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
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HR70-14

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16 November 1961
Copy No. 16A

M E M O R A N D U M

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCEConcurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Reappraisal of Evidence on Soviet ICBM Deployment

1. Agencies and subcommittees of the United States Intelligence Board have reviewed CINCSAC's followup memorandum on Soviet ICBM strength, entitled, "Critique of USIB Review of CINCSAC Memo on Soviet ICBM Strength," 10 October 1961. We have met with representatives of SAC and have discussed with them the substance of this latest critique and their views on ICBM deployment. We find that SAC has raised no substantial elements of evidence or analysis which were not considered by the USIB in preparing the ICBM estimates in NIE 11-8/1-61, dated 21 September 1961, and in commenting on the original SAC memorandum on this subject. In the interim, however, we have conducted a re-examination of our intelligence coverage of suspected ICBM deployment areas in the USSR, including an exhaustive survey of the 34 areas listed by SAC as primary ICBM suspected locations, and have again reviewed the analytical techniques employed in evaluating this intelligence.

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2. Summaries of the work performed by USIB agencies and sub-committees in support of this reappraisal are attached. In brief, we conclude from this work that usable KEYHOLE photography is now available on about 50 percent of the USSR, and that this includes approximately 60 percent of the rail network in regions best suited for ICBM deployment. Further, we conclude that by examining information from all sources including photography, and by taking into account the patterns likely to be associated with ICBM deployment, it is possible to judge with reasonable confidence the degree of likelihood that ICBM complexes actually exist in suspected areas of the USSR.

3. On this basis, 10 of the 34 specific places suspected by SAC had already been evaluated by the USIB as confirmed, probable, possible, or undetermined. One additional complex was identified and confirmed in the course of our recent re-examination. We now evaluate the remaining 23 suspect places as doubtful or negative. Finally, we note that in reaching the numerical estimates of currently operational launchers in NIE 11-8/1-61, we took into account, not only those ICBM complexes on which we have evidence, but also the probable existence of complexes on which evidence was either lacking or insufficient to permit identification.

4. The principal review of this deployment was conducted on the basis of criteria established by the USIB working group. When SAC's list

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of [] additional areas was received, all except a few places proved to have been considered already by the USIB agencies.* An initial review of evidence on the few additions does not seem to warrant strong suspicion that they are ICBM deployment areas, but they will be the subject of continuing study.

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5. As a result of our examination of the latest SAC memorandum and our re-examination of the evidence bearing on Soviet ICBM deployment, it still appears that the essential difference between the SAC and USIB estimates derives almost entirely from a fundamental difference in philosophy and concept of the estimate, i.e., SAC's application of "the-possibility-cannot-be-excluded" at each essential point of evidence. On the basis of this reappraisal, together with the results of further collection efforts, we conclude that present evidence is consistent with NIE 11-8/1-61 and is adequate to support it. We therefore reaffirm our conclusions in that estimate and restate our belief that the chances are negligible that the Soviet ICBM force is as large as SAC suggests.

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