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NRC Project Director: Cynthia A.
Carpenter, Acting.

*Indiana Michigan Power Company,
Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316, Donald
C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and
2, Berrien County, Michigan*

Date of amendment requests: March
31, 1995.

Description of amendment requests:

The proposed amendments would modify the Containment Ventilation System Technical Specifications (and associated Bases) to allow limited containment purge operation in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 for pressure control, ALARA [as low as is reasonably achievable], and respirable air quality considerations.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1

The purpose of this amendment is to allow flexibility in the use of the containment purge system during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. The use of this system during these modes of operation has previously been approved (Amendment No. 66). Therefore, this amendment request does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the proposed change to the T/Ss does not affect the assumptions, parameters, or results of any UFSAR [Updated Final Safety Analysis Report] accident analysis. Based on the existing system design and demonstrated closure capability it is concluded that the proposed changes do not modify the response of the containment during a design basis accident. The proposed amendment does not add or modify any existing equipment. Based on these considerations, it is concluded that the changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2

The proposed change does not involve physical changes to the plant or changes in the plant operating configuration. Thus, it is concluded that the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3

The margin for safety presently provided is not reduced by the proposed change. As discussed previously, the containment purge valves have been designed and demonstrated capable of closure against the dynamic forces resulting from a loss of coolant accident. The proposed amendment does not impact the ability of the purge valves to perform their intended function (i.e. achieve closure) in the

event of an accident. Based on these considerations, it is concluded that the changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Maud Preston Palenske Memorial Library, 500 Market Street, St. Joseph, Michigan 49085.

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NRC Project Director: Cynthia A.
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Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), Docket No. 50-245, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, New London County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: March
31, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) to increase the as-found setpoint tolerance of the safety/relief valves (SRVs) from plus or minus 1% to plus or minus 3%. In addition, the proposed amendment (1) would allow the as-found condition of one SRV to be inoperable, (2) clarifies the 1325 psig safety limit wording, (3) increases the number of SRVs to be tested during each refueling outage, (4) makes editorial changes to reflect the TS changes, and (5) revises the bases for the applicable sections.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

NNECO has reviewed the proposed changes in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92 and concluded that the changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration (SHC). The basis for this conclusion is that the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are not compromised. The proposed changes do not involve an SHC because the changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

The safety function of the SRVs is to mitigate the effects of a RPV [reactor pressure vessel] overpressurization, therefore a failure to open until the upper setpoint limit (+3%) is reached cannot affect the probability of an accident. The lowest allowable limit (-3%) is still above normal operating pressure and

therefore does not significantly increase the probability of an inadvertent opening.

Should the SRVs open in response to an RCS [reactor coolant system] overpressure event, opening of the SRVs below the nominal setpoints does not adversely affect the consequences of an accident. The fuel reload analysis demonstrates that actuation of five valves at or below 103% of nominal provides sufficient pressure reduction to maintain peak RCS pressure below the safety limit of 1375 psig and to maintain vessel steam space pressure below 1325 psig. The hydrodynamic loads on the SRV discharge pipe (i.e., tail pipe) and the torus remain within the design limits.

The performance of the high pressure systems; FWCI [feedwater coolant injection], SLC [standby liquid control] and IC [isolation condenser] remain acceptable. There is also no adverse impact on the operability of the APR [automatic pressure relief] system.

The SRV setpoints will continue to be required to be within [plus or minus] 1% prior to plant startup from a refueling outage. This ensures that the SRVs are restored to the optimal conditions at the start of each fuel cycle.

Therefore, increasing the "as-found" tolerance from [plus or minus] 1% to [plus or minus] 3% does not result in a significant increase in the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.

Revising the acceptable as-found setpoint tolerance from [plus or minus] 1% to [plus or minus] 3% does not change the type of action that these valves are expected to perform, nor does it change the initial "as-left" requirements for the valves. Plant operating parameters have not changed. Therefore, this change cannot create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The margin of safety established and stated in the Millstone Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, is a peak RCS pressure of 1375 psig and a peak vessel steam space pressure of 1325 psig. While allowing the SRV setpoint tolerance to increase to [plus or minus] 3% would allow peak pressures from an MSIV [main steam isolation valve] closure event to approach that safety limit, the safety limit will not be exceeded. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resource Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, Thames Valley Campus, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360.