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ORR Contribution to CIA Proposed Draft of SNIE 11-10-57 for GMIC
Consideration

ESTIMATED SOVIET ICBM PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES

We have no direct information regarding the production facilities devoted to the Soviet ICBM program; however, we do know the USSR has a highly developed industrial base which includes all the skills and facilities necessary for the quantity production of ICBM systems. Assuming that these resources are marshalled on a first priority basis we estimate the USSR could have the following quantities of operational ICBM's in the hands of trained units by the dates indicated:

50	ICBM's by September 1959
100	ICBM's by November 1959
500	ICBM's by November 1960

We estimate further that the first prototype missile having a limited operational capability could be delivered to an operational unit by May 1958. This missile provided essentially for troop training, and additional prototype missiles delivered thereafter,

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could be used for military purposes; by the end of 1958 at least a total of ten such missiles could be in place at one or a few operational sites.

We believe the USSR is capable of flight testing about 50 ICBM's (including earth satellite vehicles which we assume contribute to the ICBM test program) by the end of 1958; at which time a "design freeze" decision could be made and series production of operational ICBM's initiated. A production rate of 40 missiles per month could be achieved by early 1960 and by the fall of 1960 about 50 operational sites fully equipped and manned by trained troops could be ready.

This estimated Soviet ICBM production and deployment program is based on an assessment of Soviet industrial capabilities time-phased with the progress demonstrated by Soviet earth satellites and ICBM test launchings. We therefore consider it a sound estimate of overall Soviet capabilities in this field. Whether the USSR carries out this program depends on Soviet intent, and the vigor with which the USSR may choose to exploit a capability we estimate it possesses.

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