparation were furnished the RVN Ministry of Defense. The proposed revision was duly received from RVN.

On March 24, Ambassador Taylor formulated a 41-point program for stability and pacification in preparation for a trip to Washington. This program, without any hint of leverage on GVN, in fact put pacification on the back burner, while main attention focused on bombing and deployments.

In April 1965, General "Little" Minh, Minister of Armed Forces, directed I, II, and IV Corps commanders to develop Hop Tac plans for their areas. The delay between the COMUSMACV memorandum of the previous December that recommended the extension and the order itself is not explained, but in May the Vietnamese indicated to the U.S. Ambassador their dissatisfaction with the Hop Tac program. The Vietnamese wanted to make Region A of the Hop Tac area part of the Capital Military Region and the remaining regions part of the III Corps Commander's area of responsibility. COMUSMACV told the mission council that the Hop Tac organization should be retained for the foreseeable future because Hop Tac had been unique in providing a forum for military and civil authorities to address common problems.

Quiet consultation continued on the evaluation of Vietnamese counterparts in the provinces, on Third Country Forces, on military and paramilitary pay, and so on. Following Taylor's return from Washington early in April, he presented his pacification ideas (now having the stamp of President Johnson's approval), and discreetly got approval for the deployment of the third of the Marine BLT's. Quat discussed the military leadership frankly with Taylor and Westmoreland, and around the middle of April started considering a move to clip their wings. On May 5, the AFC obligingly dissolved itself, and seemed to give Quat a free hand.

The Honolulu Conference of April 20, which rebuffed the idea of encadrement and U.S. takeover (discussed later), approved additional deployments and U.S. force to about 80,000 men and to introduce Korean and Australian troops. After several days of hesitation, Quat approved the increases. Pacification, under the new name "Rural Construction," still gave no cause for rejoicing; and GVN resisted Taylor's proposal to install some civilians as province chiefs.

Analysis by members of the U.S. mission council of a RVNAF J-3 paper, "The Organization and Operations of the Pacification System," revealed considerable variance between U.S. and GVN views on:

    (1) The role of the corps commander in pacification.
    (2) The relationship of provinces with a proposed Bureau for Pacification Affairs.
    (3) The position of Minister of Interior in pacification.

MACV forwarded requirements to increase the number of subsector advisory teams to 180, of which 33 in particularly remote locations would be filled initially by Special Forces teams. It was envisioned that in case of escalation by the VC, these teams would perform appropriate civil affairs functions, provide intelligence, and support allied forces in many ways. Should the VC refrain from extensive overt action, the teams would push vigorous rural construction.

In the last half of May, fresh trouble blew up. After an alleged abortive coup attempt on May 20-21, and disorders in the streets, Quat tried to reshuffle his cabinet, without first clearing it with Suu. Suu objected, and the two disagreed on who had the right to decide; such a misunderstanding was understandable, in view of the lack of any recognized constitution and in view of the chaos of the preceding months. The crisis simmered past the end of May, and Taylor correctly predicted the end of civilian government, with evident relief.

C. FIRST MOVES ON COMMAND AND CONTROL, MARCH AND APRIL, 1965

When the Marines arrived in March, the control measure devised for the employment was the TAOR. Under the overall suzerainty of the VN Corps Commander, the Marines were given a well defined geographical area in which U.S. forces exercised command authority over military forces and for which the U.S. accepted defensive responsibility.

On March 3, Ambassador Taylor cabled his fears that GVN would "shuck off greater responsibility on the USG," and the same day, in another message, he said he had no idea what the GVN attitude to a Marine Landing Force might be.

The first battalion of Marines splashed ashore at Danang about 0900, March 8. The next day a second battalion came in by air.

The trip of Army Chief of Staff Johnson to Saigon in mid-March, 1965, signalled the beginning of consideration and planning for the introduction of significant numbers of ground combat forces. General Johnson observed in closing his report:

    In order for the USG to evaluate his (COMUSMACV's) request properly when submitted, a policy determination must be made in the very near future that will answer the question, what should the VN be expected to do for themselves and how much more the U.S. must contribute directly to the security of VN.

Secretary McNamara answered on the margin of his copy of the report, "Policy is: Anything that will strengthen the position of the GVN will be sent."

On March 8, Taylor talked with Prime Minister Quat about his concept of joint command, a matter which had been raised with General Johnson on the occasion of his visit March 6 (EmbTel 2877). Taylor found Quat's ideas very hazy, but:

    his purpose was very clear. He hopes by some joint command device to bring his maverick generals under the steadying influence of General West-moreland. Taylor told him he sympathized with motive but had never hit upon a command relationship which offered much hope of accomplishing this end. Although Quat's ideas hard to disentangle, he seems to have in mind a mixed US/ARVN staff element reporting to General Westmoreland and a VN C/Staff. He visualizes the staff element as a clearing house for joint studies which would pass recommendations on to the two senior officers. By implication General Westmoreland would have the power of ultimate decision based upon an unofficial understanding which Quat hopes generals would accept. Quat concedes their acceptance far from certain.

Washington was looking toward combined command arrangements that would recognize that the U.S. was no longer limited to the role of advisors to RVNAF. When asked for his input COMUSMACV replied that gradual transition would be more palatable to GVN and suggested only cooperation in the initial phase, followed by establishment of a small combined coordinating staff headed jointly by himself and CINCRVNAF. The staff's powers would be limited solely to coordinating combined operations.

These comments were sketchy, but indicative, for in Saigon COMUSMACV and his staff were putting together the Commander's Estimate of the Situation, a standard document in the military planning process. Started on March 13, the day after General Johnson left Saigon and issued on March 26, it more clearly revealed the MACV concept of command. While recognizing that there was no longer an effective ARVN chain of command because of the irresponsible game of musical chairs among the top leadership, the estimate cautioned that the Vietnamese generals would accept integrated command only to the extent that the United States contributed troops; and it advised against U.S. commitment to any rigid arrangement because GVN and RVNAF had not achieved sufficient political and military maturity. MACV omitted further discussion of the function or authority of such integrated staffs. When command arrangements were covered in the detailed description of the most likely course of action, the intent was clear. U.S. commanders would control American troops except in certain clearly defined zones within which they would also be responsible for "controlling and coordinating" operations of both U.S. and RVN forces. A collateral function envisioned for each U.S. division command was that of Deputy Command Support to the ARVN Corps Commander.

D. THE RISE AND DECLINE OF ENCADREMENT, APRIL, 1965

Ambassador Taylor returned to Washington in late March and was present at the April 1-2 NSC meeting at which General Johnson's 21 recommendations and Taylor's 41 points were approved. Almost as soon as Taylor returned to Saigon wide differences of opinion developed on what should happen next.

The State/Defense "7 point message" of April 15 to Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland set the pot boiling, following Westmoreland's urgent request via military channels for more forces. The message directed:

    (1) Experimental encadrement of U.S. troops into RVNAF.
    (2) The introduction of a brigade force into Bien Hoa/Vung Tau for security and later counterinsurgency.
    (3) The introduction of several additional U.S. battalions into coastal enclaves.
    (4) Expansion of Vietnamese recruiting, using proven U.S. techniques.
    (5) Expansion of the MEDCAP program using mobile dispensaries.
    (6) Experimentation in 2 or 3 provinces with a team of U.S civil affairs personnel.
    (7) Supplement of low RVNAF pay through provision of a food ration.

Taylor objected to the new forces, to encadrement, and to the whole tone of the 7 point message. He sent two principal messages with these objections, one setting out a reasoned comment on the message and a second, personal to Mc-George Bundy, saying how he really felt about it:

    I am greatly troubled by DOD 15 April 15. First, it shows no consideration for the fact that, as a result of decisions taken in Washington during my visit, this mission is charged with securing implementation by the two month old Quat government of a 21 point military program, a 41 point non-military program, a 16 point Rowan USIS program and a 12 point CIA program. Now this new cable opens up new vistas of further points as if we can win here somehow on a point score. We are going to stall the machine of government if we do not declare a moratorium on new programs for at least six months.

    Next, it shows a far greater willingness to get into the ground war than I had discerned in Washington during my recent trip. Although some additional U.S. forces should probably be introduced after we see how the Marines do in counterinsurgency operations, my own attitude is reflected in EmbTel 3384, which I hope was called to the attention of the President.

    My greatest concern arises over para 6 reftel which frankly bewilders me. What do the authors of this cable think mission has been doing over the months and years? We have presumably the best qualified personnel the Washington agencies (State, AID, DOD, USIA and CIA) can find working in the provinces seven days a week at precisely the tasks described in para 6. It is proposed to withdraw these people and replace them by Army civil affairs types operating on the pattern of military occupation? If this is the thought, I would regard such a change in policy which will gain wide publicity, as disastrous in its likely effects upon pacification in general and on US/GVN relations in particular.

    Mac, can't we be better protected from our friends? I know that everyone wants to help, but there's such a thing as killing with kindness. In particular, we want to stay alive here because we think we're winning--and will continue to win unless helped to death.

Another State/Defense message told the Ambassador to discuss with Quat several possible uses of U.S. combat forces beyond the NSC decisions of April 2. He replied, "I cannot raise these matters with Quat without further guidance....I need a clarification of our purpose for the large scale introduction of foreign troops unless the need is clear and explicit."

The plaintive words did not sound convincing to the JCS, for they told SecDef, almost cavalierly, in JCSM 281/65, "JCS is confident the Ambassador will be able to accomplish such measures as are required for an appropriate acceptance of these deployments as approved by the highest authority."

As directed in the 7 point message, study commenced in Saigon on the matter of combined command. The message suggested two approaches: Integration of substantial numbers of U.S. combat personnel (e.g., 50) into each of several ARVN battalions (e.g., 10); or combined operations of three additional U.S. battalions with three or more ARVN battalions. General Westmoreland asked his Deputy to give detailed study to three methods:

    (1) Assumption of officer and senior NCO command positions within the ARVN battalion by U.S. personnel.
    (2) Assignment of U.S. personnel as staff officers, and in technical and specialists positions, within the ARVN battalion.
    (3) Employment of U.S. troops as fire support elements within the ARVN battalion.

These approaches were studied in relation to: Language, security, support, mutual US/GVN acceptance, conditions and capabilities within ARVN units. Problems common to all three were the language barrier, increased exposure of U.S. personnel, difficulty of U.S. personnel adapting to ARVN living conditions, and the greatly expanded support requirement that would be generated. The following conclusions were reached:

    Method (1) was not feasible nor desirable owing to the language barrier, as well as to probable non-acceptance by GVN.
    Method (2) would not materially improve ARVN capabilities.
    Method (3), therefore, was the only concept that would benefit ARVN and not detract from GVN morale. A fire support element of six U.S. officers and 49 enlisted men was suggested for each ARVN battalion.

Because of the difficulties of supply and service support, medical support, leadership in ARVN battalions, and anticipated morale problems amongst those U.S. personnel assigned to ARVN battalions, Deputy COMUSMACV opposed the adoption of the principle of encadrement. He recommended that COMUSMACV not support it and that if it were directed, it be initially applied to only one battalion.

At the same time, as a result of the Warrenton conference of mid-January, serious consideration was being given in Washington to the use of military government by means of Army civil affairs procedures. A straw in the wind which indicated what the Saigon reaction was to be at the forthcoming Honolulu conference was the response by Ambassador Taylor on April 15 to notification that General Peers was coming to Saigon. "If GVN gets word of these plans to impose U.S. military government framework on their country . . . it will have a very serious impact on our relations. We are rocking the boat at a time when we have it almost on an even keel."

E. HONOLULU CONFERENCE, APRIL 19-20, 1965; ENCADREMENT AND COMBINED COMMAND FADE OUT

At Honolulu General Westmoreland had his way with respect to military encadrement. Notes of the meetings reveal:

    General Westmoreland states that individual encadrement of ARVN units neither required nor feasible.

Instead the plan was to "brigade" U.S. forces with ARVN troops. Consideration of the issue was ended with the understanding that General Westmoreland "will submit a written statement describing the command relationships which will prevail when U.S. forces are engaged in offensive combat actions, alone or with Vietnamese or other forces."

The introduction of U.S. Army Civil Affairs teams into the provincial government structure was also considered at Honolulu. It was decided to experiment in three provinces with U.S. teams designed to provide ample civil as well as military initiative and advice. At least one of the three teams was to be headed by a civilian. Ambassador Taylor was instructed to seek the concurrence of GVN, "recognizing that a large number of questions must be worked out subsequently."

Early in May, General Westmoreland submitted his detailed command concept. It traced the evolution of the relationship between U.S. and ARVN armed forces. Initially, U.S. forces were strictly advisory. In the period from 1960 to 1962 the U.S. had in addition provided military capabilities such as helicopters and tactical air support. The advisory effort was extended to ARVN battalions, and advisors accompanied units into combat. With the large scale commitment of U.S. ground forces in Vietnam, a logical extension of this evolution was the suggested command concept of coordination and cooperation. Operational control of each nation's forces was normally to be exercised by commanders of that nation.

COMUSMACV envisioned that the initial mission of U.S. forces would be security of base areas, a function to be coordinated through senior ARVN commanders. Subsequent deep patrolling and offensive operations by U.S. forces would occur within specified Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR's) with ARVN in separate and clearly defined areas. Eventually, on search and destroy operations, U.S. forces would provide combat support at the request of the senior RVNAF commander. The U.S. commander would move to the RVNAF command post to agree on details, but close and intricate maneuver of units of the two nations' forces was to be avoided.

This Saigon proposal did not settle the matter. SecDef urged formation of a joint command with GVN and the creation of a "small combined coordinating staff to be jointly headed by COMUSMACV and CINCRVNAF" as a useful device at this stage of development of the U.S. force structure.

There were continuing indications from USG representatives in Saigon of a sensitivity to South Vietnamese criticism that the United States acted as though we were fighting all by ourselves. On May 17, Ambassador Taylor felt it wise to relay to Washington a Saigon Post column to that effect.

On May 24, both the Ambassador and COMUSMACV sent lengthy messages to their seniors discussing the matter of combined military command. Ambassador Taylor referenced both the JCS and MACV proposals and said, "I must say we are far from ready to propose to GVN anything like a plan for a more formal combined command authority . . . If USG intends to take the position that U.S. command of GVN forces is a prerequisite to the introduction of more U.S. combat troops, that fact would constitute an additional strong reason for recommending against bringing in the reinforcements."

COMUSMACV also voiced strong opposition to the Washington proposal for combined command. He recalled recent discussion of the subject with General Minh who seemed agreeable at first but then moved perceptibly away from anything suggestive of a combined headquarters. Press reports of the views of General Thieu and Air Marshall Ky, as well as the recent Saigon Post column,were referenced to substantiate that there was no prospect of such a combined staff evolving. Instead, a U.S. Army brigadier general staff. "The positioning and accrediting of Brig. General Collins is as far as we can go."

There appears to have been no strong objection by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In JCSM 5 16-65 they reviewed the course of events and recommended augmentation of MACV by seven billets (1 Brigadier General, 3 officers, and 3 enlisted) to provide "the requisite staff assistance on combined and operational planning matters associated with the coordinated operations of U.S., RVN, and third country forces in Vietnam."

A joint State/Defense message to Saigon on May 27 deferred any approach to GVN on combined command until it was politically feasible and directed that no planning discussion be undertaken with RVNAF without Ambassador Taylor's approval.

There were two major battles in late May and early June, Ba Gia and Dong Zoai. Although U.S. troops were available to assist in both instances they were not committed and in both cases RVNAF were defeated.

General Westmoreland continued to press Washington for greater freedom of discretion in the use of U.S. ground forces with RVNAF. A June 12 message recalled the three stages envisioned in his May 8 discussion of combined command. So far, in view of statements in Washington by the Secretary of State and by the White House, movement from stage 2 to 3 had been deferred, but it sounded as though some measure of joint planning was in progress.

    The fact is we have moved some distance down the road toward active commitment of U.S. combat forces and have done so hand-in-hand with our Vietnamese ally. They and we recognize that the time has come when such support is essential to the survival of any government of South Vietnam and the integrity of RVNAF.

The message concluded with a request for modification of the letters of instructions on use of U.S. troops.

A minor note, not unrelated to combined command, was raised in May when Prime Minister Quat pressed within GVN for a status of forces agreement. The matter arose because of concern about Vietnamese sovereignty over areas where U.S. forces were stationed. Relations were being governed by the 15 year old Pentalateral agreement, clearly inapplicable to the present situation. U.S. military forces in Vietnam were enjoying virtual displomatic immunity; so the MACV senior judge advocate developed arguments to demonstrate that raising the issue was not in the interests of either government. They were passed to the SVN source of the information for use at ministerial meetings on the subject. There is no indication that GVN formally discussed status-of-forces with the Embassy.

F. THE KY COUP, JUNE, 1965

After extended negotiations between Quat, Suu, and other leaders failed to end the government crisis that started in late May, on June 9 Quat asked the generals to mediate the dispute. They did. On June 12 they forced Quat to resign and took over the government. After several days of jockeying among themselves, the generals formed a National Leadership Council of ten members and made Ky Prime Minister. Taylor was out of town at the critical time, and the Embassy found out about the main decisions after they were taken. However, Taylor was back in time to object unsuccessfully to Ky's appointment as Prime Minister before it was announced. Once things had settled down and the USG felt it had no choice but to accept the new government, Taylor cabled State:

    ....It will serve our best interests to strengthen, support and endorse this government.

IV. THE KY GOVERNMENT'S EARLY MONTHS: THE COUP TO THE EMBRACE AT HONOLULU, FEBRUARY 1966

A. THE KY GOVERNMENT'S INHERITANCE

Nguyen Cao Ky, Commander of the Vietnamese Air Force, joined with other "Young Turks" of the Vietnamese Armed Forces to overthrow the civilian government of Prime Minister Quat on June 12, 1965. Attempts at civilian government had limped along since October, 1964, following riots in August-September that had forced the generals to withdraw Khanh's military-dictatorial constitution and to promise civilian rule. That entire period had been marked by riots, coups, and attempted coups. By June, when Quat and the civilian President Suu found themselves in an impasse, Ambassador Taylor easily acquiesced in the return to direct military rule.

Pacification kept lagging, and the dark military picture forced the U.S. to decide in June to pour U.S. troops into the country as fast as they could be deployed. The pattern of GVN civil and military ineffectiveness had led the U.S. Government to resolve to do it ourselves, and to abandon any hope of forcing or inducing GVN to do the job without us. All concerned knew that the Young Turks now in open control of GVN had repeatedly defied Ambassador Taylor and had gotten away with it. Attempts at top-level leverage on GVN had produced a virtual diplomatic rupture for a few days at the end of 1964 and the beginning of 1965, and the U.S. was in no mood to try it again.

B. THE KY GOVERNMENT AND THE U.S. START THEIR DEALINGS, JUNE-JULY, 1965

With Vietnam's return to overt military government, the political blocs with their private armies, perhaps exhausted, bided their time. Communications improved between the U.S. and GVN to a state of cool correctness, gradually revealing lower-level GVN's intention to go on coasting as it always had and higher-level GVN's intention to serve its own interests.

The day after the coup, COMUSMACV cabled CINCPAC in alarm about the military picture, requesting authority to send U.S. troops on offensive missions. He recalled that ARVN had lost five infantry battalions on the battlefield in the last three weeks, and he stated that the only possible U.S. response was the aggressive employment of U.S. troops together with the Vietnamese general reserve forces:

    To meet this challenge successfully, troops must be maneuvered fully, deployed and redeployed as necessary.

To demonstrate how completely the initiative changes on the subject of combined command, Saigon announced to Washington in mid-June its intention within the next few days to conduct a backgrounder on command relationships. A reply from the Secretary of Defense said,

    As basis for Washington review of proposed Westmoreland back-grounder on command relationships and MACV organizational structure, please furnish draft of text he will use

In late June, General Westmoreland was authorized by Washington to "commit U.S. troops to combat, independent of or in conjunction with GVN forces in any situation in which use of such troops is requested by an appropriate GVN commander and when, in COMUSMACV's judgment, their use is necessary to strengthen the relative position of GVN forces."

Premier Ky, obviously wishing to play down an issue sensitive to both governments, told Ambassador Taylor he saw no particular reason for any drastic change from the previous practice of combat support. In any specific situation, he said that command should be worked out in accordance with "good sense and sound military principles." Additional deployments caused no problem, and indeed GVN now asked for more US/FW forces than could be deployed or were approved. But in response to a query, Taylor waved aside any hope of using deployments for leverage. Discussions of combined command avoided joining issue and left matters unchanged.

Although Taylor's initial reaction to Ky was one of apprehension, he was soon impressed by Ky's aggressive performance including his 26 point program. He doubted Ky's ability to implement the program, but concluded that military government was less likely to abandon the war effort and thus should be supported.

Early in 1965, AID had decided to stop buying piasters for U.S.-controlled sector funds, and in June agreed with the GVN to change the province procedures. Effective June 22, 1965, the Vietnamese Province Chief would requisition and release AID commodities on his own authority, and all supporting funds came through regular GVN channels. The new procedures included elaborate reporting steps both when the U.S. advisers concurred and when they nonconcurred with the Province Chief's actions. In practice, the change reduced U.S. adviser's leverage.

On July 1, Secretary McNamara submitted a memorandum to the President reviewing all aspects of Vietnam policy. However, he naturally concentrated on U.S. deployments, and had little to say on GVN's problems. In a section titled, "Initiatives Inside Vietnam," his only significant recommendations were that we should increase our AID to GVN and that Chieu Hoi Program should be improved. However, in another memorandum to the President on July 20, following a trip to Saigon, McNamara suggested that the U.S. Government should lay down some terms for its assistance. GVN was again pressing for more U.S. forces than were available. He mentioned rice policy, plus a "veto on major GVN commanders, statements about invading NVN, and so on."

McNamara's overall evaluation was deeply pessimistic, making clear why he recommended increased U.S. forces at that time:

    Estimate of the Situation. The situation in South Vietnam is worse than a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that). After a few months of stalemate, the tempo of the war has quickened. A hard VC push is now on to dismember the nation and to maul the army. The VC main and local forces, reinforced by militia and guerrillas, have the initiative and, with large attacks (some in regimental strength), are hurting ARVN forces badly. The main VC efforts have been in southern I Corps, northern and central II Corps and north of Saigon. The central highlands could well be lost to the National Liberation Front during this monsoon season. Since June 1, the GVN has been forced to abandon six district capitals; only one has been retaken. U.S. combat troops deployments and US/VNAF strikes against the North have put to rest most South Vietnamese fears that the United States will forsake them, and US/VNAF air strikes in-country have probably shaken VC morale somewhat. Yet the government is able to provide security to fewer and fewer people in less and less territory as terrorism increases. Cities and towns are being isolated as fewer and fewer roads and railroads are being isolated as fewer and fewer roads and railroads are usable and power and communications lines are cut.

    The economy is deteriorating-the war is disrupting rubber production, rice distribution, Dalat vegetable production and the coastal fishing industry, causing the loss of jobs and income, displacement of people and frequent breakdown or suspension of vital means of transportation and communication; foreign exchange earnings have fallen; and severe inflation is threatened.

In Saigon Ambassador Taylor gave the GVN the first definite sign of U.S. concern about the effects of U.S. deployments on Saigon port operations and on the Vietnamese economy. In a letter to Prime Minister Ky dated July 1, 1965, he said:

    Your experts and ours are in constant contact on [the budgetary deficit] and have always worked effectively together . . . [They] will need your support in carrying out the anti-inflation measures which they may recommend from time to time . . . The rice procurement and distribution agency which you have in mind is an important measure of . . . a program which should also include the further development of port capacities.

USOM also began talking about devaluing the piaster. These matters were to come to a head a year later. At this time, however, the Embassy treated these matters routinely and applied no pressure to GVN. GVN officials opened the serious bidding in their meeting with Secretary McNamara on July 16, saying that their gold and foreign exchange reserves had suffered the alarming drop from $175 million to $100 million since January, 1964, and requested a big increase in AID. Ambassador Taylor preferred to limit our counter-demands to get quick agreement; he said,

    We would avoid giving the impression of asking for new agreements or imposing conditions for our increase AID . . . We do not want to raise conditions in terms likely to be rejected or to require prolonged debate.

On July 28, the Embassy and GVN settled it. The agreement touched very lightly on GVN obligations and on joint economic planning. It provided for "joint discussions to precede policy decisions . . . for control of inflation," etc.

On July 8, MACV reviewed its relationships with the military leadership. There was no problem; they agreed that operations involving both U.S. and ARVN troops would use the concepts of coordination and cooperation. They did not discuss combined command. However, a flap developed late in July when General Thi was reported to be planning operations in the DMZ. Both Taylor and Westmoreland took it up with GVN, who reassured them; Thi got back on his leash before it was too late. Such operations commenced more than a year later. A candid subsequent statement from Saigon shows the Vietnamese desired to have the best of both worlds. Ambassador Lodge reported to Washington the disparaging reactions of ARVN general officers on the JGS staff to the U.S. Marine victory south of Chu Lai. "I flag this small straw in the wind as pointing up the importance of portraying our operations here as combined with the GVN in nature."

C. QUIET SAILING THROUGH JANUARY, 1966

In August, Ky wanted to make a trip to Taiwan, being interested in getting Nationalist Chinese troops into Vietnam. The U.S. Government objected both to the trip and to its objective, but failed to persuade him to give up the trip. Later he brought in some Chinats on the sly. An idea floated in Washington that he or Thieu should visit the United States was dropped without having been brought up with the GVN.

Lodge arrived around the middle of August to replace Taylor. Having avoided the confrontations with GVN of the type that Taylor had, he came with a residue of good will. Because he was considered responsible for Diem's overthrow, the Buddhists were pleased, and the militant Catholics dubious. In that connection, State thought it prudent to direct the Embassy to assure GVN that neither Lodge nor Lansdale, whom he was bringing with him, was going to try to make changes in GVN. On August 26, Ky told Lodge that he thought U.S. forces should "hold strategic points" so that the Vietnamese could concentrate on pacification operations. That is, he wanted the United States to take over the main force war. He also said he thought the Chu Hoi program was a waste of money.

In early August, Ky established a Ministry of Rural Construction (MRC and a Central Rural Construction Council (CRCC). These absorbed functions and personnel from predecessor groups and other ministries for the announced purpose of providing centralized direction to the pacification effort. Nguyen Tat Ung was made Minister of Rural Construction while the Council was chaired by General Co, Minister of War and Defense. Timing and circumstances give no evidence of a strong U.S. hand at work. The U.S. Embassy viewed the new organization as the result of political maneuvering, but also hoped the change would promote inter-ministerial cooperation. The move signalled renewed emphasis of pacification by both GVN and the mission. In late August, Ambassador Lodge announced the appointment of retired General Lansdale as chairman of the U.S. Mission liaison group to the GVN CRCC.

There followed a period of shuffling and reorganization during which Ung was killed in a plane crash. Two weeks later Prime Minister Ky announced that General Thang would succeed to the Ministry. The appointment was for six months only, and Thang retained his position on the JGS. At the same time, General Co was elevated to Deputy Prime Minister for War and Reconstruction in a realignment that made six ministries including Rural Reconstruction subordinate to him.
On August 28, General Thi told Lodge he thought he could do a better job running the government than Ky was doing. He spoke at some length on Ky's political weaknesses, with particular emphasis on his lack of support in I Corps, where Thi was strong. As was his usual practice, Lodge politely brushed aside this approach. (Later Thi proved harder and harder to control until his dismissal in March.)

In mid-September, Lodge went on an inspection trip to Da Nang and Qui Nhon. On his return he waxed eloquent about the benefits of the U.S. presence:

    All reports indicated that the American troops are having a very beneficial effect on VN troops, giving them greater confidence and courage. I am always mindful of the possibility that the American presence will induce the VN to slump back and "Let George do it." But there seems to be no sign of this.

    I wish I could describe the feeling of hope which this great American presence on the ground is bringing. There can no longer be the slightest doubt that persistence will bring success, that the aggression will be warded off and that for the first time since the end of WW II, the cause of free men will be on an upward spiral.

Lodge's end-of-month appraisal was that civil and political progress lagged behind the military. He felt there would be a political vacuum that the VC would fill if the U.S. pulled out. Therefore, he was trying to start a program to provide security and to generate indigenous political activity at the hamlet level. He noted with pleasure that Ky was taking the initiative in bringing his pacification plans to Lansdale, to get U.S. reactions before these plans were too firm to change.

By September, a combination of inflation, black-marketeering by U.S. troops and other related problems led both governments to agree on important steps. The U.S. introduced military payment certificates, and the GVN agreed to exchange 118 piasters to the dollar for personal use of troops and U.S. civilians. Official U.S. purchases of piasters continued at the old exchange rate of 35, however.

September brought an evaluation of the three-month three-province pacification experiment during which each was under the unified control of a team chief; one an embassy FSO, one a MACV sector adviser, and one an AID province representative. COMUSMACV judged that test only partially successful; progress achieved was attributed to the "keen spirit of cooperation" by all team members. Because he believed the results inconclusive and in view of the existing military situation, General Westmoreland concluded that the team chief concept should not be implemented. The experiment was officially ended.

The U.S. also became deeply involved in the rice trade. Vietnam changed over from a rice exporter in the years through 1964 to a heavy importer from 1965 onwards. AID provided the imported rice under CIP. In September, 1964, Ambassador Lodge spoke of measures we are taking to control the price of rice; inasmuch as AID provided the imports, USOM had a say in the GVN's policies on price control, subsidization, and distribution of rice.

During this period a problem flared up over a corrupt Province Chief. Lt. Colonel Chi, Province Chief of Binh Tuy, was accused of misuse of $250,000 of AID funds. After pressure from AID had merely produced threats against the lives of AID personnel in the province, on September 23 AID withdrew them and suspended AID to the province. Chi was a protege of General Co, the Minister of Defense and Deputy Premier, who himself figured in charges of corruption a year later. On October 5, the story got into the papers, and on the 7th Ky promised publicly to remove Chi. Lodge played no role in starting this episode, and told the Mission Council on October 7 that he did not want it repeated. After a six-weeks delay, Ky did remove Chi on November 25, and gave him a job in the Ministry of Defense. AID to the province resumed.

Advisers in the field kept on complaining about the delays in the Vietnamese system, and pressed for restoration of some resources of their own. On October 1, 1965, MACV began giving its sector and subsector advisers piaster funds they could spend on urgent projects. Each subsector adviser had access to 50,-000 piasters which could be replenished as necessary. Toward the end of 1965 it became obvious that this method was highly successful. Consideration was given to permanent establishment of the revolving fund.

However, after the trial period of about four months MACV abandoned the plan because of strong opposition by General Thang, Minister of Revolutionary Development. He argued that under U.S. urging he had been developing an effective, flexible organization that would take care of urgent projects of the type the sector and subsector advisers wanted to promote; letting them bypass his people would encourage the latter to lapse into their old bad habits and thwart both governments' main objectives.

USOM also had second thoughts about abandoning the sign-off system. Early in October 1965, the Mission Council approved a plan to restore the "troika sign-off" procedure as it had existed prior to June. After the Mission had already reopened the issue with the GVN, the State Department objected, saying that the United States wanted to make the Vietnamese more independent and effective.

After a time the frustrations of the advisors began striking a sympathetic chord at the highest levels. In a draft memorandum to the President dated November 3, 1965, Secretary McNamara stated his own impatience with the GVN and urged a more active role for our advisers at province and district. There is no sign of such high-level interest earlier, except as expressed by decisions to extend the advisory system to lower levels; as just noted State objected to the restoration of troika sign-off on October 16, 1965.

Some uncertainty and disagreement with respect to pacification developed within United States groups in Vietnam. In November, Major General Lansdale, Special Assistant to the Ambassador, asked who on the U.S. side should have the executive role in dealing with the Rural Construction Ministry? Lansdale envisaged that MACV and JUSPAO would be observers only.

COMUSMACV disagreed with the proposed limitation. USMACV was the only structure advising GVN at all levels; so MACV shared responsibility for pacification. Manpower required for cadre teams would impact directly and seriously on MACV efforts to maintain RVNAF strengths. Minister of Rural Construction was Major General Thang who also was Director of Operations, JGS. He looked to MACV for advice and assistance on the whole spectrum of pacification problems.
On December 15 in a memorandum to Major General Lansdale, the Ambassador said,

    I consider the GVN effort, in this domain (apart from the military clearing phase) to be primarily civilian . . . Consequently, on the American side it is preferable that the two civilian agencies, USAID and CAS, be the operating support agencies.

The GVN military plan in support of the 1966 Rural Construction plan was given in the JGS Directive AB 140 of December 15, 1965, which had been developed in coordination with MACV and the Ministry of Rural Construction. In November onward, portions of the 1966 GVN defense budget prepared in accordance with U.S. guidelines were received by MACV.

At the time of the Christmas truce, President Johnson launched a peace offensive, including a suspension of bombing in North Vietnam that lasted 37 days. The moves were carefully cleared with GVN and with its Ambassador in Washington, and caused no significant problems. Lodge's appraisal was that the "offensive" achieved all its aims, at no significant cost. However, trouble flared up over a plan to release 20 NVA prisoners across the DMZ; General Thi was not consulted, and said he would not permit it (in his Corps). Things were smoothed over amicably by Tet.

One troublesome area was GVN's hawkishness over such issues as border incidents. Ky kept pressing for action against Cambodian sanctuaries; the U.S. stood firm on the rule of self-defense in emergencies only, which could mean shooting across the border but not maneuvering troops across it. Ky wanted to encourage a Khmer Serai expedition, which would cause a flare-up with the Cambodian Government; State directed Lodge to keep him on a tight leash.

Coup rumors started to circulate around the first of the year; Lodge remarked that just before Tet was a normal season for that. On December 29 Ky told Lodge of an alleged assassination plot directed at Ky, Co, the Buddhist leader Thich Tam Chau, and Lodge. On January 15, VNAF took to the air in nervous reaction to some supposedly suspicious troop movements; Lodge reported more rumors on January 19, and took the opportunity to spell out his position:

    If . . . corridor coup . . . caused directorate members to fall out, consequences could be disastrous . . . A peaceful reshuffle within directorate is a continuing possibility. I would deplore it. We take all rumors and reports of government change very seriously and never miss an opportunity to make clear U.S. support for, and the need for, governmental stability.

Around the middle of January 1966, Ky addressed the Armed Forces Convention. He announced the prospective formation, after Tet, of a "Democracy Building Council" to serve as a constituent assembly and legislature. It would write a new constitution by October, 1966, preparatory to elections in 1967. This was the opening shot in what became a big issue within a few weeks.

D. THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 6-8, 1966

By late January, it was clear that Lodge's policy of not pushing GVN too hard may have helped keep things amicable but permitted pacification to keep lagging and permitted economic problems to grow serious. With conspicuous haste that caused GVN some loss of face, the U.S. summoned Thieu, Ky, and other GVN officials to Honolulu to express renewed and heightened U.S. concern. The U.S. wanted to re-emphasize pacification, with a corresponding shift of authority from the ARVN line command to the province chiefs; and it wanted strong action to limit inflation, to clear the Saigon Port, and to limit the unfavorable effect of U.S. deployments on the U.S. balance of payments.

For the first time in over a year, the U.S. bargained hard with GVN on issues of these kinds. The GVN agreed to the main U.S. demands on authority for the provinces chiefs. Moreover, it promised fiscal reform, devaluation, port and customs reform, and the use of GVN dollar balances to finance additional imports. The GVN also agreed that an International Monetary Fund team should be invited to give technical advice on these economic programs. Thieu and Ky promised to go ahead with a new constitution, to be drafted by an appointed Advisory Council, and then ratified by popular vote in late 1966; following that, they promised, the GVN would create an elected government rooted in the constitution. The U.S. promised to increase AID imports to $400 million in 1966, plus $150 million in project assistance.

Altogether the two governments exchanged over 60 agreed points and assurances, ranging over free world (third country) assistance, rural construction (pacification), refugees, political development, Montagnards, Chieu Hoi, health, education, agriculture, and economic and financial programs. This package was far more specific than any previous US/GVN agreement. Their public statements after the conference emphasized social justice, the promise of elected government, and the U.S. lack of interest in bases or permanent alliance in South Vietnam.

In a public appearance at the conference, President Johnson embraced Prime Minister Ky, before photographers. Although it caused no loss of face directly, in the eyes of many observers this act added to the impression that Ky was tied to our apron strings. If Lodge sensed this effect, he said nothing about it; characteristically, he said to State that the Honolulu Conference was good psychologically for Vietnam.

Directly after the conference USOM remained seriously concerned with the high and rising black market plaster rate for dollars, which they and the Vietnamese business community regarded as the bellweather of inflation. Moreover, besides its harmful psychological effect, the high rate tempted U.S. personnel into illegal transactions, causing unfavorable publicity. Inasmuch as GVN refused to sell dollars in the black market to push the rate down, Porter requested authorization from Washington to do it on the sly with CAS money.

The thrust of the Honolulu Conference was clearly to stimulate nonmilitary pacification efforts. Upon his return to Saigon, Lodge issued a memorandum reconstituting the Mission Liaison Group under Deputy Ambassador Porter. Though charged by the memorandum with the management and control of all U.S. civilian agency activities supporting Revolutionary Development, Porter saw his responsibility as primarily a coordinating effort. He said he did not intend to get into individual agency activities.