telecard.zip w telecard.zip ig(r{vh {{>vPgyP{ h ghxQ$Q0Rwvwb@.w^+Rw@4@6@6@6 :Telecard FAQ...................................[05-JUL-94]{Q$Yyt.)@HpZIPpZIP Vamp-HAK.txt6@4@6@6@ Vamp-HAK.txt'07j@I@p@Mv@ 9;vp:p:8'' B80? @@@@@ T;@"82!0: :Information on how VideoCrypt was Hacked (UK)..[00-xxx-00]+y@j3!68B TEXT,0 vidref.zipyMw vidref.zipig(3vh  {v P{@p@HHQ$4Pހw@ +@p8`HH:Info relating to the Videocrypt pay-TV system..[21-JAN-95] w . /pZIPpZIP vidref.zipyMw vidref.zipig(3vh  {v  often impossible to know when vital information is being intercepted. Some companies find it hard to believe that competitors have the expertise or equipment to eavesdrop on their advanced communications, and others find it even harder to publicly acknowledge the theft of proprietary information when they find out about it. Whatever the reasons, industry and government experts say, few companies have taken any steps to guard their secrets from eavesdroppers. "About 90% of electronic communications is in a perilous state," says Lilia Rudesyle, an analyst with the National Security Agency, which maintains the government's most sophisticated electronic intelligence-gathering operations. Although the agency won't cite specific examples, it says long-distance phone conversations are routinely monitored by foreign governments and corporations searching for American technology. Similar monitoring is done by organized crime and for domestic industrial espionage, the NSA contends. Most U.S. companies "don't feel there's anybody sophisticated enough to go after their communications," says Robert P. Campbell, a Washington industrial security consultant. But he warns that electronic snoopers, using nothing more complex than a $100 scanner available in most electronics stores, "can have instant technology transfer faster than by stealing out of a safe." Some companies, such as Chrysler and IBM, say they scramble or encode important data, but see no problem in transmitting nonconfidential programs to their sales staffs over teleconferencing networks. Amway says STV Magazine's Mr. Schultheiss probably picked up one of the company's marketing programs on the Lifeline cable network. A Bank of America spokesman said it isn't possible to pick up the bank's data transmissions using ordinary satellite-television equipment. But the spokesman was uncertain about the possibilities of using more complex receivers. Satellite and microwave transmission, the most popular methods for corporations' private voice and data networks, probably present the greatest security challenge. Information can be picked up by satellite dishes, microwave receivers and other equipment that is widely available. Such equipment isn't cheap. "There are much easier and less costly ways of going about industrial espionage," says a spokesman for American Telephone & Telegraph Co. A study by the congressional Office of Technology Assessment determined that facilities to intercept and sort through microwave telephone circuits would cost $40,000. "But it can be done relatively easily and without the awareness of the network owner," the study warned. The federal government, believing that many foreign governments and companies already have made that investment, has launched a campaign to encourage U.S. corporations to guard their secrets. Eavesdropping isn't the only concern of satellite users. Last fall, two cable-television broadcasters experienced separate incidents of signal jamming, each lasting longer than 12 hours. The source of the interference is still a mystery. Although federal law specifically prohibits satellite tampering, other intrusions might not be covered by existing laws that were written years ago to deter old-fashioned wiretapping. A bill sponsored by Sen. Patrick Leahy (D., Vt.) would give new technologies, including "digitized phone calls, cellular and cordless calls and private-carrier calls," the same legal protection as conventional telephone conversations. That may not help much. Last year, California passed a law making it illegal to eavesdrop on cellular telephone calls or to sell the necessary eavesdropping devices. But the law is "virtually unenforceable" because eavesdropping can be done with almost any type of scanning device and can't be traced, says Stuart Crump, editor of Personal Communications, a trade magazine. The NSA is trying another approach. For many years, the agency has provided "secure," or encoded, telephones for the Pentagon and its contractors, and the agency has worked with companies that make encoding equipment for industry. The devices haven't been popular with companies outside the defense, oil and international banking businesses, in part because they are expensive and difficult to use. So last year, the NSA spent about $50 million to underwrite development costs of a third generation of less-expensive secure telephones. AT&T, Motorola Inc., and RCA Corp. are making the phones, known as "secure telephone unit 3," or STU 3. Motorola also is making a cellular version. Nicholas Piazzola, who heads the STU 3 project for the NSA, says the agency expects the phones to be available in 1987 at a cost of about $2,000 each, compared with a current price of about $10,000. A market study projects private-sector demand of one million to two million phones. NSA officials acknowledge that they would retain the technical ability to break the STU 3 codes, although doing so would be illegal in the U.S. without a court order. Though some in the industry doubt that encoded phones will * catch on, others say that growing concern over computer crime and surveillance is creating more demand for relatively inexpensive security products. "It's typical to use passwords to protect computers," says an industrial security manager for a large high-tech company. "But you could lose the whole show if you don't protect the telecommunications." DOWNLOADED FROM P-80 SYSTEMS......