

important and would not be relied upon very much in an event. Overall, with the trade-off of adding and deleting instrumentation, the margin of safety will not be significantly affected.

The proposed license amendment will increase the allowed outage time for most of the instruments. Again, these instruments do not provide automatic actions, they provide indications for monitoring post accident conditions. All of the instruments have backup or corroborating indications which could be relied upon if the Technical Specifications instruments were inoperable. Also, an event requiring use of these instruments has a very low probability. For these reasons the proposed changes in allowed outage time will not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

For these same reasons, the proposed changes in radiation instrument surveillance requirements will not significantly reduce the margin of safety.

Overall, a significant reduction in the margin of safety would not result from this license amendment.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Minneapolis Public Library, Technology and Science Department, 300 Nicollet Mall, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401.

Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts, and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW, Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: John N. Hannon.

North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation, Docket No. 50-443, Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1, Rockingham County, New Hampshire

Date of amendment request: January 25, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The proposed Technical Specification change would replace a specific requirement for the frequency of Type A tests with a general requirement to perform Type A tests. The proposed amendment would change Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.2.a. Specifically, the change would require the performance of Type A tests (overall containment integrated leak rate tests (ILRTs)) at intervals as specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, instead of on a specific

schedule for performance of ILRTs of "40 plus or minus 10 months."

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis against the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c). The NRC staff's review is presented below.

A. The change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated (10 CFR 50.92(c)(1)) because the proposed change merely replaces a prescriptive schedule for performing ILRTs with a requirement to conduct the ILRTs on a schedule consistent with the Commission's regulations. The change does not alter the methodology, frequency, or acceptance criteria for ILRTs, does not affect the design basis of the containment, and does not change the post-accident response of the containment.

B. The change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated (10 CFR 50.92(c)(2)) because the change does not affect the manner by which the facility is operated and does not make any changes to existing plant structures, systems, or components. The proposed change merely replaces a prescriptive schedule for performing ILRTs with a requirement to conduct the ILRTs on a schedule consistent with the Commission's regulations.

C. The change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety (10 CFR 50.92(c)(3)) because the proposed change does not affect the manner by which the facility is operated or involve changes to equipment or features which affect the operational characteristics of the facility.

Based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Exeter Public Library, 47 Front Street, Exeter, NH 03833.

Attorney for licensee: Thomas Dignan, Esquire, Ropes & Gray, One International Place, Boston, MA 02110-2624.

NRC Project Director: Phillip F. McKee.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Houston County, Alabama

Date of amendments request: December 7, 1994.

Description of amendments request: The amendments would provide a permanent voltage-based steam generator tube repair criteria for both units. This criteria is based on the guidance contained in the NRC Proposed Generic Communication (Generic Letter 94-XX), "Voltage-Based Repair Criteria for the Repair of Westinghouse Steam Generator Tubes Affected by Outside Diameter Stress Corrosion Cracking," that was issued for public comment in the **Federal Register** (59 FR 41520) on August 12, 1994. The licensee's submittal also includes responses to and identifies exceptions taken to the draft Generic Letter. The significant exceptions are: (1) The requirement to reinspect all tubes if bobbin probe wear exceeds 15%; (2) the 1×10^{-2} limit on the calculated conditional burst probability; and (3) the need to pull additional steam generator tubes to evaluate the current condition of the steam generator tubes. In addition, the operational leakage requirement for Unit 2 will be modified to reduce the total allowable primary-to-secondary leakage for any steam generator from 500 gallons per day (gpd) to 150 gallons per day.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

(1) Operation of Farley units in accordance with the proposed license amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Testing of model boiler specimens for free standing tubes at room temperature conditions shows burst pressures as high as approximately 5000 psi for indications of outer diameter stress corrosion cracking with voltage measurements as high as 26.5 volts. Burst testing performed on pulled tubes with up to 7.5 volt indications show burst pressures in excess of 5900 psi at room temperature. As stated earlier, tube burst criteria are inherently satisfied during normal operating conditions by the presence of the tube support plate. Furthermore, correcting for the effects of temperature on material properties and minimum strength levels (as the burst testing was