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DISCOVERING NATIONAL ELITES

**A Manual of Methods for Discovering the Leadership
of a Society and Its Vulnerabilities to Propaganda**

by

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with the collaboration of

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Preface to the first publicly available edition of the Manual of Elite Target Analysis.

In 1953-4, Alfred de Grazia, who was then Executive Officer of the Committee for Research in Social Science and Associate Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, submitted a proposal to the Department of State to write a manual that would help train federal employees assigned to culturally diverse countries around the world. It was a period of great and expanding scope of U.S. operations abroad.

Upon its acceptance, he invited two colleagues from the fields of sociology and communication studies to collaborate. By the year 2000, both colleagues, distinguished leaders in their fields, were long deceased; yet the manual of Elite Target Analysis had not been published, beyond the copies used internally by government officials. There was never any secrecy about the activity or the manual. And it is hardly superseded in theory and practice, although it was prepared in the age of the hand-punched card or machine-sorted Hollarith card, and it was a generation preceding the sophisticated generally available computer network. Despite the new technology that would be applied, strictly comparable pragmatic works seem not yet to be available.

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7 September 2000

ELITE TARGET INTELLIGENCE

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Alfred de Grazia: Discovering National Elites

PART A

ELEMENTS OF TARGET ANALYSIS

I

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE MANUAL

The effort to influence the policies of any society in favor of one's goals requires a thorough knowledge of the factors that determine the policies of the society. To one who plans such an effort, the more a person of the society helps determine its policies, the more crucial it becomes to influence him. He becomes a target of high priority. It is essential, therefore, to have complete intelligence about him. A society that is the objective of influencing activity, which when it is carried on by symbols is called propaganda, must be divided into less important and more important parts. Lower costs and greater effectiveness come from striking as directly as possible at those who can influence decisions in one's favor.

The purpose of this manual is to enable symbol operators to identify such priority targets. In warfare, whether by psychological or physical

means, the more complete the intelligence about the target, the more precisely defined its natures, vulnerability, direction and placement, the more accurate the fire that can be directed upon it, and the more satisfactory the ultimate result of the engagement is likely to be.

What is meant by the statement: the purpose of the manual is to enable symbol operators to identify targets? In the first place, the meaning of symbols here is simply any sign, sentence or sound. The operator (sometimes called the sender) is the person acting in the name of the organization sponsoring his activities (e.g. the U.S.A.), with intent to influence through symbols the attitudes and behavior of others, the target is the person or group whose attitudes and behavior the operator is attempting to change.

Since the object of this manual is so to analyze targets as to provide number of techniques by which the operator may choose among numerous targets the ones most important to policy, the chief concern of the manual will be with the policy-making targets, or, in other words, with the elite. The elite, or leadership group, consists of those persons in any community who possess in extraordinary degree* one or a combination of generally desired qualities. The elite, therefore, possesses high measures of power, respect, wealth, and skill, in combination or singly. When a person possesses a high rating only on one index, he is part of a *special* elite, as, for example, the religious elite or elite of wealth. When that particular quality thoroughly dominates the society, he is also a member of the *general* elite. Otherwise, when he possesses a high, or fairly high, rating on several qualities, that together dominate the leadership of a society, he is part of the general elite, as well as of several special elites.

*See section 6 for discussion of extraordinary degree.

It was said that the purpose of the manual is to enable symbol operators to identify priority targets, or elite targets, and the question arises as to precisely how they will be so enabled. They will not be so enabled in the sense that they will be given here a description of the actual elite of any one or more countries. They will not be told, for instance, who is ruling in Germany, Morocco, or India. Nor will they be given certain slogans or messages that they are advised to use in bringing attitudinal or behavioral changes to the elites of one or more countries. Rather will they be enabled in a technical sense to inquire into the constituency of the elite in any country. The object of each and every one of these techniques is to help the operator successfully and simply to select precisely the audience most important to the dissemination of messages, the audience that is crucial because it is in the best position to help achieve the goals of the sender. Propaganda tactics that fail to select the crucial elite from the uninfluential mass - or from the irrelevant elite - are uneconomical and less effective. The ultimate aim of this work is to enable every officer in the field or at home to establish and test his own model of a given target, according to the most useful, simple and reliable techniques of behavioral science. In pursuit of this aim, the study endeavors to reduce all technicalities to that level of skill which is commanded by operating, as opposed to specialized, personnel, with a minimum loss of valid, systematic and standardized scientific procedures.

The range of techniques discussed in the manual is wide, stretching from those that are well known and often used to those that are little known and little used. An experienced operator will discover not only many techniques that he knows already, but even some that he is already employing systematically. New operators will find perhaps

many more new techniques for identifying and analyzing priority targets. Some of the techniques will be assimilated mentally by the operator and will guide his thoughts and actions without external controls, whereas others can be expected to take external form and be employed consciously as standard operating procedures of an office.

It is intended that the manual be used to its fullest extent. However, its employment will be conditioned by several practical factors. The first and most important is the time element. The absolute amount of time available to the different operators by whom these techniques may be employed is often drastically limited. In most cases it will probably be sufficient if the operator is conscious and conversant with the techniques, without employing, in his work situation, more than a limited number of those that appear most useful to him. Every operator can assign priorities to the techniques. Some are more important than others. Moreover, some are easier to employ and better known than others and require less work to put them into effect. Limitations of personnel will also condition the full use of the manual. Where an evaluation officer is not assigned to a country mission and where a single officer may occupy two positions or suffer great demands upon his time, without staff to assist him, his use of the manual will be almost entirely intellectual and internal, with perhaps no more than an hour a week devoted to the conscious implementation of the methods outlined herein. Under some circumstances, too, local research resources are so poor as to limit exceedingly the number of techniques that can be put into effect, even over a considerable period of time. However, it should not be considered that this manual is more or less appropriate to a society that has been much written about or little discussed. Although the matters it takes up and treats are very little considered in the writings of any country, including that of the United States, except on a highly journalistic level, there should be no more hesitation in applying them to an advanced country of Western Europe

than to a seemingly simple and underdeveloped country of Central America. Furthermore, linguistic barriers often unduly discourage learning about local sources. Some may be surprised to note, for example, that a source of *Who's Who* type of information is very generally available (see the last section of the Bibliography).

In the administrative process, nothing is truly known unless it is used. The last section of the manual deals with the implementing of its techniques. There the manual aims to instruct operators in the task of translating country plans and missions into suitable forms for feeding into target calculations. And it seeks also to make the techniques of target calculation part of the everyday process of influencing target attitudes and behavior. The final success of this manual will be operational. It will have succeeded when what it says is already being done. When a sufficient number of individuals have used it, when they have used it to solve one or more new problems, when it has been used over a fair length of time and in a large number of countries, then it will have justified the effort and money expended on it. Each individual operator can contribute to its success by relatively modest changes in his normal operations. He would be unwise to let the manual convert him into a research scholar. He would be equally unwise to believe that his messages are already striking dead center in all conceivable targets of his country's policies.

Alfred de Grazia: Discovering National Elites

PART A

ELEMENTS OF TARGET ANALYSIS

II

THEORY OF ELITE AND ELITE NETWORKS

The premise of elite theory is that the great majority of human actions are not *random*, but are *structured* and *directed*. The structure and direction are provided by the roles, references, or identifications that all people possess. A man has one or more such roles, usually a number of them: family, occupation, social class, nation, neighborhood and political party are some examples of them. Those people who share a man's role or identification together with him make up the group. The group, in turn, is structured - it consists of people who range from the greatly involved to the little involved and who can also be ranked from the 1) most influential (leaders) to the least influential 2) (followers). There is naturally some correlation between those who are heavily involved and those who are most influential. A high degree of activity usually means a higher than average power in a group.

Involvement and leadership resulting in power, are, of course, the criteria that

interest the operator, and therefore he seeks out those groups that have important orientations towards matters usually expressed through the government actions. Within such relevant groups, he is interested in the involved and influential personnel. The major problem of target analysis becomes that of discovering who is heavily involved and influential in a politically relevant group. The influentials are, of course, his ultimate targets, but the search for the involved follows closely because the involved are defined by high psychic investment and high activity and hence the involved are 1) likely to be influential in contrast to the less involved and 2) are active in executing policies or preparing matters for determination or decision by the influentials (elite).

The several points just made can be elaborated and clarified in the several paragraphs to follow on the structure of society; the structure of involvement; and the distribution of leadership in groups.

II - 1 *The structure of society.* The relationship between individuals in a society which produce its structure can best be illustrated by considering a hypothetical model. Suppose that every man in a society has an equal chance of knowing every other person in the society, that is, that the only universe is the society and that the society is unstructured.* In that case, the probability that John Doe knows any given Richard Roe is determined by the number of Doe's acquaintances, divided by the total population of the society. If this is limited to the adult population of the United States and if Doe has 500 friends, then Doe has 500 divided by 100,000,000, or one chance in 200,000 of knowing Roe. If Doe is very active in making friends and has 2,000 of them, then his chance of knowing Roe becomes one in 50,000.

Although the probabilities of mutual acquaintanceship are thus far very low, they increase by gigantic strides when a) the number of acquaintances is increased, and b) an intermediary, or third man, is introduced. Suppose Doe and Roe each have 500 acquaintances. What is the chance that through these acquaintances they will have an acquaintance, Q.E. Smith, in common? The chance is one in 200. If Doe

and Roe each have 1,000 acquaintances, the chance becomes one in 50; and if each has 2,000, the chance is one in 12.5. Now suppose a fourth person, A. B. Jones, is considered, and the question is: if Doe knows 500, and Roe knows 500, what is the chance that each will know somebody who will know somebody else who will know the other? The chance now is "better" than unity. It is certain the Doe knows somebody who knows somebody who knows Rod in this fictional society.

*The theory here presented has been developed primarily by Dr. Ithiel de Sola Pool, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

However, no society consists of random-moving, atomistic individuals. Instead, the society is structured itself as a group into involved vs. less-involved, the influential vs. less-influential, and many other functional components. Moreover, besides the society as a group, there are numerous other role or identification groups, such as the neighborhood, family, profession, club, or religion. The effect of these two facts on the theory of networks in the randomized universe is twofold: 1) some contact chances between persons are increased; 2) other are lessened.

Contacts and contact chances are increased by social separatism when the two individuals selected for testing share an identification which sets them apart in the universe under study. (Suppose they are both government employees.) The contact chance in the shared group increases inversely with the size of the group. (Suppose they are both Bureau of the Budget employees.) If the men belong to one shared group, they may belong to others, in which case also the chance goes up. (Suppose they are both Bureau of the Budget employees and live in Georgetown - a second common identification that would increase slightly their chances of encounter.)

Contact chances are lessened by social separatism when the differences between individuals' identifications keep them moving along separate channels and through different networks. For example, a minor labor leader of the garment industry and a Department of Agriculture farm agent in Iowa would have few common groups

and might even lack intermediaries. A merchant in Paris may know more merchants in London than he does workers who live a mile from his home.

II-2. *The structure of involvement.* The inner structure of any grouping is also not atomized but is composed of people who can be ordered according to their involvement in the grouping. Involvement can vary greatly. An internal measure is the extent of one's spiritual and mental life that is bound up in a role; an external measure, more useful in studying elites, is the extent of his behavior or action-output that is oriented towards or done in the context of a role. One might ask, for example, how active a man is in his professional group, or in his political community. A recent study of the political activity of the American population asked a representative sample a series of questions about participation in their political role.*

Responses were scored in the following manner:

TABLE I:

	Percentage of total sample qualifying	Scoring points credited	Total possible score for channel
TYPE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY:	Voting		
Once or more in last four years	75	1	3
Three times or more	47	1	
Five times or more	21	1	

TYPE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY:	Discussing public issues with others		
Discusses frequently and takes an equal share in the conversation	21	1	2
Discusses frequently and usually tries to convince others he is right	6	1	
TYPE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY:	Belonging to organizations that take stands on public issues		
Belongs to one or more	31	1	2
Belongs to two or more	7	1	
TYPE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY:	Written or talked to congress-men or other public officials giving own opinion on public issue		
One or more times in past year	13	1	2
Two or more times in past year	7	1	
TYPE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY:	Worked for election of a political candidate in last four years		
	11	2	2
TYPE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY:	Contributed money to Party or candidate in last four years		
	7	1	1
TOTAL POSSIBLE SCORE	12		

* Julian L. Woodward and Elmo Roper "Political Activity of American Citizens," XLIV American Political Science Review (1950). 872-885.

The distribution of scores for the whole sample population on the scale of 0 to 12 follows:

TABLE II:

Score	Percentage making score
0	19.2
1	19.1
2	19.0
3	15.6
4	10.3
5	6.5
6	4.0
7	2.0
8	1.6
9	1.2
10	0.7
11	0.3
12	0.1

Figure 1

Fig._1.gif

When this distribution is plotted on a graph, the figure of a J-curve is obtained (see Figure 1). That is, there is a progressively smaller group involved in political activity as one moves towards greater participation. This phenomenon, here illustrated by one study, is found in all groups for which information is available.*

As the operator examines every new grouping that comes to his attention, he can expect that the J-curve will fit the distribution of activity therein. To the degree that it does, his problem of target-selection is greatly limited; most of his targets will fall among the high-scorers, as succeeding sections of this manual will show.

II-3. *Distribution of political leadership.* Whereas involvement is an index to who are leaders and who are symbol-receivers and symbol-conveyors, leadership is the direct indicator of influence and is the bulls-eye of the target. A J-curve fits generally the known distributions of leadership in groups, but it should be remembered that there is not a perfect overlap between those who score high on involvement and those who score high on influence. The leaders have a proved influence on the behavior of others within the group. The involved have not.

* Alfred de Grazia, "Political Activity and Leadership in *Politics, Lad and Administration*" (publication forthcoming).

An example of the J-curve of leadership is presented on the next page, based upon a study by Bryce Ryan of a random sample of 25 per cent of all farm operators residing in four townships of Iowa. Respondents were asked to name people to whom they would go for 1) advice, 2) organization, and 3) representation on five local problems of rural schools, farm taxes, scarcity of farms, land use, and local roads. The combined nominations of all counts give a kind of composite index of community leadership. The distribution of replies is presented below in Table 3

and plotted on Figure 2. It is noticeable that, as in the study of involvement, very few individuals emerge as the leaders. This is the expected situation regarding leadership in any group, and the operator, in moving into a new situation or into the examination of a new, relevant social grouping should again aim at the top influentials as the most profitable targets of his messages. The few who have a disproportionate amount of influence can do more for him than can the rank-and-file; they can act on his cues more decisively if convinced, or block them if hostile; they can pass on his cues with greater force.

Often, of course, the operator will discover that the elite is more hostile or difficult of persuasion than the rank-and-file. He will often have to direct messages at the lower leadership (and activity) echelons to make any impression whatsoever. But this retreat must be planned and self-conscious; he must realize he is forced to abandon the choicest targets because they are inaccessible, and not rationalize his retreat under illusory slogans about the "greater potency" of the rank-and-file members of a group.

TABLE III:

71 persons	(53%)	were named 1 time
20 persons	(15%)	were named 2 times
11 persons	(8%)	were named 3 times
08 persons	(6%)	were named 4 times
05 persons	(4%)	were named 5 times
10 persons	(7%)	were named 6 to 10 times
07 persons	(5%)	were named 11 to 15 times
03 persons	(2%)	were named 16 or more times

* Graph *

Being practical does not mean being visionary or wishful. It means being as rational or calculating as possible under a given set of circumstances.

The so-called mass scarcely exists from the point of view of propaganda. Every component of society is structured. Within each element or group distinction between elite and mass is one of graduation of influence. Unless a person has some significance as an influence upon others or a target. The foregoing paragraphs have shown that in practically all groups, persons without influence are a very large fraction of the total who are identified with the group. What unfortunately and frequently happens in propaganda analysis is that the phrase "appealing to the masses" is used loosely to refer either to a kind of blunderbuss scattering of messages on the principle of "hope-it-hits-something," or to the targeting of a part of the population that is large and has potential leaders, or leaders not formally recognized as powerful in the institutional structure of the government. The inefficiency of the former case is self-evident; the leaders in the latter case can, and should, be found by appropriate target analysis of the elites, and their importance measured by the degree of their influence, not by the degree of their accessibility.

PART A

ELEMENTS OF TARGET ANALYSIS

III

GENERAL ORIENTATION OF OPERATOR TO TARGET BACKGROUND

The title of this section might well be stated as question : "How does one find his way around in an unfamiliar place?" The question will have to be answered in terms of the people of the place, the things they have around them, and what they *do* in relation to things and other people. The problem is to understand the relationships between persons and things, and in particular between persons who control the actions of others. When this understanding is achieved, the operator can move and act in the new environment with confidence that his acts will produce predictable results.

One usually knows at least generally how a strange country fits into a larger world scheme. Argentina produces meat, Bolivia tin, Iran oil, and Australia wool. And in turn, persons who control operations related to each of these major products are a vital part of the elite of each area. To know who they are and how they operate gives clues to many other activities of the area which might not be as readily understood. In a like manner, one usually has a general impression of what relation a particular community has to the larger national whole. These general impressions, when supplemented with the operator's observations and factual data gathered by him, serve as orientation. He sees the directions others are taking in their activities; he finds directions for himself.

BACKGROUND ANALYSIS

III-1. *Achieving an organic sense of the area.* In the long run, one acts on the understanding of a situation that has become his own. He may read or hear about an area, but until he has observed the local scene and translated these observations into his own terms and his own conclusions, he cannot act in the area with sureness. Thus the operator must achieve an organic sense of the area; and since his special problem is the identification of elites, he should focus his attention on those details of cultural life that have meaning in elite terms. Since elite groupings will be related to the activity pattern of the area, the operator should be constantly asking himself: "What is the relationship between what this individual or this group is doing and what this city or this country does as a whole?" If he has prepared for his new post by a review of historical or descriptive material, he will repeatedly ask himself whether what he sees and hears affirms or denies the accuracy of this material. Through such observation, comparison, and evaluation, he will eventually arrive at a breadth of understanding which will make it possible for him to judge the effects of his own acts accurately.

III.2. *Touring the Locale.* If the operator is assigned to a city, one of his first acts should be that of making a "Cook's Tour" of the place. The tour should be *extensive* - not just a quick run up and down Main Street or ascertaining the best route from the hotel to the market or casino. It may or may not be a guided tour, but in either case notes and questions should be kept on observations. One might well begin by asking himself if he actually knows physical directions, north, south, east and west. The question is simple, indeed, but sooner or later someone will say that a plant, refinery, mine or business operation is in such and such a

direction and the initial orientation will be valuable.

How is the town laid out? Is it built around a square, at a point of break in transportation, where rivers meet, or where land meets sea, or at rail or road junctions? A knowledge of these points tells something of the functional significance of the city and its relation to a hinterland. What, too, is the general pattern of town layout? Where is the business district? Where are the major industrial establishments? Where do the people live who man the business and industrial facilities? Where are the governmental offices? What is the dispersal of religious buildings? For what purpose were the buildings built that one is unable to identify? Where are the fashionable neighborhoods? The slums? What are the major forms of transportation? What do they carry? What are their points of entry and exit in the community? Where do they go? What is their traffic volume?

What are the people like? Are they all of one race or mixed? Are there different nationalities or racial groups. Do they live in separate areas? Do these areas appear to be equal in adequacy of facilities regardless of the ethnic composition of neighborhoods? How many are in each group? How many in the town as a whole? Which group furnishes community leadership and power personnel?

One needs to inquire into the time habits of people in the area in which he will operate. Do the people have a time sense as westerners have? Do they go by the clock or sun? Do they have a historical past? Do they look to the future? To a future life? What time do they rise? Retire? What hours do they work? Do their dress habits vary in time? During the day? On weekends? Holidays? Festivals? Do holy days or seasonal changes mark the calendar? What are the recreation hours? Days? What are the forms of recreation according to various groups?

The general movement of people is also an index of a culture. Do they move in masses along the thoroughfares? Do they appear to move purposefully - as to market or to work - or do they move aimlessly? If the streets are deserted in any portion of the day, what are the people doing? If overly crowded, what then? Where do people congregate and for what purposes? When?

Have the people built cultural facilities, such as museums, art galleries, libraries, club houses or buildings, music houses, and park facilities? How much are they used? Who uses them? Who supports them?

These questions are merely suggestive. They are not intended as a check-list, but exemplify the kinds of questions the operator should have in the back of his mind. In answering them, the operator will obtain general and cultural information which will provide an initial basis for his analysis. While the elite may behave somewhat differently from persons outside its own limits of prestige and ritual refinement, it develops out of the same general environment and functions within it. Answers to the questions posted will give the operator a sense of this physical environment. Insofar as it expresses internal values, he will begin to see the meaning of these visible manifestations of them.

This process of overall observation need not be strictly organized. It is a browsing kind of activity. It is seeing a few trees *and* the forest. The operator doesn't have to spend a long time at it, but its pace should be leisurely rather than hasty. It might be thought of as an attempt to gain insights which will be validated in the long run by more detailed observation and study.

III-3. *The regional setting.* Within the larger picture, observations of regional vegetation, animal life, and land formations may tell one something of a people. What is the agricultural base? What are the food crops? Cash crops? Is the land cultivated extensively or in small plots? Is the land locally owned and operated or is it a plantation system? How much arable land? How much under cultivation? To what use are animals put? How productive is the area in minerals? What are the rights involved? What machinery and tools are visible? How widespread is the use of various combinations of tools? Who uses them?

The approach to the region may also take up such questions as these: What is the population? What are the population trends, the birth and death rates? What is the rural-urban population ratio? What is electric power capacity? Railroad

mileage? Canals and road mileage? Is there an index of industrial production? Of resources and raw materials? What technical schools exist? How many students? What military schools? What is the literacy rate? Are data available to construct indices of telephones, automobiles, trucks, tractors?

Many of the questions cited relate to what people do, who they are, where they are, how they move, and in those instances in which values have been mentioned, how they think. In this, a structural-functional approach to social observation has been suggested. And by this latter statement it is merely meant: one looks for those elements in a society, a nation, or community in which physical structures or habit patterns and their relation to social goals are so fixed and stabilized that they may be observed.

III-4. *Means of limiting perspectives.* The sum total of actions in any community or nation, of all men, is a staggering figure. It is not conceivable that a single investigator could possibly observe the total action structure of even a small community in a given period of time, but one can rather quickly learn what acts are considered important to the overall well-being of the people. Some of the questions might be: what makes this area worthy of consideration? What makes it important enough to the United States that men within the policy groups there wish to affect the actions of men in Iran, Columbia, Calcutta? What do local leaders do that relates to the major activities of the area?

These are all questions related to "finding one's way around," and none of them are profound in the sense that they have never been asked. The profitable exercise is that of asking all of them, and more, in order that the orientation to the culture visited may be broad and that the psychological environment that the operator carries with him from his own culture may be enlarged to embrace the cultural and sociological facts that may vary from his own. The operator can assume many things, which may or may not be true. His assumptions must be tested by seeing, hearing, and evaluating on the spot.

III-5. *Avoiding simplism.* To miss the fact that corn grows in Iowa, and that individuals activities and group functions there are related to it, would be a gross oversight and one that is hardly conceivable. To dismiss these facts lightly, to assume that everyone knows that corn-growing is important to Iowa, indeed, would be superficial. To explain the whole of Iowa culture in terms of corn-growing would be fallacious. The same might be said for auto manufacture in Detroit, gum Arabic and cotton culture in the Sudan, fruit production in Guatemala, and skin processing around Hudson Bay. But to orient oneself to any one of these areas, one would certainly need to know the significant facts related to activities revolving around corn, autos, gum, cotton, fruit, or skins. To pick one set of activities for illustration, one easily says the function of Detroit is that of making autos, meaning that there are specifiable groups in Detroit who make autos. It is equally easy to say that Detroit serves the rest of the nation and large parts of the world in a functional capacity, namely, making autos. To know the patterned relationships between those who make autos in Detroit and others who do not provides a functional basis for analysis of the area in question.

In Detroit there are other activities of great importance. In a dragnet survey of activities one would see governmental activities, commercial enterprises, chemical operations, and service establishments of some magnitude. As these are broadly scrutinized their major functions within social life will become clear. The physical questions posed earlier would be a part of the orientation scheme in this city as much as if it were a non-industrial town in a backwash area of the Yucatan or Transvaal.

III-6. *Correlation of functions and elites.* It may be said here, however, that as one travels across the United States and visits cities, towns and villages, he cannot help but be impressed with the correlation of major activities in the various communities and community leadership and élites. The variables in each situation are related to the kind of environment and environmental production, but

stable patterns of leader-follower relations begin to emerge even in the process of asking about physical and external cultural arrangements. In the U.S. the major producer-banker-lawyer-civic association patterns of organization are unmistakably apparent, and give clues to total social configurations. Patterns in other areas of the world may or may not be as readily apparent, but a good starting point for testing social pattern validity is that of isolating and examining major functional groupings.

III-7. *Functions as clues to presence of leadership.* Whereas most techniques of research in leadership presume going directly to potential leaders, at times the camouflage or unconsciousness of leadership, or the lack of area knowledge by the operator may block an appreciation of where to look for the centers of leadership. An understanding of the target background is useful in shaping one's theories about where to seek leaderships. In brief, wherever a population exhibits significant social separatism, corresponding leaderships may be sought. For instance, if two crops are important to a farming area - say rice and cotton - then the presumption is that two more or less different leaderships will be found: both may share many attitudes and there may be a general leadership that overlaps both groups, but on some questions the two may diverge sharply. Other long-range functional differences may provide similar examples of different leaderships. For instance, two types of orchard crops - plums and peaches - may bring about partially separate leaderships as a result of the first being primarily an export crop and the second a domestically consumed crop.

III-8. *Documentary sources of background information.* While stress has been placed here on the physical observations alone, documentary sources of information, expert informants, and exploratory and tentative study reports, when available, may be extremely useful. Sources, including those mentioned, might be listed and briefly explained as follows: written materials, including history, political analyses, industrial and commercial data, geographical and population

data, bibliographies on the area, and special studies done by the international community of research analysts and scholars.

III-9. *Use of informants.* Expert informants may give verbal accounts and act as guides in the exploration of an area. These may be drawn from the area, or may be persons familiar with the area but who are now stationed and reside in the United States.

III-10. *On-the-spot studies.* The operator should also make his own studies on the scene, taking into account the various questions raised in earlier portions of this section, e.g. "How is the town laid out?" "What are the people like?" "What is the time sense of the people?" "what are the general movements of the people?" "What makes this area important to the United States?" "What are the major social groupings according to the over-all functioning of the community or nation?"

III-11. *Systematic review of observations.* It is not assumed that complete studies can be made relative to any of these questions, nor that all materials can be analyzed. However, a sample scanning of materials and a resident survey can be made and is vital to the analysis of power groups within any area. The operation described here is one of stage setting for later, more detailed work. If it is adequately done, it will provide clues to social behavior related to power and prestige elements within social groups.

A review of the materials and notes taken during the initial stages of inquiry is usually helpful, if done a few months after entry has been made into an area. Such a review serves as a check on bias that creeps into the operator's thinking as he becomes acclimated to his social environment: it also turns up areas of

investigation that may have been overlooked and that might shed light on present problems he is encountering.

PART A

ELEMENTS OF TARGET ANALYSIS

IV

AREA AND FUNCTIONAL BOUNDARIES OF TARGETS

When the operator has oriented himself to the target background, he must cut out of that background the precise targets at whom he wishes to direct his messages, very much as he might cut the geese out of a flock of ducks. A large number of sections to follow are devoted to helping him do this. This section begins that process by showing how to limit the scope of his inquiry. A population is always heterogeneous in its natural state; it has many elements and it is geographically dispersed. It is divided into social group ins by *area* and by *function*.

The leadership of a nation differs from the leadership of a part of the nation. The leadership of one neighborhood from that of another. Both are elite; but together they are not always the special elite that one's message is aimed at. Hence, it is necessity to separate them.

The best way to separate the elite into its components is to analyze the roles of its members. With what roles in society do they identify? With the farmers? With the communist party? With the intelligentsia? With the "people"? With the King? etc. A grouping is known by the fact that some people us it as a reference point in

their thought and action. For example, when a soldier has been a member of a squad for a long time, he often filters his ideas and conduct through the screen of what he thinks the squad will agree are right ideas and behavior. A career officer will do the same for the army officer corps, a civil official for his branch of service; a party member for his political party.

Every group then is composed of people who refer to it and "think via it." Some members do so more than others. The leadership of a group ordinarily is more preoccupied with it and "group-oriented" than the rank and file, who may, in turn, be more oriented towards a sub-group (e.g. the army squad rather than the division). When addressing messages at a "group", therefore, the operator will do well to realize the gradations of group or role identification found among its members. The symbols that may affect those of high group identification do not often affect those of low identification.

Furthermore, men have more than one role, in most instances. A corporation director may hold several other directorships. A soldier may also be a farmer. A priest may also be a nationalist. And so on. If the roles are complementary, any class of arguments which affects the individual will be satisfactory. But if the roles are not complementary - or if the argument in effect plays one role against the other - then internal conflicts are set up in the individual. Actually, the latter situation occurs much more often than the former. This makes it mandatory to distinguish the roles of an undifferentiated audience, whether or not it is an elite audience, in order to direct at the target messages which will be appreciated. Once the operator has located the elite, he is part way to the target, but the process is not completed until the role components of the target have been identified.

TECHNIQUES OF DELIMITING THE ELITE

IV-1. *Individual records.* For a specific person, the dossier is a major source of clues to his roles, for it should provide information on where he was born and raised (his local identification), his education (source of several identifications, such as class, school, internationalism, etc.), his present and past occupations, his religion, and his membership in voluntary associations (such as a political party). Beginning at the top of the elite (in power terms) and going down into it as far as possible, such dossiers should be prepared and used.

IV-2. *Individual interviews.* Dossiers should be supplemented by interview records wherever possible. (In Section XII-2, problems of interviewing are treated.) There are many ways of querying a man's identification. All seek ultimately to sub-divide his perceived world into discrete loyalties of known intensity. Respondents may be asked, directly or as subtly as circumstances demand: "With whom do you spend most of your time?" (Also "Free time"); "What kinds of people are you most fond of?"; "If you could join any group you wanted to join, which would you most like to join?"; and "What group would be your second choice?"; "With what part of the people do you find yourself in agreement most of the time?"; and "To what groups do you belong?"

IV-3. *Judging the intensity of identification.* For greater significance and completeness, the relative strength of a person's attachment to communities such as the city or nation or social class references, as well as to his clubs, unions, church and profession, ought to be known. At least enough information should be available on a person to place his references in an approximate rank order of importance to him. Thus, both fullness of information and comparative importance of the roles are desirable. If a man's only group membership is the socialist party and he has never voted for any other group, there are two strong indicators (monopoly and duration) that his political life is bound up with that group reference. If a man belongs to many groups and shifts frequently his

affiliations, one should look for more basic loyalties (e.g. to the nation or family) or for an instability of character that can be exploited. In preparing dossiers, it is well to standardize some crude scores of intensity that can be assigned individuals: thus rather than Mr. A. being credited merely with membership in Group X, he might be graded as X2 if he is importantly concerned with X (compared with other members of X), and X1 if X is his most intense identification.

IV-4. Identification with elite or mass. An important special case of identification for many symbolic purposes is the extent to which a person may be rated as identifying with the general elite or with the population as a whole. The importance of the case arises from the fact that the contrast between mass and elite is a hypnotic subject almost everywhere, and much propaganda is directed at it. An individual who is relatively invulnerable to changes of mass attitude and behavior is a target armored against mass propaganda. One who is strongly influenced by mass opinion can often be reached via messages in the mass media. This information is valuable when it is possessed regarding single persons. It is also valuable to have it regarding a special elite or general elite. Variations of such questions as were asked in Section IV-2 will provide the necessary focussing and scoring on this problem.

IV-5. National and international identifications. Another important special case of identification is internationalism. There are often great differences within and among elites in the extent to which they feel they belong to extra-national associations and respond to internationalist symbols. Furthermore, the precise nature of the international references is needed. Since demands for commitments to international groups (U.S.A. policy, N.A.T.O, U.N, Communism, etc.) are numerous and persistent, the elite should be segregated into those vulnerable to the particular extra-national appeals and those that are not. If the elite is available for direct questioning, variations of the approaches suggested in IV-2 will help

provide the necessary focussing and scoring on this problem. Another approach might be to record the direction of opinion toward a few key symbols, such as the U.N. or Communism, as indicated in public speeches, writings, or according to the estimate of reliable informants.

IV-6. *Group occupation analysis.* With personal dossiers in a proper state of completion, but also often with special information obtained from written sources, the operator can make a group occupation analysis. Occupation is one of the most significant role, attitude and behavior indicators. An essential of target identification is a fairly accurate quantitative picture of the occupations of the elite. Occupations may be broken down into several kinds of categories for useful elite target analyses. One breakdown would specify the occupation in great detail, resulting in almost as many categories as tasks. (e.g. tailors, druggists, barbers, tobacconists, etc.) Another would classify occupations according to their general functions, somewhat as follows:

Professional and semi-professional

Self-employed businessmen and artisans

Officials

Managers

Clerks

Salesmen, buyers, agents, brokers

Skilled and semi-skilled workers

Unskilled, service and farm workers

Policemen, firemen and military

Farm owners

Miscellaneous workers

Yet another breakdown, aimed directly at analyzing the location of power, would divide the leadership into these categories: I, Owners, managers, workers, and officials. These, in turn, would be sub-divided by: II. Works with people, works with objects or things. The sub-divisions would be further divided by: III. Skills in use of force, skills in symbol manipulation, skills in management of goods and services. Thus, an owner who works with people and is skilled in symbol manipulation (e.g. a newspaper publisher) is distinguished from a manager who works with people and is skilled in use of force (e.g, an Army officer). These several dimensions of a person and a group (such as a legislature, a political party, a union, or an elite in general) provide excellent basic intelligence for sighting propaganda messages. Table 4 illustrates one type of occupational analysis of the more traditional form.

TABLE 4 (A)

MEMBERSHIP IN JAPANESE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BY SELECTED OCCUPATIONS

OCCUPATION	1931	1946	1947
Military	12	0	0
Bureaucrat	39	33	41
Business & Managerial	126	160	191
Journalist-Writer	42	28	38
Lawyer	77	48	48
Educator	2	49	39

Physician	11	12	5
Agricultural & Fisheries	67	55	36
Labor leader or employee	0	35	51
Miscellaneous & vacant	90	46	17
TOTAL	466	466	466

TABLE 4 (B)

MEMBERSHIP IN JAPANESE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BY PARTY AND OCCUPATION

1946								
OCCUPATION	Names of parties							
	Liberal	Democratic	Co-op.	Soc.Dem.	Communist.	Minor Parties	Independent	Total
Business	64	45	6	11	0	16	18	160
Bureaucrat	13	6	0	3	0	1	10	33
Journalist	6	4	0	11	4	1	2	28
Professional	32	13	3	22	0	10	29	100
Agricultural	15	18	4	5	0	4	9	55
Labor	0	2	1	29	0	2	1	35
Miscellaneous and vacant	10	6	0	11	1	4	12	44
Totals	140	94	14	92	5	38	81	460*

1947								
Business	61	78	12	32	1	3	4	191
Bureaucrat	22	10	1	7	0	1	0	41
Journalist	10	6	2	18	1	1	0	38
Professional	29	17	11	28	1	2	5	93
Agricultural	7	8	3	10	0	7	1	36

Labor	0	4	1	42	1	2	1	51
Miscellaneous and Vacant	3	3	11	6	0	1	2	16
Totals	132	126	31	143	4	17	13	466

* Total includes 2 Vacant.

IV-7. Class and socialite analysis. Information on the occupations and relationship of the elite to the means of production, as well as being useful in itself, raised a possibility of social class analysis. However, it is advisable to note limitations on the concept of class, with reference to characteristics of the elite. It is most useful to regard social class as existing only when class consciousness exists, that is when there is an awareness of political and social warfare drawn on class lines, or of rigidity along class lines in the performance of the universal activities of commerce, eating and visiting, and marriage.

Verbal self-placement of individuals or groups in a class is significant only to a limited degree. Sometimes people say that no social class system exists, but they operate in terms of one. By the same token, there may be verbal assurances of the existence of class and a lack of other criteria. However, where there is an emphatic denial of social class - in a communist or non-communist country - there is good reason to expect that class political warfare, as one of the criteria, is not *allowed* to exist.

In the "society page" sense, the social class system may operate to rank the target elite according to who will marry whom and who will visit whom. Diplomatic protocol makes a formal attempt at top elite analysis in setting a table, arranging a reception line, and the like. But these rankings are likely to depend upon formal procedures, legal fictions, international conventions, etc., that conceal real power relationships among those being graded. Beyond the highly visible top few, whose social rank is thus accorded, the bulk of the elite may sometimes have a carefully regulated pattern of social relations or a very mobile one. The operator can check the general type and then the special subtypes that prevail by a variety

of straightforward questions. He will often discover that some special elites, for example, inter-marry at a high rate and that others marry only within their own group, with the result that the general elite picture may be a blurred combination of two highly contrasting patterns. Attention to lineage is important, also, both as a clue to role attitude and behavior and as an indicator of informal relationships that may be actuated in crises. The society pages, genealogies, histories, reports of "who was seen with whom," gossip, etc. are all grist for the mill of social analysis. It is well to point out in conclusion that social familiarity and other evidences of in-group cohesiveness do not prove the absence of elite schisms (cf. *War of the Roses*, and innumerable other examples of the contrary, including the Moscow trials of the 1930's). But they do indicate what form political warfare will take if it does occur within the general elite.

IV-8. *Geographical identification.* Another widespread identification of individuals is with some geographical section. The nation is, in part, an idea of familiar and beloved land, even when it spreads into regions an individual has never visited himself. Other identifications reach down into the provinces, cities, villages and even neighborhoods. When symbols reach and stimulate a person, he often receives, vies and evaluates them in such localistic terms. Most often, there is actually some organization of these localistic references, i.e. not only does Mr. A. feel and think as part of Village X, but Village X has its own elite that is differentiated from the general elite by strong biases favoring local demands, needs and tastes. A study of history, customs and current behavior, coupled with an analysis of the immobility of elite in a given area and of the unrepresentative character of elites of the larger geographical areas, may reveal a high degree of autonomous reaction among the local elite, and a consequent need to adjust propaganda drastically to cope with the different view of the world involved among the local as opposed to the national elites.

As with functional groupings, such as occupations, religions, and fraternal associations, the area grouping is diffident by the limit of its references. That is, its members consist of all those who achieve more than a minimal score in their

psychological attention to the group. The high scorers, correspondingly, are those who have high activity and high leadership in the group. They are the special elite. This is the most efficient mode of differentiating this elite component from other elite components.

IV-9. Content Analysis of Roles. The press is a common source of information on roles. A count of names in the news, their context and the group with which they are identified, is useful in fixing the affiliations of the elite. Official government announcements and documents, such as honors lists and legislative hearings, also provide material on elite affiliations.

IV-10. Group Cross-Pressures Analysis. Cross-pressures are intra-individual, inter-individual or intra-group and inter-group. Intra-individual cross-pressures occur when two roles of a person conflict, as for example, the citizen-role is at odds with the soldier-role, the national with the local, or the professional with the national interest. The individual then assumes more moderate position or retreats into apathy or, infrequently, becomes very aggressive in one of the roles as he "guiltily" strives to repress the other. In the second case, intra-group cross-pressure occurs when secondary or other roles of some group members are present and conflict with the role being considered, whereas other group members do not possess such conflicting roles or perhaps even have supplementary, fortifying roles to the one being considered. The third cross-pressure type occurs when two groups, which are on an absolute scale equally identified with a particular symbol (such as the "nation"), are thrown on to different scalar positions towards this symbol and another symbol to which one of the groups adheres. An example would be nationalism, which is shared equally by two groups under most conditions, and which, when it conflicts with the pacifism of one of the groups, is no longer regarded equally by both groups.

Divide and conquer is the commonsense term applied to the technique of playing

on all three types of cross-pressures, when the object is to weaken elite unity. Again basic social data on the elite, either of an aggregate kind or of personal data, is essential to the determination of the existence of cross-pressures. When a given issue is expressed in symbols that harm group A and help group B, the issue should be checked with the alignment of elite identifications to determine who will be helped how much, and who will be harmed how much; then an estimate can be prepared of the reactions to be expected: i.e., the pros, the cons, and the person and groups who will be neutralized by the conflict.

PART A

ELEMENTS OF TARGET ANALYSIS

V

ISSUE ORIENTATION AND RELEVANCE OF TARGETS

The discovery of the elite and the delineation of the roles of its members moves the operator nearer the goal of choosing targets, but does not complete the task. Even though the total elite may not be a large group, some portions of it may be more relevant to the purposes of the operator, others less. To assure economy of activity and to make effort more effective, the operator must distinguish between the more relevant and the less relevant targets which become available after the elite has been identified.

The best way to choose between potential targets within the elite is to study the issues which concern the respective parts of the target power structure and to discover which are most relevant to the operator's policies. The simple logic of the operation consists of three steps: (a) determination of issues to which the elite are oriented; (b) determination of the policies to which the operator is oriented; (c) establishing which issues - and which members of the elite - are relevant to (b). It is useful also to differentiate between the primary elite targets which this analysis will reveal and the secondary targets made up of elite who are less

directly concerned with the relevant issues.

Such an analysis will draw heavily upon the information obtained from the study of the background area described in Section III, and from the study of the roles of individual influentials and groups of influentials outlined in Section IV. In effect, it calls for an analysis of three basic variables, each of which has the characteristic of successively describing or delimiting the target. To review the total operation suggested thus far, one can think of starting with nation or community X, an undifferentiated potential target. By studying the structure and the functions of the target, he has made it specific - XA; by investigating elite roles he has delimited it to - XA/B. And now by investigating elite issues and their relevance to the operator's policies, he will come near pinpointing the target as - XA/B/C.

METHODS OF ISSUE ANALYSIS

V-1. *Issues with high visibility.* A first step in issue analysis is to determine those public issues which are of concern to the elite. What issue indicators are present in the press? In the other mass communications media? Is there concern with basic power issues which will determine the inclusion or exclusion of certain influential groups in the power structure? Is there a personal contest for power between individual influentials? The mass media have been said to be agenda-makers, i.e., they determine what people will talk about, what they will think about. To a considerable degree, the influentials have the more basic power of directing the mass in their media agenda-making. Thus elite concerns may be revealed through a study of the press.

V-2. *Issues with low visibility.* Public issues sometimes are mainly "window-dressing" designed to keep attention away from more basic issues which the elite

handle "among themselves". When study of public issues reveals many that seem unimportant, that do not affect the holding or exercise of power, or that seem much removed from what the structural -functional analysis of the society has shown or what the role study of the elite has indicated, the operator should look for non-public issues. In such instances, the operator must turn to informants, and usually to those within the elite structure, to discover issues which are the real concern of top influentials.

V-3. *Pattern of issue emergence.* How does an issue come up in the target area? Is there a formalized system for the development, discussion and resolution of issues? Or are issues developed at a high level and decided there? Is the issue-deciding machinery designed to operate quickly? Is it capable of operating quickly? Or is it a complicated machinery which means that the drawing of an issue will produce indecision and inactivity? Is it possible to have such a thing as a "grass roots" issue? Or are there governmental or informal devices to resolve incipient issues of this type or stamp them out? Does the background study of the target indicate that wide areas have been ruled "out of bounds" as far as disputes are concerned? In some states, for example, it has been impossible to have an issue over religion. The matter is settled and there is little or no likelihood of an issue arising in this sphere. In another state, religion may be a paramount issue, fraught with importance and danger for influentials.

V-4. *Relationship of elite to issues.* The identification of issues suggested in V-1 through V-4 is incomplete until the operator has related the issues he discovers to specific individuals and groups within the elite structure. He will want to ask and find answers to questions such as these: Will this issue involve the entire elite structure? Will it be a concern of special elites? The knowledge of the elite provided by the analysis of roles should make possible a "matching" of issues and influentials. When this has been done, the operator will have located the influentials relevant to the issues. Unless the target has a very narrow, monolithic

power structure and a small elite which concerns itself with every facet of life, one can expect that there will be a division of labor among the elite. An issue on public education will be the concern of school influentials, possibly of the intellectual elite and possibly also of the religious elite, to give an example. It may or may not involve the business elite or the bureaucratic elite. Such potential groupings around issues can almost always be expected.

At the same time, issues will not necessarily have fixed boundaries within the elite. Expansions and contractions can be expected, which is to say that the "relevant" group of influentials may change in the course of an issue. The school problem may develop a financial aspect, such as a bond issue, which will bring in the financial elite to discuss this special phase and to make a specific decision, then to leave the larger school issue to the original group. Or political and bureaucratic interests may be drawn in by a proposal to put teachers on civil service or to centralize the school system.

As a general rule, the operator will make the most progress towards matching relevant influentials and issues by noting the primary elite role of the power-wielder. Yet he should not lose sight of the fact that most power-wielders have several roles, and they may thus become relevant to the issue through one or more secondary roles. Such persons would constitute a target of secondary relevance as far as the issues are concerned.

V-5. Relationship of operator's policy to issues. The study of issues in the target area and of the relevant influentials would be academic unless the operator found it possible to relate them to his own goals, his mission as set out in directives and orders. A power struggle within the elite between factions which would maintain roughly the same kind of regime, which would mean little or no change in the relationships of the target with the U.S. would not be a very relevant issue, as far as the operator is concerned. On the other hand, a power struggle between influentials, one of whom was very friendly to the U.S. and the other a direct critic or opponent of the U.S., would be extremely relevant to the operator. A

broad framework of relevancy can be erected. Is the issue likely to result in a change of the attitude of power-wielders to the U.S? Is the issue likely to produce a physical change in personnel? Or will it produce a new elite point of view inimical to U.S. interests?

Often, the operator's directives will stress the preservation of the target area's independent status as a U.S. goal. In this even, an issue which might have an end possibility of threatening the independence of the nation would be particularly relevant. On the other end of scale would be the local issue which would not change the status. This the operator could ignore. Another framework is suggested: Is the issue likely to result in an unfavorable change in the status of the state (as distinct from that of the influentials themselves)?

If the operator's directives contain specific goals, he may find a kind of "face relationship" between such specific goals and members of the elite. For example, if American policy concerned a vital raw material, its production and its availability to the United States as needed, the operator would tag as especially relevant to him those elite members who were particularly effective in applying their power in the specialized fields involved in production of the raw material. He might then assign higher target priority, on grounds of greater relevancy, to the owners of the mines, the union leaders, and the local elites of communities in which the raw material was processed. Thus there is another framework: Do the specific goals of the operator's mission suggest the classes of influentials (or even individual power wielders) that are specifically relevant to these goals?

V-6. Short-range relevancy versus long-range. Any study of issues and of their relevancy must be a continuing project. There will be changes in the operator's specific goals: there will be a procession of issues in the target area. The lists of relevant influentials will need to be revised continually, sometimes in terms of a specific list - or target - for this mission, and another for the next. While paying attention to targets on the basis of what might be called "short-range relevancies," the operator should not lose sight, however, of long-range goals which may

indicate that a basic, continuing group of influentials should be considered as a target. To the degree that his directives make such a breakdown necessary, he may wish to classify the total elite into these sub-divisions: 1) prime short-range targets which have been identified by issue-relevancy to the immediate goals of the U.S. and by influential-relevancy to the issues; 2) secondary short-range targets, which have been identified by issue-relevancy and by secondary influential-relevancy, i.e. those influentials interested in the issue by reason of a subsidiary role; (3) prime long-range targets, made up of influentials with a concern in continuing relevant issues; 4) secondary long-range targets, made up of those with a secondary interest in these same issues.

This ordering of targets will make it possible for the operator to concentrate upon the prime groups when time and assistance are lacking. And the knowledge of additional targets will make it possible for him to expand operations in a meaningful way if funds and personnel are made available. If there is a general elite biographical file, the operator might indicate in it the issues to which the individual has risen. After a time, either by punched card analysis (See Appendix C) or by going through the files, one may be able to select the most probable activists on a forthcoming issue of the same class as a past series of issues.

PART A

ELEMENTS OF TARGET ANALYSIS

VI

DIFFERENTIAL POWER OF TARGETS

If one defines power as the ability of some men to move other men to move goods and services towards definite objectives, societies are stratified. That is, for an orderly direction of activities, some men are "above" other men in a status scale. This "being above others" may or may not be with the consent of those who "take orders". In any event, those at the top of any power pyramid are considered by most people to be more important than those lower in the scale of authority, deference, and obedience - important, according to the definition of getting things done.

The concept of stratification should not have connotation of some men being "better" than others in the operator's mind, but should only suggest that societies consider some people more important than others in relation to work or reward. The formulation of policies in relation to social goals and their execution practically always results in a hierarchy of power, prestige, and benefits.

In western society, and in most societies that have been studied by social scientists, stratification exists. Most people consider it a natural and normal thing to ask "stratification questions" of strangers whom they meet. For example, upon meeting a man for the first time, one gets around rather quickly to such questions

as: "What do you do for a living?" "Whom do you know that I know?" "Where do you live?"

These questions are concerned with status and social position, the roles that a man fills, the offices that he holds (or does not hold), the prestige that he has, and the deference that one should accord him (or he the questioner). One is asking the man how high he is placed on the status ladder or in what strata of society he places himself by his admissions.

In brief, the questions are those one commonly puts to persons whom he would, for a variety of reasons, place in some juxtaposition to himself. One is always measuring others by prestige and power standards, using his own position in society as the standard of measurement. The psychological process is apparently that of seeing oneself, through the mind's eye, as holding a position somewhere between the top and bottom rungs of the status ladder, and placing others higher or lower than oneself according to the answers to such questions as have been outlined.

DIFFERENTIAL POWER ANALYSIS

VI-1. *Discovery power circles.* In order to get things done, social groups form many hierarchical pyramids of power in a whole society. Church, state, and economic groupings are readily visible bureaucratic structures in our own society. Labor organizations, civic groupings, luncheon clubs, fraternal societies represent other power pyramids. There is no single pyramid of power and influence in American society or American communities - not even in the highly integrated mill villages where the mill owners and top operators may hold a balance of power. In the latter community scheme of things, the ministers of the area, the merchant group, and a multiplicity of civic associations may be a part of an informal power structure that "holds things together," or "holds things in line." Around each pyramid of power there may be a clustering of people who attach

themselves to the basic group, and the whole grouping may be called a clique, ring, circle, or crowd in the common way of stating this idea. Specifically, a corporation may be of considerable size in a community. In its own power scheme of producing and distributing goods it has a top board of policy-makers, an executive staff, a supervisory foreman group, and a large body of lesser employees. The top men mentioned will not only be in close physical proximity to each other but may also work closely with one another.

In the community configuration, however, the corporate personnel are related in a number of ways to persons external to the corporation work group. Its attorney may have a large number of other clients. The supplier of an important commodity used by the corporation may be an independent producer. A college professor may occasional pieces of research for the corporation. One of the men of the corporation may be interested in local politics. A particular church may attract most of the members of the corporation to its services. The corporation may do its banking and financing through a local concern. The "top and middle brass" of the corporation may engage in a variety of civic projects as representatives of their company. They may become known as the "X Corporation group" in a civic sense, and those working closely with the basic group may become known as the "X Corporation crowd."

VI-2. *Intra-circle co-ordered behaviors.* The crowd idea usually implies that the persons attached to a particular grouping tend to think alike on matters of policy. There is consensus on most important issue, political, civic, religious, economic and the like. In any such grouping there are men who have contacts with other men in other crowds or groupings. They are liason persons. They carry information from their basic grouping to other groups and relay information back to their primary group. Their role in the general society is that of an intermediary who assumes specific roles in two or more social groupings. Such roles are carried by persons up and down the status, prestige, power hierarchy of the various potent pyramids of power, and the total linkage between such persons can be called a power structure.

VI-3. *Power within a single organization.* Every organized group may be thought of, then, as a basic power pyramid, and a part of the total power structure. The persons within such groups, as corporate structures, labor organizations, church bureaucracies, civic associations, and the like have power on a continuum. Those at the apex of the individual pyramid may have power that approaches totality over all others below them. The power effect of each individual decreases as one moves down the scale or through the ranks of the same group. The individual who might be said to be at the top of the pyramid would have the ability to influence all others in a given organization. In addition, depending upon the culture, he will have other characteristics associated with power such as wealth, membership in exclusive groups, special rights, etc.

VI-4. *Top, middle and lower elite.* For purposes of analysis one may roughly divide each power pyramid into a relatively small top layer of status, influence, and prestige; into a relatively larger section below the apex, representing the middle men of power; and a lower third section who are policy conformists, who neither consciously formulate, question or change policy or the larger social structure in which they operate.

At the top of a power apex are decision-makers or policy-makers. Power has been defined previously as the ability to move men to move goods and services. It may be added here that this definition specifically implies the charting of the direction of movement; this is decision or policy-making. It might also be added that such decision-making may encompass negative acts or the power to veto such movement as may be proposed or in progress. In a study of comparative elites, it has been noted that the decision process implies "phases of initiation, consideration, enactment, and enforcement," and that "elite power can be defined as sharing in decisions." These phrases are in accord with the materials set down here.

VI-5. *Collective form of decision-making.* Policy makers do initiate, consider, enact, and enforce courses of action. They may, however, have the advice and guidance of many who do not have final decisive power. A corporate executive of one of the large oil companies once put the matter this way in a discussion of decision-making:

"In using the term decision-making, I usually think of making choices and compromises among decision that came to me ready made. Our stock holder have made a decision that they want greater dividends. Labor has decided that it wants higher wages. The consumer has decided that gasoline is too high. Top management has decided that it should have a greater share in the profit. From all these decisions, the board group and I must make decisions that will partially satisfy all."

Thus, it may be seen that decision-making may not be the completely arbitrary process it is sometimes assumed to be. It must take into account the many factors involved, and if decision are to be operative, must satisfy those upon whom the decision for action falls. All decision-makers have an ear to the ground for "what will go and what will not go." Yet, in the final analysis, in a highly organized society, relatively few men make decisions that affect larger groups of men. These men are charged with consistently upholding past or traditional decisions, and with supervising the initial execution of new decisions.

In order to carry out decisions in western society, a large body of middle men are structured into bureaucratic-like positions below the top layer of policy-makers. Upon them primarily is laid the task of executing policy, reporting policy snarls to those above them, and defining in detail the larger policy matters that have been given over to them. Corporation presidents, vice-presidents, and the like fall into this category. Those below this group conform, as has been suggested, to the decisions made and elaborated upon by those above them.

In the community situation and in national affairs, those at the apex of power

pyramids tend to have a wide acquaintance with those in related pyramids of power, and consensus is arrived at on the larger issues of public policy direction, by those in corresponding positions.

VI-6. *Differential power of circles.* As in a primary, bureaucratic structure in which there are differences in the amount of power and status held by different persons, so are there differences between the various power pyramids in a community or nation. Size, organizational complexity, relation to primary social functions, social policy considerations, and action orientation set one power pyramid higher than others. Thus U.S. Steel carries more weight in certain power decisions than a plant manufacturing brooms. A local chamber of commerce usually outranks a council of church women. One tends to say that the functions of one such group is "more important" in the total scheme of things than the other. Each is, of course, important socially. The question resolves itself to more and less, and men so judge activities.

VI-7. *High power of major functional groups.* To power pyramids within a nation or community that are concerned with those activities most closely allied with primary regional or community functions, e.g., making autos, producing coffee, waving cotton, manufacturing weapons, engaging in education, producing electrical power, or engaging in governance, have higher power ranks. Persons who are at the apex of power in any one of such social structures are likely to have greater power within the total community or society. This is to say that power gradations within associational, corporate or political groups are reflected in both community and national affairs. Quantitative control over resources and services - no matter what the institutional base of the control - makes a man or group of men powerful *per se*. Even though the base is not ostensibly related to national or community affairs, there is a power transfer into these areas. This is particularly apparent at those levels of society in which decisions are made, the levels at which top leaders are found.

VI-8. *Organization charts as clues to power hierarchy.* Some clues to the power structure in a given situation may be provided in the organizational charts which may be available. They present a formalized "portrait" of the power pyramid, showing the rational or legal relationships between individuals, between jobs, and between departments. Usually, an organizational chart which is up to date will delineate actual relationships and will show the power gradations within the organization itself. The force of the organization will be employed to preserve the chart structure to keep the relationships as shown in the chart.

However, there are some limitations in the chart as a clue, primarily relating to the informal groups which also will exist in the organization. This will be taken up in Section VIII. A method for tracing out the configurations of such power structures, as has been touched upon here, will be picked up in the sections to follow which discuss the identifying of various institutional and associational elite structures.

PART B

IDENTIFICATION OF ELITES

VII

IDENTIFICATION OF FORMAL ELITE INSTITUTIONS

By "institutions" is meant all organizations in a society that have rules and Officers operating theoretically according to the rules. By "elite institutions" is meant all institutions whose members mount considerable force in making public policy and political decisions of the state. Elite institutions ordinarily can be grouped into three types: the state organs, para-constitutional groups, and semi-private organizations.

ANALYSIS OF ELITE INSTITUTIONS

VII-1. *State organs.* The most obvious candidates for the title of elite institutions are those constitutional organs that are formally declared to be the machinery for legislation and public policy. These ordinarily include executive, legislative and, in some cases, judicial organs. Functionally, one must look for the

practice rather than the theory, that is the *actual origin and consummation* of decisions rather than the hypothetical origin and determination of decisions that may be provided for in a written constitution or some publicized official account of the working of the government.

Even when it is obvious that these general species of institution, such as the executive and legislative branches of government, actually exercise power in the community, the precise allocation of the making of decisions among the subdivisions of these organs is a more difficult matter and, of course, the essential matter in this selection of targets. Thus, of the four hundred and thirty-five members of the American House of Representatives, not all members are equally powerful, and there is a considerable degree of specialization in the types of power wielded by the four hundred and thirty-five, some of them specializing in agricultural decisions, others in public power decisions, others in decisions regarding the armed forces, the state department, etc.

Similarly, in the executive of any government, there are likely to be a number of quasi-independent agencies which engage in a struggle, not only for specific power concerning their own province, but in a general struggle for determination of public policy as a whole. No mere statement of the scope of an agency is sufficiently valid on its face to be accepted, for some of the most significant contests for power occur as one agency seeks to enlarge its scope or to participate in some general power movement that has very little relevance to its theoretical function. Thus, there were several different police groups of Nazi Germany, and over a period of time they struggled with one another for police powers and struggle for political power in the whole of the state. The example extends to the Soviet Union and to many another country.

VII-2. *Para-constitutional agencies.* The second type of elite institution, the para constitutional group includes organizations that are not given formal authority to make law and to enforce it, but who contribute directly to the making of decisions about law and its enforcement, and in many cases partially undertake

precisely those functions behind the scenes. Such organizations would include political parties, movements of various kinds, economic organizations, parties, movements of various kinds, economic organizations, educational groups and institutions and church organizations. A number of prominent lobbying or interest organizations would fall into the para-constitutional category. In this category of groups, one finds even greater cleavages between the statement of intentions of the group and its actual behavior, and between the ostensible normal structure organization, and leadership of the group and the actual structure, organization and leadership. Thus, a party operating in the name of the little people may well have at its head an executive secretary who is actually a paid servant of the party leadership.

VII-3. *Semi-private institutions.* The third category, semi-private institutions, includes large number of agencies that are not directly committed to an interest in political power, and in many cases are even forbidden by law or by hostile public opinion to engage in any struggle for general power. They would be corporations, monopolies and cartels, trade associations, newspapers and magazines, and any other institution whose activities and behavior is relevant to the determination of public policy. There is no hard and fast line between semi-private institutions, para-constitutional groups, and state organizations. From time to time, an institution moves into another category and then back again. In some instances, one institution may be functionally represented in two or three categories. Thus, there are, in some countries, actual state organizations built up from the leaders of business, as in the Portuguese legislature or the Irish senate. In others, para-constitutional economic organizations may be consulted frequently regarding political decision or may actually use their resources to influence or determine state policy. An example of this would be the large Japanese monopolies, especially before World War II. In most technologically advanced states, there are dozens or even hundreds of economic advisory groups set up on local, provincial, and national levels. Only a minute examination of statutes and administrative regulations or degrees can reveal the whole apparatus of para-constitutional advice. Yet again, there will be economic organizations that have

an isolated and autonomous sphere of action and which will govern a special sector of the economy but be prevented from or will not desire to intrude or interfere with general power decisions of any kind. Finally, there would be a large number of economic institutions that would in no way be relevant to the general power situation, and which the operator can afford to ignore.

VII-4. *Formal and informal organizations distinguished.* All of these institutions may be distinguished from informal elite institutions by their having a set of rules and a number of officers or functionaries who operate in their name. Informal institutions, such as clubs, cliques, social groupings of a loose kind, and the like, may be exceedingly influential institutions, as influential as the formal elite institutions, and they will be discussed at length in the next Section. The relations that one can discover between the two types of institutions are so important as to deserve yet another Section following that dealing with informal institutions.

VII-5. *Utility of institutional identification.* In the discovery of the elite and their vulnerabilities, the knowledge of institutions is useful for several reasons. An institution consists of the sum of actions of individuals within it. In a number of cases if one knows the behavior of the aggregate, that is, the institution, he does not have to compute the behavior of the individuals in it separately. Secondly, institutions lend a power to individuals. The power of a given person includes both his personal power, his abilities, his energies, and connections, and also the institutional power given by virtue of his institutional position. Thirdly, individuals who have little power or great power often masquerade behind institutions. In this even, the penetration of the institutional curtain is necessary to ascertain the power of individuals. A question of what hand is moving events, when the events emerge from the impersonal facade of an institution, is often answered by matching individuals, of known power with the fact of their presence in those institutions. In face, one of the criteria of the astute political

observer is his ability to discern what "anonymous" official lies behind an action taken in the name of an institution . Finally, institutional officers have an inherent and residual power. This power ought to be known and judged in some way as to its extent and direction. Once known, it can be transferred automatically to the incumbent of a position. When the position changes hand, the residual power remains. When a man with a known personal power "score" takes on a new office, one can add to or subtract from his score the power or lack of power conferred on him by the office.

The crucial question to which this comment leads, deserves to be considered at length in the techniques that follow, namely what is the relative power of any given institution to other institutions in the society. Hence, the main intent of this section is to get at the discovery of institutions that wield power and, simultaneously, to determine how much power they wield in relation to the sum total of decisions in the society. Furthermore, it is necessary to determine within a given type of decision what contribution an institution makes, since it may matter little for the purposes of the operator that any given institution makes only a tiny fraction of the total decisions of the society, if its contribution to those decisions falls in a vital but small area in which the operator is interested. Then the institution becomes a most formidable elite institution for his purposes.

VII-6. *Constitutional analysis.* The major divisions of a government are described in constitutions, which most states now have. *The Statesman's Year Book* is an easy guide to the major formal political institutions. Practically every country in the world will have some volume on it, written in or translated into English. Local governments and functional institutions are likely to be scantily treated in English and, rather than go into difficult chapters, statuses, etc., the operator may prefer to use informants.

VII-7 *Legislation analysis.* What laws are being passed? How are they passed?

In most countries the degree of legislative activity is known, but where not immediately discernible, it should be discovered. Analysis of the forms of sanctioned command over a period of time covering two or more legislative years should give some notion of the extent of the powers wielded by an office, an assembly or a King.

VII-8. *The sources of legislation.* The chief sources of the laws can be discovered fairly readily by an examination of the authorship of a sample of all bills before the legislature in two or more sessions. Sometimes the authorship is public information - the bureau, legislator, committee, etc., proposing the bill must be stated. This does not give full information on authorship, however, for as soon as the authorship would be embarrassing, a "front" author is used. Inquiry into the origins of a bill from parliamentary informants - friendly legislators, clerks, journalists, bureaucrats - is probably a better method because they can get behind the formal institutional associations of legislative personnel. In most countries, lack of publicity on legislation makes this necessary anyway.

Knowing the chief sources of laws indicates the chief legal centers of power. Whether or not the elite institution where the legal output centers are in fact the sources of proposals and policies, they are a formidable instrument of power since they at least add important legitimacy to naked acts of power.

VII-9. *Administrative Rule-Making.* A good deal of law-making in societies of some size and complexity is done by government offices. Sometimes registers and codes of this legal production may be obtained. Study of them may reveal the extent of which law-making is confided to the executive agencies. One should watch for signs that the output of an agency is initiated or cleared by another agency, an external authority or power, or the chief of the executive branch and his staff. The importance of the rules of an agency are again judged by a sample of its output of rules, weighted by the degree of scope (topics covered), intensity

(depth of control of or sanctions on the subject matter) and domain (number of people affected by the rules). One should ask what proportion this weighted rule-power is of the total law-making effort of the society in order to arrive at a judgment of the total power of the rule-making agency.

VII-10. *Law and Rule-Making by private bodies.* In many societies, organizations not forming part of the constitutional agencies of the state may nevertheless have authority to pass laws in specific domains. Such "laws" may go by a different name, but they are formally enacted or ordered and their enforcement is regular and effective. Often there is doubt whether the agency is a formal constitutional organ. Such agencies are most often economic in character - they rule industries, labor relations, production, etc. But they may also be religious. Where an official state religion exists, a religious officer or assembly may determine a number of modes of behavior that are politically relevant. Their rules, for example, may effectively exclude certain individuals from high power positions.

VII-11. *Court Power.* As the seat of judgment upon legal contests the court may have only a veto power on policy. But even this power should not be underrated. Although it is true that the courts in almost all countries lack the power to veto laws, incidents of history such as the Reichstag fire trials, the Nuremberg trials, the South African judiciary acts decisions, and the behavior of the so-called People's Revolutionary Tribunes of Eastern Europe, demonstrate the power potential of courts to aid or impede the ruling groups. The demand for legality being almost everywhere great, the judiciary functions both in office and behind the scenes as part of the elite. Operators should ask, therefore, what is the social and power status of lawyers? Is that of judges higher? To whom do they owe office? Are they removable? Can they rely upon the executive to carry out their judicial decisions?

VII-12. *Analysis of Agency Operation.* From outside an agency's potency and energy can be judged by measures of its functions, funds, and personnel. Especially in a bureaucratic society, where public posts are eagerly sought after, one can take the measure of an agency's power by the size of its budget, the number of functions it performs, and the number of personnel it employs. In addition, the most political of functions are those commanding information (propaganda), short-run economic resources (treasury and budget), and violence (police and military). These functions count for more in a power struggle than the others, and go far to outweigh more numerous activities, personnel, and greater expenditures.

VII-13. *Publicity analysis.* Attention in the press and among people generally, both indicates and abets power - at least in the political sphere. An analysis of press coverage of agencies reveals that disproportionate attention is given to certain agencies. The military, for example, may receive more column inches than the treasury. This is a clue to who makes important policy and who has a better entry to public opinion with his case. Even where press disapproval results in silence concerning an agency, interrogation of ordinary people (and an examination of popular fictional material) may well reveal a high rate of attention to an activity or agency. For example, the CIA in America is a secret agency, little reported in the press, but many radio programs, movies, and comics treat with the agency's work.

VII-14. *Trend analysis of constitutional organs.* Time series data, or activity expenditures, personnel, and publicity can help evaluate the increase and decrease of government agencies relative to one another.

VII-15. *How to locate para-constitutional groups.* Human organization seems to demand groups that are fronts and auxiliaries to the central groups. These para-groups are set up to add flexibility and a greater degree of informality to the central, formal actions. Many para-constitutional groups have achieved status as almost wholly political and legal organs with sanctions, but their most important trait is that they do fall short of such achievement. In fact, their function would be considerably impaired if they were to achieve that status. Because they are not central to the state, information on such groups is often not readily available. Usually the regulatory statutes of the government take cognizance of such groups and one may look up such items as parties, churches, corporations, schools, etc., in the code of laws, if such exists. Interviews are perhaps an easier mode for discovering the existence and relative position of such groups. One asks his sample or his informants what kind of agencies does the legislature, or do the bureau chiefs, depend upon for advice and consultation? Do they always do it and is it required by law? Is it permitted and fostered by law and custom? What would happen if the para-constitutional agencies were ignored in the making of an important decision? In a crisis, do the central organs turn deliberately and invariably to para-constitutional groups for help?

VII-16. *Political parties.* Parties are the most influential para-constitutional groups nearly everywhere. They vary in their organization and in their connection with the state from highly integrated dominant organs in a one-party state (where, nevertheless, they are given a somewhat outside connection to the government) all the way to unorganized, fluid, informal factions. The placement of the party institution in any government is a first step of elite analysis. For party institutions, as with constitutional agencies, one inquires into the numbers they represent by voting returns and party membership rolls, their party war-chests, their degree of organization and cohesion internally, and the legal possibilities they have of presenting their program before the government and the people and of taking over the government (what organs, with what completeness, for how long?). See Section XVI also.

VII-17. *Religious groups.* In some cases, a certain religious affiliation, guarded by church authorities, may be pre-requisite for certain offices. In Lebanon, for example, the chief religious divisions ordinarily have quotas of offices, based on their numbers and vested power, that run from the highest to the lowest. The Maronite, Shiite, and Druse religions thus form elite institutions by their importance as screening agents for qualifications of candidates to office.

The religious groups may be quite powerful in their own realm, all pervasive of the customs and minds of the people, and yet divorced from the precise centers of political power. In India, for example, religion plays a great role among the common people and there is an extensive religious elite that is powerful in its own right, but there is an open split between the directed energies of the political elite and the minds of the religious leaders. See Section XIX also.

VII-18. *Education and Youth Organization.* Ordinarily, these agencies are weak in power and have access to the state only through the capacity of their leaders to associate on fairly equal terms with the general elite as members of the intelligentsia. One should inquire, however, whether there are youth organizations sponsored and dominated by the state as part of the party organization, or religious political organization. Leaders of such groups may have distinct access to power in their own right and on behalf of the considerable number of sub-officials and youth that they manage.

VII-19. *The identification of semi-private elite institutions.* In a complex society, there are many hundreds of private, semi-private, or semi-public institutions, the leaders of which participate in the general elite or else have considerable power, of a politically relevant kind, within their own jurisdictions and everyday functioning. In some smaller communities and simple societies,

technically speaking, a complete listing of corporations, cartels, trade associations, unions and newspapers will provide a handy guide to where to look for the well-to-do sectors of the public. In other countries such lists are so large as to be useless in their totality, without a large staff to examine them constantly and determine who operates them. For some countries quantitative analyses of the ownership structure and the trade union structure are available and should, by all means, be obtained, for they are valuable indices to who's who on the level below, on the margins, and even in the general elite itself.

Just as there are different functions among the executive agencies of the government, some of which, like the military, police, and communications functions, are more important politically than others - so, also, in the privately organized institutions of society there are the more and less politically relevant and important functions. It is more necessary to know who operates and governs the steel, machinery, munitions, and motor vehicle and transport industries than who operates the textiles and luxury goods industries. The industrial networks of the world are frequently possessed of international ramifications, and one may even discover before entering a country that a certain portion of the leadership of elite institutions has international connections by virtue of selling or buying abroad. These institutions have peculiar problems and sometimes different identifications with international slogans and international problems and personalities than do the strictly local industries.

VII-20. *The political influence of business organizations.* Business groups include corporations, monopolies, cartels, trade associations, and certain kinds of individual enterprises and syndicates, the latter especially in less complicated and developed economies. One cannot study all of them intensively. He can better discover from interview of them intensively. He can better discover from interview or analysis of the press, especially the financial sections and special financial periodicals, what seem to be the leading organizations that give cues to industry both for its internal affairs and for its political line. Very often, except in the extreme opposition press, one cannot detect readily the existence and

membership in various kinds of cartels, syndicates and associations, because the activities of those groups are vulnerable politically, and are often extra-legal. But that kind of press exposure is quite likely to be exaggerated and unreliable. America, for example, has a great body of literature on the exposure of corporation networks, monopolies, cartels, etc. The main theory of these studies is that a band of determined men are engaged in a conspiracy to combine totalitarian political power with a desire for great profits.

VII-21 *Trade union.* The same caution is in order in making judgments about the cohesion and unitary direction of trade unions. To the innocent, the networks of relationships among private institutions vested with public interest always seem to have more solidarity and purposiveness than they in fact do have. However, the international connections of unions are worth taking into account and watching. So are the questions of tenure and turnover among union leadership. More will be said of this in Section XXI. Ordinarily, lists of the unions of a country may be obtained from the central, national confederations or offices, from registration lists for national conferences of trade unions, and some times from the central statistical offices of the government. Unlike any business with considerable prosperity, or size, unions of considerable power and activity may not even have telephone numbers. See Section XXI, also.

VII-22. *The Press.* The press is divisible into publishers, editors, and reporters wherever the press is of a sufficient degree of affluence. Otherwise, and this perhaps goes for most countries of the world, the three functions of a newspaper or magazine may be combined in single man's hands, with perhaps an assistant or two. From one point of view, the press interest is identified with the interests of other private and semi-public institutions; from another point of view the press belongs with the intelligentsia as an elite institution. From both points of view it forms a bridge between rather well-defined material interests, be they of labor, management, or ownership, and the intellectual segments of the population.

VII-23. *Identification of the elite institutions in informal preliterate or unhistorical societies.* Referring back to Section II of this manual, there were instructions for following the functional aspects of a society as they move towards the discovery of the elite. This is the shortest way in a simple or primitive society and in many local situations in Western countries.

VII-24. *Institutions crucial to coups d'etat.* Elite institutions are often seen in an unusual perspective by those who are attempting to seize power. The legislative chambers, the executive offices and the courts of the state remain important objectives of power. But more crucial to the success of a *coup d'etat* are the arsenals, key public utilities, such as the gas and electric plants and transportation facilities, certain bridges, the newspaper plants and radio stations. A major explanation of the success of the Bolshevik coup in October 1917 was Trotsky's organized seizure of communication and power facilities, even before making an assault upon the central government buildings. In certain countries that are habituated to coups, it is commonplace that more attention be paid to the army major in charge of an arsenal than the head of the cabinet. A new group of men are momentarily the holders of power in the short-lived perspective of the coup.

PART B

IDENTIFICATION OF ELITES

VIII

IDENTIFICATION OF INFORMAL ELITE ASSOCIATIONS

When men organize to accomplish specific purposes, they often begin their tasks by series of informal, "off-the-record" discussions. They may meet informally, making no definite commitments as to their positions in regard to the subject under discussion. They "want to see all angles," "shake the bugs out of a proposition." They may say, "This looks pretty good to me, but I cannot speak for my company (or church, or party), but I will take it up with them (formally) and you do the same with your group and we will see what can be done."

Informal groupings in society represent *flexible* social structures in contrast to more rigid institutional structures. Informal group discussions are an important means by which society "makes up its mind" related to a particular direction for action. The value structures of informal groups are less rigid, less absolute than those of institutions. Their value systems tend to be pragmatic, that is, "if a thing works, it is good."

INFORMAL ASSOCIATION ANALYSIS

VIII-1. *Traits of informal association.* Informal groups have no constitutions, written rules of procedures, or binding traditions to guide them. They may develop quasi-traditional way of acting, but so long as they remain informal, the ways may be easily changed to meet specific circumstances. Informal power groupings are usually seeking ways to accelerate action, to expedite it, to find short-cuts around cumbersome institutionalized procedures, and to effect change with the least amount of disruption of the institutionalized groups of which they are auxiliaries.

An informal group has both manifest and latent functions. That is, it has a loosely stated purpose and its actions are apparently aimed at this visible goal. This is its manifest function. In addition, it may also do things and express ideas that serve individual members in a manner quite unrelated to the expressed aim of the group. For example, a small group may decide to hold informal meetings to discuss means of increasing the community water supply. The manifest function is getting more water. But by meeting together and the group may gain increased business. And if the project is successful, the whole group may gain community prestige. None may have had these latter purposes in mind at the beginning of the meetings, but these functions of group activity were latent in the situation.

Again, it may be stressed that one looks at what men *do*. As one sees what is being done, social structures become apparent. Informal structures are often taken for granted. They appear to be friendly gatherings. They may seem trivial in their purpose, but if looked at for their functional significance, they may give one clues to the directions taken by related larger and more formal institutional groupings.

There can be no hard and fast line drawn between formal and informal social groups, and yet, when one sees a group operating without publicity, with no formal record of its activity with changeable membership, and with relatively few members, it is likely that the group is purely informal. Political caucuses are well-

known example of informal groups. Such groups may continue to be informal, become formal, or dissolve.

VIII-2. *Dysfunctional groups.* A word may be said here concerning dysfunctional groups. Not all informal group activities are correlated to the overall well being of the larger society or community. Some groups may function informally to subvert the larger system, or they merely may be

"misguided" in their aims. Through discussion and trial-and-error activities, they may finally come to conclusions in conformity with the ongoing interests of society. Nevertheless, such groups, in operation, are dysfunctional to the system in which they act, regardless of the "rightness" or "wrongness" of their cause.

Gossip cliques in a corporate structure, critical of top management, might be an example. Regardless of the merit contained in the gossip, it usually is dysfunctional to the corporation. In this case, the gossip activity may be functional to the smaller group while being dysfunctional to the whole group. Functional evaluation is, of course, subjective and related to the observer. One check is to have different observers evaluate the same phenomena. This will result in more objective conclusions.

No matter how informal a group may be, it will have a leader or leaders. Such leaders are often leaders in the more formal organizations. Formal organizations operate social institutions, but the identification of elite leaders who are engaged in informal activities may throw light on formal movements within organizations.

VIII-3. *Boundaries of informal groups.* The manifest function of the informal group will suggest its limitation to individuals with some relationship to the stated goal. But since latent functions also are important, they may have much to do with the delineation of informal group membership. A regular, informal

gathering of public relations people, for example, might have no more manifest function than to provide a congenial gathering at luncheon time. Yet this group might serve the latent function of providing a place where politics, literature, or a variety of subjects could be discussed. The group could also be a social device for exclusion. It might limit its membership to certain persons considered "desirable" and keep out those who "would not fit." Such a latent function of inclusion-exclusion is always a characteristic of a group.

The rules of inclusion and exclusion may be vaguely defined or unstated in an informal group, in contrast to those of formal associations and institutions. Yet most persons recognize whether they are included or excluded from an informal group, even though there is no formal statement of membership qualifications. They know, for example, that only persons of a certain religion, racial background, economic status, social position, party affiliation, or business connection can belong to this or that informal group.

Thus the operator may often discover both membership and limitations upon it of the informal group from the non-member. But the excluded person probably will have only general knowledge of the inside workings of the informal group. Such information can usually not be obtained in detail, except from members of the group itself.

VIII-4. *Using 'hidden' informal groups as channels.* Many informal groups may be unknown to the majority of persons in a culture or community. Many may be of relative unimportance, but the informal groups of the elite are important to seek out, to inquire about, because they are often channels of access to the most influential decision-makers. The operator may not find himself included in an informal elite circle, but by knowing members he may approach them individually and know that his information will eventually be carried into the informal group for discussion. The informal "grapevine" is often a powerful and swift channel of communication.

Informal groups operate in and criss-cross through formal organizations. In many large scale organizations, one often hears the statement made, "the man to see on such and such a project is John Doe." Doe may not have the title of "running the show." Top decisions may be made by the chairman of the board of the corporation, but Doe is still the man to see. Why? Simply because, in all likelihood, Doe is the person who can go most quickly to the chairman and get a decision. Many men in corporate positions refuse to retire at an early enough age to allow for vigorous prosecution of their own work, or they may rely heavily on technical persons in relation to certain decisions. These angles must be explored to ascertain the best channels of contact in relation to any given project. No set rule can be laid down here, but it may be emphasized that the organization chart of a corporate grouping will not reveal the informal channels that make the whole group function adequately. See Figure 3.

FORMAL AND INFORMAL ORGANIZATION*

In studying the organization structure, the official organization chart is obtained. Sociometric ratings based on with whom most time is spent in getting work done are superimposed over the formal organization chart. In all samples, there are noticeable deviations between the formal organization and the informal organization as revealed by the sociometric ratings. An index of deviation to show in statistical terms the amount of deviation is in process of development.

In this figure, the formal organization chart is shown in solid lines with the pattern of interpersonal relationships in checked lines. The checked lines show the first two choices; that is, the two persons within the group with whom most time is spent. The arrow points in the direction of the person named. Thus, number 51 named number 1 and number 511 and number 1 named number 2 and number 51. One can see what are sometimes called "violations" of the

organization chart. The studies of various staff suggest that "violations" are a normal activity. The informal or interpersonal work structure represents day-to-day relationships. Staffs are usually fairly familiar with the organization chart, but little has been done to acquaint staff members with an understanding of the "interpersonal chart."

The informal structure is one index of the dynamics of getting work done, and it appears that for efficiency it will necessarily deviate from the formal structure. Extreme deviations, however, may hamper rather than promote efficiency.

*Carroll L. Shartle, "Leadership and Executive Performance," *Personnel* (1949), reprinted and copyrighted, 1949, by the American Management Association. Reproduced with the permission of the American Management Association.

VIII-5. *Discovery of informal groups.* The easiest way to locate the informal elite structures of a community or a nation is to identify the formal elite structures first, and then ask oneself, "what *really* makes them work?" The stated purposes of an organization may be so general and highly abstract that they have little meaning in terms of action, but the association may accomplish a great deal. How, then, is this done? A large measure of the activity of a formal organization is carried by informal methods. "Off the record" meetings, informal luncheons overlapping club memberships of association members, social knowledge of members of one another, card games on the breakfast car coming into New York, civic, educational, and project committees of many sorts may all be points at which influentials meet to come to a like-mindedness on social, political, moral, and economic questions. Places in which men eat, sleep, play, are all likely spots for developing groups that may have profound bearing on formal decisions.

In every formal organization the process of delegating responsibilities for the execution of projects is a continuing task of the organization leadership. The process does not end with naming a formal chairman of a committee, for example, but continues with further delegation by the man named. To know the

persons called upon to act, time and again, on behalf of a formal organization, is to make a beginning at understanding the operations of it, but to go a step further and see whether these persons habitually use an informal group to stimulate their ideas, and to carry out details of operations is to begin to trace out informal patterns of behavior.

VIII- 6. *Access to top elite information via informal groups.* It may well be that in some instances, access to the top elite of both the formal and informal organizations will be denied the operator. In such cases, the whole patterning of action, from its formal to its informal aspects is highly important and highly relevant work for the operator, for it will lead him to persons who can contact those higher on the hierarchical line and transmit the information he wishes to disseminate to the target persons. For a power structure is of one piece, operating up and down gradations of influence, with messages and information going up and down the line. The further from the source of decision one finds oneself, the less formalized may be the modes of operating in relation to a given policy, and the greater the number of informal actors who in various ways have access to others higher in the power gradient than they.

PART B

IDENTIFICATION OF ELITES

IX

INTERLOCKING OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL GROUPS

After one has identified the elite institutions and informal associations of the target area, it would be convenient if he could study them independently, identifying the personnel of each institution and of each informal group, and consider the task done. But such is not the case. The complexity of modern society warns against separating an organization from its total social context, except with great caution. Having done so, one must recognize that this separation is an artificial, laboratory kind of operation. Even though useful and necessary, it has meaning only as the ties between the artificially separated organization and the total social network are identified and understood.

Charts of social structures and of organizations give some help in finding where power is and how it is exercised. Yet an organizational chart is aptly described as a "still picture" of what is essentially a moving scene (refer back to VII 4, 5). At its best, it is an accurate picture of an organization at an instant of time. At its worst, it reveals little more about the organization than does a formal family portrait reveal about the family. But perhaps a "word chart" can be presented here which will be flexible enough to help show the interrelationships among formal

and informal elite organizations.

The notion of power "pyramid" has been referred to several times. When one thinks of the formal institution, the pyramid most often serves to give graphic form to the idea. If the total social entity can be thought of as a number of pyramids with a common base, and with inter-mingled lower (and sometimes even upper) portions, there begins to be a picture of the institutional complexity of a society. If one thinks then of the pyramids being of various heights and perhaps several of them rising to fairly equal heights, the notion of variations of power also is made graphic. Then, if one will go a step further, and imagine the apexes of these pyramids being flexible and moving towards a common central area of power, we will arrive at a graphic notion of a complex power structure in a community.

The entire arrangement next should be thought of as in movement, with pyramids building up into the zone of power, with others declining; with the apexes twisting about so that now three or four are inter-related and two or three others are not involved, now all of the top level are interrelated, now another different partial set move together.

If one could imagine this interrelationship as being signified by a relatively impermanent, plastic material, which would tie three or four of the apexes together for a time, then stretch or dissolve to permit them to come together in a different order, he would additionally have placed the informal elite organization in this schematic structure.

Within this moving representation of the power structure of a society, the operator is interested in those twisting apexes of the individual power pyramids when they are associated in making policy affecting the U.S. He is interested in the informal organizations which also serve to make policy. It may be helpful to think of one of these arrangements as roughly vertical, i.e. the apexes of the several interrelated institutional power pyramids; the other as roughly horizontal, i.e. the plastic, informal organizations, which tie the apexes together from time to time.

If this has tended to depersonalize the power structure, one should remember that this schematic representation is made up of people who are moving up and down, indulging their whims and using their abilities, hating and loving, seeking, gaining and exercising power. Moreover, the emphasis upon "separate" pyramids should not obscure the fact that often an influential will wear "several hats," i.e. he will have a position in the education pyramid, another in the business, and yet another in a political party. In addition, he will probably have position in the power structure not only by virtue of such institutional roles, but by virtue of his membership in informal elite groups.. One can expect to find that influentials will have power based upon such a combination of formal and informal roles. And this very multiplicity of roles provides an important part of the interrelationships among formal and informal elite organizations.

ANALYSIS OF INFORMAL-FORMAL RELATIONSHIPS

IX-1. *Formal-informal transformation.* To begin with a simple example, this kind of relationship may exist entirely within a given institutional pyramid, as when a board or council or other official elite group may have an informal, private existence, as well as its public, official, institutionalized existence. When a city council, for example, meets informally at the mayor's home or gathers for a drink at the bar, it sheds its institutional character in part and becomes an informal organization; Yet the power comes along, and the decision-making ability may be enhanced rather than impaired. Issues are talked out personally on a first-name basis and often the decision may be made for the next council meeting to ratify in its institutional role.

There is a kind of interrelationship here, difficult to perceive because, after all, the groups are identical in membership; at the same time, it does exist and the activities of the informal organization have an effect upon those of the institutionalized organization.

IX-2. *Informal groups representing combinations of formal.* The relationship becomes more apparent when one considers the informal organization within the single institution that is less than an exact duplication of the latter, as when one or more members of the official group is left out of the informal group. The next step is the introduction of other influentials, not members of the institutional group, who come in to the luncheon, dinner, or gathering of "friends" and play a part in policy making. The interrelationship begins to be more complex, yet the suggestion of the informal organization influencing the institution or actually wielding its power remains apparent.

For such a partially non-institutional informal group, one can move to an even more variegated organization, in which perhaps only the mayor (or the councilman with the most power) meets at luncheon with the top banker, the dominant businessman, the leading contractor and the high-status lawyer. Here the informal group may be made up of individuals located at the peaks of their special institutional power pyramids. But though the luncheon table is surrounded by representatives of the important institutions, they may be sitting in a de-institutionalized way (as was pointed out in Section VIII), participating as persons and not involving their institutions. In spite of this institutional detachment, the luncheon may be a more potent decision-making organization than the subsequent meetings of boards of directors, or executive committees, and council committees which may do little more than implement the decision reached over the luncheon table.

This series of example points up another characteristic of institutional-informal group interrelationships. They may serve as the actual decision-making organization, and at the same time as a means of direct communication between representatives of the institutional elites.

IX-3. *Informal Channels to lower formal echelons.* The presence of an overpowering institution in the community or state may bring a different kind of

interrelationship. In Montana for example, and particularly in past years, a large mining company held predominant power. This single institution, in terms of our diagram, towered above all others, though it was not absolutely independent of them. The informal organizations in such a circumstance would be at a low level of the power pyramids, with decisions moving down until they reached an informal organization which could "pass the word around." Indeed, almost any company town suggests a similar power arrangement, with decisions being mainly reached in the company pyramid and being passed down to the informal group at a lower level which distributes them to the other institutional pyramids. There is also the possibility that within the dominant institution, in this case the company, there is a self-contained informal group which is the seat of real decision making.

IX-4. *Combinations of institutions and communication links.*

A more complex interrelationship is exemplified by the community which is "run" by a combination of institutional interests, making decisions through informal organizations, and passing them along to a political boss subservient to them, who in turn moves the orders to institutions of government (whose power pyramid would be in the scheme far below those of the others).

With these examples, another characteristic of the interrelationship is demonstrated; informal organizations serve as communication links between dominant institutions and submissive institutions. As was demonstrated in Section VIII, there are informal organizations at all levels of society, some serving to strengthen the institution or institutions in which they operate, others serving to weaken. As one moves down into the institutional pyramids, the informal organizations are more likely to be communication agencies and less likely to be decision-making agencies; as one moves up, the roles are reversed.

IX-5. *Discovering overlapping conditions by observation.* The problem of

discerning the interrelationships among elite institutions and elite informal organizations is a difficult one and will not be solved by mere casual observation. Since in America the Self-contained informal organization (particularly regarding a governmental institution) is regarded as reprehensible by most newspapers, it may be instructive to see how a newspaperman discovers the existence of such an informal group (as in the case of a city council taking the decision-making process away from its institutionalized self and handing it over to its informal group self).

The reporter would first of all keep a careful check on the decision-making process. Are difficult decisions being made quickly? Are complicated issues resolved with a minimum of discussion. Are known interests in the council going unexpressed in the rush of happy unanimity?

Whenever he found that these questions could be answered in the affirmative, he would suspect the existence of an informal means of thrashing out difficult decisions, or of throttling the minority interest by extra-institutional devices.

Depending upon the sources of information available to him, the reporter would endeavor to verify his suspicion. If there were a council member whose known interests were going unexpressed, he would be a likely choice for an "off-the-record" interview. He might even discover at this point the isolated individual, not a member of the informal group. Possibly, by checking one of the informal organizations (with primarily a communication function) at lower levels in the governmental pyramid, he could gain information about the informal group. If the group met openly, the reporter might join them at the luncheon. If they met secretly at a member's home, he would not be above checking their whereabouts by a round-robin of telephone calls, and then visiting the home of the member who was present. Or he might follow a councilman at the suspected meeting time, to track down the session.

Such aggressive gathering of information is scarcely possible to the operator. On the other hand, the technique of observing the decision-making process, of observing the informal meeting habits of influentials, and of checking with

informal groups at lower levels can be used effectively.

IX-6. *Direct interrogation for informal structures.* This is not to suggest that the interrelationships among elite institutions and informal groups are conspiratorial or reprehensible. In many political places, they will be the normal method of reaching decision. They will be the normal means of seeing that various institutional interests are represented in the making of decision. They will be the normal means of seeking that informal decisions are communicated to formal agencies where they will be executed.

The operator if he is to be aware of these interrelationships, must be curious as to how influential A is aware of Decision X though he has not institutional connection with the official agency of decision. He must be even more curious about how Institution A's interests are reflected in Decision X, even though the decision is "made" by Institutions B and C. He must do more than wonder why Businessmen B and Ministers C and D have lunch together regularly. He must discover the interrelationships between this informal group and the institutions which the participants represent.

Some of his answers will be deductive; some will come from informants who are essentially communicators in the power structure. Some may come-and often more than he thinks-from the power persons themselves, who may be willing to explain how they work with other power persons and to reveal the informal organizations which so often are the means of their interrelationships.

PART B

IDENTIFICATION OF ELITES

X

IDENTIFICATION OF FORMAL OFFICERHOLDERS

By "formal officeholders" is meant persons holding positions of leadership in elite institutions. Almost everywhere it is a simple matter to discover who holds the top offices of a government. The kind of information is available in the *Statesman's Yearbook* and is widely circulated in other ways. The job becomes more difficult as one moves away from the center towards the still important offices that are not quite integrated or, as one discovers, move downwards towards the offices that hold decentralized power. Yet the identification degree of power, of formal officeholders is most useful to propaganda operations and other means than the most obvious must be sought to gather information on them and their power. Though it may be true that in a number of important operations, only the top elite are the targets, on some general campaigns and over a long period of time, it is well worthwhile to consider the larger leadership structure of elite institutions. Since the increment of power going to a formal officeholder accrues to him by virtue of his position, ordinarily a knowledge of the power inherent in an elite institution will give some idea of the power inherent in the man occupying a post therein.

TECHNIQUES FOR IDENTIFYING FORMAL OFFICEHOLDERS

X-1 Reference Works. There are certain basic reference works which deal with leaders of all countries. Most of the people cited are noted for the office they hold, unless they are powerful politicians or political intelligentsia. The most important of these references are the *International Who's Who*, the *Biographical Encyclopaedia or the World* and *World Biography*. Of these, only the *International Who's Who* is published annually. The other two were published last in 1948 and probably have not been published since. The *International Who's Who* gives only the most elementary data for the most "important" personalities. It is not of much value in obtaining a full biography of a person. There are also *Who's Who* for areas of the world such as Central Europe, and for individual countries. Frequently there is no general *Who's Who* and if there is one available it may consist of autobiographies which include, therefore, only what a man wants to say about himself, and sometimes just plain flattery. Ordinarily *Who's Who* information is valuable only for certain tangible data for which there is no reason for the elite to fear the incurring of criticism, which cannot readily be concealed or distorted. One should not ignore the blue books published by many countries under various names. These are government or officially sanctioned documents or books giving some biographical data on the officials of the government, especially the legislators. *The Statesman's Yearbook* is a good source of works of reference from which may be procured the names and positions of those who hold office in the key elite institutions. Many other biographical lists are cited in Appendix D-II.

X-2 The use of indexes to periodicals. Once some of the leaders of a country have been located from all these publications (the most important ones would be those whose names appear in most of the publications and have also been

mentioned in the government files and by "old-hands" to the country), it may be well to consult the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* under the name of the man. There one will find a great many well-indexed magazines and can obtain references to articles about political personages. If the person is not listed by name in the index, one can also consult the listings under the name of the country. Although this index deals only with periodicals which appear in the United States, the "International Index to Periodical Literature" covers a variety of foreign periodicals, chiefly European. It is organized in the same way as that for the United States. Both sources naturally are available in the Library of Congress or in one of the better university or public libraries. They cover not only news magazines of the type of "Time" but also scholarly publications such as the *Public Opinion Quarterly*. In addition, the monthly publication *Current Biography* though concerned mostly with Americans, sometimes contains articles about men of other nationalities.

X-3. Biographical files. There are several agencies of the federal government which collect biographical information continuously. Most of the information is classified. The Department of State has a biographical division which collects personal intelligence on people in foreign countries who are important or are likely to become important. A point to remember in this connection is that the different agencies collect biographical intelligence for their own varied purposes. In no instance will the purpose be exactly the one the operator will have in mind. In addition, the data are often sketchy, perfunctory and generally not very enlightening. Another problem is that most agencies record what they call "unevaluated data" i.e. bits and pieces of information on a given person are incorporated into the person's file without evaluation, and the truth and meaning of items are left to whoever uses the file.

In addition to the biographical division of the State Department there are several area and country desks. Usually, they are staffed by people who have had experience in the appropriate countries and who generally can provide valuable information on personalities. In many instances this will probably be first hand

information.

Another division of the federal government which collects information on a biographical basis is the C.I.A. Its information is usually highly classified. Only under unusual circumstances, and with special arrangements, would the operator have access to it.

The department of Commerce has information on foreign exporters to the United States, some of whom may have great influence at home. The large exporters are important, not only because they supervise large commercial enterprises, but also because they bring needed American dollars into their country.

X-4. *Organization rosters and publications.* Most formal groups of size and importance, unless they are clandestine, publish periodicals or other organs. The dullness of format or the absence of news should not convince one that they must be useless. The names appearing therein are selected to represent the formal leadership of the organization; Such publications are a good source for names of group leaders who may not be listed in *Who's Who* or blue books. A magazine or even mimeographed bulletin, say of the postal clerks or fisheries division of government will provide names of leaders. House organs may be supplemented by union journals (a comparison of names here is useful - sometimes the house organ of a company will define a different union leadership than the union organ). The names appearing in publicity for causes also should be checked. The U.S.A. is not the only country where organizations are set up *ad hoc* to aid a financial or reform drive for one or another purpose. The appearance of a person's name on the sponsoring list of several organizations is a way of bracketing him politically. The procedure is used commonly to discover whether a person is a communist or 'fellow traveler." If he appears on one type of letterhead constantly, some presumption of connections is established and, at the very least, there is some notion of what political communication network he fits into. The collecting of rosters of all kinds is therefore recommended.

X-5. *Building files.* The building of a file of officeholders is recommended. Primary reference in many operations may be to certain functions or types of offices. Hence that knowledge would be useful. However, since the names may be in a general file of elite, or a file of formal and informal leaders discovered by techniques other than running down rosters and lists, the minimum entry in the larger file should contain information on the office held.

X-6. *Job-turnover of office-holders.* In working with formal officeholders, it is helpful to know something of the turnover of elite personnel in offices. The operator can sample a group of offices in each agency and calculate the average length of time the office is held, if no general study is available to help on this point. Informants may also be used - personnel officers of the agencies should have this kind of information on the 'tops of their heads." Is turnover or mobility mainly within the organization or between organizations. If the former, special communications are more effective; the audience is more isolated, and self-communicative. If the latter, then the contrary. Apart from other knowledge of the character of the elite thus gained, one can learn from the turnover whether or how best to keep records on who holds what office. If the rate is too rapid in less important offices, one had best confine his precise inventory of officeholding to the top offices alone.

X-7. *Indices of Importance of Office.* The importance of the institution is transferred to the office, and that of the office to the institution containing it. If, in state dinners, the minister of army is closer to the chief of state than the minister of public works, both the institutions and offices are so graded on a prestige-power scale. Figure 5 (from *U.S. News and World Report*.) gives a concrete picture of power changes translated into protocol. Again the problem of tradition breaks into the picture: the more recent the ordering, the more realistic the

precedence. Also, it is well to check whether the state affair is an ancient ceremonial or a modern one; if the latter then realistic precedence will probably hold. When examining the press for indications of the relative importance of offices, a check and count of all offices mentioned over a long period should bring to light the relative importance, assigned by the media and/or politicians reported on, to offices in the same agency, and, less plausibly, all the offices of the state. One should appreciate, however, that the some elite institutions are well reported, but not the offices in them, while the converse holds for competing institutions. For example, the military is often referred to as a whole, whereas the diplomatic process brings up the names of many officers not necessarily important. This is an inheritance from earlier ages of diplomacy. Also newspapers often mention in the U.S. individual pilots but not infantry officers, incidentally a practice much diminished since the bureaucratization of the Air Force. If possible, the length of mention of the office should be given weight as well. If, over a period of time, the operator is not conversant with the relative power quanta of 80 per cent of the offices mentioned in the press, he may suspect that he is operating far off target.

Alfred de Grazia: Discovering National Elites

PART B

IDENTIFICATION OF ELITES

XI

IDENTIFICATION OF INFORMAL LEADERS

Informal leaders are those who are influential in informal groups. These groups have been described as having no written constitutions, as being flexible in their value system and requirements of membership and as being regulated in various ways to the formal associations and institutions of the society or community in which they operate.

Such leaders are, even as formal leaders, products of the group process. They usually hold no office since the informal group rarely has a series of offices.* The authority they exercise in most instances, is that of persuasion rather than the sanction of coercion. They have followers and persons within the group who defer to them.

* The exception may be the designation of a person as "chairman" of an informal group.

METHODS OF INFORMAL LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS

XI-1. *Local and national informal leadership compared.* On the national level of affairs there appears to be a patterning of power pyramids similar to that of communities. Certain persons become known as leaders within the larger organizations of society, and while the whole process of decision-making is complicated by a multiplicity of interest groupings, geographical distances, and sub-cultural differences, there is still a set of informal relations extant among men who represent the top echelons of power within the nation. They will act and interact with one another on matters of national policy development. One need only look at the names of top leaders in industry in the American system of organization to begin to list top leaders. Status organizations such as the Industrial Conference Board, the Committee for Economic Development, the Farm Bureau Federation and the Advisory Committee for the U.S. Department of Commerce carry some of the same names as do church organizations, and a multiplicity of other civil and philanthropic organizations. The men peopling the letterheads of such formal organizational groupings are also found interacting in personal relationships much as men do on the local level of affairs. "Who clears with whom in relation to what policy?" is the basic question here.

XI-2. *Identification by sociometric "choices."* Various methods have been employed in identifying top community leadership. Most boil down to

elaborations and modifications of sociometric techniques. That is, one finds out within a prescribed circle of people, who knows whom and who is thought of by others as a leader. The persons receiving the greatest number of choices as leaders are considered as top influentials, and are known technically as "star isolates" because of the usual graphic form in which the choices are presented. If the choices are represented as lines between individuals there will be concentration of lines among the top influentials, if they are asked to rate a group and there will be a concentration of lines going towards the top influentials when lower leaders make choices.

Warner in his Yankee City studies, did a dragnet operation of a whole community. While his study of social prestige factors in Yankee City cannot be strictly considered sociometric in design, the whole study represents the desire to get information from a large number of people in relation to their attitudes about others of the community and specifically in relation to their patterns of deference. A major difference between the Warner study and other community studies lies in its scope. Warner had data on almost 100 percent of the population he studied, while others have been content with sampling methods. The latter method is the chosen one here.

XI-3. *Developing a first entrance into a sample.* It has already been suggested that elite organizations, both formal and informal, may be identified in a community, nation or society. This identification is carried out by asking questions of persons in positions closely identified with the elite groups, and in the process one can begin to identify the formal and nominal leaders of these elite groupings. The next step of identification is that of ascertaining the kinds of things the leaders of the elite organizations are active upon, and getting at patterns of deference, authority, coercion, prestige, influence, and the like. The pyramid of leadership is self-narrowing in a highly integrated society, and the problem of sampling is thereby proportionately narrowed. To know top influentials and

power elites in a modern industrial society does not require an embracing dragnet operation of questioning. It does need to be broad enough in scope, however, to bring into view the major characteristics of a given social group.

XI-4 *Participant Observation.* Participant observation may also be employed as a method of sighting informal groups. If one participates in organized activities, he learns by observation that certain people carry considerable responsibility even though they are not elected officials. They are persons to whom an elected chairman, for example, turns for advice during a formal meeting. They are the persons who "caucus" in the cocktail lounge before and after meetings, or who may be seen at luncheons with officials of an organization.

In many committees there are informal "luncheon circuits." Many of the same persons attend the same luncheons. They tend to sit together, or with those persons with whom they have some business to transact, be it civic or private. Thus in public gatherings of associations and institutions the operator may ask himself why is the seating arrangement as it is? Or why does this group tend to congregate as it does? Who is "talking up" certain projects or issues? Who leaves with whom?

XI-5. *Informal committees.* Well organized associations usually have a multiplicity of committees. The formal committees are often listed, but to make committees operative, informal subcommittees are often formed. Questions related to the "real" workings of formal committees will often reveal the persons of influence at this work level. Questions can then be asked related to these working leaders. From whom does the individual informal leader get advice? Does he follow organizational channels, or does he go outside the organization to some influential person or group to carry advice to the committees upon which he works?

The flexible and fluid structure of committee operations provide leads to the "prime movers" of many formal organizations - those groupings which, in the final analysis, have the power to move the larger body politics. The leaders in informal groups may be potential, if not actual leaders, in the formal associations. At least, one may begin with this assumption, and weight the evidence.

XI-6. *Informal decision-making networks.* A basic distinction that must be made here is that contained in the concepts of "real" and "nominal" leaders. Real leaders are those who have actual power. They may or may not hold office, but it is generally recognized that they hold the power to move or stop movement in any given organization. Many such persons may have been actively identified with a formal organization and through long identification with it gradually become persons respected for their judgements and looked to in matters of decision. Their position is such that they command the obedience and respect of officeholders and rank and file personnel of the organization. Such persons are often described as "behind the scenes operators." The description is not always accurate.

"Behind the scenes" operations are often thought of as being clandestine and manipulatory action in favor of narrow-interest groups. What may appear to the casual observer as "behind the scenes" machinations or conspiratorial actions may in reality be the normal workings of the informal decision-making and opinion-forming network. In the long run, most behind-the-scenes decisions have to run the test of acceptance of larger groups. The opinion leaders behind the scenes are liable to be real leaders whose opinions are more nearly in accord with the interest of the larger body politic than may be readily apparent. One might cite examples of dysfunctional decisions on the part of the "quiet operators" in the power realm, but in the main these leaders must conform to a standard of acceptability within the ongoing associations and institutions - otherwise they lose influence.

XI-7. *Invisibleness usually short range.* Nominal leaders are those who may hold office or be in the public eye, but who do not actually direct the power inherent in their position. They have title without actual power. These leaders are often controlled or manipulated by the real leaders who are hidden from public view. The "power behind the throne" in such situations must be known and such power may reside in the informal and "behind the scenes" leaders. Identifying nominal leaders and those who stand behind them must be done in terms of watching activities and asking questions related to "who *really* put this or that project across?"

In large scale organizations the presence of informal decision making groups may be of functional necessity. The sum total of decisions in a large organization might be a very large number. Widespread discussion or discussion in formal meetings of every detail of every proposal before the large organization might be an unwieldy and time-consuming operation. The informal discussions within a narrower range of persons who know the inner workings of the large group may be imperative for the survival of the organization. Observation of organizational operations dealing with day to day and practical problems may also reveal a network of informal decision-making and decision-makers to whom one must address himself to get favorable organizational response.

Even though "invisible" or "behind the scenes," such influentials are not completely hidden, for the very nature of power means that to use it they must have relations with other men. And to be members of the elite, they must have some interrelationships with the "visible" influentials. These relations eventually become known - if not broadcast wholesale. Thus there should not be a literal stress on their "invisibility." In point of time, one can say with assurance that as they exercise power they will become more and more visible.

America has a great folklore of the "secret political boss" and such an influential does represent a possible member of the class of influentials being discussed. America also has a folklore of the secret criminal influential. Nor is this a peculiarity of the American culture. Behind the folklore there is some fact and the

possibility that the operator may find influentials whose power is based upon clandestine or criminal operations must be considered. But it should not be dwelt upon overlong.

XI-8 *Informants on unofficial networks.* Professional persons who are called upon for advice, as the occasion demands, by informal leaders for "off the record" and informal opinions (off the cuff, horseback opinions) are good informants in locating those whom they serve. Even those professionals (city planners, social workers, chamber of commerce executives) who do not participate in every informal decision-making group, may know another professional who is related to this or that project and would be willing to steer the investigator to him. Professionals, being marginal persons in the power scheme and dependent upon their own advice being purchased, keep a practiced eye out for others who may be called upon by the informal leaders for consultation. They must know the informal channels of communications and operations within their area and they usually keep well informed on this subject. Consequently they are good informants. Their information, of course, must stand the test of comparison.

As one becomes familiar with the formal associations and their operations, he may also begin to read between the lines of news accounts and other written materials and find references to status persons who do not hold official positions but who lend their names to specific projects. A line in a news release suggesting that, besides the officers of a formal association, "Mr. Smith also has an interest in this project," should alert the operator to look into Mr. Smith's connections with the project in question.

XI-9. *Charismatic Leaders without Official Status.* While many informal group leaders are relatively invisible, there are some whose power is broadly based and publicly known. Such are the influentials who head amorphous movements which give them sufficient power to be associated clandestinely or indirectly with the

top elite even though they have no "official position". To a degree, Gandhi was such an influential in India, although his association with the elite was not hidden in any way. General DeGaulle might also be considered as an influential without position or membership in the top elite groups during the height of his *Rassemblement du Peuple Francais*, which even though it has the characteristics of a political party, is more of a "movement". In both of these instances, the influential persons also failed to participate directly with the remainder of the elite in exercising power. In smaller social units there also may be individuals who serve as spokesmen (and power wielders) for unorganized but important groups which lack organization and which provide these informal leaders with no official status. The leading farmer in a backward agricultural area sometimes has this kind of position.

The operator will have little difficulty in locating these highly visible leaders, who have sometimes been identified as "charismatic"- having a following because of their personal appeal to mass. Normally, they will move from such unofficial or peripheral power position into the organized elite structures. The expectation is that most of them will be in this situation for a relatively short time, either losing their hold on a mass and their power, or keeping it and formalizing their movement into an organization or institution, or joining the elite group through informal channels. In any event, the basic problem here is an assessing the power, in discovering how it is related to the existing structure, rather than in locating the influential.

XI-10. *The elder statesman.* Another kind of influential who may have low visibility is the "elder Statesman." It is conceivable that an outsider studying the American elite structure by checking officeholders and elite informal groups might have missed such an influential as Bernard Baruch. As if he were particularly lacking in background he might even miss the two ex-presidents because of their lack of official status. The degree to which a culture stresses traditional values will often be a clue to whether there are relatively hidden "elder statesmen" who are members of the top elite. On the other hand, one should not

lose sight of the possibility that the lack of visibility of such individuals may also relate to the loss of power once held.

XI-11. *The "handy-man" type.* Within the elite structure, there may also be individuals who have an unclear relationship. They may seem to be lacking power, yet they will show up in elite groups. Such an individual might stand in the modern power group in the same relationship as the ancient jester to the king. The apparently a-political friends of the power person, the members of his poker game, the handy man in the kitchen cabinet all fall into this grouping. Most will be without official position, but most should also show up in the analysis of informal groups is thorough. Even though they may actually be non-power persons who have proximity to power but do not possess it, they may often be valuable to the operator as communication links to the power-wielders.

XI-12. *The "fixer" type.* An important kind of influence with low visibility in many modern, complex states is found in the "fixer". For example, he became important in prewar Italy as the bureaucratization of the Fascist government advanced. He also was important in the U.S. during the war as the "five per center." Studies of Russia have also revealed the role; in the U.S.S.R. there seems to be some effort to institutionalize "fixers" by creating official offices and titles, such as "expediter" (a term not unknown elsewhere). Here again, one can see a class of influentials who may not wield power directly, but who may possess it by reason of their ability to serve as links between influentials with different institutional bases. Sometimes the "fixer" may move into a position of real power. The alleged "secret boss of California" was supposed to exemplify such an individual. However, he never gained full membership in the group of prime influentials and as his position became more powerful and more visible he was eventually deprived of most of his power.

XI-13. *Identification during study of target area.* It is unlikely that the operator in his first brush with the target area can do much to locate informal influentials. On the other hand, even at this early phase of study, he can be alert for signs of community activity of a covert nature. If smuggling, or brigandage is an important activity in the area it will be hidden, to be sure, but if it is extensive, it will not be completely hidden. And if it *is* extensive it will bring power to those who control the activity. To use an American example, one can assert that if gambling is important enough in a community to give considerable power to the controllers of it, the sophisticated observer will undoubtedly find signs of gambling activity during the very early stages of investigation of the city.

XI-14. *Identification through study of power issues and decisions.* Disputes over power tend to bring out the existence of hidden or informal power wielders, since usually such an issue forces them to exercise their power more directly. Thus in American cities, the identity of criminal influentials was often brought to light when they clashed among themselves. By extension, when a power issue has been resolved, there may again be provided clues as to the existence or identity of informal influentials. The question to ask is: does the decision seem inexplicable in relationship to the visible members of the decision-making group.

On the whole, one may sum up the discussion of informal leadership by repeating the suggestion alluded to in most of the foregoing material: Informal leadership patterns may be found paralleling formal patterns. The former are functional to the latter and necessary in power operations because of the flexibility provided by their tenuous character.

PART B

IDENTIFICATION OF ELITES

XII

SINGLE AND PLURAL ELITE STRUCTURES

To reconstruct the theory of elites for understanding the problem of single or plural elites the following steps are in order:

- a. The concept of identification: e.g. Mr. A. thinks through eyes of Group X.
- b. How many groups does Mr. A. identify with?
- c. What are the similar identifications of Messrs. B, C, D, etc. who are also members of the elite?
- d. What groups so discovered are top level in influence?

Then to discover whether one is dealing with a single or plural elite structure:-

- e. What is the total communications map of these groups?

(That is to say, when it is known what groups exist and have power, it may be inquired how interdependent, how isolated, and how cooperative or conflicting are these groups in reference to those decisions of power in which the operator is particularly interested.)

ANALYSIS OF ELITE PLURALISM

XII-1 . Indices of interdependent elitists.

What are some of these indices of interdependence and cooperation or their opposites?

a. Number of groups interested in the same decision on the same level of operation. For instance, suppose both the army and the police are interested in the choice of a dictator. Thus are two groups interested in the same decision. Also, suppose both the general staff and the divisional staffs are interested in the choice of a dictator. These groups are on different levels of power and the lower level is likely to be interested as a reflection of the interest of the upper echelons, rather than independently.

b. Community of ideology of the groups interested in the same decision. If the same symbols are shared, then the separation is likely to be less sharp, and the competition regarding the position less.

c. Interdependence of personnel leading the groups.

If the leading members of both groups share the same social, ethnic, and economic background, and there is a high rate of family interconnection among

the group's membership, the elite components in question can be construed as belonging to the same structure.

d. Evidences of co-operative decision-making.

If the leaders of the two groups intermingle in work and in leisure, they are unlikely to separate along group lines or to precipitate a crisis over the decision.

e. Tradition of *caudillismo* for *personalismo*.

Where individual leaders from political factions or followings along purely personal lines, violent separatism can exist within a fairly homogeneous general elite.

Application of discoveries regarding these indices to the group structure of the elite should allow of the conclusion that the elite is or is not a single structure with reference to the decision in question.

It should be noted:

a. That mere multiplicity of groups does not mean a plural elite.

A given elite element may have many faces. It may have numerous front organizations. Also, what seems to be a single elite may be basically divided or at least divided on half of the relevant issues. For example, one may speak of the international banking elite who agree on free exchange but who compete with one another for control of the finances or underdeveloped areas. Again the textile manufacturers of New England may join on some basic issues with those of the South, but are fiercely competitive on other questions.

b. That personality clashes can produce a plural elite even where other evidence shows a single elite.

C. That lower elites cannot be weighted with upper elites in judging whether an elite is single or plural.

Frequently, a lower elite with only modest power is in opposition to the dominant elite but is neither part of it nor a short term potential elite. Hence the elite may be judged under those circumstances.

d. That the example is given with reference to two groups and one decision.

Introduction of extra groups (practically always the case) and of another concurrent policy or decision under consideration in a slightly different area (again almost always the case) complicates greatly the analysis, and the analysis becomes increasingly complicated as more individuals, groups and policies, are considered.

Hence, the calculations are almost always rough, i.e. in terms of the major groupings, the major issue aggregates, and the major coalitions or discords among the groupings. From these the statement is made that the elite is single, double, or, more often, plural.

XII - 2. *Utility of single - plural distinction.*

From the standpoint of the operator, the utility of the distinction is apparent. It is the utter base for the most potent technique of *divide et impera*. It is also the base for isolating messages: i.e. messages that would do harm if they reached the ear of the balance of the elite. It also informs one of the ultimate limits of spread of the message.

XII - 3. *Relations to other techniques.*

The techniques for deciding the single or plural character of the elite are a combination of those mentioned elsewhere (see cross references below). That is, the determination required in this section is made from the information that the

operator gathers in answer to numerous other queries. But one should keep particularly in mind the following tests:

XII - 4. The overlapping of names and references in sociometric interviews.

XII - 5. The overlapping of formal officers and formal organizations.

XII - 6. Overlapping of power, prestige, income group standings of elite members (i.e. extent of the agglutinative phenomenon)

XII - 7. Ratio of hostile to friendly intra-general elite symbols.

XII - 8. The extent of coalition-forming required by the issue differences with the elite (i.e. there are many special issue coalitions interlacing and cross-secting the elite)

XII - 9. Examination of skill, class and other social spectra to determine the community among the elite and also the community between elite and population, the latter in part to determine the possibility of contending or potentially contending elites.

XII - 10. Some measures of cohesion.

Do separate elite groups refer to intra-general-elite slogans in waging debate or determining policy? Do conflicting elite groups refer separatistically to the mass and try to cut off the other elite parts from the mass?

XII - 11. To what extent do elite members protect one another via immunities - legal or illegal, despite different group memberships? (Cf., e.g. the American Senate's internal protection of members with the generally hostile open atmosphere of politics.)

PART B

IDENTIFICATION OF ELITES

XIII

PLOTTING ELITE NETWORKS

Thus far, elites have been discussed in terms of their general characteristics. Some illustrations have been given related to their actions and general patterns of operations, but a precise method of locating them has not been revealed. It has been said that there are networks of persons formed into groups and individual relationships that vary in intensity of associations and formality of organization. The task here is to suggest how one can trace these networks of the elite.

MODES OF DISCOVERING ELITE NETWORKS

XIII-1. *Development of lists of influentials, issues, projects, and policy procedures.* In every community there are persons who are not top influentials themselves, but are close enough to them to know who they are and something of how they operate. The same may be said for nation or a region. Often, in western society, they are professionals who man the associational posts as executive secretaries. Finding out how a community, or other area, is formally organized is

the first step in turning up power leadership. This is done by a chain referral method of interviewing.

In chain referral interviewing, one begins at an arbitrary or what he guesses to be the most likely point, and begins to ask about influential organizations in the community. A hotel manager may be as good a person as any with whom to begin. He may be asked whether or not there is a chamber of commerce, a political party headquarters, a civic association center, a church center, or a social club headquarters that is of top rank in terms of getting things accomplished in the community. The operator will want to know who the executive officer is in each organization and where he may usually be found. The hotel manager in this case is the first link in a chain of referrals. He may steer one correctly or he may not, but if he refers one to others, they in turn may refer one to still others - and so it goes on until one finds himself being referred to the same people, and the chain is closed. By the process one has "covered the field," and has not relied upon the hearsay of a limited number of informants whose views may be biased or erroneous.

As one makes the rounds of the associational chain, he asks other questions and roughly evaluates responses. When he is in touch with associational secretaries he wants to know two important things: (1) Who are the persons of top power in the decision-making processes in the community, and (2) what policies, issues, or projects are currently being worked on by the men of decision?

In the first question, related to policy personnel, the operator is interested in those persons, particularly, who are closely identified with the operations of the association from which he is getting information. He is interested in knowing how active each top power person is in the association and he is also interested in knowing whether or not there are men who may not be extremely active in committee work or board affairs, but who still influence the decisions of the association, or influence the men who make formal decisions within its framework. Many influentials are not joiners. They work through other men, and in the initial stages of survey it is important to get as many of these names as possible.

In moving from one association to another, one may begin to pick up the same names repeatedly, i.e. some men may be active in many different associational groupings and carry different roles in organized life. Such persons will automatically, in a sense, begin to emerge in the operator's mind as leaders. And here a word of caution on scientific conduct must be inserted.

XIII-2. *Interview precautions.* The operator allows others to do the talking. He does not assert what he knows at any point, but is interested in what others know. His attitude may be described as dynamically passive. He listens alertly, but makes no overt value statements or judgments. He needs constantly to remind himself that he must wait for all the data to be in before he makes final judgments. He may, for example, hear from others that Mr. Smith is active on this and that. If he immediately says to himself that Smith must be *the* important influential in the community, he may be quite wrong. If he reveals his impression to his interviewers, he may invite a bias in his data. Many informants have only a part of the picture of power in a community. As a matter of fact, even the top influentials often have only a partial picture of the total operations of a power structure. Although they are generally interested to know what the investigator knows, what he reveals to them will influence the replies elicited by subsequent questions. The operator wants to hear the whole story from others. As he puts the pieces together, and at a much later stage of inquiry, he may recheck his facts with persons whose judgments he has come to trust, with a confidential informant, or with a group of "judges" (to be discussed at length presently), but in the first blush of inquiry "open ears and closed mouth" is the best rule.

Even so, it is almost impossible to avoid making judgments as one proceeds. The mental tendency is to form Gestalt patterns of thinking. One is constantly trying to put two and two together. One wishes always to see the whole to explain the parts of social patterns, and the desire is normal. Yet, one must say, "This appears to be so, but what else is so?" "What are the gaps in this whole picture?" "What is contradictory in what I am seeing and hearing?" The attitude of open-minded

inquiry is thus developed. Nothing can be taken for granted. If something is taken for granted or a dogma accepted without proof, why bother to investigate further. The answer is obvious to one who really wishes to operate on facts rather than fancy.

XIII-3. *Records of data.* As names of top influentials are given, a careful record of them should be kept. One should know such identifying data about the influential as where he may be found, what his general occupation is, what his interests are - especially his policy, project interests - outside of his occupation, and any other data that are spontaneously given by informants about him. Such data are best kept on cards 5 by 8, and in alphabetical order by names of informant. Data given in interviews should be written up as soon as possible after interviews in journal form and as fully as possible. The card file can be built from data obtained from the journal or diary form of recording. A man's interest in policy, issues and projects is an especially important cluster of information to the operator.

XIII-4. *Relating issues to names.* Peripheral informants, those outside the circle of the policy-making group but close enough to know much of its working, know what is being done communitywise or nationwide, as the case may be. Questions should be asked, at the same time top influential names are gathered on major policy developments in the community. "If you were to name two major issues in the community," one might ask, "what would they be?" "Are any of the men whose names you have given to me related to these issues in a policy-making capacity?" "What is their general way of conducting themselves in relation to these issues?" Also, "What are the two major projects of civic, industrial, or governmental nature that involved the whole community?" "Who makes policy in relation to these projects?" "Who are the men who keep the projects going?" "What are the roles of some of the men mentioned?" "How do they work together?"

In this phase of inquiry, certain projects will be mentioned repeatedly. If one gets a good correlation of opinion on what projects and issues are important, and who are important in formulating and executing policy in relation to them, he may be assured that he is getting somewhere near the center of a power nucleus of the community. If he has a limited amount of time at his disposal, the operator may take steps to limit his inquiry to manageable proportions without thwarting objective considerations of investigation.

XIII-5. *Problems of abundant data.* In any community or larger power center there are thousands of activities going on daily. As has been pointed out earlier, and as is perfectly obvious now, some activities are more important than others in an elite power sense. The big issues and big projects, in terms of money, time, and energy, are the activities that attract the elite power-wielders. By getting a listing of influentials from peripheral leaders and a cross section of opinion correlated, as to major issues and broad scale projects, one can begin to "strain out" the persons of lesser influence and eliminate the projects and issues of lesser importance.

After both lists mentioned are compiled, they may represent a sizeable array of names and projects. If this be true, it would be impractical, perhaps to try to interview all of the persons named. In such a broad scale survey, one should have picked up names of persons related to business, industrial, financial, labor, political, religious, government, and social prestige groupings. (The functional view of the target area established earlier may indicate additions to or deletions from such a list as this.) If any of the basic groupings of this target have been missed or overlooked, effort must be made to find such leaders. Then, all names can be classified by these major categories, that is, business, labor, political, and the like. It may be that more names appear in one category than another. This will not be surprising since one group is often more dominant in power matters than another, but for the purposes of getting a cross section sample of community activities, it is important that names and projects from all groupings be

represented in as large numbers as possible in the initial stages of inquiry. With this data in hand, one may begin to proceed to reduce the numbers for interviewing purposes. A "judging" procedure is one of the most effective and objective means that may be employed.

XIII-6. *Use of a panel of judges.* Within groups interviewed there will probably be some persons who seem to know great numbers of people and a great deal about community affairs and to make judgements about them readily. Since one must begin to shorten the interviewing task somewhere, he may pick persons as he proceeds whom he thinks would be adequate to the task of helping to judge the power and leadership capacities of the persons named on the omnibus list he is acquiring. He begins to build a judging panel. Such a panel will be as much of a cross section of opinion as he can secure; older persons, younger ones, large business, small business, labor, men, women, ethnics, professionals, politicians, churchmen, and any other representatives of elite groupings and peripheral elites should be utilized as judges. The technique is a modification of a scheme used with success by Harold Kaufman in examining prestige classes in a rural New York community, differing in that here one is sampling associational leaders rather than community members at large.

The fact that the original selection of judges is arbitrary and subjective on the part of the operator or investigator need not be a troublesome fact. The panel selected will be interviewed individually and asked to select from the large lists developed those names that appear to be, in their estimation, top influential elites in terms of policy development. Some of the judges will have already given some names to the investigator on initial contact, but often enough the judge will see names on the final compilation of names that had not occurred to him at the time of the first interview. At all events, one must get a sample of opinion from those who are presumed to know their community well. Fifteen or twenty such judges should be chosen, dependent upon the size of the community.

They should be asked to choose from different lists a sample number of top

influentials. Let this be specified concretely. Depending on the functional groupings, names will be listed, as business, political, church, civic "society," or other categories. Here the functional importance of man's power position will determine the category into which his name falls. For example, a man may be a small business man, but a powerful political leader. The fact that he has a business defines a social role for him, but the source of his power and the area in which he exercises it is in the field of politics. He would then be listed under the category of politics. Another person may be minor civic leader, but influential as a lay member of a powerful church organization. Here, again, the source of power determines the listing under which the names would be put.

XIII-7. Sampling for network interviewing. Having categorized and listed all names alphabetically, a sample of the names will be utilized in interviewing. The judges can then be asked to pick names from each category of those persons considered top influentials compared with all others on each list. If a list is 100 names in length and a 25 percent sample seems possible in terms of interview time, the judge will be asked to select 25 names that represent top power. If one wishes to spend less time in interviewing, a 10 per cent sample will suffice to draw off the top influentials. There is usually a good correlation of opinion on top leaders, and those who know their community well will have less trouble in selecting a few names than many.

Those persons receiving the highest number of votes as top leaders from the judges, *from all categories*, can then be alphabetized on one master list and utilized for interviewing purposes. The list is a select one. It should be, and has proven to be, a nuclear group from which a great deal of data can be gathered relative to power operations in a given area. The process of investigation from this point on is that of serial interviewing of the persons within the power nucleus that has been systematically isolated.

XIII-8. *Length of interview.* Each man on the list of influentials should be interviewed. Specific information is necessary from each to work out a complete pattern of inter-personal relations. A schedule of questions may be prepared. This schedule should be brief to allow plenty of time for the interviewee to expand on certain topics related to power processes within his area. The question schedule is a starting point of discussion. One should allow about an hour for each interview and take more time if a man is able and willing to discuss power relations. The question schedule should take about fifteen or twenty minutes of that time.

XIII-9. *Entree to respondent.* The question is often asked, "How do you get in to see these men?" "Are they loath to talk about so touchy a subject as power?" The answers to these questions run something like this: Men of power like to talk about it. It is their stocking-trade. They are more interested in its processes than almost anything else. They are familiar with power projects and issues, and if one is not out to muckrake them, they talk freely. Depending upon the culture, the best methods of gaining entrance to see them are usually direct, normal ones; phoning the secretary, going to see her, writing a letter to the man. Working through other people may sometimes be necessary if a man is interview-shy, but such persons are rare. Most men of power are busy, but they most often delegate much of the detail work to others and their desks are relatively clear. They have time to talk about that which interests them.

XIII-10. *Contents of interview.* In order to have comparable identifying information, one may ask each man for such information as age, birthplace, occupation, kinds of property owned, number of employees supervised or directed, education, place of residence, and length of residence in the community. If any of this information can be obtained from written documents or other sources, such as *Who's Who* it will save time in the interview.

The interviewee can then be shown a list of the names of influentials that have

been gathered. He may be asked to name the ten or twenty top influentials on the list, in his opinion, and indicate various ways in which he has known or worked with those persons he knows on the list. He may be asked to indicate how well he knows each, and especially he should be asked to name any persons who are not on the list that should be there. The questions at all points should be open-ended to allow for omissions in the name-gathering process.

The interviewee should be asked to name projects he considers to be top priority in the community and upon which he has worked with others. The same should be asked in relation to public or quasi-public issues. Here one should inquire as to the top decision-makers in relation to the project in question, and how they delegated responsibilities to make the project go. Who clears with whom? How was an issue settled? And so on.

XIII-11. *Recording and analysis of interviews.* Notes may be taken during the interview, but stopped when the interviewee indicates that a subject is off the record or confidential. Such items should be remembered, of course. A journal account should be recorded as soon as possible, probably at the end of each day of interviews. The sooner one writes down the information gathered the more accurate it is.

Through this process, one begins to piece together items related to the major decisions and their execution in a given community. The pattern begins to unfold, and seemingly isolated activities on the part of power-holders take on functional meaning in relation to the whole system of power. The method is simple in its outline and manageable for operators who may be pressed for times.

One may make call-back interviews to clear up points that may not be self-evident, or one may use a confidential informant to help measure the accuracy of the materials that may be in question.

XIII-12. *Strangeness to area often helpful.* It must be said here that the operator who has been in a community for some time may be hesitant to make such a study. If he is already involved in the power structure on an operating level, some may question why he is going about the task, and rightly so. In such cases, a better procedure would be to assign a new employee to the task, or to engage a social scientist to do the work. A newcomer or pure "staff" person is often expected to ask an abundance of the "silliest" questions. The principle of utilizing the "sociological stranger" operates in power examinations as it does elsewhere. People are often willing to tell things to a stranger that they will not discuss with persons known to them in their home communities. This factor must be considered, and operations modified accordingly.

XIII-13. *Modifications of methodology.* While the process outlined above gives best results when every step has been performed, the operator may find that exigencies of time make it difficult for him to complete it. Or he may be studying a target in which the top elite is not available for interviewing of this nature. In such event, the use of parts of the system just described will still produce valuable information. The only necessary caution is to recognize the strength of the full system and the weakness of information based on parts of it. Though not as reliable, the partial information may be very helpful, and in combination with data obtained in other ways, may tell the operator much about the elite network.

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PART B

IDENTIFICATION OF ELITES

XIV

INDICATORS OR TESTS OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL LEADERSHIP

When thoroughly done, the discovery of the elite and the ranking of its components is a large operation. From time to time during the course of study and indeed frequently in the course of normal intelligence operations, one needs to check his information to be sure he is "on target," that is, really treating with important centers of influence. This section provides a number of criteria, indicators, or tests that one may apply to alleged or presumed leadership to determine more surely its influential character.

ON TARGET TESTS

XIV-1. Testing knowledge or others in group. In plotting the elite structure, questions are put to interviewees that indicate interaction between themselves and other members of the power structure, for example, "How well do you know

others (on the list of influentials)?" This question may have parts, or degrees of knowledge, such as: related by blood or marriage, know intimately, know well, know slightly, heard of him, unknown. If one is "on center of an elite target group, the persons within the group must at least know each other well. Otherwise, the persons on a list of elite do not interact. Power cannot be exercised without interaction, policies cannot be developed, things and persons cannot be moved. It will be found that top influentials know other top influentials.

It will also be found that the degree of knowledge of influentials by persons outside the immediate circle will fall in ratio to the distance a man is from the innerworking group. For example, a high status lawyer who is called upon frequently to advise the top influentials as to their legal rights, but who is not a decision-maker in his own right, will know many of the primary policy-making group, but he will know them less well than those nearer the center of a decision-making circle. Other professionals who may be more remote from the inner circle may know even fewer persons or know them only casually. By asking the same questions of persons close to but outside of the inner circle, one tests the close-knit character of the elite policy group.

XIV-2. *Discovering with whom subject works.* A second question is one related to the way in which a person has worked with others on issues or projects in relation to policy development and execution. Those who are top policy-makers are liable to "have a hand in on" the development of most of the major community policies - those that affect the whole community in a civic sense. Here a word of caution may be inserted, however. Not all members of the elite are active in *every* policy that is formulated. Their interests may be such that they do not care to participate in every decision. They may know considerable about what is going on in relation to the development of public schools, for example, but their own public interest is stimulated by physical planning for roads, utilities, development, and the like. In the over-all delegation of community responsibilities one group relies on another to look after mutual interests. In every major development there are "key persons" related to all other key persons in

some manner, and one needs to look for such relationships as reveal the ties between groups.

Thus, while Mr. Smith may rely on Mr. Jones and vice versa in relation to two major community developments, and neither may be on a basic committee related to the other's project, both may have representatives on each committee. Each "speaks" to the other through a representative and may speak to each other directly only at times of crisis or when crucial decisions have to be made in relation to one or another of the major projects which proceed simultaneously. The major question is, "What part did each play in the policy-making procedures in any major project of large dimensions?" "Through whom did they work?" "What is the relation between the principals?" By asking such questions, the pattern of the inner structure can be traced and proven. Those of highest power will become apparent and those to whom power is delegated and through whom it is exercised will be revealed.

The image of top leadership described by this policy-making group may not be the same as that of the larger body politic. Some of the elite may not be known to the community at large. For example, in a study made of community and air force base relations, "the man on the street" assumed that the political boss was the top power in the community. It was shown that the boss was a power and a part of the inner circle, but there were also three men who outranked him. In the city in question, the people did not generally know these men's names in connection with the exercise of power, not did they know many others connected with the decision-making structure. A like picture was found in Salem, Massachusetts, where the citizenry generally picked the mayor and other public officials and figures as power-wielders, but a study of this type revealed that major decisions were made by ten or twelve men who held no political office. This does not mean that public officials in such a situation are powerless. They are part of the total power structure, but they may not be the process at its apex.

XIV-3. Indicators of subject's power position. Qualitatively, there are certain

characteristics by which policy-makers can be identified. These characteristics might be called power weights. Certain of them may weigh in favor of a man's power position; others may detract from it. A listing of 14 items for consideration will be given. It will be understood that each item is *one* factor in weighting which standing alone does not make a man powerful, but which, in combination with the others, does help to do so.

XIV-4 *Kinds of policy-interest.* The kinds of policy in which a man is interested may determine his power status. In every community, with its multiplicity of projects, there are thousands of decisions being made. One, for example, may be concerned with a decision as to whether or not a boys' recreation camp should be built. The decision may be of interest to many influentials who feel that such a camp will stabilize a social situation in which juvenile delinquency threatens the community order. The decision may ultimately cost the taxpayers or private donors thousands of dollars. This may be of central interest and importance to a few of the policy-makers, but minor decisions - such as how many cabins should be built on a chosen site - would rather quickly be delegated to professional experts. The policy-makers may then move to other problems of similar magnitude. Thus, magnitude of decision may give a qualitative measure of a man's power. Men who make policy on large scale civic and industrial problems are usually also among the top circles of the general elite.

XIV-5. *Independence of judgements* Those at the apex of power are *relatively* independent in their judgments. They are often called "opinion leaders." They do not *have to* "clear with" others in the power hierarchy to come to their own conclusions. This does not mean that a man of top power will not clear his thinking with others, seek expert advice, and discuss tentative conclusions before coming to final decisions. But, after all the relevant facts are in, he does not have to follow the lead of another. In those situations in which two such men differ on policy matters, a struggle may ensue in which each gathers about him as strong a

force of sub-leaders as possible. The outcome then depends upon the ultimate coercive superiority of one over the other, unless a stalemate occurs, or a compromise is achieved through negotiation.

XIV-6. *Clique membership.* Where power cliques exist, as when there is a rather widely recognized political, church or industrial "machine" membership in the clique is, of course, prerequisite to power wielding. Such a machine may be known widely, but few usually know its inner circle completely, and few, in like manner, know its outer limits and ramifications. The extent of this is revealed in ways indicated in preceding sections, but if a man is said to have power in a bossed or machine political situation, the chances are excellent that he has connections with the network of community policy-makers.

XIV-7. *Amount and kind of participation.* Participation is another important measure of power. This factor, like action must be qualified. Some persons are extremely active in community affairs. They seem to say, "behold me busy." They belong to everything that comes along, and yet they may be relatively powerless persons in relation to the major decisions. They may be "fronting" for certain interests, or they may just love the limelight that activity of any kind creates for those who move about with alacrity. The *kind of participation* is often a better measure than the amount.

Some men may be relatively inactive, but when the major decisions are to be made, they are asked for their opinions, and others act according to their cues. Such may be said to have participated in an issue settlement or project proposal by a "nod of approval". This nod may be the crucial action in a scheme involving thousands of actions. The weighing of this factor is qualitative and can be made, generally, only after one has weighted many other factors and begins to see the whole power structure in its overall operations.

XIV-8. *Age.* There seems to be a prime age for policy-makers. If a man is young, he may be considered a potential leader. Such a person is often dubbed a "comer". If a man is too old, he may be said to have passed his prime, and in extreme cases be dubbed a "has been." Somewhere between 45 and 55 year of age, most power leaders have hit their stride and are considered to be at their peak of potency.

There are, of course, many exceptions to what is being said here. Some young men who have inherited their positions may be of great power weight. Some old men may be considered the elder statesman type of operator and hold a firm grip on power for years beyond the norm of the power prime indicated. The factor is one that needs to be analyzed within its local context.

XIV-9. *Sex.* The term "men" has been used here in its generic sense. In reality, in western cutter and in other cultures around the world it is men, masculine gender, who formulate policies and wield power. There are, however, many women who have a part in power operations. They serve on corporate boards, have wealth, can contract in their own right, win political office, achieve professional success, but in the main they are of lesser rank in most power groupings than a man with the same general qualifications for power holding.

XIV-10. *Record of successes.* A successful bid for public office, a successful execution of a major project, or a successful solution to a public issue may enhance the power rating of one who has been subordinate in the power scale. Any of these successes tip the power scale in a man's favor. In like manner, failure in any of these endeavors may lessen his power rating. As a matter of fact, most of the factors mentioned here could be reversed and a man would thereby lose power weight.

XIV-11. *Achieved and ascribed status.* Both achieved and ascribed status have meaning in the power scale. By achieved status one means merely that a person has gained status by his own efforts. Ascribed status is present in the social situation. In the latter instance, within certain cultures specific status is ascribed to women, to the aged, to the young. One obviously does not achieve youth, age, sex. These factors are inherent in the person and the status given to these factors is inherent in the culture. Also, in most cultures, position and status are ascribed to property holders, wealthy persons, even sometimes to those with mental or physical abnormalities, or to those of normal birth. The status of such persons is ascribed by the culture. Both may be of equal importance in power rating, or they may not be. A man who makes a place for himself may be looked upon with more favor or less in a given culture, depending upon the value placed on achievement as against hereditary rights and social ritual.

Thus, it may be said that wealth, old family connections early settlement, and the like, *are dependent variables* within a culture and must be weighted accordingly. It has been found repeatedly in western society that wealth and power are functional to each other, but they are not always synonymous. The wealthy dowager may have a social position in a society sense, but she may wield little power because she does not actively control her wealth. Her lawyer, who expends money for her, may by that very fact be a most powerful (and perhaps self-made) man.

XIV-12. *Location of residence.* Ecological prestige is sometimes of power significance. Where a man lives, what kind of office space he has (by location), the clubs he frequents (at the right addresses) are indicators of status and prestige. The sections of the community considered desirable will have been mapped out in the period of orientation by the operator. A look at addresses often provides a clue to power.

XIV-13. *Length of residence.* Length of residence in time has meaning in some cultures. If a man has lived in a community all of his life he may be a more trusted person than the man who has come in recently. This is a factor that needs careful weighing. Some men who come into a community may come with the weight of enormous operations behind them. They may wield great power. They may not be accepted "socially" in many quarters in the community, but this does not detract noticeably from their ability to move men in relation to things that need to be done.

XIV-14. *Local ownership.* Local ownership of a local enterprise of the same magnitude as local ownership of an outside-located enterprise, tends to favor the double localism in contrasts of power. Local people tend also to be more important in the power scale than managers of outside corporations of equal or even larger size doing business in the area. To the in-group - out-group principle is here added the preference for ownership over "mere" management.

XIV-15. *Numbers commanded.* Power increases with the numbers of employees or subordinates the power-holder commands. This factor, too, is relative to other elements. The president of a powerful bank may have only a handful of employees under him, while the owner of a factory employing hundreds of workers may be less powerful, especially if the factory owner is dependent upon the banker for financing. In general, however, the size of a group supervised, managed or controlled in any way adds to a man's power.

XIV-16. *Recreation habits.* The types of recreation pursued give only a minor and unreliable indication of a man's status, and indirectly of his power. If

yachting carries prestige as a form of recreation in an area one whose power depends upon the social strata of the yachting set will frequently pass this test of his power. Yet the most powerful man in town may raise petunias a hobby, or, very often, have "no leisure for anything at all."

XIV-17. *Popularity.* The meaning of popularity is difficult to judge. Perhaps in most cases the power wielder is a person who can hold his own in contests for the approval and liking of those on whom his power depends. Some, however, are roundly hated by many and are still extremely powerful. This factor must be weighted in its social context; how power is achieved and held (the customs, people, and mechanisms determining the gaining of power) will affect greatly the importance of popularity to the aspirant for power. Conversely, one must beware of regarding popularity as denoting a corresponding power, in a large circle or in a small circle of society.

XIV-18. *Tests by prediction.* A simple on-target test which the operator can use systematically is to endeavor to predict the action of top influentials whenever there is sufficient advance indication of an action to make this possible. To the degree that he has learned about the actual elite, he will be able to predict their actions accurately. This procedure can be systematized by recording predictions and actions, so that improvement can be observed.

Any failure to predict correctly should immediately be analyzed. What factors about the elite were not taken into consideration which are apparent now that the decision has been made? What influentials ranked at a lower level in the power structure now seem to be more important? What elite institutions played an unexpected part?

Another approach to this same notion is to say that the informed operator is rarely surprised by an action of the elite. To the degree that he does find their power

decisions inexplicable, their policy changes inconsistent, their project incompatible with what he knows, he is probably "off target." At some point in the gathering of information he has overlooked important points, or he has misevaluated or failed to discover interrelationships.

A time of change in the composition of the elite offers another opportunity for spot checks. Experts on the elite of Russia were not perplexed when the triumvirate of Malenkov, Molotov and Beria emerged as the successors of Stalin, nor when Malenkov became supreme. For example, one expert concluded in 1950 "that there was only one plausible alternative in the matter of the succession to Stalin: either Malenkov alone, or more likely, Malenkov as one of a 'directoriate of two or more'" (for which Molotov and Beria were named as likely prospects. This prediction becomes more impressive when one considers that it was primarily based upon analysis of documents, rather than upon direct observation in Russia. The informed operator should find it possible to predict with some accuracy who will take over when a member of the top elite dies or is deposed. He should know who is likely to be a candidate for top office if there is an elective process. He should know which influential is ascending, which descending; and more broadly, which groups of influentials are gaining power, and which losing. To the degree that his predictions at times of change are accurate or inaccurate, he has a spot check of his information.

XIV-19. *Predicting media output to validate intelligence.* If the operator has succeeded in locating and identifying elite publications (See Section XXVII) he may find another means of giving himself a "spot check". He should be able to predict the stand and the main line of argument of the editorials or leading articles of the publication; he should be able to read it more as a confirmation of judgment than as a means of obtaining information. To the degree that he finds this ideal realized, he will have another measure of whether or not he is on target.

PART B

IDENTIFICATION OF ELITES

XV

PLOTTING POWER SHIFTS AND ELITE MOBILITY

A power shift is a marked change in the composition of the elite. The term marked is used because all elites, like the whole of society, are undergoing some change in composition, even though under certain conditions, as for example, at one period of caste society in India, the change may be almost imperceptible. So again, the operator must make a judgment about how much change is to be designated "marked". Ordinarily, he will estimate the point at which greatly different behavior will come from the elite because of the change, and that will be his dividing point.

By change in the composition of the elite is meant its important and relevant composition *vis a vis* power, and not merely the advent of personnel of the same characteristics as their predecessors. Naturally, all elites have about the same rate of change, owing to the death of members. A number of elites also have high turnovers of a physical kind that do not necessarily indicate changes in their composition. One would have to know whether changed characteristics accompany the new incumbents of office. Thus, the fall of the Conservative cabinet in 1945 and its replacement by a Labor cabinet in England was much more significant for the analysis of elite mobility than the more frequent shifts

and falls of French cabinets in the same post-war period.

It is important to know about power shifts because a shift in power may mean a change in elite strategy, either by new plans of action or new uses of propaganda symbols it may mean a change in elite tactics in action or in symbols, in the short run, if not in the long run. In other words, a power shift ordinarily signifies a re-orientation of the elite that may be favorable or unfavorable (potentially or actually) to the operator.

ANALYSIS OF POWER SHIFTS

XV-1. Basic data for detecting power shifts. It is necessary to know the composition of the existing elite before plotting the metabolism or movement of the elite. The following dimensions should have been provided before one undertakes analysis of power shifts.

Who has actual power in the group surveyed? How much power do the components of the group have? What are the power holders using their power for, that is, to what ends or issues? And what is the normal political mobility? Since some degree of mobility always exists, one should not interpret a noticeable normal movement as a great power shift.

XV-2. General indicators of power shifts. The general questions to be asked in order to get at possible power shifts include these: Are there changes in who has power? This may be answered generally by studies of the officeholders and informal leaders to determine whether major shifts are occurring in those

positions. Thus, are workers moving into legislatures? Are institutions formerly monopolized by upper-class groups being "packed"? (for instance, Augustus packed the Roman Senate, Cromwell packed the Commons of England, Northerners packed the Southern reconstruction legislatures, and the House of Lords of England has suffered attrition in its composition from continuous moderately-paced packing and was once threatened with packing by the Liberals over the question of home-rule for Ireland).

The next question is: Are there changes in the quanta of power possessed by the new as against the old elements of the elite? For instance, significant in English history of elite study was the triumph of the Commons representing large new commercial, mercantile and industrial interests over the Court party in the late seventeenth century, and a century later the growing restrictions on the freedom of action of the House of Lords, culminating in practical helplessness today. In these instances, rather than a complete substitution of personnel and physical transformation of elite institutions, the load of power has shifted from certain institutions to others.

A third general indicator of power shifts is discovered by the answer to the general question: Is there a major change in the orientation of the elite? Normally, answers to the first two questions will produce an answer to the third, because a re-orientation of the elite towards different sets of issues and towards a different ideology and pattern of practices will accompany the preceding changes. Only rarely does an elite have within itself, without external infiltration, or upset by revolt, the capacity for self-change or inner transformation. The elite of the Roman city state accomplished a re-orientation to a republican empire without losing its original character or personnel. Ordinarily, however, a threatened elite exhibits confusion, self-contradiction, escapism, or other decadent symptoms.

XV-3 Major types of shifts:

from single to plural elite or vice versa. A study of the connections and communications among the elite should reveal the decreasing or increasing

integration of the elite on the same level, that is, are those who share the major decision-making powers themselves organized into separate groups, or part of a single well integrated group, and is this tendency decreasing or increasing? The obvious importance of this is that integrated elites though more heterogeneous than the separate pluralities and less vulnerable to separatistic propaganda, and more capable of swift and decisive action on behalf of the whole elite.

Centralization is also to be watched for the same reason. Are the elite on a lower level being disciplined less or more by the upper level elites or is there a great deal of autonomy of behavior on the part of the lower elite personnel on those matters or decisions consigned to their limited purview?

XV-4. Major types, continued:

from one skill base to another. Are the present personnel being replaced by recruits of different skills who promise a different orientation of action by the elites? Are men skilled in the use of coercion substituting for those skilled in bargaining, oratory, or religious practices?

XV-5. Major types; continued:

From one personality type to another. Is a re-orientation of the elite being accomplished by co-optation from other social sectors or from the mass, or from the sources within the elite itself of different character types who are more or less decisive, more or less radical within the limits acceptable to the elite? By illustration here is meant such phenomena as the replacement of a Chamberlain by a Churchill as prime minister, or the replacement of a Hindenburg by a Hitler.

XV-6. Major types, continued:

From one set of issues to another. Sometimes the principle component of a power shift is the moving of elite attention from one to another group of issues. This

may occur without any of the other types of powershifts, though normally, like all other changes, it is usually part of a multiple action complex. Sometimes the very success of an elite presents it with a set of issues to which it must face up. Thus, the American leadership over a generation exhibits pretty much the same basic traits with some skill changes, but its orientation has become noticeably international so that one cannot say about it today that it is isolationist in the sense of a generation ago, but rather is divided among several types of interventionism. Similarly, the elites of other countries have become oriented towards America. Formerly they were dealt with by the propagandist very much as an unknown tribe is dealt with by an explorer who is trying to explain his own culture to them. Today, they are likely to argue within the same frame of orientation as the American operator.

A major power shift of this type may occur solely as a result of focussing upon new "threats" new issues thrown up by public opinion, or other new orientations, mainly caused by any one or a number of the conditions of political mobility already cited. Then the new issues are politized. What before has been irrelevant to politics because it has been part of business or part of religion contemplated as the source of political struggle, now becomes a political issue. This in itself tends to bring forward new leadership who are acquainted with the new issues. It also upsets pre-existing communication channels, which through they may be highly general and capable of carrying all kinds of qualitatively different messages, are nevertheless somewhat specialized. Some new channels must develop from the politizing of new issues, and the operator should try to discover whenever there are new issues, what new routes he will have to plot in his communication new of the society.

XV-7. Major types, continued:

From one social-economic base to another. The infiltration of the merchant into the Chinese elite groups of the twentieth century, alongside the literati, the bureaucracy, and the warriors would be one example of the change in the social economic base of the elite. Many examples are afforded from Western history

such as the taking over of Western European legislatures by representatives of the rising middle classes in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the subsequent movement into the legislatures of representatives of worker and union groups, this kind of transformation ordinarily involved drastic shifts of other kinds: in orientation, in personalities, in skills, and shifts from one type of mass base of the elite to another.

XV-8 Mass-elite connections. For ideological and other reasons, including an increase of education and organization of the public, the question of the relationship of the elite with the mass develops great importance. Some of the major types of power shifts occurring are those in which an opposing elite or a segment of the elite professes or manages to obtain the affection and support of the mass against the "unrepresentative" existing elite or some fraction thereof. Ordinarily, this mass relationship of the elite is not easily discovered as long as any powerful or controlling elite or part thereof feels that it will suffer greatly from such a revelation. At other times the factions or parties without mass connections will have nevertheless succeeded in building mass support to the point where they may contend with the original mass parties on equal terms in action and propaganda. That is, wherever free political agitation and propaganda may be engaged in, all factions will insist upon their excellent mass connections. It remains for the operator, then, to discover the true extent of these connections in the case of each of the factions. The development of closer connections, whether through organizations or through symbols is to be carefully watched because, especially in a crisis of revolution, or war, or economics, the party with the actual active mass connections has a great weapon at its command.

XV-9. Mobility indicators continued:

Business politics. The penetration of the business elite by politicians and the penetration of the political elite by businessmen are common features of the changing elite process. How many politicians got their starts in business or were

co-opted from business? How many businessmen originated from political leaders who used power as means to wealth? Frequently the converse processes occur at the same time. Also, from the political side, come not only politicians proper, but bureaucrats and judges. Probably, the business-politics exchange is much more alive than the theology-politics or education-politics and perhaps more even than worker-politics, other forms of inter-penetration and accommodation among elites. Naturally, or orientation aimed at taking account of the business interests of politics and the political interests of business can be expected where the process is going on at a rapid rate.

XV-10. *Mobility analysis continued:*

Growth of new functions. The development of new functions of government accounts for the introduction of new elements of the elite. Thus, the high bureaucracy in the United States, and in other countries, has been created by older elite elements to carry on new functions and has come to occupy a respected position among the general elite. Those who have manned the new function are often not the same socially as those who are older to the elite. And of course, along with the new functions, have come transfers of quanta of power from private decision-making, and these have further strengthened the hand of officialdom in many cases.

XV-11. *Mobility analysis:*

Shifts in the sources of economic chances. The origins of much of the transformation of the elites comes from changes in the kinds of economic chances that are available and the distribution of those chances. The discovery of new worlds in the sixteenth century expanded the possibilities of wealth and political power among certain nations and among groups within those nations. For instance, the British East India Company used its profits from the Orient to win influence in the parliament and Court of England. Within a given country the development of large corporations as centers of the highest opportunities or pay

increases in the government service in a time of recession or the regulation of finances by the government and the consequent loss of autonomous functions by the financial classes or the differential and usual increasing value of land - all of these represent shifts in economic chances that have their effects on the prestige, power and wealth of components of the elite.

XV-12. *Mobility analysis :*

Development of new types of social organization. Labor unions, as they grow, become recognized, and acquire their own leadership, are examples of new organizations that take their place in the elite structure. The development of cartels, trade associations lobby organizations, and other types of organizations, all hold significance for the composition of the elite, replacing less well-organized, or defunct, elite elements.

XV-13. *Mobility Analysis continued :*

New Skills. The development of new types of social organizations, such as large corporations, or unions, the shifts in sources of economic chances, the growth of new functions, and other elements, frequently go along with the shift in the kinds of skill emphasized by an elite. It is well to discover whether, for example, warrior skills are being superseded by technical skills, whether religious and ceremonial skills are being superseded by bargaining skills, and whether, especially in the more developed societies, bargaining and technical skills are being subordinated to warrior skills. The various techniques of biographical analysis and power analysis already described serve to produce a conclusion or trend.

XV-14. *Mobility Analysis Continued:*

Social Stratification of Elite. Using class measures such as the type of house that

people live in, their income, and their associates, one can discover whether there is any noticeable acceleration of social mobility or, conversely, a stratification of the population. This kind of criterion is especially useful in judging the extent to which a revolution is slowing down, and in predicting a shift in power from revolutionaries to organizational experts.

XV-15. Mobility Analysis continued:

Education of the Elite. Is the new elite more Western oriented and Western thinking as the result of education? Are indigenous schools and universities supplying more and more of the local leadership? Are there conflicts among the elite in terms of the types of education they have had? Do these conflicts cut through other divisions among the elite, or are they peculiar to two mutually hostile groups? Table 4 shows some significant differences emerging from a comparison of Chinese communist and nationalist top elites.

TABLE 4

UNIVERSITIES ATTENDED BY KUOMINTANG
AND CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS*

UNIVERSITY	Kuomintang		Politburo		Central Committee Communist Party	
	No	percent	No	percent	No	percent
Chinese university	86	33.0				
Chinese military school	88	33.7	13	44.8	23	54.8

Chinese classical education	15	5.7				
Japanese university	42	16.1	5	17.2	5	11.9
Japanese military school	26	10				
United States	40	15.3	2	6.9	1	2.4
France	13	5.0	6	20.7	12	28.6
Germany	13	5.0	2	6.9	3	7.1
Great Britain	15	5.7				
Belgium	2	0.8			1	2.4
Soviet Union	14	5.7	20	69.0	25	59.5
Other	3	1.1				
None	2	0.8	2	6.9	3	7.1
Total known	261	100	29	100	42	100
don't know	26		13		2	
TOTAL:	287		42		44	

* The table is reproduced from Robert North, *Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites*, p.51. In some instances, the columns are non-additive because individuals attended more than one university and are carried in more than one place.

** 1924-1945, comprising 6 Central Executive Committee

*** 1921-1945, comprising 10 different Politburos.

PART C

SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS

XVI

POLITICAL ELEMENTS

This section and the several to follow are concerned with the special problems of several functional elite elements: pure political, bureaucratic, military, religious, rural, labor, hereditary, business and intelligentsia. Many methods of identifying these elements have been described in other sections of the manual. separate consideration is given to them here because certain study problems are peculiar to each element. Each is an important segment of most elites and has special modes of behaving that arise from its function.

Any of these functional groupings may be the major basis - indeed, sometimes the exclusive basis - for an elite. At other times, each may be found radically submerged as an unimportant part of an elite that is dominated by another functional group.

The pure political element is least likely to be found in subordinate roles and most likely to be the major basis (rarely the exclusive basis) for the general elite; By the political element of the elite is meant all professional, hereditary, or long-term leaders of political policy who are directly connected with the central policy-making organs. This group than excludes: part-time politicians; functional group leaders; pure power-types of men who operate in groups not relevant to the central organs of state nor the makers of political policies, and career officials

(bureaucrats).

One should note, however, that such pure politicians will frequently have formal occupations (lawyers, teachers, army titles, etc.) that may be mainly disregarded. Also, such men are not necessarily pure power types; that is, they need not be pure politicians because they seek power or power alone; they may be interested in wealth, prestige or the effectuation of an ideology or attitude. Furthermore, the fact that a man falls into the category of a pure politician does not mean he has no functional ability. For example, Winston Churchill has skills of a high order in journalism, naval strategy, oratory, and administration; Trotsky was highly skilled as a writer, revolutionary agitator, and military leader. Indeed, positions of pure political leadership demand a combination of similar qualities. The less mobile the elite (ranging from explosively mobile, as with revolutionary violence, down to extremely static, as with a political leadership caste), the more apt the elite is to partake of special functional characteristics such as militarism or priestcraft, and the more apt to be homogeneous in possession of this trait.

In addition, the more a leadership is one of office rather than *de facto* or achieved, the less the elite possesses unspecialized traits or the traits of the open political struggle - agitation, propaganda, oratory, maneuverability, and bargaining.

TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL ELEMENTS

XVI-1. *General character of political elements.* Perhaps the first and most general question to ask of the pure political elite concerns its total configuration. What are the general types of elements composing it? In a totalitarian regime, one is likely to find that the strongest elements are the party, police, army, and bureaucracy. By contrast, in a free political configuration, one is more likely to find parties, interest groups, the public and the bureaucracy as the principal elements of the political elite. These general groupings are easily located through

preliminary informants and by superficial scrutiny of newspapers and official pronouncements of the governments.

XVI-2. Socio-economic status of politicians. Once the individuals who have the characteristics of the pure political elite are segregated from the general or special elites, their origins may be compared with those of the remainder of the elite. How do their prestige, manner of life, income, and range of social connections compare with those of the bureaucracy, military, and other special functional groups? There will always be special cases of high income, high prestige, and high status in general among politicians, and the operator should be aware of the range of politicians on those indices, as well as the upper and lower extremes. Is the political group especially addicted to the accumulation of wealth while in office? Do those who have been in office longer have greater wealth than those who are coming in?

XVI-3. Character Analysis. The average or typical character of the purely political leader is likely to lend its tone to the total elite configuration. Yet, although it is crucial to establish this typical character, it would be erroneous to generalize it to the remainder of the elite, or for that matter even the non-typical elements of the pure politicians. It must be remembered that changing orientations and events can call forward from among the politicians characters of quite different types, provided that they are there and ready to go into action from the beginning. It has often been the error of foreign strategists, whether they are intending violence or propaganda or economic measures, to over-generalize the central character type of an elite, and neglect a considerable minority of quite different traits that can easily be substituted, under changing conditions, for the original central type. The transformation of English top leadership in the face of dire Nazi threat is a case in point.

Among the dimensions along which the characters of politicians might be

measured are four: the first concerns the extent to which they are volitive or indecisive. Obviously for the operator it means a great deal to know whether the attitudes that are the target of propaganda can result in action or end up in indecision. In fact, a great deal of propaganda effort may be completely wasted upon indecisive characters who will not act one way or the other favorably or unfavorably, no matter what type of attitude change occurs within them.

A second dimension is the flexibility-compulsiveness one. Ordinarily, compulsiveness in political behavior is a product of functional specialization (e.g. bureaucracy, militarism) or of characterological peculiarity, which may be distributed randomly among politicians, or for that matter, people in any group, or maybe, under certain conditions, a trait of even non-specialized political elites. Apparently totalitarian regimes, especially after their revolutionary phase is over, breed high rigidity and compulsiveness. This tends to make them invulnerable to propaganda appeals of a "rational" kind, but not necessarily vulnerable to many other types of symbolic assault. The flexible character that will be receptive to a wider spectrum of messages will, by the same token, have greater resistance to "non-rational" appeals.

Thirdly, one should place the typical character of the political class along a scale of internal consistency of direction. Do they tend to hold to the same line of attitude and ideology and policy consistently or must one be ready to change at the slightest provocation one's alignment of messages because of the very quick change of target? A final and fourth characterological mechanism on which the political elite should be measured, concerns the temporal limits of their planning and vision. Are they solving their problems and planning their policies for short-term or long-term periods?

XVI-4. *Identifications of politicians.* By interview, press analysis, and such devices as may occur for the purpose, politicians may be rated according to the degree to which they identify themselves with an ideology, with a party, with a leader, with a faction, or with the people. Frequently members of the same group

differ in their identifications among these several roles. For example, a study of an American state legislature began by asking legislators rather simple questions on the differences between the political parties, and as a result of the interview, the legislator was placed in one of three groups, depending upon whether he saw the parties as divided along essentially class lines, as oriented around leaders, or as rather complex organizations combining leadership, program and tradition. Then the legislators who fell in each group were scored on their ability to perceive which interest groups were active on major issues, to give examples of political activity by the state administrative departments, and to understand how their constituents were worked into pressure groups. The more complex-minded legislators scored highest in their perception of these factors in the legislative process, the party leaders second, and the legislators oriented to the idea that the parties were divided along class lines were least perceptive of the three groups.

One might expect in any society where legislators or politicians have different identifications, that their perceptions, and consequently their receptivity to messages, will vary with the character of their identifications, just as occurred in the study cited. Now in a multi-party system, or in a multi-faction system, where one group of politicians is organized around a leader, another around an ideology, another around a party, and so on, one should be able to discover different postures and stances of the several groups in the face of propaganda. Perhaps the most feasible method of getting at this difference readily would be by interviewing one or two "typical" or "best known" representatives of each group, and comparing them in their attitudes towards specific appeals or the perception of specific facts or conditions. Again, one might follow the differential responses of the several elements in the press on several issues.

XVI-5. *Opportunism-consistency measure.* The word opportunism is bandied about a great deal, and is especially used to refer to politicians, no matter in what kind of society. On the other hand, one is always given to understand that some politicians are not opportunists, although the majority may be. Objectivity on this point is, of course, quite important. Examination of the action record of an

individual is perhaps the most direct way of ascertaining his degree of consistency or opportunism. However, conditions are not always equal, to use the trite phrase, and what may seem from a very superficial survey of a record to be opportunism may be the facade for an underlying consistency. Here resort to a symbol analysis of speeches, writings, etc. to assist in the validating of the action record is useful, although again opportunistic words are frequently used to conceal underlying consistency, and vice versa. Popular opinion regarding the politicians may be given some small credence: if the political group has a universal reputation for opportunism, where there is so much smoke there must be a little fire, at least. Perhaps a better way, and not a much more difficult way, of getting closer to the truth would be to ask one of those politicians reputed to be the most opportunistic to name those he regards as highly opportunistic and highly consistent, and then to ask the same questions of one of those reputed to be the most consistent of politicians.

The knowledge gained by placing a political elite generally on this continuum can be useful in deciding on the extent to which an observed attitudinal change is likely to persist, whether it is significant, or whether the promise of indulgences will result in any firm adherence to a policy. It is good to have men measured by this scale, too, if only to achieve objectivity in the choice of targets, for frequently the opportunist is an obliging target, he seems to react to propaganda readily, whereas it seems as if the barrage is wasted on a consistent group, or a consistent individual.

XVI-6 *Autonomy Analysis.* Is the political elite really independent of the functionally skilled parts of the general elite or special elite, or is it strongly dependent upon them? Does the functional elite commonly make statements such as "let them talk" (referring to the politicians); "in the end they will have to do what we say." Are the politicians dependent almost completely for the execution of their policies upon unremovable bureaucrats, military men, or other groups formally below them in power? In the course of their work, as seen from accounts, direct observation, interviews, etc., does the political elite consult

continuously and invariably with the functionally skilled components of the elite, or does it act independently and seemingly without concern or anxiety about ignoring the functionally skilled? For example, the relations between Hitler and the German General Staff were an absolutely required subject of study; it was not enough to understand one, or both separately, since the fateful decisions of the war emerged from their conflicts.

Here again, there may be no typical behavior on the part of the general elite, for individuals may be greatly dependent upon the staff, advice, power, and prestige of the functional groups, while other individuals proceed directly to their ends with as much ultimate effect without consultation with the same groups. Related to this problem is that of the tenure and stability of the leadership. Do they turn over very rapidly? Are they in office for a short time? Do they hold positions very briefly? If leaders are highly instable, they may be vulnerable. They may lack strong organizational backing and operate as lone wolves: such a condition would immediately suggest the special adjustment of propaganda tactics.

XVI-7. *Measures of cohesion.* An opportunity to apply measures of solidarity to the various elements of the elite should not be neglected. Sometimes, although the politicians themselves lack an organization behind them, they manage to develop a considerable *esprit de corps* and concert of action and behavior among themselves, thus compensating for not having a disciplined following. So the operator should be alert to any possibility of defining parties, cliques, sections, or blocs of politicians by the quantitative analysis of voting records, by the analysis of similarity of symbol output, by the extent to which mutual flattery and constructive criticism is engaged in, as against destructivism and negativism.

The basic technical problem in cohesion analysis is the determination of the point of departure, that is, the hundred percent point to which all other individuals being surveyed may be related as proportional percentages. Ordinarily, in

determining the existence of a party, or clique, or bloc among the general elite, whether the ultimate index used will be words, votes, or actions, some individual is given an arbitrary score of 100 per cent on the index, and then all others in the universe are described and score insofar as they agree or disagree with him on the selected indices. Then the bloc, party, or clique is defined as those achieving a score of some arbitrary break-off percentage point, say 70 per cent, which denotes their agreement in 70 per cent of the cases with the reference individual. Many varieties of cohesion measures may be devised to distinguish among the several relatively unorganized elements of the political element itself. The same cohesion measures may be used to determine the amount of separatism between the pure political element and other parts of the general elite or the sub-elites or special elites.

PART C

SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS

XVII

BUREAUCRATIC ELEMENTS

All elite members holding institutional positions as careers are called bureaucrats. They include all permanent officers of the state and political parties, and men of the top elite institutions that originate policy decisions. As with the political element, and other typical elements found among the elites, the bureaucrats may, in certain groups under survey, compose, in fact, the general elite because of peculiar historical and social circumstances. At other times they may form only one of the elite elements, and at another time may be either absent or not figure significantly in the important power decisions. Although no special attention is given to the army in this section, it should be realized that most armies are, in many ways, the most perfect of bureaucracies in a society, and that most principles regarding bureaucracy hold for the army or military. The exceptional trait of the army - its function of managing force - gives it special characteristics that deserve separate treatment.

BRUEAUCRATIC ELITE ANALYSIS

XVII-1. *Centralization-decentralization.* The positioning of bureaucratic elements on this continuum differs from country to country and may often differ within the same nation or jurisdiction among the various agencies. The major question here concerns the identification of individual officers with national or localistic groups. How much local agency autonomy is present? Is it informal, arising out of the recruitment, origin, and informal social and political structure of the bureaucracy, or is it legally designed and sanctioned as would be a federal arrangement like the American? For example, in the U.S.A. state officials are frequently of contrasting social backgrounds and attitudes when compared with the federal officials in the same functional area, and at the same time have a number of legal powers that cannot be seized by federal officials. In countries such as China and India, there are great traditional resistences against centralization, even when the theory and presumed sanctions are in the direction of the central government and the officers are centrally appointed. Thus, when they go into the field to their tasks, the officers often revert to the traditional pattern and seek to establish local "baronies."

One recalls that even in countries where some control remains over local officials, there may be a constant conflict between field offices and central offices, or if conflict is absent, at least an independence of character is found among local officials that qualifies them as one's targets along with their hierarchical superiors in the central offices of the government.

XVII-2. *Integration, high and low.* By integration is meant the intensity of control and coordination of the bureaucracy on the same level of power and function. Are the offices of the central government coordinated by a master planning group, or a political party, or a specially selected board of high officials or politicians? Is the integration legally sanctioned or informally accomplished? Are interdepartmental transfers on the same level a common occurrence, so that, for instance, a high military official may be experienced also in high level

diplomatic work, and high level public works decisions, etc?

XVII-3 *Extent of bureaucratic autonomy.* This is the universal problem of bureaucracy, reflected in such phrases as "the bureaucratic state," "Government by bureaucrats" and the like. Does the bureaucratic element issue independently orders of great scope, intensity and domain. Are these orders becoming more and more common and are they beginning to envelop larger portions of the economy, more people, and do they possess greater intensity of effect (e.g. less exhortation and promotion of policy and more command and domination of policy)? The structure of all known bureaucracies promotes, against whatever resistences of psychological, localistic, or ideological natures may occur, the concentration of decision-making in smaller numbers of elite who permanently hold office.

The process enlarges into a mental tendency to treat all problems as deductive ones: that is, war, peace, government enterprise, and all other types of heated issues are regarded as matters of administration that can be deduced from the law (of course, as defined by the bureaucracy itself). And the tendency is to reject politics under its proper name and to call politics by the new name of administration or execution of policy, with an exploitation of the symbols of hostility to politics that are always present in a society. The preferred channels of the bureaucracy, therefore, are anti-political in the conventional sense, and "pro-scientific." "pro-legal" and "pro-expertise."

XVII-4 *Informal connections with politicians.* The general politicians must maintain the prestige of politics in effect, even though they may see fit to join in the general denunciation of "politiking." They seek control over the bureaucracy through external sanctions, by placing their own members in the bureaucracy, and by assimilating the bureaucracy at the top to the general elite. It is well to determine which of these, techniques, or which combination of them, are being employed by the general political group in any given situation. Bureaucracies will

always have some connections with the politicians. There would also be considerable separatism produced by different origins, modes of work, and techniques of power. The formal channels of the bureaucracy to power and the limits of these channels are often prescribed by law but are supplemented or even substituted for, in great measure, by informal arrangements. One should determine by interview, observation, and the study of the legislative process, to what extent informal relationships exist between individual politicians, politician as a group, or some faction of politicians, on the one hand, and the agencies of the bureaucracy on the other, and whether these outside connections are with some integrated bureaucratic elite, or with individuals or scattered agencies.

XVII-5. *Connections with the socio-economic elite.* One of the most significant indicators of the place of the bureaucracy in the general elite, and of its response to general, as against functional, symbols, is its social-economic status when compared with other elements of the elite and of the population. By sampling and subsequent interview, or by press analysis and sometimes from a study of *Who's Who*, or official publications, one can reconstruct a typical bureaucratic background and compare it with the background of politicians generally. One can assume relatively little about such similarities without self-conscious, systematic study. For instance, a comparison of American high level officials and high level businessmen reveals significant differences in origin that are responsible for a number of cleavages in attitude and differences in behavior and policies. Significant differences show up again when the comparison is extended to labor union leaders and general politicians, and, of course, with the population as a whole. To what extent does the top bureaucracy depend upon unearned income as well as its salary. To what extent does the high bureaucracy engage in off limits circulation and enterprise or literary activity?

XVII-6. *Clannishness.* Do nepotism, family connections, tribal or religious connections pervade the bureaucracy? Again hasty decisions should be avoided;

yet when a decision is made, it will be important, because the type of bureaucracy as infiltrated by nepotistic elements and favoritism of a clannish nature, is far less vulnerable to rationalistic, scientific appeals, and much more to traditional symbols. Comparisons of names and biographical comparisons are useful in ascertaining these conditions. The press sometimes reports outbursts or news related to clannishness when it might least be expected to receive airing. Thus, in September of 1952, Nikita Khrushchev, then newly re-elected Secretary of the Moscow Communist Party, declared publicly that there were too many executives in the Moscow region selected on grounds of friendship, personal devotion and kinship, and called this a "big evil".

XVII-7. *Connections with private groups.* Does the bureaucracy create, or are there created for it by other authorities, numbers of formal advisory committees or commissions to assist or supervise its work? Is part of the administrative task or a number of agencies entrusted to representatives of interest groups? Is there an interchange of personnel between business and the bureaucracy? Is it customary for officials to move into business and vice versa? Are there any significant differences between the bureaucratic elements who are engaged in activities to promote private business, those who are charged with regulating private business, and those who are operating government business unrelated to private business? Which, if any, of these three elements gives a dominant characteristic to the bureaucracy and determines the general ideological atmosphere of the bureaucracy? Which of the three groups has the greatest prestige?

XVII-8. *Recruitment methods.* Some of the most revealing discoveries about a bureaucracy, as with any other group, can emerge from studying its recruitment. From what parts of the population is it drawn? How are these parts selected? Is the kind of recruitment practiced in the state apparatus the same as among business institutions, the army, educational institutions? Obviously there is a great

difference between the rationalized bureaucratic recruitment and the recruitment of politicians. The gap between such groups is manifested in the way leaders are recruited. Are career service examinations technical, general-academic, or entirely at the discretion of individual hiring officers? What kind of person applies as a result of the forms of examination? If technical, what kind of technique is favored by the examining system, and in general, what kind of skill is sought? The great difference here is between those skilled in human relations or in behavioral science, and those who are legally trained. The former are likely to be more pliant and more ruthless, whereas the latter are likely to be rigid. Is there a verbal examination behind the written one, so that a further screening of "undesirables" is accomplished by informal and unregistered oral conversation? What trends are observable in recruitment? Are certain universities less and less the sources of recruits? Is there a switch from Western to Eastern schooling or vice versa? Often such trends can be discovered from a study of a sample of bureaucrats over a period of time, or by an account of background indicators and items in a series of *Who's Who*.

XVII-9. *Prestige measures.* A good index to the prestige of the bureaucracy in relation to other elements of the elite is the extent to which its recruits are coming from the most privileged sections of the society. But also, not content with discovering whether the prestige of the bureaucracy is low or high because of the source of its recruits, one should know whether it is actually recruiting potential elite elements not hitherto represented in the upper strata. The bureaucracy may thus have high prestige among the most promising elements of society. The seating of bureaucrats in relation to others at social events publicity given them in the papers; the random, sporadic remarks and sayings about them that one encounters in normal social activity; the pride with which special uniforms, designations or decorations are worn by the bureaucrats; all are additional indications of the prestige of the bureaucracy.

XVII-10. *Morale Measures.* Morale is a measure of drive towards the goal of the group, and a group may have very different prestige with, say, the upper reaches of socialite society, and yet much greater morale than a group of high prestige in the same circles. One measure of morale is turnover and separation of personnel. Do men get out as fast as they can? If there a great deal of transferring about without valid administrative reasons? Does the group exhibit expansive, aggressive characteristics in its public behavior? Is it always demanding more money and new functions? Is its treatment of critics either very severe or quite aloof? That is, either extreme is perhaps a better measure of high morale than some middling or confused attitude towards hostile criticism. There are a large number of techniques for determining the condition of morale. The operator may refer to some of the standard works on industrial relations and personnel administration for those techniques, which are peripheral to the interests of this manual.

XVII-11. *Capacity to act.* Indicators of the capacity of the bureaucracy to act under different situations such as are presented by new policies, emergence of new elite membership in some other part of the elite, crisis or war, are useful. For example, the bureaucracy of the German social democratic party in the twenties and early thirties was quite competent to amass funds, organize the trade unions, conduct party warfare, and run a fairly stable bureaucratic government, but it was incapable of decisive hostilities against a group of Nazis who began weakly but became progressively stronger all the while, giving unmistakable evidences of planning the total destruction of the social democrats. One should ask and seek the same kind of answer for the bureaucracy of the government and of the elite institutions outside the government. Some bureaucratic organizations are very slow to act. Others can act rapidly. It would be presumptuous to declare what the particular structure is that invariably results in decisive action. Certainly the psychological question is paramount here: do the leaders, when faced with a new question, invariably resort to group thinking, prolonged committee sessions, accelerated exchange of correspondence and memoranda, and other inhibiting or

escapist behavior, or do they fall very quickly into an action formation and make and execute a decision promptly?

XVII-12. *Compulsiveness.* Rigidity has been mentioned in several other suggested analysis. This is essentially what is meant by compulsiveness. Certain actions must be preformed in a habitual sequence, no matter what the external circumstances are, and not matter what the demand for a change may be. Indicators of compulsiveness or rigidity or bureaucratic habits are the extent to which the deductive form of thinking is employed; the extent to which written documents dominate the everyday lives of even the closest working partners; the veneration of formalities; peculiarities of dress; hyperconventionality, according to a norm set up within the bureaucratic element itself; and rigidity of holding to a given sphere of activity without expanding or contracting it.

XVII-13. *Propaganda Machinery.* It is customary and/or legal for bureaucratic agencies or elements to operate publicity or public relations machinery. One should look not only for lobbying or personal relations with politicians, though these are important as public relations devices, but also for the regular use of the media of influencing public opinion; public informative bulletins, helpful hints, voluminous correspondence, illustrated brochures, radio programs, friendship teams that go on tour, and a wide variety of educational devices. In addition, particularly through the press, bureaucrats sometimes disseminate their vies anonymously or under pseudonyms.

XVII-14. *Personal documents.* The operator may consider himself indeed fortunate if he has at his disposal any scrupulously recorded descriptions of the behavior of a high bureaucratic official as well as some other individual political elite members. The diary and case study can be full of the kinds of suggestions

one received from reading a great novel such as Proust's *Memories of Times*. A chance to persuade an official to provide an intimate record of daily work, or to collect such a piece done by somebody, else in published or unpublished form, should be taken up. The kinds of data useful for a complete understanding of executive action and for a considered judgment of his leadership include all contracts with persons and institutions, all techniques of communication, the nature of each question handled, and the kind of behavior of the individual under observation in the particular minute situation.

XVII-15. *Group observation.* Although few operators or observers have to be told that it is useful to observe a parliament or cabinet in session and operating, it does not often occur to them to attend smaller conferences, or less-publicized meetings of the leaders of the elite institutions. Practically every elite institution has some kind of collective meeting where non-security matters are being discussed and here the observer may become enlightened as to the procedures used in conducting the meeting, the form of arriving at decisions, the degree of collegiality and other peculiar characteristics that had not been imagined by one person in what seemed to be the universals of American small group behavior.

XVII-16. *Organization charts and manuals.* The simple reminder is in order that the U.S.A. government is not the only one employing organization charts and manuals, and that the formal structure of any organization, its goals, functions and responsibilities, are usually provided in such charts and manuals. These formal materials are limited but useful, first as reflections of the facts, and also as facts about the ideology of the organization, that is who *should* be doing what to who and why. Care should be exercised in exposing evidences of informal organization. Americans, who are matter-of-fact about forms of organization, cannot assume that others feel that way, too. Thus, sometimes propagandists, in their need to appear clever, describe the "inside dope" of the informal structure and power in an organization, not realizing that they are engaging in tabooed

publicity.

PART C

SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS

XVIII

MILITARY ELEMENTS

Every elite endeavors to transform its power into *authority* in order to gain psychological acceptance of its exercise, of power, and to gain a general attitude which will confer legitimacy on the physical coercion that is needed to carry out authoritative decisions. The stability of the government depends directly upon the elite's control over the instruments of force and violence. Internally speaking, the greater the authority of the regime, the less it need rely on violence and force. The greater its weakness, the more it must use violence as a means of holding and gaining power. These propositions, however, are cut across by the fact that violence as means for executing decisions is more acceptable in certain societies than in others. The fact that many elements of Western elites disavow force as a means of governing, except *in extreme*, does not preclude a number of different societies from preferring forceful means to psychological or economic methods of carrying out state decisions. In all societies, however, the instruments of force constitute a reserve power, though the point of commitment of reserve varies greatly.

Whether or not violence has an accepted place among the ordinary instruments of power, violence will increase as a means of power when consensus is disrupted by disagreement between elites and mass or between segments of the elite. External conditions of the use of violence - the preference for violence in other

communities or societies, the aggressiveness of other communities - affects independently the position of violence and of those skilled in force within a society, apart from but certainly affecting the internal condition previously described. Consequently, the total place of force in a society at a given moment depends both upon internal and external conditions, operating independently and also with mutual effect. The military element of the elite consists of those whose careers are devoted to the preparation for and the exercise of physical coercion. Beyond the ordinary meaning of the military as land, sea and air forces rest the police; a final sub-section hereunder will treat of them also.

The present world situation is one that focuses attention of people upon the use of force, both internally as civil struggle, and externally as war. This heightened attention is itself a factor increasing the visibility of the military and the expectation that the military will become civic leaders. The military is always a potential elite, even in the most peaceful of societies, for so many are the influences that will heighten the attention given to military events and to the qualities that the military are expected to possess, that a significant fraction of every elite will possess military skills. If one surveys the proportion of years in history that have been given over to war, and more usefully the present state of the world, the military is shown to be much more active in the elite than this minimum picture conveys. Since at least and at most the military contributes to public policy in any national group and by reflected glory in many non-national, corporate, provincial local and other groups, the operator must attend to military leaders as targets with at least as great attention as he pays to targets among the intelligentsia or the press.

In a large proportion of states (for example, France under the Directorate Italy after the first world war, Egypt and Guatemala today) a Napoleon, Mussolini, Nasser or Castillo an skyrocket into power by forceful means. The fact that the military are traditionally reputed to have only the slightest interest in propaganda should not deter the operator from seeking constantly to devise media and messages suitable to the military element.

ANALYSIS OF MILITARY ELEMENTS

XVIII-1. *Importance of the military.* An obvious measure of the importance of the military element to the general elite is the proportion of top posts of the government held by the military, as individuals or collectively. Again, the test of the scope, intensity and domain of power should be applied to those who wear uniforms in their normal work in order to determine what proportion of decisions involve them, how important those decisions are, and how many people they affect. It should be remembered that, all things being equal, the transfer of civil power to a military leader almost automatically increases the intensity of the power since the military has at its command disciplined man-power for executing orders. Whereas with other bureaucracies, even firing is a rare occurrence, the military has the court martial, which is completely beyond the disciplinary power of civil agencies.

XVIII-2. *Comparison of armed forces.* The army tends to be more political than the navy or air force. Army leadership works most often with larger masses of men, works more often among civil populations, is used to taking ground and holding it and treating with the occupants of the territory, has more complicated problems of discipline and human relations because of the distribution of its forces over territory in contact with disturbing elements, and consequently has been more naturally power-conscious and the source of power.

XVIII-3. *Internal differences.* Despite efforts to rotate military personnel among the various types of line, staff and command services, most armies face the problem of antagonisms between combat and service or staff elements. For

instance, one of the reasons that a number of South American revolutions have been led by colonels is that they are often the highest active command officers, whereas generals are deprived of direct control over troops and are stationed in capital cities. In determining the most powerful political element in the military, in the present and potentially, the operator may well look for some distinction between combat elements with a high morale and strong drives, and the more bureaucratic army leaders who have merged more readily into the *status quo* or the elite. Evidences of this distinction may be seen in rotation schedules, time and space separatism, various differences between periodicals, bulletins, and orders issued at a low level as against the high level, and the atmosphere in clubs frequented by the one as opposed to the other group.

XVIII-4. *Personality.* In assaying the direction, capacity for action, and receptivity to media of the military leadership, it is often useful to make some determination of the extent of intellectualism, activism or bureaucratic habits among the military leaders. These distinctions have to do with the modes of reacting to outside information and of carrying out attitudes.

XVIII-5. *Military values.* Though the model military leader is one who is directed at external targets with the aim of overpowering them through force, other values frequently prevail among the military and assist or conflict with the primary goal. In the first place, there may be internal targets as well as external ones, and the internal ones may prove to be more important to them than the external. Many armies and other armed forces have been more concerned with overcoming internal elite opposition to their power than in facing towards an external target. In the realm of values, the acquisition of wealth can be a very strong motive of those who employ force for a living. For instance, in past years, many Chinese warlords and provincial governors rose from poverty to become rich and powerful semi-independent rulers. Wealth has been a primary motive in their lives; one authority writes, "Almost without exception, warlords rose to

fame from obscure beginnings, gained jurisdiction over a large territory, put money into their own pockets which should have gone to the government." If such a situation has changed in China, the typical personality of the new military elite gives the propagandist a different target than the old.

Yet another value frequently encountered among the military elite is security. At times military elites have opposed any constructive behavior that would have brought changes to the tables or organization or their standard operating procedures. Prestige and pleasure, following a reverence for tradition and for the social life of the armed forces, have been other important motives to characterize certain military elites or important portions thereof. Hunt clubs, and other sports, gambling, travel and generally high living, have been the motives for many military leaders of the past. Therefore, whether military is directed at internal or external targets, and what the values are that predominate among them, constitute important data for the propaganda operator.

XVIII-6. *Militarization of the community.* With an increased expectation of civil or foreign conflict, the elite tends to militarize those functions of society that have hitherto been considered irrelevant to power. Educational, economic, religious, scientific and business spheres become politicized governments are increasingly mobilized to face expected internal or external threats; the military begins to infiltrate into an ever increasing number of positions hitherto considered entirely civil. Soon one may, by examining laws, ordinances and appointments, determine whether a functional expansion of the military skill is occurring.

XVIII-7. *Cohesion with other elite groups.* Societies have widely differing interrelationships between the military and other functional and general social components. In some cases the military elite is intimately connected with other elite elements by almost all indices of social cohesion and intellectual agreement. In other societies the military is isolated - by training, by background, by

function, by social class, by dress, and in social life generally. Against, some military elements are quite divorced from the mass, whereas in others they are the most democratic in the sense of being typical of the mass of the society as opposed to the rest of the elite. Reference here is made to the analysis paragraphs under Sections 12 (Single and Plural Elites) and 17 (Bureaucracy for the appropriate indicators of elite cohesion with military).

XVIII-8. *Police Elements.* The organizational forms, powers and relationships between the police and the elite and military forces are numerous. In totalitarian states or states approaching that condition in theory, if not in practice, the police are sharply distinguishable from the military by the hostility which all elite elements as well as the mass commonly feel towards them. In contrast, the elites of other societies feel confident of commanding the loyalty and obedience of the police. To be distinguished are locally commanded as against centrally directed police; secret police as opposed to non-uniformed police under strict supervision of formal institutional organs; police who operate according to the rule of law or arbitrary police who have a special code, either formal or informal that they follow.

Even where the police are controlled by law, are treated as equal to other citizens, operate mostly in uniform and under public record, are localistic, and are recruited by tests that do not emphasize ruthlessness, they will still have worked in human relations, as a matter of course, and are recruited by tests that do not emphasize ruthlessness, they will still have worked in human relation, as a matter of course, and are in a position to be opinion leaders or, at least, symbol conveyors. Though frequently thought not to have political opinions, most do possess them, and apart from obvious precautions about antagonizing others of different views. They carry on a great deal of face-to-face contact in which opinions are exchanged with people of differing statuses and ways of life. As a special group, even a peaceful and law-abiding police force cannot be neglected as a vehicle and target for propaganda. As one goes to the other extreme, the secret police proceeding by arbitrary methods, the operator encounters, of course,

not only concealed targets that he cannot spot, but also minds that are closed to messages that might influence others among his people. Pseudo-scientific periodical journalism and messages emphasizing the image of the operator's sponsor as a powerful entity are two of the few modes of access to that type of police mind. Despite its forbidding aspect, it should not be ignored as a target of propaganda, for such a police force is a constant terrorizing influence over others who receive the operator's messages. Any caution or lethargy that may be introduced into its behavior by terroristic propaganda aids the larger targets' possibility of exposure.

PART C

SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS

XIX

RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS

Most national states retain a religious elite today, though in many the power of religion and of its elite has been seriously undermined. One can expect to find the religious elite in one or three roles in relationship to power: (1) the top elite, as in a theocracy or as in a nominally secular state dominated by religious institutions; (2) members of the top elite sharing power with other influentials with different institutional bases; (3) in a subsidiary role, either because of effective separation of church or state, effective domination of religious institutions by state and other institutions, or because of the fractionating of religious institutions into many small groups.

ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS ELITES

XIX-1. *Internal structures.* The authoritarian nature of most large religious groups is often reflected in their power structure, which makes the identification of their elite a relatively simple task. As Lasswell observed: "There are one Pope,

55 cardinals, 22 apostolic delegate, 256 vicars apostolic, 245 archbishops, 1, 578 bishops." The discovery of the Catholic elite is not quite as simple as getting the names of these 2,157 persons, but much of the job would have been done at that point.

It almost goes without saying that a religious movement which is not hierarchical will rarely produce an elite which is within shouting distance of the top power structure. The informal, non-institutionalized religions of the world have demonstrated this. Religious movements which have eschewed institutionalization have attained power for their leaders, but have generally disappeared after relatively brief periods of prominence. The temporary power of a revival leader in an American community provides an example of this.

But the hierarchical arrangement of a religious institution does not necessarily tell the full story of its elite. It may be necessary to observe the specialized subsidiary organizations within the institution, which can have special powers. It may also be necessary to observe lay organizations outside the main structure which nevertheless provide some of the elite of the total church organization. And it may be necessary to examine organizations which appear to be divorced from the church, but which in reality are quite close by reason of duplication of memberships, commonality of goals, and close relationships between the hierarchical elite and the subsidiary organization elite. Thus the example of the Catholic church just cited is not complete until one has examined the special orders within the church (as the Jesuits), the lay groups identified directly (as the Knights of Columbus), and the groups predominantly of Catholic membership (as the various Catholic political parties of several European states). The top elite of the total Catholic church may well include representatives of several of these subsidiary and allied organizations, and may well omit some of the 2,157 who are in the official pyramid.

XIX-2. *Localism of structural components.* If one is searching for the religious elite in a particular community, he may find quite different combinations of the

several factors important in the national or international hierarchy. Thus a dominant local order may overshadow lay groups or the lack of influential representatives of the hierarchy may mean that religious party officials are the dominant members of local religious elite; or the special abilities of an individual priest or minister may project him into the elite. If the local pattern is quite different from that of the national-international pattern, the overall power potential of the religious elite may be weakened. Usually such differences relate to a lack of control by the central elite over its local parts. In any event, conflicts of this type will often have a divisive effect, analogous to that introduced into the bureaucracy by arguments over centralization versus decentralization (See XVII-1).

XIX-3. *Competing sects.* Another factor which will influence the constitution of a religious elite, even though there may be a well defined hierarchy, is the presence of competing factions or sects. The Mohammedan church is divided into sects of this nature. As a result the composition of the religious elite of a given Mohammedan state or region reflects the predominance of one or another. (The Shiites of Lebanon, of example, are by far the dominant Muslims of he country.) Depending upon circumstances and local conditions it may well be that the operator finds himself faced with the problem of dealing with a single sect, or a dominant order, or a religious political party as the base of the local religious elite. His analysis then must shift from the total group (and from its hierarchy) to the part of the group important in the target.

As has been remarked about other special elites, when they are the dominant influential group the operator will have no special problems in locating them. It is when a special elite shares power or is in a subsidiary role that the problem of determining its relationship and degree of power becomes more difficult. Thus, in considering the second role of a religious elite, that of sharing power with influentials representing other institutions, special problems do arise.

XIX-4. *Formal status of church-state relations.* The sphere of influence of the secular elite in comparison with that of a religious elite has been a continuing source of conflict for many centuries.. In the main, this has been resolved by the domination of the religious elite or the limitation of its sphere of influence to minor matters. However, in many areas, this conflict continues. Thus the status of any given religious elite can often be determined by examining the current status and background of this conflict in the target area. What is the status of religion in the target? Is it a state religion? Does it have a monopoly position? Are minority groups tolerated? Was the religion the dominant force in the community in the past? How severe was the power conflict in which secular authorities asserted their predominance? Are church-state relations formalized in law? Or are they governed by unwritten custom? Do religious leaders take a direct part in government, or do they stay within the framework of their religious institutions?

XIX-5. *Discovering government's position on communism versus religion.* The atheistic doctrine of international communism, though considerably tempered in recent years, remains a central problem to religious elites. Thus the policy of government towards communism may provide indices of the proximity of religious leaders to power. Is the government, even though secular, effectively Christian or Mohammedan in its outlook? Do religious rituals have a part in government activities? Are there political parties which are independent of the church, but possessed of similar goals and linked by various informal means? In postwar Europe there are several Christian political parties, which have arisen largely because of the concern of religious elites over the atheistic characteristics of communism and its direct attack upon religious institutions.

XIX-6. *Participation of church groups in non-religious activities.* The strength of a religious elite is often shown by the extent of the non-religious activities in which it engages. If the religious institution controls the education of an area it

will have more power than if it is restricted to matters more directly spiritual. If the church owns property, operates industry, and publishes newspapers and magazines, it will usually be more involved in the decision-making process than if it does not engage in such temporal activities. The power of Catholic elites has often been directly related to the wealth of the church or of its orders.

XIX-7 *Relations between non-church elites and religious elites.* Even though power has been "secularized" in an area considerable influence may remain with church elite because of their relations with the top influentials. Study of the top influentials and their religious connections will often provide clues. Table 5 presents materials from Lebanon to illustrate such connections.

TABLE 5

REPRESENTATION OF RELIGIOUS-SOCIAL GROUPING IN LEBANON

(in percentages)

I. In political Assemblies, 1841-1943

	1841	1861					
	Council of the Emirate	Administrative	Council 1864	Lebanese Assembly of 1937	Lebanes Assembly of 1943	Number of electors registered in 1937	% of total
Maronites	7	5	10	33	45	40	100
Greek Orthodox	7	13	13	27	40	15	100
Greek Catholics	10	20	10	30	30	10	100
Armenians	-	-	-	33	67	3	100

Sunnites	4	8	4	38	46	24	100
Chiites	5	9	5	36	45	22	100
Druzes	20	13	20	20	27	15	100
Other sects	-	-	-	50	50	2	100
TOTAL	8	9	9	32	42	131	100

II. In 24 cabinets. 1926 - 1945 of 3 or more ministers, including the Prime Minister*

	Total	Maronites	Gr. Cath.	Gr. Orth.	Rom. Cath.	Protestants	Sunites	Chiites	Druzes
No of cabinet ministers	134	36	12	20	4	3	26	21	12
Percent from each religious group	100	27	9	15	3	2	19	16	9

III. In the high bureaucracy, April 1946

	Total	Maronites	Gr. Cath.	Gr. Orth.	Rom. Cath.	Protestants	Sunnites	Chiites	Druzes
Director-Generals & Heads of Service	15	40	-	20	-	-	33	-	7
District Administrators	5	20	20	20	-	-	20	-	20
High Ranking Magistrates	3	67	-	-	-	-	33	-	-

High Ranking Diplomats	11	46	-	18	-	-	27	9	-
Grand Total	34	41	3	18	-	-	29	3	6
Percentage	100								

In the U.S., though religious elites have relatively little power because of the proliferation of sects, it has been observed in many communities that top influentials are more often members of the Episcopalian or congregational denominations. The professional elite of these denominations, in turn, are much more likely to be members of the top power group of the community than are minister of other faiths.

The history of the Jesuit order provides a multitude of examples of how a religious elite influenced and directed top temporal influentials. Members of this order assiduously associated with the elite of many European states in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Jesuits became confessors and advisors to princes, they created schools for the sons of the elite, and they exercised such a profound influence that eventually they were disbanded for a long period because of protests by temporal powers to the Pope.

XIX-8. *Attention to issues with a moral or religious facet.* When a community is torn by a moral issue, the identity and power of the religious elite will come to the fore. In American cities, the perennial issue of gambling, or of prohibition, unites the religious elite and shows both its strength and weakness. Whenever such an issue becomes prominent in a target, the operator will have an opportunity to re-evaluate information already assembled on the religious elite.

XIX-9. *Religious ceremonies and rituals.* The hierarchical nature of religious institutions is often publicly demonstrated at the time of important ritual or ceremony. In addition, the participation or lack of it among other elite members and the ranking of non-church personnel in such a ceremony will tell something about the power status of other sections of the elite.

XIX-10. *Popular acceptance or rejection of religion.* The overall place of religion in a community, as demonstrated by such things as attendance at regular church services, the mere number of churches, the presence of shrines and the worship at them can give the operator a general notion about the power of the religious elite.

XIX-11. *Training of religious elite.* Much can be discovered about the religious elite by studying the training top church influentials have received. Is it concentrated upon dogma and ritual. Or is it a training involving considerable concern with secular matters? Is the elite practical and flexible or is it self-contained and inflexible? Is it aware of what's going on in the world or in the rest of its nation or community? Are members of the religious elite schooled to renounce power? Or does their training direct them to seek it actively? Within the Catholic church there are orders that suggest the extremes of this continuum from the non-speaking Trappists to the articulate, politically minded Jesuits. Do religious schools and universities emphasize the introverted, contemplative ideal, or do they use the extroverted, active social leader as a model? The personality of the presently ruling head of the hierarchy may be a clue: his virtues and his approach to problems may represent the emphasis of his past training and may direct current training toward creating a new sub-elite in his image.

XIX-12. *Recruitment of church personnel.* The characteristics of a religion,

and by extension, of its elite, may be inferred from study of the source of its ministers, pastors or priests. Do they reflect the social composition of the broad congregation of the particular church? Or are leaders drawn from a narrower or different base? What is the rate of infusion of new clergy? Is the recruitment process slow and deliberate, or is there opportunity for a religious influential to move up rapidly? Are positions within the clergy sought after? Or is the church faced with a lack of recruits. Is the church elite essentially a combination of many local elites because of recruitment practices? Or is it a national or international organization, drawing its personnel from a broad geographical base and assigning them to duty in accordance with hierarchical needs, rather than in accordance with local interests?

Answers to questions such as these will show whether the church elite is likely to be specially compatible with other institutional elites, whether it is ascending or descending in prestige and possibly in power, and whether it is integrated within its nation or region or has international characteristics that sometimes increase its power or sometimes decrease it, depending upon the changing dispositions of the remainder of the elite.

PART C

SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS

XX

RURAL ELEMENTS

The rural elements of a population or elite consist of people to whom agricultural, nomadic, pastoral, lumbering or related and dependent pursuits are the important ones, and who live in small towns or open country. The capital of a country whose population is heavily rural will, of course, reflect strongly the rural interests, but it is considered the center of a more general elite. Here the focus rests upon the special conditions of rural leadership.

A common empirical error is the belief that rural elements are the same the world over. On the contrary, there are large numbers of rural functions, rural social systems, and hence rural elites. For instance, the industrial, transportation, and agricultural revolutions have struck the rural areas of the world with varying impacts. In many regions - most of the U.S.A., parts of the U.S.S.R., Denmark, to name three - the rural population has become urbanized by universal education, rapid communication, travel to and from cities, the decentralization of industry, universal military service and other widespread modern conditions. In others - China, Siam, India, and parts of many other places - rural life has changed little over the last millennium. In addition, in these and other areas, urbanized rural life lives along side the original country society, producing two different modes of life, each with different goals, methods, and political attitudes. The analysis of rural leadership must take into account these numerous differences.

Scarcely any universal trait of rural leadership may be cited. Conservatism, for example, which is supposed to characterize the rural mind, is often not true of particular areas, or at least requires such a stretching of the term as to make it useless. The Iranian large landlord is not conservative in the same way as the American midwest farmer, and so on through many similar comparisons. The same holds for other presumed universal traits, such as "respect for authority," "stability," "superstition," "isolation from human contact," or "high patriotism." They may or may not exist in high degree in given localities. What is true of popular attitudes pertains also to rural leadership. Generalities are easy to make but misleading. Better to engage in some kind of social analysis - no matter how rudimentary - before judging the prevalence of attitudes and behavior. Some of the elements of such an analysis are contained in the paragraphs to follow.

ANALYSIS OF RURAL ELITES

XX-1. *Hereditary connections of the rural elite.* Hereditary elites springing from urban societies are rare. The aristocracy of the Venetian Republic was an exception to the general course of development by which a rural society- through conquest or systems of land-holding - generates a class with hereditary privileges. The most abundant provider of nobility is a feudal system, such as most of Europe possessed in medieval and earlier modern times. A hereditary monarchy itself does not *ipso facto* signify a nobility extending beyond the monarch's immediate family or person. Manchu China, with its emperor and his bureaucracy exemplifies this condition.

Also, titles of hereditary nobility nowadays do not necessarily signify present or former land-holding. In some countries, part of the nobility retains its titles without owning land; it is urbanized and its members may be found in the

professions, business or other pursuits. In other cases, titles are granted for exploits or aid to the ruler and land ownership may occur subsequently.

Titles are equivalent to a guaranteed prestige "income," land ownership to economic income; together they form an imposing combination for gaining power. Large-scale land ownership with title of nobility everywhere is coupled with large powers in the local government and some important actual or potential contribution to the central government. The age of the combination a man possesses and the grandeur of both title and holdings suggest the potential power that may be ascribed to the position of the incumbent, but may not at all indicate his actual power role in the society.

XX-2. *Composition of rural elements.* The rural population is not composed wholly of farmers, and some knowledge of the occupational composition of rural areas is essential. Rural power centers are small towns and trading centers shading into larger provincial cities. Inhabitants of open country are unlikely to be politically active or generally influential. In the town, one encounters the doctor, lawyer or "fixer," priest, money-lender, land agent, artisan, vendor, and laborer. Rural power is often concentrated in the hands of a combination of occupations with "dirt farmers" constituting a modest percentage of the total. For instance, a survey of the economic status and occupations of the leaders of a "radical" Saskatchewan rural movement (The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation) revealed the figures.

TABLE 6

A.

ECONOMIC STATUS OF DELEGATES TO C.C.F. CONVENTIONS AND OF DELEGATES TO TWO COOPERTIVE CONVENTIONS WHO ARE C.C.F. SUPPPORTERS COMPARED

WITH TOTAL

	Saskatchewan 1941 Total Population	C.C.F. Delegates	Cooperative Delegates
Size of farm (acres)	433.2	673.7	689.4
Value of farm	6,435.7	12,983.4	14,189.9

Another example may be adduced from a study of AAA crop control elections in selected southern countries, where it was observed over a period of years that the administration of this "grass roots" opinion apparatus was predominantly managed by local bankers, lawyers, and others of an education and economic status considerably above that of the farmers themselves.

B.

OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF TOWN-DWELLING C.C.F. LEADERS

	Convention Delegates	Constituency Executives	Prov. Council & Constituency Presidents	Total
Workers	45.9	63.6	52.2	50.0
Buisness and Professionals	43.4	24.7	38.1	34.3
Teachers	11.2	11.7	9.6	11.3

*From Seymour Lipset, *Agrarian Socialism*, 1950

Generalizations about the character of leadership in villages and country of a

nation are not difficult. Ordinarily, the power structure of a given local unit is easily observed or learned. It is much more difficult to determine how much the power of a local ruling group extends outward, and also whether the local elite found in one village will be replicated everywhere in the nation. In respect to the first point, a big fish in a small pond may never find himself in the large pond. Here the observer can rely both upon direct field investigations or on deductions from what is known generally about the society in determining by all indicators of contact and relationship, whether the local leaders belong usually to larger leadership groups, as when they are heads of farmers' associations or members of parliament.

On the question whether the local elite is the same in all localities, one need not be above randomly sampling the rural settlements of a society, and ascertaining the political structure of each type in the whole. In Italy, for example, one encounters several varieties of general rural political-social structures - large landholders; independent commercial farmers; subsistence farming; etc. Each reflects itself in a different kind of elite. The proportion each plays in the whole of Italy is indicated by the sampling results. One would not achieve the same picture by looking solely at the governmental structure, which, like that of France, is uniform throughout the nation.

The same mode of sampling is useful, also in obtaining a notion of the range of variation throughout the land among villages of the same general type.

XX-3. *Family role in rural centers.* Frequently, in the small rural centers, the power of individual families is considerable. There are many more "family towns" in the world than there are "company towns." It is well to inquire how primitive is the agriculture and how old the cultivation of an area, for a recent nomadic history and a low level of agricultural development are frequently associated with a form of rule by extended families, clans, or tribes.

XX-4. *Class structure in rural centers.* Overlapping with hereditary or familial organizations where they exist, and existing independently in any event, will be found a class structure of varying extent and intensity. The Chinese village system is founded, for example, upon a basic division into two classes of peasantry and gentry, with outside traders, officials and freebooters entering into the village as foreign but powerful interlopers. The elders of the principal gentry families are the ruling group for local policies and treat with the outsider on matters that involve the *hsien* or village with the outside world.

But this is only one of many possible rural class structures. American surveys show more complicated, indeterminate and multiple class tendencies. A study of a rural central New York community revealed eleven distinct levels of prestige among the population of 1235 persons. The rating of the people were made by a panel of 14 community members. More or less levels could have been formed and used to analyze the population, just as, in the Chinese case cited, the gentry and peasantry might be further subdivided on the basis of additional criteria regarding ownership, wealth, office-holding etc.. The Sixth Congress of the Chinese Comintern reminded communist strategists of the presence of a hierarchy of many stages, consisting of "landlords and sublandlords as parasitic intermediate links between the laboring cultivator and the big landowner or the state." It further declared that "the peasant...no longer represent a homogeneous mass. In the villages of China and India ... it is already possible to find exploiting elements derived from the peasantry who exploit the peasants and village laborers through usury, trade, employment of hired labor, the sale or leasing of land..." The operator should not feel some absolute number of classes necessarily exists. A rural caste system is likely to be very tight between castes, but otherwise the important question to answer is how people stand or relation to one another and in relation to the outside world, with respect to the criteria of prestige and wealth in order to ascertain their appropriateness and vulnerability to the message. The adjoining diagram, Figure 8, gives a picture of one kind of structure generalized for several Balkan countries before World War II.

XX-5. *Seeking typical agrarian conflicts.* Among the distinctions found in rural societies are several that have been associated often with agrarian discontent and revolt. They are: the small proprietor versus the large proprietor; tenants versus landlords (including tenants versus absentee landlords, as in the ancient Roman latifundia, old Ireland and France in the *ancien regime* hired laborers versus owners of estates; tariff and pricing policies of the government; landowners versus money-lenders.

XX-6. *The methods of the rural elite.* Rural elites have been and are frequently skilled in the use of violence, and weak in the use of bargaining and propaganda. Mosca writes: "In savage or barbarous counties where economic production is very rudimentary, all adult males are soldiers in the rather frequent event of war...One factor favorable to the permanence of such a state of affairs is the existence of very small political organisms - a *de facto* autonomy on the part of each little tribe or village, which can make war a daily routine and thefts and reprisals between neighbors unending." Contrasting with this is the tendency towards bureaucratic centralism that results in heavy recruitment of soldiers from the country, leaving no military power in the villages, as has been the case in China and India for many centuries. The soldiers may return, but as conquerors. There are within this latter framework ample opportunities for skills in bargaining to make their way - as with the moneylenders or bankers, the officials, and the warriors who seek to exploit the local community.

There is also room in the same structure, as it is found in the new decreasing but still vast colonial world of the Orient and Africa, for a new kind of market economy - with its own elite of brokers, carriers, storers, dealers and scientific planters and agents overlaying and adjoining the traditional economy and elite. The imposition or development of a popular representative government or communist revolution introduces the instrument of propaganda into the everyday politics of such rural areas. It is in this sense that the fertile territory for communism is *ipso facto* the fertile territory for capitalistic democratic agitation as well. The two propagandas do not demand different breeding grounds. The

success of communism among the agrarian "masses" (a false term, since the peasant mass is differentiated by political skills into leaders and followers) is not the "natural success" of agrarian revolution. It has been success by default, because capitalistic democracy has had more lucrative fields to develop than illiterate, oppressed and impoverished areas provide, and has not "gotten around to them."

XX-7. Occupation of rural elite. Although the existing occupational structure of the rural elite is easy to obtain or observe, the potential sources of the elite are more difficult to discover. Leadership in stable times is often reflected in the existing occupational structure, for example, the local lawyer, banker, miller, and large land-holders. In the Western rural community rural leadership in troubled times comes from sources less predictable than urban leadership. One fact has to do with the quality of the discontent - is it revolutionary or simply rebellious?

Where a revolution is building up, one may find in rural areas an ideological leadership emerging from students, teachers, or priests, as in England during the early seventeenth century, and most of the Orient today. Morris Watnick writes of the latter regions (1951), "whatever it may be that we are facing in southeast Asia today, it certainly does not resemble the classic uprisings of peasant jacquerie, but a highly organized and well-integrated movement, with a leadership that has transcended the immediate urgencies of its mass following and can plan ahead...That leadership is supplied by the new indigenous intelligentsia." Maps of the type of Figures 9a and 9b (from North,*op. cit.*) can help plot the similar or distinctive sectional and rural origins of opposed elites.

Sometimes the leaders of rural movements are not even located in rural areas, though they must, of course, have entree the rural elite. Thus were the physiocrats of eighteenth century France, the northern manufacturers of pre-civil war United States (leading the mid-western farmers) and the many nationalist leaders who have sought tariffs to protect the "virtues" of ruralism and autarchy to prepare for

war.

Non-ideological agrarian rebellions that lack persistent leadership and long-term orientations are led frequently by men who come from "nowhere." Writes Mosca:

"The initial leaders of rural *insurrection* are usually but little superior to the peasants themselves in education and social status. The famous Spanish *cabecilla* Mina was a muleteer. In Naples in 1899, Rodio was a country lawyer. Pronio and Mammone had once been farm laborers, and Nunziante, at best, had been a sergeant in the army. Andreas Hofer, who led the Turolese revolt in 1809, was a well to-do tavern keeper. The initial moves in the Vendean insurrection were led by Cathelineau, a hack driver, and Stofflet, a game watchman."

XX-8. *Formal versus informal organization of rural elites.* The stereotype of the rural elite is of an informal association or network. Often it is thought to be an unconscious combining of powers. In reality, rural elite networks vary from the highly informal to the highly formal, with a great amount of overlapping among both kinds, as is true of all elite elements and the character of men's affiliations generally. Writing of the Chinese gentry, Haias-Tung Fei says : "A big house is an empire by itself. The members, like subjects, live under the rules and whim of the patriarch...By such a string kinship organization, the political power of the house in the logger community is secured. The members, even the servants, of the house enter the power structure of the nation with facility." This picture contrasts sharply with the situation in Denmark, for example, where an elaborate formal system of agricultural cooperatives holds political power and dominates the government for the benefit farm interests. Perhaps somewhere in between would fall French rural society, where less politically powerful syndicates of farm producers act formally in politics, where a strong family structure exists, and where the rural elite is complicated by the presence of priests, school teachers paid by the central government, elected and appointed officials, the remnants of aristocracy, doctors, lawyers, traders, and money-lenders.

Agrarian political parties are common in many countries but rarely hold power.

They arise from the changes referred to earlier and tend to disappear into communist or fascist movements or the bolster over a period of time religious and centrist parties. Rarely have the leaders of an agrarian movement been able to establish permanent rule, even in a highly rural country, and to subject decisively to their power the financial and large land-holding interests they were directed against.

XX-9. *Rural office-holding.* The constitutional structure of a state will give clues to the presence and power of rural elements. Federalism, for example, decentralizes power along territorial lines and promoted the achievement of power by land-vested interests. Many of the American countries, including the United States, show such a strong formal encouragement of rural elements and interests. Limiting recruitment of the elite by territorial apportionment accomplishes this, whether called federalism or by another name. Filling quotas of the bureaucracy or military commissions by districts would be examples. So would laws that candidates for parliament must reside in the districts from which they hope to be elected. Moreover, one should examine the representation accorded to rural interests in qualifying candidates for offices in private rule-making bodies such as conservation commissions, dairy control boards, grain exchange regulatory boards, and the like.

XX-10. *Rural influences on other elite elements.* A large part of any population that is *not rural* has rural origins. Rural origins only have lingering effects on thought and behavior but where found in concentrated form, rural background is an important determinant of rural behavior. Certain important vulnerabilities, such as the preference for psychological as against forcible conversion of the opposition, may thus be made manifest and explained. Divisive propaganda may fail because the general elite has strong rural ties. A large part of the church or military leadership may spring from rural origins, isolating them to an important extent in kin, idea, morals and behavior from other "cosmopolitan" portions of the

general elite. An inquiry into the general elite's background should determine the extent of recent ruralism within it.

PART C

SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS

XXI

LABOR ELEMENTS

Labor elements in the elite are a comparatively recent phenomenon. Seventy-five years ago a discussion of influential groups around the world would probably not mention labor or its leaders. Even today in some nations the same holds true. Nevertheless, in an increasing number of states the influentials of labor form part of the total power structure for this new power base is strong enough to push its leaders into the top elite group. In some states, in fact, the power structure has been dominated by labor leaders; in some they have shared power with other elements; in many more, labor influentials remain peripheral to the main power structure, but are actively seeking places in the top elite.

It is impossible to discuss this new element in the elite without giving consideration to the Marxist doctrines which have been so intertwined with its rise to real or peripheral power. In a sense, the labor element in the elite does represent the growing self-awareness of a kind of world "proletariat." At the same time, in many instances the growth of labor movements and of power for their leaders has been contrary to Marxist theory. One need only cite the American labor movement as an outstanding case in point. Essentially devoted to the domestic *status quo* the movement has come to power within the existing framework and would be destroyed if the present power structure were torn down. A labor movement more in line with the Marxist doctrine is that of

England and the British Commonwealth nations, which operates within an existing framework, but is not as devoted to the *status quo* and (when in power) makes large scale changes. Even though such changes are drastic, the British kind of trade unionism is far from the communist variety (as exemplified in part by the French and Italian communist-dominated unions) which operate in keeping with revolutionary Bolshevik doctrine and which seek to destroy the present power structure in its entirety.

To the degree that the latter kind of unionism produces elite individuals, they are best thought of as pure political elements. The choice may seem somewhat arbitrary, but it is necessary if one is to evaluate this elite correctly. It might be stated in this manner: the communist labor influential is not really a labor leader but a politician or revolutionary; the socialist labor influential is a real mixture of labor and political leader; the American or capitalistic labor influential is typically a labor leader. To a degree, this analysis can be carried over to the organizations which would be directed by influentials of the three types. The communists unions are perhaps best thought of as political or revolutionary groups the socialist unions are mixed groups, while the capitalistic unions are essentially non-political.

ANALYSIS OF LABOR ELITES

XXI-1. *Isolation of labor influentials.* There are many points of entry for the search for labor influentials but all should take into consideration that they are somewhat isolated from the main power structure in most cases. Being a new element and representing at least a partial challenge to the power of older elements, they remain "on the outside." And even when they are members of the elite power group, they generally continue to be at least partially isolated, or - if they attain control of the power structure - they tend to isolate other elements.

This condition is probably more marked in the earlier stages of the coming to power of labor groups than in the latter. Both the American and the British experience suggest that as labor organizations mature within a social structure the degree of isolation is reduced.

XXI-2. *Legal status of unions.* The isolation of labor influentials and their organizations is often pointed up by actual legislation which may have been passed in an effort to minimize their power or to keep them isolated. In some areas of the world an effective union remains illegal; in others there are many measures available to the elite to restrain and restrict the power of the labor influential. A check of the laws of the area, of the course of action in the courts involving a labor dispute, of the penalties imposed for actions which are taken by labor groups will reveal much about the status of labor influentials and their relationships to the power structure.

XXI-3. *Limited sphere of influence.* The isolation of labor influentials means that they will be more often individuals with a single role. In terms of the graphic model of the power structure discussed in Section IX, they are members of only one power pyramid and they are often excluded from the informal elite groups which tie other influentials together. This works both to the advantage and to the disadvantage of the operator. It will be easier to locate the isolated labor influential, but he often becomes a less important target.

When there is a duplication of roles, the most common will be that of politician-labor leader, as has already been noted. In postwar Europe, there have been set up a number of labor groups which had religious bases, suggesting that here might be a case of religious-labor role duplication. The Christian-Democratic parties of Western Europe aim at a junction of two special elite elements, one of which - the religious - lacks secular momentum in modern times, the other religious - lacks secular momentum in modern times, the other of which - labor - tends to be

socially isolated and there revolutionary. There may also occur a farmer-labor role duplication. In the main, however, the labor leader will be rather restricted in his influence in the community to affairs relating to labor matters, unless the community is dominated by labor groups.

XXI-4. *Background of labor influentials.* One factor enforcing the isolation and limitation of the power of labor influentials is their socio-economic background. Many come from the working class itself. Others may be drawn from the middle classes or from the intelligentsia, but the disparity of background is the one case and the "abandonment" of background in the other, make it more difficult for the labor influentials to be members of a stable top elite. In locating labor influentials however, the operator cannot safely assume that they will have a single background pattern. The various labor movements of the world have taken leadership where they could find it. Some labor leaders are best thought of as "accidental" influentials holding their positions by mere circumstances. The rapid change and the relative youth of labor movements also has produced a mixed background. In the U.S. it has been shown that AFL leaders are more likely to be of a working class background, of lower education and of direct experience in the working group they represent than CIO leaders. At best, this is a very broad indicator which may give some useful hints, but which cannot be relied upon in locating the elite of a particular movement, union or local.

XXI-5. *Hierarchical nature of labor organizations.* Except in their very earliest years, most labor unions show marked hierarchical tendencies. The union organization may begin as an association of voluntary members sharing duties informally, but since it must operate much like a military organization (or like a religious group) powers are delegated and once delegated are consolidated. The organization of the union from the shop unit (or department unit within a large plant) to the local, to the national, or international, creates a pattern of officialdom which tends to become fixed and old in office.

All of this organization tends to help the operator in locating the influentials. By concentrating upon getting lists of formal office-holders he may often find that he has all of the influentials of the union. The usual alertness for informal power wielders should be maintained, of course, for there are informal groups and invisible power wielders within unions as in all other institutions.

Sometimes, power tends to be consolidated in the hands of the secretariat of the organization, with the elective officer structure being reduced to a ceremonial group. When a secretariat has been in office for a long period, it may exhibit all of the tendencies which were discussed above in Section XVII. However, the liaison between officers and bureaucracy of a labor union is usually good, and considerable cohesion can be expected, since neither can go very far outside. Often there is no need to think of them as separate entities at all.

XXI-6. *Industrial base of labor movement.* The significance of a labor movement and the power of its leadership are usually affected by the kind of industrial base upon which it operates. In areas which are not industrialized, working class groups are not large and the possibility of a labor movement of size or power is lacking. In determining the situation in a given target area, the operator can gain clues by checking the percentages of persons engaged in industrial work as against agricultural work. The presence or absence, and indicators of size such as production or employment, of basic industries like steel, coal and railroads, together with the presence or absence, and size of labor organizations in such fields, will evidence the power of labor influentials.

XXI-7. *Craft unionism versus industrial unionism.* If labor organizations, whatever their industrial base, are mainly craft union (i.e. workers are associated with others doing the same kind of work no matter in which industry they are employed) they will generally have less total power and tend to local power; their leaders will be farther from the top elite. If, on the other hand, the union

organization is accomplished on an industrial basis (i.e. all workers of an industry are associated despite differences in skills or jobs) the movement will be potentially more powerful and so will the leaders.

The first indication of the craft or industrial base of labor organization in an area is provided by the names of labor organizations themselves. If they are mainly in terms descriptive of skills, the movement will be of the craft type; if in terms of broad areas, it will be of the industrial type. In some cases, industrial unionism has been grafted upon a historical base of craft unionism, which will preserve the old names even though the newer system is being used. The nature of the collective bargaining will usually reveal the actual status. Here, too, is an aid to the operator: industry-wide bargaining is much more visible than craft or local area bargaining. It will produce tensions which will bring top elite into negotiations and will make the location of labor influentials an easier job.

XXI-8. *Fragmentation of labor movements.* It has been noted that labor leaders are frequently isolated from other influentials. In addition, they are often isolated from each other. Differences in approach to union organization political differences, the tendency to build large scale organizations on a basis of federation, all help to build many small pyramids of power rather than a single large one. The craft-industrial dimension just discussed has divided American labor leaders into two basic camps for nearly twenty years. And the loose nature of the ties of federation has often meant that a single large union finds it possible to "go it alone," particularly if its leaders disagree with the policies of the remaining labor elite. The split of labor influentials into many different camps can cause the operator much trouble in determining who are influential and to what degree they hold power.

XXI-9. *Political schisms.* The involvement of the labor movement in political affairs has produced many additional divisions. Outstanding, of course, is the

division of labor in many nations into rival groups which are pro-communist and anti communist. The labor movement of France, for example, has been torn for decades by the struggles between communists, socialists, Christian elements and others for control. At present there exists the *Confederation Generale du Travail* (Communist-dominated) and the *Force Ouvriere* (anti-Communist).

This political splitting extends to the large international organizations. Some are involved in current power conflict; others have split into rival groups. The creation of the International Federation of Journalists in 1952 was the result of such a conflict in an international group related to a particular skill. The split also exists at the level of general world labor organization, there being a World Federation of Trade Unions (communist-dominated) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (anti-communist).

The place of a given labor influential in the local power structure can sometimes be discovered by noting whether his union is affiliated with the one or the other group of this type. However, the degree of communist domination of such organizations has varied, and one should not be too categorical about organizations or the influentials associated with them.

XXI-10. *Pseudo-union organizations.* In many parts of the World, organizations have been formed in the guise of unions. At two opposite extremes are the "trade unions" of Soviet Russia and the "company unions" sponsored by the management of a company for its employees. In neither case will the leader of the "union" have power by virtue of his "labor leadership". Rather, he will have power as a member of the political elite in one instance or of the business elite in the other. If the operator were looking for local labor influentials, for example, to get them into contact with a group of visiting American labor leaders, he would accomplish little with either group of his list represented such pseudo-labor organizations. Further, any approach to such influentials on the basis of their "labor" reference group, would almost certainly fail, since their dominant associations are actually with another kind of group.

The influential identified in America as the labor "racketeer" is of a similar stripe. He may also be thought of as more properly a member of another power pyramid, that pertaining to politics, or business, or possibly crime.

XXI-11. *Visibility of influentials at time of strike.* The prime purpose of a union is to make possible the use of the economic strength of the total group through a strike. When a strike does take place, the influentials of the union are called upon to play a more active role *vis a vis* the membership. They demonstrate their solidarity with the "rank and file" by such acts as participating in picketing, donation of funds and other deeds which make them more visible to the union membership (and to the operator). If the strike action depends in any degree upon public opinion, the union influentials also may become visible through the issuance of statements, speeches on the radio and other acts.

To a degree, they will also be visible during the period approaching a strike, on the other hand, during a relatively peaceful negotiation, the union influentials (as well as business influentials) may be difficult to observe. Both sides will be seeking to keep knowledge of their strategy and tactics hidden.

XXI-12 *Visibility of influentials at conventions.* The labor convention offers one of the best opportunities to collect information about labor influentials. The delegates are frequently sub-elite (or local elite); ceremonies, protocol, and the distribution of honors, create chances of identifying the rank of various persons in the power pyramid. If the convention becomes a contest for power within the organization, additional opportunities are presented, since influentials are forced to act to protect their position, or to gain better ones.

XXI-13. *Use of direct informants.* Nothing has been said in this section on the

use of direct informants in gathering information about labor influentials. In many ways, it is more difficult to use direct informants in this area of power than in any other. Labor organizations have had to engage in a severe struggle to obtain the power they do hold; they have had to maintain a kind of "security" at many times in their histories and have been beset by spies and informers. Thus, they are more than ordinarily suspicious of any individual who comes questioning, no matter what his purpose. The suspicions will usually be more marked among influentials who are of a more typical working class background, less marked among the "modern" labor leader or the one with middle class or intelligentsia background. Often, it may be advisable to use an indirect informant, someone not connected with the labor movement. Influentials in the business power pyramid and academicians are sometimes excellent sources of information, though their biases must be considered.

PART C

SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS

XXII

BUSINESS ELEMENTS

It has been said that, "over a great and unified society, the business man has never ruled. In the main his influence has remind indirect, and has been exerted through politicians, courtiers, or dictators, and in compromise with the desires of other groups: military, agrarian, democratic, aristocratic." (35, p.59). At most it appears that the businessman has ruled commercial cities.

Whether or not businessmen have ruled cities or nations as recognized heads of government seems beside the point in the present discussion of power. In the modern world the vast flow of trade, the moving of goods and services that as dependent upon power decisions would indicate that the businessman is a force of great magnitude and although he may influence "indirectly," yet influence he does and top business influentials are the most important elite figures in many areas of the world. Public policy and social direction of energy resources are part of their stock in trade.

BUSINESS ELITE ANALYSIS

XXII-1. *General influence.* One need only look at the great industrial and commercial cities of the world to know that those who control the movements of men within them are persons of great power. The cities represent the accumulation of vast arrays of organizational skills. Construction, ships in harbors, rail car movements, traffic lines, trucks and buses, smelting and forging operations, chemical plants and many other activities, suggest vast powers of organization and direction.

Within the centers of movement the businessman's powers are interwoven into a complex arrangement of indirect as well as direct influences. He sits, moreover, in the center of the network of influence and his power extend radically to state capitals, national cities and to other great cities of the world - directly or indirectly.

Below the industrial, large-scale financial, legal and merchant prince group, stands a commercial group. This includes the men of small-scale commercial enterprises, small scale industries that manufacture and distribute to local markets primarily, and, in general, the "main street crowd." On the same level with this group are communications personnel, public relations firms and other service organizations, trade associations, and industrial research and planning groups.

These groups, the first and second echelon influence groups, are underpinned by the large mass of white collar workers and laboring people who are often organized into civic, professional, and fraternal organizations, but who are relatively powerless in the short-run decision-making process.

XXII-2. *Functional significance a sign of power.* The basis of power of a businessman is generally proportional to the size or functional significance of the business of which he is part. As pointed out before, business enterprises represent apexes of power. Those persons at the top of individual power pyramids represent

top influence both within and outside of such arrangements.

In the business community there is general recognition of gradations of influence in business matters. The top elite of the business community are usually found in occupations contained within heavy industry, steel, oil, machine tools, auto manufacturer, chemicals; import-export activities for the world market; large scale banking; corporate legal service organizations; large scale storage and distribution operations, mail order and regional merchandising establishments, and the larger real estate management enterprises. This list is partial and intended only to be suggestive.

XXII-3. *Internal corporate power ranking.* The men within the industries and operations mentioned defer to one another on the basis of corporate ranking and hierarchical positions. The ordinary corporate rankings are: chairman of the board (sometime a figurehead), chairman of the executive committee (often a position of great influence and power), president, vice presidents (often 20,30 or more; usually fewer), treasurer, comptroller (And any other officers of the Board), and finally operations personnel, such as general manger, assistants to various board officers, production chiefs, accountants, personal public relations, and labor supervision.

Within a specific corporation the formal lines of authority between the various offices mentioned are well known to all who must use them. The whole chain of command represents a "pecking order," i.e., the top man can tap all and make them move for him, the second man in control can tap all but the one man above him, and so on down the scale.

Informal lines of authority and communication are not unknown in large scale corporate bureaucracies and those who know the system of informal channels can often expedite work and advance personally by such knowledge. E.g., an assistant purchasing agent may know that the vice president in charge of production advises the purchasing officer on specific requirements for machine tools and

likes to talk personally to certain salesmen. The assistant sends those persons of intimate acquaintance directly to the vice president instead of routing him "through channels." Generally, however, lines of authority are rather strictly followed in bureaucratic organizations and deference traditions are observed.

XXII-4. *Inter-corporate cliques.* Within the business community at large, there is an understanding of "who is who" in other corporate groupings, and chairman of boards have dealings in the main with other persons of like, rank, authority, and prestige of organizations outside their own. The inner circle of top organization personnel is thus formed. The men on this level interact frequently, come to know one another intimately, and trust each other's judgments, or as the case may be, learn to avoid one another. Clique arrangements arise from like-minded people working together with some regularity, and the inner workings of the various cliques become well-known in the top circles.

XXII- 5. *Representation of larger scope.* Within a given community the larger corporate interests will have representatives in most of the major civic, political and institutional groupings. The fact that large industries are heavy taxpayers and generous donors to local government and civic endeavor makes the voices of such representative potent. The representation follows the status scale of the business organizations, that is, the large scale public and quasi-public endeavors will attract top corporate talent, while the smaller enterprises of civic import or political relevance will be delegated to second and third string men. Only a minority of men related to basic industries or businesses are politically active, of course. Those who "tend to their own business" and let others do the "politicking" are dependent upon the latter and indirectly support them.

XXII - 6. *Cosmopolites.* Those who are polemists may be divided into

"cosmopolitans" and "locals". The cosmopolitan business man is a power in his own business, and draws his basic community power from this fact, but he also translates some of his power to the larger issues and policy considerations that confront the general business community and the civic community at large. Some of these men go a step further and act on a state, national, or international level of affairs.

Some of the cosmopolitan leaders on a national and international level resemble "shuttlecocks." They travel extensively, are interested and generally informed on policy developments over a wide geographical and political area. They act as intermediaries for many diverse interests and are bearers of news, gossip, and technical information. They may hold no elective or appointive office, and they may not be members of official or unofficial committees. They may travel on behalf of their businesses primarily, but act as informal couriers of policy information. They visit acquaintances enroute, stop at clubs, make formal and informal talks and are universally accepted as national and international leaders. The man "just in" from Japan or London who has vital trade news or political intelligence finds a ready audience in the major centers of trade and commerce.

XXII - 7. *Localists.* Most businessmen are stay-at-home leaders. By sitting in one spot and wielding power and influence locally they indirectly influence the decisions of the state and nation. "What Detroit, Milan, Santiago will do or not do" in relation to any given policy may be ultimately dependent upon the attitudes and decisions of the local leaders of these areas. The combination of the locals and cosmopolitans makes the whole system operative. One could not do without the other, yet the functions of each are relatively distinct.

XXII - 8. *Owners and managers.* In the patterning of elite power in the business community the owner group has the advantage of often being a hereditary elite with the margin of influence that such position gives. On the other

hand, many of the business leaders are self-made men, persons who have "beat their way to the top," and from the perspectives of power may be extremely influential while being socially self-contained or even inferior socially to those who can claim aristocratic lineage.

There are still areas in the world in which those in business are considered to be a cut below the landed aristocracy or other gentry of the cloth or cultural centers of the arts and learning. Latin Americans and Europeans are prone to claim this to be true. Yet many businessmen from many diverse nationalities are being integrated into the cultures there and their business success does them no harm in the process. History affords many parallels. There is a vitality in trade and commerce and its fruits that is hard to deny. Even managers of foreign corporations are culturally advantaged by rates of exchange, higher pay, and the prestige of their parent companies and nations and in time find themselves taken into the policy strata of national affairs of the nation in which they do business.

Managerial personnel both locally and abroad are in strategic positions in relation to policy development. They are usually "organization men." They may not be at the top of the power pyramid in policy formulation, but through their active contact with conditions of work within their businesses plus the fact that research and other organized blocks of knowledge are available to them makes them persons upon whom the top policy makers depend. The whole network of national trade organizations with their ability to influence policy is usually open to these men or to some of their immediate subordinates. As a class they fit into a middle strata - a strata that is noted for its activity and group mindedness. It is the class from which the elite recruits its members, as has been pointed out, and many of the managerial persons are out to make good - to secure the place held out to them as a social reward.

The managerial person is, then, a middle man in the processes of policy development. He works with many of the active people, his peers, on the projects and problems of great importance to his company. He is in touch, actively, with the policy makers of company affairs. He has at his command a large body of supervisors and workers to whom he can turn for execution of any general

community or state project. He reports successes and failures of policy execution and makes suggestion for changes in policy alignments in accord with political reality. He thus becomes a key figure in elite operations and a part of the circle, although he may not be at the center of power direction.

Managerial personnel may be politically active at the committee level of political affairs. Their business operations may require considerable contact with public officials. For example, when a Texas pipe line company has to lay a pipe from Texas to New England and in the process cross dozens of state boundaries and countless local political sub-divisions, it is necessary for the company manager to know the workings of local politics on a very practical level. The same condition applies to a lesser extent in any purely local situation. The manager may not hold political office and he may not contact local officials directly, but someone within the company depends upon it and politicians who favor the activities of the company are in turn favored directly or indirectly. There is no mystery to all of this nor necessarily political chicanery. The facts of activity demand working relationships between business and industry.

XXII-9. *Integration of an industrial society.* In an integrated industrial society the larger metropolitan centers are star clusters of influence. The smaller communities are satellite to them. In turn, the rural populations are dependent upon the services of both the small and large communities to provide basic goods and materials for day to day, week to week operation. Few communities are so isolated from the industrial and commercial centers of the world that they are not dependent in some measure on the things brought to them from the outside. This is subject to the measure of degree, of course, but the modern world is closely bound together by ties of trade and commerce. The dependency of the large units upon the smaller is also obvious and the interchange between them is likewise apparent. Between them all there are ties of human relations and the businessman has played no small part in strengthening and extending these ties.

The visible signs of commercial integration can be seen on any main street that

advertises products from various parts of the world. Sale outlets in local merchandising markets display the face, for all the world to see, that they are a part of a larger system. From local outlets, ties to district wholesalers, regional jobbers, manufacturers' agents to the original producer are apparent upon reflection. It is also apparent that a whole network of communications, loose indeed in many cases, exists to tie the national and international business community into a complex action system. The value system of the industrial revolution and its manifold outgrowths, including socialized and state managed systems of production, underlies the whole pattern of development, and provides a working stock of ideas for the individual entrepreneurs. The development of an elite group in the whole process was inevitable and, in terms of the system, functional.

PART C

SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS

XXIII

HEREDITARY ELEMENTS

A function of power is that of maintaining social order. A common element of this function is the process of "fixing" certain persons in a status hierarchy of social prestige, the designating of them either formally or informally as prestige bearers. They are given, by ascription, certain rights, privileges, advantages, immunities, and prerogatives at birth and, all things being equal, can pass such social favors on to their offspring who, in turn, have ascribed status. Within a given society the whole process is designed to give stability to the social order by the controls implied in the ranking. The process is one of inclusion-exclusion. The bearing of titles of office may or may not accompany the exercise of the rights, privileges, etc., involved in hereditary forms of social control.

The maintenance of social order is a preoccupation of those who govern or wield power. Many devices have been utilized in this process and history is replete with descriptions of systems of social control that have succeeded and others that have failed. Many systems that have succeeded have utilized hereditary prestige rankings to give stability to the working arrangements of the social structure. The most obvious ranking system is that which obtains in feudal social orders in which rank is dependent upon the control of land. Others such as the caste system of India or hereditary religious castes elsewhere, are also built around controls. They may involve trade and skill monopoly, service performance or sacerdotal

functions. In such systems the social rankings must be generally accepted by the underlying population in a traditional and historical sense.

ANALYSIS OF HEREDITARY FACTORS

XXIII-1. *Charting the hereditary structure based on land.* It is well accepted that titles of nobility and feudal grants of authority were originally conferred on such persons as those who had performed a service for the ruling authority or who had, by force, demanded and obtained control of certain territories and peoples. At any rate, in a feudal system the top ranking person of authority is specifically designated and others measure their own authority in relation to him. The prince, for example, has power of taxation, war levy, and land rents over a wide territory but of lesser rank have lesser authority. The system, in all of its ramifications and complexities where it is a potent force, is essentially a measuring device for authority.

XXIII-2. *Hereditary structures, non-landed.* Where the feudal system has lost its potency in relation to land control, titles of nobility may still remain in force and be functional to a modified system of semi-feudal organization. By tradition, certain designated families retain certain rights, privileges and prerogatives. The general mass of people within such a system accept the gradations of social status as right, just, and forever-given so long as the scheme apparently meets their needs. Habit and custom provide a stable base upon which systems of authority and obedience rest. The hereditary elite are often ardent keepers of tradition. They perform roles prescribed by custom. Members of the elite hold to the rituals of their station by preference in most cases because the rights and privileges are desirable, but they also held to the rituals because they are duty bound to do so by

the culture in which they operate. They provide a point of reference by which each man can measure his own status and gauge many of his actions.

XXIII-3. *Describing symbolic hereditary destinations.* Every social system has some modifications of the gradations so clear visible in a feudal system. An hereditary elite is directly powerful in those states and communities in which authority is an integral vestment of office. In such places, law and institutional sanctions buttress habit and custom to make the system operative. In other areas the hereditary elite may be divested of direct authority and serve only as symbols of the ruling authority. English rulers are the usual example of the latter situation. These monarchs are used as symbols for the political purposes of the ruling ministries.

XXIII-4. *Heredity in democracies: indices thereof.* In societies dedicated to a democratic tradition there are also hereditary elites, although their rights and privileges may be more obscure and less well defined than in constitutional monarchic states. Property and money handed from one generation to another in democratic states lend social prestige and a modicum of power to those so possessed.

In modern societies, class systems are the generalized social structures that define gradations of eliteness or the lack of it. Much has been written about class systems and few authors agree on how many classes exist if they "exist" outside the minds of social investigators. Without repeating the arguments pro and con on class systems (some say there are three classes in America, for example; others say five or six; the Marxists say two), it can be postulated that men do use some rough classificatory system to measure their own social position in relation to others, particularly in those areas where feudal gradations have been blurred or obliterated. The process of identifying others in a class scale is primarily psychological in its operation.

There are apparently clusters of attitudes around occupations, living areas, wealth, ways of speaking and acting, and social origins that can be said to be class oriented. A group within a community, for example, whose members have traditionally gone into the practice of law, whose son and daughters have been educated in fashionable schools, whose homes are located in pleasant, healthy surroundings, whose "roots" have been in the community for a long period of history, and whose members speak the language of the region correctly, and act in a manner "approved" has a class status differing from members of the community who do not enjoy the distinctions cited.

If the members of the families cited above accumulate property and pass it on to their children, along with a relatively rigid code of conduct befitting their class, they may be said to be an hereditary elite regardless of whether the position they hold in society is prescribed by title. Community custom and habit will afford the families in question a degree of deference withheld from those of other social stations in the area.

XXIII-5. *Determining the stability of inherited distinctions.* Class systems of eliteness are generally more open than those based upon caste or other rigid rules of prescribed behavior. Individuals move up and down the class ladder during their lifetimes. Thus the class position "inherited" by a son may differ from that into which his father was born. Yet, there is enough stability in class positions that one generation tends to start at the base line of class position held by the parent generation. Hollingshead in tracing class positions of high school students in a medium sized community pinpointed the relative stability of class positions.

XXIII-6. *Changes in hereditary elites.* The foregoing does not imply that only the elements of stability must be observed. There is good reason to believe that all social groups are in a slow but constant state of change. Pareto and his followers have discussed at length the idea of "the circulation of the elites," whether

hereditary or not. It would appear that there is a slow but sure attrition of elite groupings in both class and feudalistic societies. The "comers" in any society bear watching.

Latin America gives one example of a "rising middle class." Traditionally many of the nations of Latin America have been dominated by a landed aristocracy with a semi-feudalistic outlook. Family position and land ownership have been the criteria for entry into policy-making positions and elite social position in general. The temper of the mass of people, and that of some of the elite gentry, has been to move in the direction of industrialization. Within recent years small scale industry has flourished giving rise to a relatively new class of individuals in the various nationality groupings. These persons are not yet "included" in all of the social strata of each society, but there is good evidence that they are arriving. Many industrialists marry into the "good" families, employ the sons of old families and in many other ways integrate themselves into the upper social structure. They represent the direction of change.

There are many ways of entering the "closed" circle of hereditary elites. Club memberships, political alliances, business and financial collaboration, intermarriage, and even more subtle and ingenious ways are made in society for inter-action between the hereditary elites and those who wish to be included in the inner circle.

The process of inclusion-exclusion is a key element in any system of eliteness. If one has social position by inheritance, he is automatically included in the elite circles supported by deference patterns extant in social circles. A closer knit, well supported hereditary elite holds an indisputable advantage over those who would try to break into the circle or destroy it. Newcomers cannot claim the privileges of birth; their inclusion can usually come only by sufferance. So long as the hereditary elite retains its vitality, reproduces itself, exercises the will to power, and makes decisions compatible with the basic wishes of the underlying population, it represents a social force that must be acceded to or, at best, compromised with in relation to decision-making and action in social situations.

XXIII-7. *Ascertaining role of retainers.* In many situations the hereditary elite may delegate its authority or retainers. It may become a purely leisure class. In such situations, of course, the retainers are powerful in the areas of responsibility delegated to them. The basic question here is one of the vitality of the hereditary elite and their ability and desire for actions related to power-wielding. The true test of power lies in the ability of the wielders to move others. If the ability is not exercised, a man may have latent power or he may merely be a symbolic figure in power operations. In many areas the hereditary elite have become symbolic, prestige figures. Such figures may be very important in the power pattern, but it is necessary to look elsewhere for those who exercise power. To cite an historical example, the *major doom* of the medieval Merovingian empire, founded the Carolingian line.

XXIII-8. *Symbolic figures.* Symbolic figures serve two primary functions in social action systems. They provide figures of reference and deference. The two functions are intertwined. In wielding power men are prone to "refer" to authority. They use such phrases as, "in the name of the King," or "in the name of the law." The latter implies non-hereditary authority "The King" includes the person of the King and a host of officers and petty officials who "do the King's will." The King may be a symbol in a whole scheme of action, but at some place there will be people who formulate policy and enforce decisions in his name.

XXIII-9. *Visibility of hereditary and free systems compared.* Due to the strength of hereditary ties and the ease with which one can refer to those who have hereditary authority, a system of power built along such lines is more readily visible and much simpler in its operations than when decision-making and action enforcement is more diffuse. Tracing family connections is a fairly simple procedure compared with tracing the lines of communication of multiple power

pyramids.

XXIII-10. *Indices of deference.* Deference implies a yielding or submission of one's own judgment, opinion, or preference to that of another. The status system of society depends upon these psychological elements. As long as the hereditary elite can depend upon the deference of those below them in the social scale, the system is in balance. Those immediately next to them in the social hierarchy defer to them, and in turn the canons of taste, preference, and the like of the middle group, becomes the power scale. There may be much fiction in all of the deference process, but so long as the chain of deference remains unbroken, the system operates with at least the passive accord of those at the top of the pyramid of power and prestige.

PART C

SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS

XXIV

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

By intelligentsia is meant those individuals in a society who are specialists in knowledge. In any fairly advanced culture, they will come from among the academicians, the professionals, the artistic and aesthetic specialists, the journalists, creative writers, the philosophers, the specialists, in "symbol manipulation." They have been called the *avante grade*, *cognoscenti*, brain trusters, "eggheads," and the intellectual elite. Whatever the name applied, they represent the intellectual leadership of the society.

Whether this group is an observable entity or whether it is split up and attached to institutions is a moot question for the operator: he is concerned with those individuals in the power structure who have the qualities which are associate with the concept of "intelligentsia" no matter where they occur. He may find intelligentsia as direct wielders of power, he may find them in a subsidiary position or relegated to a non-power position.

ANALYSIS OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA

XXIV-1. *Criteria of various roles.* According to some observers, the intelligentsia (or at least the important part of the group which may be so identified) are actually "socially unattached" and that they will in the long run - and in their own right - become the leaders of society through this very lack of connection with social classes. They bring evidence to show that the intelligentsia as a group does have a cosmopolitan characteristic; it does consider problems on a global basis; it is involved in various international movements. (There was even set up in 1919 a "*Compagnons de L'Intelligence*" with provisions for international memberships). The international characteristics of specialists in physical sciences and of their organizations also have long been noted. At the same time, it is difficult to accept wholly the theory of the "socially unattached intelligentsia" since there is much evidence which points in the opposite direction.

Against these theoretical constructions, one must place the observations of the diverse roles of the intelligentsia in different times and societies. They have been in the vanguard of social revolutions, but they have also fostered reactionary nationalistic movements and have vigorously defended the status quo; they have obtained power through moral and spiritual suasion and have obtained it though participating in the use of force and violence; they have received the highest honors of a society and have served as a society's scapegoat; they have provided the means of power yet have possessed none.

Some of the most interesting studies of elite groups in recent times have suggested strongly that members of the intelligentsia are more likely to be found in power at a time of stress or revolution and in the period immediately following. It has been shown that intellectuals were prominent among the early elite of both the communist and fascist, movements and that subsequently they were ousted or were relegated to minor positions. Studies of the Russian Politburo, for example, have clearly demonstrated the predominance of intellectuals in the earlier years of the U.S.S.R. and their replacement by men of administrative or violence skills in later years. These and other studies suggest a pattern of participation of the

intelligentsia in the power structure (1) as critics and attackers of the *status quo*; (2) as leaders of a revolution destroying the *status quo*; (3) as legalized ruler in the early stages of a new regime; (4) and finally as potential threats to the regime, being eliminated or relegated to subservient roles.

Another pattern which has long been observed is the movement of the intelligentsia into the elite to provide the ruling clique with support. Thus the elite uses their imagination and intellectual acumen to preserve its own power, to legitimize it, to build a theoretical base for it, to create "myths" which would perpetuate it. This pattern suggests that the intelligentsia are almost always an "out-group" as far as the top elite is concerned, being brought in now and then in accordance with the usefulness and cooperatives of individual intellectuals or groups of them.

Both generalities are too gross. They erect stereotypes, the one of the intelligentsia trifling with advanced theories, speculations and new ideas and challenging the *status quo*, the other of the intelligentsia pandering its knowledge to intelligentsia is a tempting target because it is so obviously attuned to symbols and dedicated to conveying them to others.

If the intellectual elite are direct participants in the power structure, locating them will present no special problems. The operator can expect that the general approach outlined in earlier chapters will locate the top influentials no matter what their base in the society. His problems arise, however, when the intelligentsia have a subsidiary, but still important, role. The suggestions which follow will relate primarily to that situation.

XXIV-2. *Differentiation of intelligentsia by proximity of specialization to power.* The varying activities which mark an individual as a member of the intelligentsia suggest that the operator can concentrate upon parts of this group with greater effect. Some specialization's are "closer" to power than others. The painter or sculptor is less likely to be concerned with power than the political

scientist or economist; the poet than the expert on public administration. In general, the intellectual whose activities involve the manipulation of symbols more related to power is more likely to be close to the elite. The ballet dancer or opera singer is less of a target than the journalist or critic.

It might be noted that the intellectual who is specially interested in power as his own area of specialization (as are many historians, political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and other academicians) may be excellent sources of information for the operator. These persons may or may not actually possess power themselves, but as students of power they will be very well informed about it.

Another factor which may make a particular specialization more important is the nature of policies and project of the top influentials. They may be absorbed in a project which will bring certain members of the intelligentsia into the top echelon; Such persons would assume a higher priority as targets. In many societies, communists have moved from theoretical pursuits to participation in power decisions because of present concern of top influentials with economic matters. Priestly advisers are much rarer nowadays than in early modern times though their part is played in a way by the ideologue-propagandist.

XXIV-3. *Proximity of organizations of the intelligentsia to power.* Members of the intelligentsia are ordinarily members of many organizations ranging from groups of fellow specialists to political action associations of very diverse specialists and broad cultural associations. If such organizations are, in fact, elite groups, they will have already been observed. On the other hand, as organizations of lesser power rank, they may become important to the operator from time to time. An example of such an organization was the "Keep Left" group of laborites in Britain (along with a similar group in France) who did much to spread neutralist sentiments among U.S.. allies in 1951. Describing this situation, a

propaganda specialist said: "...the early manifestations of neutralist sentiment were dismissed as the work of the 'intellectual fringe' in these countries, and hence of small political import. This erroneous judgment was based on ignorance of the communications network. The 'Keep Left' group of M.P.'s for example, included the editors of three small-circulation but extremely influential British weeklies. The *Combat* group of French writers radiated out into the mass circulation Parisian and provincial press, e.g. *Figaro* and *Franc-Tireur*.

The incident points up the potential importance of intellectual fringe groups to the operator. Here, by their control of elite publications, they had an influence beyond that expected. (For additional information on elite publications fringe group also is demonstrated in this incident.

Organizations which have an intellectual or semi intellectual base, also serve as means of influencing other organizations which may have much more power. The National Union of Journalists provided a base for working British journalists to stimulate demand for an investigation of the press and eventually to win parliamentary approval of the proposal.

Mention of this organization suggests a point of caution concerning organizations of intellectuals. In some fields, they may also have many characteristics of labor unions. In fact, many of the newer organizations of intelligent (particularly of writers, actors, and other such groups) prefer all of the functions of unions as well as serving as organization of the intellectual elite.

A final point regarding organization of intellectuals is that no large interest or community group or mass basis forms "naturally" beneath them, as is the case, for example, with labor leaders or the military. The organizations themselves are often volatile, anarchically organized, with an individual *Librium veto* on any matter of personal concern.

XXIV-4. *Direct participation in government.* The role of the intelligentsia in

Russia, Italy and Germany has already been remarked upon. Similar studies of other nations should provide information on the degree of direct government participation by intellectuals. Dossier material will often carry on its face the fact that the person is an intellectual as well as something else. Information on the writing of influentials is a useful index, the presence or absence, bulk or quality of them providing clues as to whether the individual is an intellectual or not. Examination of memberships of parliaments by job classifications is another device. Studies of the French and German parliaments through the years have demonstrated the importance of professors and other intellectuals in these legislative groups as compared to their importance in the U.S. Congress, where, however, the influence of academia is not negligible.

XXIV-5. *Distribution of rewards.* The economic standing of intellectuals relative to other groups such as businessmen or military men or farmers also will provide information on where intellectuals stand in the power structure. In the U.S. the pay of professors and journalists is indicative of their lack of power; in the Soviet Union the great disparity between pay of intellectuals and workers indicates that they have a higher power rank. The granting or the taking away of rewards also provides indices of the power of an intellectual. The career of the Soviet biologist Lysenko is an excellent example. From obscurity in 1936 he rose to the position of President of the Lenin Academy of Agronomy, a vice president of the Supreme Soviet, and along the way accumulated Stalin prizes and Orders of Lenin. He also obtained his own institute, and enough power to silence or banish his academic foes. His downfall, while not yet as completely documented, was signalled by authoritative criticism in such publications as *Botanitshesskyi Journal* and the *Bulletin of the Soviet Academy of Science*. This suggests that praise or condemnation of intellectuals as indicated in these publications should also be scrutinized in an effort to check the power position of the intellectual :

XXIV-6. *Concern of the intelligentsia with pure, as opposed to "applied"*

science and art. Intellectuals have been arguing this matter in all nations for centuries. Today, there seems an increasing pressure of the top influentials upon the intelligentsia to make all of their activities useful to the state. The combination of technological and ideological demands of modern civilization have drawn the physical scientist, the social scientist, even the composer and sculptor, into government. In extreme form, as exemplified in Russia, every activity of the intelligentsia will be weighed as helping to achieve the goals of the elite. An intelligentsia who is concerned with useful application of its skills as against pure or scientific or artistic use of them can move into higher ranks of power. Thus physicists moved nearer power in the U.S. after the development of the atomic bomb, though they did not move into the top echelons. However, the tendency to apply the skills of the intelligentsia awakens in them a greater interest in and concern with power and may in the long run make them more important contenders for power than they have been in the past.

XXIV-7. Concern with nationalism as against concern with internationalism.

The cosmopolitan character of the intelligentsia was referred to above, but cosmopolitan awareness may be the prelude to extreme nationalism and anti-cosmopolitanism. The cases of Gobineau, Nietzsche or Wagner are in point. Today, the awakening nationalism in many parts of the world which were recently governed by foreign powers is led and driven on by intellectuals. The intelligentsia became nationalistic leaders, working directly in politics or in such allied projects as the development of regional art, literature, architecture, etc. The intelligentsia are not necessarily in step with the general elite. Italian and German poets and professors annoyed greatly the conservative forces of their lands in the early nineteenth century with nationalistic appeals. In the twentieth century with intellectuals mostly have hailed internationalism to the dismay of the nationalist elites.

Since intellectuals have at the same time been identified with international revolution in the form of communism, or with international cooperation in the

form of less violent organizations of specialists, the dominant activity of the intelligentsia in this regard, as compared to that of the general elite, will often help show whether they are near to power or far from it.

XXIV-8. *Propaganda activities within the target area.* The propaganda activities of the target area, directed at its own population or at the rest of world, usually will involve some members of the intelligentsia. It has already been suggested that the greater importance of propaganda activity at a time of change in regime will bring intellectuals to the fore, and that they will decline in power when the change has been consolidated. Propaganda activities of the intelligentsia offer another kind of opportunity to the operator, i.e. to learn of the goals, problems and techniques of the elite. Analysis of propaganda may show not only the degree of participation of the intelligentsia, but much about the power structure and vulnerabilities of the target elite.

XXIV-9. *Journalists as members of the intelligentsia.* To a much greater extent than in the U.S.A., journalists abroad are members of the intelligentsia and as such play an important part in determining its characteristics and power role, Keys to the power position of the entire intelligentsia, and to that of journalists in particular, can often be provided by investigating the system of training and recruitment of journalists. Are they university educated and thus a more respectable part of the intelligentsia? Or are they trained "on the job" from relatively early ages, remaining outside the formal advanced education process? Is the training controlled by the government? Are there state examinations or licensing arrangements? Is journalism training such that it develops individualistic, personal journalism or does it develop impersonal institutional journalism? Are journalists most concerned with an objective presentation of the news? Or do they interpret freely? Is the prestige accorded to the medium or to the writer or editor?

Another key to assessing the role of journalists is the amount of upward mobility available to them. Do they move freely from one power role to another? Is journalistic activity essentially another facet of political activity? Are editors and officials of magazines and newspapers at the same time direct political leaders? In France, the combination role of politician-journalist is frequently found.

PART D

COMMUNICATION VULNERABILITY OF ELITES

XXV

RECEPTIVITY OF TARGETS TO COMMUNICATIONS

If a person could be at every place, understand every language, listen to every message, receive every symbol with perfect understanding, without modifying it in any way, such a person would exemplify perfect receptivity. If, in addition, this person could pass along, unchanged, all of the symbols he received to all members of an audience, he would be a perfect channel or medium of communication.

Such a person does not exist. There are spatial, language, and volitional barriers to receptivity. And there are barriers produced by the social experience and the personality characteristics of individuals. Even though man has developed many complex and efficient mechanical and electronic means of circumventing some of these barriers, they too are less than perfect. To speak only of mechanical limitations and to use some of the language of information theory, the message may be obscured by "noise" (or error) occurring at the time the message is encoded. There may be additional noise in the channel and finally noise produced in the decoding process. All of this noise or error interferes with the reception of the message.

Human tendencies to put their own cultural and psychological peculiarities into an outgoing message, and to add to or subtract from an incoming message by the same process, introduce another "error" which has been called "semantic noise." If a potential target is jammed by "semantic noise" it is just as fruitless as if it were jammed by mechanical or electronic means.

The operator is concerned with communications which will go to a group and which will be received or not received, passed on or not, in accordance with the characteristics of this group and of the individuals within it. Putting the problem into tabular form, the operator wants to divide up the elite into :

	Symbol-conveyors	Symbol non-conveyor
Receptors of sender's symbols	p	q
Non-receptors of sender's symbols	r	s

He wishes to locate the channels to the symbol receptor-conveyor group (p), and to know as much as possible about their channels to q, r and s, so that the amount of favorable communications from p to non-p influentials may be increased.

ANALYSIS OF RECEPTIVITY

XXV-1. *Spatial availability of elite to communications.* A first step in isolating the symbol-receptor-conveyor group is an obvious, yet necessary task of identifying the physical means of communication which are available to the operator. What opportunities, for example, are there for face-to-face communication? Is the elite concentrated in a physical place? Are there language

barriers? Are there space or time barriers? Are there special opportunities for face-to-face communication because of habits of the influentials? Is the elite dispersed geographically? Are means of travel to them available? Does the influential have a favorite bar, coffee house, night club or park bench?

The operator should also endeavor to inventory the means for indirect, yet personal, contact. Is there opportunity for telephone conversation? Are there unlisted phones. Is approach by telegram or by letter a possible channel. Are there persons near to the influential either in power rank or in physical proximity who can serve as message conveyors? Are there more effective times of the day to use these indirect means of personal contact. When does the influential get to his office? Or to his home? Or to his mistress's apartment? Are there barriers in the form of subsidiary personnel such as secretaries who must be by-passed.

XXV-2. *Face-to-face contacts.* The operator should gather information answering these and other questions on simple availability of influentials. Face-to-face contact remains the most effective means of symbol conveyance. Yet it is often difficult merely to get to see or to talk to the right man at the right time. And the operator's general efficiency demands an efficient use of his time. There is not enough available for him to spend much upon futile attempts to get to the influential.

The study of opportunities for face-to-face contact with influentials is virtually endless. The skilled operator with a storehouse of such information will add to it almost daily. He will record changes promptly, will assemble the pertinent information on the ascending influential, note changes in old habits and relationships, catch quickly the discovery of a new favorite eating place or coffee house. He will know which influential one can talk to directly, which can be called on the phone; he will know where influentials are likely to be day or night or which of their associates can and will give information on their whereabouts.

Direct channels are particularly important in a hostile state or organization, where

any open dissemination of one's messages is all but impossible Recent studies have indicated that in Russia, for example, word-of-mouth communication plays a very important role in the communication system. Indications are that more than half of the population utilize word-of-mouth as a regular source of information and that one-third regard it as their most important source. Of special relevance to the operator, this study also indicated that individuals in the urban elite were above average users of this unofficial "communications network" and that they were almost unanimous in regarding it as providing more reliable information than official sources such as newspapers and radio broadcasts of the regime. In this respect, these individuals differed markedly from the worker and peasant representatives of the group studies, who made a similar use of word-of-mouth communication, but had much less faith in it. A note of caution should be injected concerning this study, since it was based on refugee groups who had voluntarily left Russia. The authors point out, however, that reports of use of word-of-mouth communication and tendency to consider it reliable, were as strong or stronger among individuals who had low anti-Soviet feelings as among those who had high anti-Soviet feelings. They suggest strongly that it is a reliable indicator of the use of the unofficial "network" within Russia.

That such a phenomenon exists in Russia should be encouraging to the operator who is faced with hostile or closed society, which puts almost insuperable barriers in the way of his reaching the target. At the same time, this word-of-mouth network should not be overlooked by the operator who is working in a more friendly atmosphere. Such a network exists in open societies as well, and provides real opportunities for the circulation of information.

Of maximum importance to the operator is the similar, but much smaller network of the elite. It will be made up of the patterns and habits of contact between elite individuals. As the theory of elite networks indicates, this will probably be a relatively self-contained interaction pattern, though there certainly will be offshoots into lower levels of the power structure. These offshoots may be of particular importance when the operator discovers that he has no direct access to the elite network.

XXV-3. *Inventory of mass media.* As well as making an inventory of the means of direct communication, the operator should become familiar with the less personalized communication channels. What mass media or communications exist? And especially, what media are particularly read, listened to, or looked at by influentials?

The first task is to take a basic inventory of the mass media in the target area. Yearbooks, directories and other publications often will list them quite definitively. If the target area is relatively small, the operator can easily prepare adequate lists himself. Names of media personnel (if not already obtained on the grounds of membership in the elite) circulation figures, statements of political affiliation, and other pertinent information should be obtained. A caution on circulation figures of printed media (and of radio audience estimates) is probably in order, since virtually no foreign publications are subject to the rigorous kinds of checks on circulation figures which are standard in the U.S. A special note on magazines: the operator should expect a diversity of kinds of magazine, including many of small circulation, but particularly important as elite publications. While foreign magazines are not as multitudinous as those of the U.S., the standard path to success in the magazine field, abroad as well as in the U.S., is to find a specialized audience and to put out a publication for it alone.

Resources of the target area in movie-making facilities supply of films, and movie-showing facilities should also be checked. Similar categories in the book field are useful; publishers, supplies of books, libraries, book stores. Information on particularly successful films and books in the target area also will be helpful. Information on the legitimate theater, concert programs, lecture programs, and other such programs, along with facilities for them, is useful, even though they do not fit the notion of mass media. More detailed information on the media, with special reference to both individual influentials and elite groups will be taken up in the following chapters.

XXV-4. *Analysis of personality factors in receptivity.* Before ending the discussion of receptivity of the target, one should consider two other limitations upon it - those related to individual personality and those related to group associations.

While study of elite groups has failed to isolate universal personality types or even common dominant traits among leaders, psychological research has indicated that there are personality types which are more susceptible to persuasion than others. To a degree, this research confirms the man-in-the-street stereotype of the gullible individual ("He'll buy anything") and of the man from Missouri("Show me.") Anyone who has engaged in activities related to persuasion, from salesmanship to seeking political converts to getting a neighborhood petition signed, has observed such a range in "persuasibility."

Psychological studies of American groups indicate that the individual with a feeling of social inadequacy who is shy or has low self esteem, tends to have more persuasibility. In addition, the person who seriously inhibits his aggressive feeling, who rarely criticizes others, who is not distrustful, is placed in the same group, along with the depressed or unhappy persons.

On the other hand, the aggressive person, the one who is socially withdrawn (in a narcissistic sense), or who is actually acutely psychoneurotic, has been found to be low in persuasibility. Other characteristics related to an unwillingness to change of ideas were symptoms of anxiety and symptoms of obsession.

While quantitative information to support the idea is lacking, certainly the stereotype of the influential tends to fit the latter configuration of traits better than the former. If in fact the target group is made up of individuals of these traits, the operator would have to face the fact that he is dealing with a group with generally low persuasibility. On the other hand, there certainly have been (and continue to be) influentials with personality traits associated with persuasibility. The existence of elites dominated by men of violence skills suggests a group of low persuasibility, while the existence of others predominantly made up of men of bargaining skills suggests personality traits associated with persuasibility.

This is only to suggest to the operator that some assessment of the personality of the influentials who are members of the target group is advisable. And if the operator finds characteristics associated with steadfastness in opinions and attitudes, he will be forewarned about the difficulty of the task before him. Certainly, if within the target he discovers a variety of personality types, it would be sensible to assess them as to persuasibility, and to concentrate upon those who present more opportunity for success.

Studies of the relationship of intelligence to persuasibility have produced a variety of results, but they do tend to confirm the common sense notion that one has to be as smart as his prospect, if he hopes to convince him. And as far as the quality of the message is concerned, there are experimental indications that a more intelligent target is more likely than a stupid target to accept a message relying on impressive, logical arguments. To use a military analogy, it's waste of ammunition to shoot armor-piercing shells at infantry in an open field.

This discussion also suggests that the operator must be aware that the personality of the target influential, in terms of the opening remarks, may create a measure of "semantic noise" which will interfere with the reception of his message. The relation of the above personality factors to other phases of communication, such as readership of the mass media will be discussed in Section XXVII.

XXV-5. Finding the channels through target's associations. Sections VII, VIII and IX have already discussed elite groups in some detail, but it should be reiterated here that the group associations of the influential will have much to do with his receptivity. Actually, the operator should always include in his concept of group associations, the total number of "reference groups" of the influential. It has been often demonstrated that an individual tends to act in accordance, not only with the standards of the group to which he belongs, but also in accordance with the standards (the sociologists call them "norms") of groups which he admires, would like to belong to, or to which his admired associates belong. Study of elite

groups in accordance with the suggestion of early chapters also will have revealed to the operator that the "norms" of some are more favorable to the U.S. than those of others. In addition, the development of detailed information on the influential's group associations will usually have revealed that he has a variety of them.

Again the suggestion is to be selective. If one group association offers a barrier to receptivity, look for another more favorable. In personal discussion with the influential, in indirect contact through message conveyors, in choice of media, select the channel and use the "cues" which will evoke the norms of the U.S.A. - favorable group; avoid the channels and the cues of the U.S.A. - unfavorable group. Further, (see Section IV-10), the operator should always be aware and alert when he is dealing with an influential who is being subject to group cross-pressures. Reaching the target in such circumstances is a delicate task, always in danger of failure through evoking the unwanted set of norms.

XXV-6. Differential cohesion as a limit on vulnerability. Some discussion of the intensity of group associations, along with suggestion that information be recorded to indicate it, has already been presented (Section IV-3). This must be mentioned here again, as it affects the persuasibility of the individual, especially when the message is contra-group norm. Tests of individuals with high valuation of membership in a group have indicated that they also have a high resistance to change. Conversely, individuals with low valuation of membership in a group are more likely to change their opinions in the direction of a persuasive communication, even though it is contradictory to their group norms.

XXV-7. Differential status as a limit on vulnerability. The status of the individual within the group is another factor which probably is related to persuasibility, but the evidence of how it affects the individual is mixed. This is unfortunate, for the influentials in which the operator is most interested, will have high status within their groups. There is some evidence to indicate that the high

status member of the group can at least receive contra-group communications without affecting his status (while the slow-ranking individual might not even be accessible). But whether he is more or less likely than a lower ranking person to be persuaded by the communication depends upon a number of factors: is his leadership in the group based upon his own conformity to group norms? Is his leadership related to his ability to make changes or innovations. Instances can be cited which would tend to prove either hypothesis. An anthropologist, discussing this question, suggests that there are two circumstances in which the elite are more likely to be innovators: when their "prestige ratings depend upon their support of novelty within a limited framework of expectancy" (as in the setting of new clothing styles or fads) and when their "power prerogatives" are so great that their followers have no choice but to submit. (H.G. Barnett, in *Innovation* (1953), p.318).

The first instance is probably not very important to the operator, but the second may be very valuable. But, in general, as the writer goes on to caution:

"The advocacy of a novelty is a precarious venture..An eminent man owes something to his admirers, and one of his obligations is to meet their expectations of him. These expectations may be imposed upon him because of the status accorded him by birth, or they may be extrapolations based upon his achievements. In either case they impose restraints upon his behavior and forbid radical departures from the norm that has been determined for him or that he has evolved for himself. A reputation is an obligation to conform, and it permits little freedom in advocating novel ideas..."

XXV-8. *Leakage of symbols-meaning over target boundaries.* Although stress has been placed on limitations to receptivity in terms of the individual influential and in terms of the groups of which he is a member (or which he admires), it should be noted that modern communications are providing a measure of "cultural diffusion." This may help eliminate some of the barriers caused by the group "references" of the elite. A study of national constitutions, for example, indicates

that there are striking similarities, with approximately four-fifths guaranteeing such rights as freedom of speech and press, property, assembly and association, religion, conscience, inviolability of domicile, etc. At the same time, the operator should be alert for possibilities that there may be considerable "semantic noise" if he endeavors to use such phrases and concepts, with the target elite having definitions and nuances of meaning quite unlike his own when they use these phrases.

PART D

COMMUNICATION VULNERABILITY OF ELITES

XXVI

INDIVIDUAL VULNERABILITY TO MEDIA

Every individual has his own preferences in communications media - a collection which he enjoys, trusts, regards as authoritative, and uses regularly. The operator is interested in the media preferences of the target elite, for if he could know (1) which of the media each influential uses, and (2) which of the media has high credibility for him, he would know how best to get a message to him. The media the influential does not use are useless as channels - he is invulnerable to them. The media he uses, but in which he places little credibility, are of little value - he is only slightly vulnerable to them. But the media he uses AND in which he has high credibility are of most value - he is truly vulnerable to these.

The complete answer to this problem is, in the long run, essentially an individualistic one, i.e. a dossier of the media use habits and credibility evaluations of each influential who is in the target group. Nevertheless, some general approaches can be suggested so that data may be gathered more systematically and results may be comparable.

ANALYSIS OF VULNERABILITY

XXVI - 1. *Variations in media use: non-users.* The variability of traits in leaders, which study has indicated, suggests that there probably will be considerable variability in other matter such as use of the media. One may expect, therefore, that influentials will range all the way from virtual non-media user to those who use all of them available.

In some areas, for example, there are still influentia who are illiterate and who are effectively invulnerable to the printed media. On the other hand, there are influentials who are invulnerable to printed media because of their entire personality pattern or method of operation. They may be highly suspicious, or they may be "men of action." They might also be termed non-intellectuals. In this connection it will be recalled that in Section XXV-4 it was noted that persuasibility was related to personality, and that specifically, individuals with high anxiety or of the aggressive type were likely to have low persuasibility. It is interesting to note that at least one study has indicated that amount of readership is related to anxiety, with persons of low anxiety reading more items, or showing an interest in more items, and persons of high anxiety reading less items in newspapers.

XXVI-2. *"Class" media versus mass media.* Another class of influentials might be made up of those who were vulnerable only to "elite" media, who read, listen to or look at only those materials especially prepared for them or for their reference groups. They would be invulnerable to the messages moved through the mass media channels, but would be vulnerable to messages placed in the elite publication, such as the confidential business letter, the specialized trade or professional publication, the political journal, or the religious magazine.

XXVI-3. *Variations: Users of all media.* Another class might be termed total

media users, in that they consumed media at all levels and in all forms. Studies of American media consumers have indicated that many persons fall into this "use-one, use-all" classification. There is also some indication that these consumers of all the media tend to be among those who make maximum use of the media. The point of special importance to the operator is that there are indications that his group contains the elite. Individuals who use newspapers the most, for example, are of socio-economic characteristics (occupation, age, education, income) which coincide with the characteristics of the elite. This is true of general readership, and of readership of public affairs news and editorials. Coming upon editorial readership the author of this study said:

"The significant fact is where it (editorial readership) plays its most important part in reading patterns – with older age groups, more highly educated groups, and higher economic groups. These are opinion-making groups.

While these studies were made in an effort to determine the characteristics of the mass of readers, they can, with caution, be applied to the elite.

XXVI-4. *Classification of users by different media.* An alternate classification could be made on the basis of use and vulnerability of influentials to class of media, i.e. to collect information on those influentials particularly susceptible to the press, or to magazines, or to movies, books, etc. It also might be useful to discover which specific organs have the largest groups of elite users (more will be said on this in Section XXVII). Thus, in the latter case, one might locate a particular magazine which was read by almost all of the general elite or by all of a particular special elite. While this approach may at times be the correct one (and would certainly be so when a few critical publications could be found) generally it would seem that the low, elite media and total (or high) media user classification suggested above would be more workable. Such variation is more likely to occur in matter what the cultural situation, while the classification by media may be altered by local conditions to a considerable extent.

XXVI-5. *Solving the media habits of "non-users".* Discovery of the influentials in the low or non-user classification might indicate to the operator that his battle is lost, as far as use of the media is concerned. But this is not necessarily so. If the target influential is in fact a non-media user, he nevertheless must obtain information. His very position of influence dictates that he must have information or the means of getting it whenever necessary. In such a case, he will ordinarily use some of his associates, either on his own power level or, more probably at lower level in the power structure. If this is so, the operator must shift his analysis to them to discover their vulnerabilities to the media, for he can be sure that if he gets a message to them, he will get it to the power person who is his final target. These individuals may actually stand relatively low in the power structure, but for the operator they have now increased importance. As symbol-conveyors, they are important links. Their vulnerabilities, in effect, are the vulnerabilities of their chief; what they believe is what he will eventually believe; what they read or listen to is what he indirectly "reads" and listens to.

XXVI-6. *Relation of vulnerability to credibility.* An important common factor in determining influential's vulnerability to the media, no matter where they might stand in the above suggested classification, is that of credibility. Specifically this refers to the influential's own evaluation of how trustworthy or expert is the source of the message or how expert, authoritative or trustworthy is the conveyor of the message. While the source of the message will be most often dictated by the mission of the operator and as such is beyond the scope of this work, it should be noted that source is very important. Often, the operator himself will be the source and the cumulative effect of his work in the community or national state will determine whether his messages are received with low or high credibility. While an analysis of the problems of source and credibility are beyond the scope of this manual, to a considerable degree what concerns credibility of channel or media will apply equally well to that problem.

In any event, the message is affected by the channel. Recipients have generalized

evaluations in terms of the authoritativeness and the trustworthiness of the various channels which are available to them. At least a backwash of these evaluations will have come to the operator in making the inventory of media suggested in Section XXV. It will be in the form of generalized information on the commentators, the press as a whole, etc. Certainly, the newspaper of low general repute can be eliminated at this point; possibly also the publication catering exclusively to a non-elite group or the medium serving a group not relevant to the power structure. Along with the generalized information on the media, the operator also should have, through the dossiers on the individual influentials, information as to political affiliations, special interest and other matters.

These two sets of information provide the opportunity to use a basic principle of credibility. The influential will regard as more expert, more authoritative, those publications which advance views similar to his own. Thus he will regard his own party paper as a more credible channel and will tend to be more vulnerable to an article carried in it than in the opposition press. Indeed, he may not even expose himself to the opposition newspaper, having long ago given it a very low credibility rating. Thus, whatever information has been obtained on the beliefs and affiliations of the influential and be checked against the known positions of the media with an expectation that agreement will generally mean high credibility, disagreement low – and to the same degree, the vulnerability of the influential.

The factor of trustworthiness may be ascribed to a medium even though it has low credibility for a person. It will be determined by the beliefs and attitudes of the influential about the *intention* of the channel, i.e. its purpose in disseminating its publications or messages. To the degree that he thinks the medium intends to seek a particular goal or to advance a particular interest or to propagandize, he will consider it trustworthy or untrustworthy. This is to say that if the influential clearly perceives the medium as a propaganda channel, messages carried in it immediately lose some of their effectiveness. He is alerted to question them. For example, it was learned during the war that soldiers who identified the movie, "Battle of Britain," as a propaganda message were less receptive (and had their opinions changed less) than those who identified it as an informative message.

XXVI-7. *Adding media information to biographies.* Within this general framework, it is possible to line up influentials on the one hand, and media on the other. Even if it were impossible to gain a single hard fact on exactly what was being read, listened to or looked at by the members of the elite, it would be possible to make useful inferences about what they were reading or listening to on the basis of knowing something about them and their association and something about the media available to them.

Actually, the operator may find several sources available which will aid him in pinpointing the media vulnerability of the members of the elite. It should be noted that most of the following tell him primarily about use; they do not tell him very much about credibility ratings. Nevertheless, they are useful to note:

- a.** Observation of media in the office or home of the influential.
- b.** Observation of conversational references to media sources of information.
- c.** Subscription lists of media. (A special case here is that of subscriptions to American publications. An increasing number are being distributed abroad, with considerable indication that many members of the elite are among subscribers. Presence on such a subscription list which should be available at least in larger centers, certainly would indicate that the influential was a potential or actual USA-symbol receptor).
- d.** Check of advertisements and announcements of the media seeking to enhance their own prestige by reference to influentials who are users.
- e.** Check on members of the elite chosen to receive advance copies of the new books.
- f.** Check on members of the elite chosen to attend advance (often private)

previews of new movies.

g. Presence of the name of influential on lists of persons who have asked for or have indicated receiving U.S.A. messages in the past. (Certainly the operator, if he sends out any materials, should maintain a list of this type himself. Checks with Voice of America listener lists if available and checks on users of USA library services and on other lists of American message receivers should be made, especially if it appears that any significant number of the target elite will be named.)

PART D

COMMUNICATION VULNERABILITY OF ELITES

XXVII

VULNERABILITY OF GROUPS AND UNORGANIZED AGGREGATES

Whereas in the last section the vulnerability of individual influentials to the media was discussed, the subject here is the vulnerability of groups of elite to the media. Since one of the characteristics of the mass communications media is multiplicity of contacts with an audience, here is perhaps the more effective use. The mass media message is duplicated; it goes out in the same form to all recipients; it is very often in a permanent or semi permanent form.

At the same time, the very asset of multiplicity of contacts creates a basic problem: How to find media weapons which are concentrated enough to reach the target elite – or at least, how to eliminate the media which have such a broad circulation that most of the multiplicity of contacts is a waste, as far as reaching the targets is concerned?

GROUP MEDIA ANALYSIS

XXVII-1. *Finding elite media.* Some general characteristics of what will be called "elite media" may be helpful. In the United States, the advertiser frequently speaks of "class" magazines. He means publications which go mainly to members of upper socio-economic groups which contain a large part of the total elite of the U.S.A. If he wishes to advertise a product which is merchantable only to persons of upper economic status, he will use a "class" publication with the knowledge that almost all of the readers of his advertising will be in a position to buy. Very definitely, he will not use a magazine with a mass audience, which will charge him for circulation which is of little or no value to him, since most of the readers will be in no position to buy.

The American magazine field provides another example. Whenever a magazine publisher discovers a group of people with a common interest, who are also in a position to desire a special class of products or services, he creates a new magazine for them and is usually successful. Some of these specialized publications may be elite around their profession, business activity, hobby or field of knowledge.

With the advent of televisions, the U.S. has seen the creation of "class" audiences even in the field of radio which has remained the medium most unspecialized (in a total sense), though even here there is a long history of creating programs to tie persons of similar interests together. Lately, there have arisen stations and programming practices which seek out an "elite" audience rather than a mass audience. Some stations have even discovered the possibility of operating on a subscription basis by presenting programs which an intellectual sub-elite is willing to pay for.

Distributors of movies have also developed means of serving a "class" audience, even though the film produced by Hollywood is designed for a mass audience. The distributors have set up in recent years theaters which offer diet of foreign movies, appealing to an intellectual sub-elite. The audience is small, but it is faithful, and the specialized theater exists by serving it.

While trends in the book industry have recently been in the reverse direction (especially with paper-back books creating a mass audience where none previously existed), in the book publishing field, the approach has very often been that of estimating whether a special group would be willing to pay for volume appealing to their interests. And the price of the finished book often serves as an indicator of the "eliteness" of the audience, the combination of willingness and ability to pay serving as signs of higher economic status and perhaps special knowledge or interest.

These examples should serve to give an American frame of reference, at least for the concept of elite media. The problem of finding elite media abroad will not be nearly as great as it is in the U.S. In general, the rest of the world has a relatively undeveloped media system, with not all nations having true mass newspapers, less having mass magazines or mass distribution of books. Radio does represent a mass medium almost everywhere, although there may be portions of the radio programming which are directed to an elite. In many nations this may mean that even the daily newspaper is an elite medium, at least of the intellectual elite if not of the prime influentials. The long range tendency is for this condition to change in the direction of the media structure of the U.S. and other nations with high literacy and sufficient wealth to support mass media. But, in spite of this trend, the existence of elite media within the total mass media structure can normally be expected.

XXVII-2. *Relating size to influence.* One of the dangers of media analysis is that "power of the press," for example, is so often equated with gross size. In his search, the operator may usually rule out size of total audience as an important factor. Actually, he may expect more often to find a significant correlation between small size and membership in the elite media group. A political scientist, C.J. Friedrich, discussing a number of small circulation American publications of influence said that they made up a group whose "influence and significance seems to be in inverse proportion to the number of its readers." (*Constitutional Government and Democracy, 1950, p.527.*)

To use American examples, the operator should be much more interested in the *New York Herald - Tribune* with only 300,000 subscribers than in the powerful *New York News* with its several million; in *The Atlantic*, rather than *Look* or *Reader's Digest*. In England, he would be more interested in the *Manchester Guardian* than in the *News of the World*, and even more so in the *New Statesman and Nation*. In Italy, he would pay less attention to *Oggi* and more to *Candido*, and *II Mondo*. In Japan shortly after the war, he might actually have reached more elite through one of the "gorotsuki shimbun" (racketeering blackmail sheets) than through *Asahi*.

Wherever possession of wealth is a characteristic of the elite, one may also use the most of the publication as a clue. *Fortune's* price immediately indicates that it is a publication for an elite. In Italy, the higher cost per copy of *Epoca* is *prima facie* evidence that it is read by a higher economic and cultural group than the cheaper news weeklies. The high cost of special semi-confidential news services also tends to indicate that the service is restricted to an economic elite. The American Kiplinger letter is an example of this kind of publication, relatively high in cost and relatively restricted in circulation. Aid in determining the economic level of the audience is provided by the advertising in publications. Advertisements of costly luxury goods indicate one kind of elite audience; advertisements of costly industrial machinery indicate another.

XXVII-3. Privacy of circulation. Another clue is the existence of restrictions upon the circulation of the publication. Thus the *Rotarian* and *Kiwanis* magazine are elite publications in America, since they are restricted to members of service clubs which limit themselves to the business elite and sub-elite in their home communities. Many American trade or professional magazines are carefully controlled in circulation, to the extent that subscribers must possess certain characteristics, (such as being a member of the AMA or having passed professional examination in architecture) in order to purchase the magazine *Vlast Sovietov* designed for Soviet officials, is an organ of this kind, though this

publication doesn't have much use as a channel for U.S. messages. Another characteristic of the restricted clientele publication is that it will usually be more carefully edited, since its readers will be relatively more expert and more demanding. This screening of the content, of course, will make the publication more credible to the consumer, but will also pose added difficulty in moulding the operator's intent and style to its columns.

XXVII-4. *Determining political ties of media.* A fairly obvious measure of elite status of a publication is its political affiliation. If power is concentrated in a single party, one need spend little time with the organs of the out-of-power groups. If there are several parties with power, the operator must know the organs most likely to reach the party elite most relevant to his mission. Thus, in Uruguay, if he seeks to reach the Catholic elite, he would be more effective in a publication going exclusively to the Catholic elite. In Italy, in 1953, he would communicate with more monarchist elite in *Candido* and with more leftist-liberal influentials through *Il Mondo*.

XXVII-5. *Relating level of media to probable audience* Another clue to elite status of a publication is the educational level of its content. American studies have clearly shown a hierarchy of difficulty in the written content of different publications, which serves as a kind of measure of the elite or non-elite status of the publication.

The work of Flesch is best known in this field. His measurements show that there is a tremendous difference in the "readability" of a confessional magazine, for example, and of a "quality" magazine such as *Harpers*. To the extent that intellectual attainment is a mark of the elite, it can be expected that the less readable publication, in Flesch's terms, will be more elite publication.

XXVII-6. *Relating language-choice to probable audience.* Another kind of clue may exist, particularly in relatively "new" national states which still have many cultural attachments to a former colonial power. The use of the language of the former colonial overlord may be a mark of the present ruling elite and may also mean that publications in that language are essentially in the elite group. The English-language *The Times* of India, for example, continues to be regarded as an influential paper. An historical example of a related type is provided by the aristocratic elite of the late Czarist Russia, who became exceedingly "frenchified" and who were more easily reached at that time through French books and publications than through publications in their own language. The possibility that a foreign group is powerful in its own right in an area also may make the foreign language publication a member of the elite media group.

On the other hand, strong nationalistic tendencies may also be present in "new" states, making use of media not in the national language a contra-norm activity and sometimes resulting in the elite particularly eschewing the practice. There are indications that such a condition exists in Israel. The Arab states also show some resistance to information sources identified with their former masters. A study of editors in five Arab states revealed that they had strong feelings that foreign-owned news agencies which serve them were actually propaganda agencies of the governments in which their headquarters were located, despite repeated assurances by the agencies that they were operating independently.

XXVII-7. *Finding elite at special media events.* If there are any physical gatherings of influentials into an audience, as for a film, this also may provide clues to the operator about elite media. Not only the public, but the private advance preview (especially in the U.S.) are attended by community influentials. If film previews are used in the target area, the operator may get information not only on media receptivity and channels, but also on the composition of the elite. Similarly, the advance distribution lists of books may offer clues as to both receptivity and composition. The operator who develops contacts with officials of a publishing house, for example, would get information on the "advance"

distribution list, providing himself with an elite audience for an American book, and also learning more about the composition of general and specialized elites in the target.

XXVII-8. *Radio program elites.* Radio stands as the media best deserving the adjective "mass" and this is particularly true of radio abroad. Its inexpensiveness per person reached, the fact that it can reach illiterates, the simultaneousness of its communication – all work toward using it as an instrument to address the mass rather than the elite. However, as was remarked, there is a degree of specialization of programming which sometimes may mean that a particular audience is principally made up of influentials rather than mass. The B.B.C. "Third Programme" is one example, of course. There may also be programs that even though directed at the mass, may by their nature have a large percentage of the elite as listeners. It is very probable that in Mexico, members of the elite are numerous among the listeners to "La Hora Nacional" (the weekly "report to the people" of the Mexican government, carried on all stations.) The radio speech of a top influential, while it is aimed at a mass audience, will also be heard by many influentials. There are also some indications that radio messages aimed at the mass of a population have had an effect upon the elite of that population, since they will be the only groups who can violate with impunity the regulations which forbid listening. Goebbel's diary remarked upon the effect of monitoring allied broadcasts upon members of his propaganda ministry, and individuals in Japan who studied radio broadcasts report similar effects. In the main, however, radio should probably be regarded by the operator as a shotgun with "so much spread" that can only reach the elite target by hitting a mass target.

XXVII-9. *Reaching elite through mass media.* While this discussion has "played down" the mass circulation newspaper as a potential channel to the elite, the operator should not totally ignore it. In the first place, its content is predominantly about the elite, their activities, their orders, their accomplishments.

Studies of American newspapers of "mass appeal" show that the names mentioned are overwhelmingly those of individuals who are in the first or second levels of the power structure. Names of persons at the bottom of the power structure enter news columns most often when they figure in crime, accidents and disasters, and court actions. Since most foreign publications do not have the inclination – or the space – to handle such news, it is likely that the content will be even more heavily weighted with information about influentials. Studies of readership of American newspapers cited above also indicate that the upper socio-economic groups read more of the news which contains informatic group, influentials will be readers of the mass newspapers to a considerable extent.

The departmentalization of newspapers in America suggests another possible approach; i.e. to identify sections of the paper which are designed to appeal to the elite or sub-elite. While direct counterparts of the American gossip column, capital city "dope column," of "society chatter column" are not found in foreign newspapers, analagous sections may be located in some. Certainly many foreign papers are effective in reaching the intellectual elite with cultural sections which are far more developed than those of all but a few U.S. newspapers.

XXVII-10. *Receptivity of special "gate-keepers of the media.* Location of the elite media is a considerable task and a relatively unfruitful one, unless the operator knows how to get messages into the media, having located them. This is essentially a problem in assessing the vulnerabilities and receptivities of media influentials who will stand in the way of the operator or will actively aid him, depending upon their attitudes and the impression he makes upon them.

The first point to stress is that the operator should clearly perceive his relationship with media personnel: he wants something from them, i.e. he wants them to place his message in their medium in a form which will be to his own advantage. Almost all media personnel, no matter how naive, how lacking in financial resources, how limited their abilities, perceive this upon first contact with the message-bearer. It is their brief time of power. They have him at their mercy.

The American public relations man who is effective recognizes this and works to obscure this relationship by concentrating the attention of media personnel on what he can do for them. He creates such a strong picture in their minds of him as a useful, accurate, helpful, cooperative individual that the other relationships all but forgotten. The by-product of this is that eventually his messages go through unchallenged. While the operator will usually not have time to use this principle to its fullest extent, he will find that the placement of a message becomes a much simpler operation if he keeps this relationship in mind. If he spends some time discovering the needs and wants of the medium and its personnel, if he uses ingenuity in satisfying them, then his message will be transmitted in just the form he wishes.

XXVII-11. *Content study by the "market" method.* Somewhat the same information may be pointed up by recounting the advice invariably given to the beginning freelance writer in America. It is simply this: "Study the market." (I.e. Study the magazine or other medium to which you hope to sell and write an article or script which is slanted to fit that publication.) The failures among freelance writers are many and most of them failed in this simple assignment; the few who succeed are almost always experts in analyzing markets. Some are so experts that they can take the same material and sell it to one magazine after another, simply by reslanting it each time. The operator is in exactly this position; he has fundamentally one message and he must sell it over and over again. The way to do it is to slant it to fit the medium.

Additional advice here is really little more than elaboration of what has just been said. Consider the physical form of the medium; can it use pictorial material? Will it want articles ready to go to the printer? Or is it more receptive to story suggestions which will be developed by a staff member? Does it have deadlines? Does it operate considerably in advance of publication date? Does it have technical requirements? (As size of film for a television station or movie house, or kind of engraving for a magazine, or kind of mat for a newspaper). Is the editor

or program director personally interested in some phase of the news? Or the arts? Or the theater? Or science? Or agriculture? Are the media personnel most impressed by the big name? (The ghost-written article may be the answer.) Is there a possibility of – to use a term from press agency – "planting the message with a local journalist and letting it find its way into the media by this indirect but effective means?

XXVII-12. *Role of freelancers.* This last suggestion merits some additional consideration. If the media system of the target area depends to a large extent upon freelance journalists, it may be a particularly effective one. In some foreign areas, even newspapers are dependent upon freelancers to a considerable extent. If there is any receptivity for U.S.A. messages, the operator can often place the message with such a journalist with full expectation that it will be disseminated. Direct control of the message must be surrendered, although often the writer may be willing to have his copy checked "for accuracy" (rather than for anything suggesting "censorship"). This approach is widely used by American public relations men with magazine freelancers, and frequently pays dividends. One of the merits of this approach for the operator is that it puts the shoe on the other foot as far as the relationship between him and the message-carrier is concerned. The local journalist is now in the position of "wanting something." This may mean that the operator actually ends up with more control of the content of the message than if he delivered it directly to the medium.

XXVII-13. *Sources of media intelligence.* Directories of the press, radio, magazines, etc., if they exist, should be used, along with any of the considerable volume of United Nations material which may be available. (Such as Freedom of Information, U.N. Department of Social Affairs, 1950, Vol. I and II, which has a wealth of information on press law, journalistic codes of ethics, etc.) If specialized trade magazines designated for media personnel are published they also should be checked. Most larger states today have journalism programs in

their universities, which will usually indicate the collection of publishing materials as well as the presence of specialists. An American publication regularly reports on foreign press and radio as well as providing a bibliography of foreign articles. However, its coverage is not very broad. A special problem is the availability of specialized publications of the types we have referred to. Many will not be sold in the customary channels but will be found in larger local libraries. Others will have to be obtained directly from influentials who are readers of them.

PART D

COMMUNICATION VULNERABILITY OF ELITES

XXVIII

OVERLAPPING AND SPECIAL TARGET CLUSTERS

Receptivity, as well as being affected by characteristics of individual members of the elite and of their groups, is sometimes related to overlapping groups or clusters of groups. The influentials of the target area, for example, may be divided into many groups, but many possess a common religion which will make them receptive to a message in terms which will evoke the cues of their religion. To give another example, if the influentials are especially concerned with a project, such as the development of a hydro-electric power plant, they may be drawn into clusters which will cut across normal groups and make them receptive to messages related to their interests in the project.

Analysis of the power structure of the target area will generally show a considerable amount of overlapping of the more permanent groups. Such target clusters are available to the operator over long periods of time, provided that he can locate them and use them effectively. Analysis also may reveal clusters which are less permanent, being related to projects or issues. These are perhaps less difficult to use since their relatively short life and their singleness of purpose make it difficult to relate the message and to deliver it in time to take advantage of them.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX ELITE CLUSTERS.

XXVIII-1. *Type of permanent clusters of overlapping groups.* Permanent target clusters can be of many types. They may relate to profession (as in some states which have a large number of lawyers or professors in the elite), they may relate to business activity (as export trade in a nation whose power structure is dominated by such a group), they may relate to a common educational experience (as for many British influentials), they may relate to a common important political experience (as the March on Rome for the Fascists elite of pre-war Italy, the beer-hall putsch of the Nazi elite of pre-war Germany, the long march of the communist elite of China). There may be a "clique" within the elite whose membership is a common informal group (which has no apparent power purpose) provides a bond.

Such ties may be very strong for the influentials related by them and may actually be more important than more obvious association such as membership in the same political party or participation in more "visible" organizations, such as parliaments or cabinets or councils. An American example of such cluster is the "farm bloc" in the U.S. Senate, which is very effective group despite varying geographic, political party, and socio-economic background of the members who constitute it. Actually, the farm block has survived many of its members, and, in fact, the operator should be alert for such long-term clusters which may represent interests almost independent of the persons who physically represent them at any given time.

The usefulness of the cluster of this type to the operator depends upon two factors: (1) the commonality of the tie which produces the cross-group cluster; (2) his ability to relate his message to cues which will evoke this commonality; (3) his ability to avoid antagonizing sub-cluster identifications, as for example, when

a person addresses a group of Americans, mainly of Norwegian extraction, and says he likes Americans but dislikes Norwegian.

XXVIII-2. *Complexity of clusters.* Actually, the operator may sometimes find that a cluster does exist, but that the commonality factor is weak or is interfered with by the strength of more basic group associations. Thus, the possession of common religion may bind all Catholics in a given community very strongly, but the fact that they are divided into Catholics who are workers and Catholics who are employers may make the composition of a suitable message all but impossible. The presence of a number of lawyers may bespeak a cluster, but it may be, in fact, seriously split, because the lawyers are members of two violently contesting political parties.

The potential complexity of any such target cluster, therefore, should always be kept in mind. Even groupings based upon socio-economic characteristics may indicate a kind of spurious commonality. A study of Iranian extremists (potential elite or sub-elite) showed that they had striking similarities in residence, amount of income, in attitudinal areas such as lack of attachment to traditional values, and in behavior patterns, such as amount of social activity. Yet this apparent "cluster," which one might consider as having a common receptivity, was actually made up of individuals from the extreme "left" and from the extreme "right". While it might be possible to construct a message which would utilize the similarities of this pseudo-group, it almost seems certain that the message would fail with one extreme or the other, and most likely, would fail with both.

The problem is essentially one of evaluating the strength of the "reference group" which creates the target cluster. If it is strong enough, and if the message can be constructed in terms which will evoke the wanted cues and not the unwanted ones, the operator may use it effectively. If these conditions cannot be met, he had best refrain from attempting to reach the cluster.

XXVIII-3. *Temporary clusters.* The less permanent groupings caused by projects or issues may be easier to perceive, although here also the operator must exercise care, particular in using the overlapping produced by an issue. In seeking to utilize the latter, he must not only analyze the cluster carefully, but must also examine the issue which created it. An "issue" immediately suggests division, the taking of sides, the splitting up of a total group rather than the uniting of it. The divisive effects of issues may often create grave dangers for the operator who uses them incautiously. Nevertheless, issues also have a coalescing effect, in that they bring together adherents – and opponents – from a variety of backgrounds and associations into new associations which may form a useful cluster.

It is important to analyze the issue in terms of its relationship to both short-range and long-range U.S. policy. Is there a side of the issue more favorable – directly or indirectly to U.S. Policy? Does the issue contain implications for the future which may prove difficult or embarrassing? Is there a danger of backing the wrong horse? Is the divisive effect of the issue likely to be so strong that any association with it will have a negative effect?

XXVIII-4. *Dangers of persistent 'in-group' feeling.* Even though issues may divide the influentials of the target into hostile groups, there remains the possibility that a strong "in-group" feeling will persist despite the division. This may make the entry of the operator into the arena downright disastrous; his message aimed at an apparently favorable cluster may be interpreted by both sides as an "intervention into our local affairs." Factors which seem to be important in determining whether the utilization of the issue-cluster will be regarded as a friendly gesture of "intervention" usually relate to whether the message was phrased, timed, or delivered in a manner likely to evoke reactions related to local pride. Sometimes the message has been stated too bluntly; sometimes it has been delivered at a time which makes its pressure just too obvious to be accepted. In the terms of this discussion, if the message uses cues

which evoke local or nationalistic feelings, it has, in fact, reached a larger "cluster" than was intended. The response is then in terms of associations broader (and possibly stronger) than those related to the issue. The message will have boomeranged.

XXVIII-5. *Clusters formed by projects.* A much more felicitous grouping, as far as the operator is concerned, is that which remains after an issue has been resolved and influentials are brought together in a resulting project. The very constructiveness of such activity provides a strong common bond that will often obscure group differences and make the influentials receptive to a message which relates to the project. Of course, there will be projects possessing this constructive aspect – as far as the influentials are concerned – which will represent very hostile activity in relation to the operator's mission. But if the activity is friendly or neutral towards U.S. policy, there exists a cluster of influentials which is identifiable and which makes a receptive target.

If the project has come out of the resolution of an issue, the identification of the cluster will be relatively easy and there will be little problem in timing the message. However, if the project has developed, or is developing, without public controversy, identification of the target may be quite difficult. And it is at this point, when the first decisions to go ahead with a project are being made, that the top power wielders will be most concerned and most receptive. Later, when such a project becomes more public, it will be easier to identify, but the receptivity cluster may be considerably enlarged and the message actually may go primarily to second level influentials. Thus the early identification of a project cluster is imperative, if the operator hopes to reach the top power wielders and to utilize their concentration upon it as a means of finding a receptive cluster.

XXVIII-6. *Operator-created cluster.* The opportunity for the operator to create a receptivity cluster for his messages by initiating a project himself, should

not be overlooked. Choice of a project will depend upon his own resources and upon the local situation, but if they are favorable, he may generate a cluster where none previously existed. His previous analysis of the power structure will be most useful here. His project should be presented initially to the top power wielders in an informal and non-public fashion. Having gained their assent, or assurance of co-operation, or indication at least of non-opposition, he can move by successive steps through the power structure and eventually into the execution of the project.

An effective next step after approval of the project by the top influentials is the creation of a community committee, drawing upon influential groups to name members to study and perfect the project. At this level there may still be direct participation by top power people, but the bulk of the persons involved actually will be second level influentials, chosen with the approval of or as the representatives of the prime influentials. The selection of committeemen from a variety of groups will also assure that the various power groups of the community are represented and have a chance to participate in and to shape the project in accordance with their own desires.

At this level, publicity for the projects may be initiated, although it may be possible to wait a later stage when the cross-group cluster has been more firmly welded together. A device to assure that timing of general publicity for a project is controlled is to get early participation of top influentials in the communication field. Newspaper publishers or editors-in-chief, radio station owners or managers, and others in similar positions, can and will prevent premature publicity, especially of the type which might evoke the charge of "intervention in local affairs."

If the project is such that the services of technicians or experts are required, they also may be brought in on a collateral basis. But the project should never be turned over exclusively to experts; the danger of this is that it may become completely formed, even inflexible, before it has been made acceptable to either top or second level persons who are important not as experts but as general influentials. A useful manoeuvre is to have the committee of influentials control the reference of technical matters to the experts and to concentrate their own

attention upon policy matters. This is usually easier to accomplish at the top power level than at the secondary level.

Even though there may be no mass media publicity at the earlier stages of committee discussion, members of the committee should be encouraged to report to their groups frequently, to seek suggestions and improvements to the project plan, and to pass along information. Eventually, the relatively small committee may be enlarged by the addition of delegates down the line of the power structure. These individuals can function, in turn, by carrying information about the project out into the total community and by winning support for it and active participation in it by members of the population at all levels.

When the project reaches this stage, the full use of the mass media should be made. The advance work done in the power structure of the community will usually assure that the possibility of effective opposition arising has been minimized.

All of this discussion has presupposed that the project will relate as specifically as possible to the operator's mission. Again, local conditions and his own resources will dictate whether he can choose a project that is directly relevant or whether he must work indirectly. The project is important, not so much in itself, but as a vehicle for messages and as a means of creating a favorable target cluster. A cultural affairs officer in Passau, Germany, accomplished his purposes quite directly by interesting the people in that community in a cultural festival, built around the idea of Western European and American unity. On the other hand, projects involving Point 4 specialists have often carried a minimum of direct, U.S.-favorable messages, though many indirect messages. The libraries of the U.S. Information Centers are often appropriate vehicles for the operation of the described project. In the creation of a receptivity cluster by this method, the operator might best remain behind the scenes. If he endeavors to "run the show" publicly and openly, he may offend local pride and may well wreck the project as well as ending up with less receptive targets.

PART E

THE USE OF TARGET INTELLIGENCE

XXIX

LONG - TERM ELITE INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURES

XXIX-1. *Utility of systematic records* A system should be set up to insure the maximum usefulness of data collected about community, national, and international elites. Scattered information or unclassified data clutters agency files and over a period of time becomes useless. Isolated facts become meaningless out of context. Operators in the field are often called upon to report the activities of influentials in key areas of policy related to the development of national policy and specifically to policy matters of the particular agency effecting policy or affected by it. The procedures outlined here should be of help in such reporting, and effective work in ordering basic records as work proceeds, insures accurate and prompt reporting when data is urgently needed.

TECHNIQUE OF RECORD-KEEPING

XXIX-2. *Types of files.* After the operator has collected data on influentials according to the suggestions in previous chapters and according to his own particular needs, it must be analyzed and put into usable form. Basic data may be kept in journal files (folders) and in card indices. Some of the data may be used as reference material. Other data may be kept in summary form, or in lists and be used in daily practice. It may also be coded and punched onto cards (See Appendix C). For example, much of the material gathered in journal form during the operator's orientation period may be summarized and kept in a folder. Afterwards, familiar with the material and increasingly aware of various forces in the elite environment, he may gradually ignore his first recorded impressions of the area. On the other hand, a list of names, addresses, and positions of top influentials may be used daily.

The usefulness of records are enhanced by simplicity and accessibility. They must be complete enough to give essential information, but not so burdened with information that they become incomprehensible in daily use. All information may be valuable, of course, but proper classification increases the value of the most pertinent data. Data that does not seem momentarily relevant may be stored for future reference in classified form. The journal records illustrate the latter type of storage. Out of journals, card indices may be built for quick reference..

Folder files for clippings related to elite individuals and groups may be kept. Files of written documents, speeches by influentials, pamphlets and the like, may supplement library materials and the journal materials. Again excerpts and briefs may be abstracted from such materials to become a part of the analytical data that is accumulated. In an intelligence operation, no data should be allowed to escape scrutiny for possible leads to elite status, interaction or decision making.

XXIX-3. *Special problems of journals.* Journal forms of recording may be kept in chronological order as data is gathered. That is, each day, one records observations and places, excerpts of written materials and documents, into a

running record - on letter paper - to keep a journal of events. Impressions, hunches and guesses may be recorded as one proceeds. The journal might contain impressions of the background of the elite, data on formal and informal institutional identification, listings of formal and informal leaders inside and outside these institutions, tentative analyses of elite networks, observations of power shifts, references to clipping materials, and any other information suitable to the purposes of the operator's investigations. Such recording is a diary form of record keeping. It is omnibus in its content and relatively unregularized or analyzed. It is a record in chronological time rather than a systematic analysis, but it is the first step in getting data processed.

At periodical intervals the operator will need to summarize the journal data, take from it the facts that must be transferred to card indices, and draw tentative conclusions from his analyses. In the early stages of investigation this summarization procedure should be a weekly task. Otherwise, data get old, facts lose their meaning, and the cumulative task of analysis becomes overwhelming. During the early stages of elite investigation, the data will be recorded in greater volume and detail than at later stages. As one becomes familiar with the elite network, new information replaces old and the volume of recording can be cut down: but in the early period it is vital to record in minute detail and keep materials summarized to make it amenable to use.

XXIX-4. *Dating and coding.* It is important that all materials be dated. In summary recordings the dates of original recordings should be kept and the dates of events and happenings within the data should be noted. The sequence of happenings is most often important in a final analysis of data.

It is also good procedure to classify data by code numbers in the margins of summarized journal recordings. For example, all data related to key policy makers may be coded "100". Within the range of numbers from 100 to 200, qualifying data related to key policy makers may carry numbers within the series to designate such qualifications as one chooses to make. For example, one may

with to designate policy makers as hereditary elites and given them the code "110" to differentiate them from self-made leaders who may bear the code "120". Such coding allows one to scan journal materials and pick out paragraphs that may be needed without having to read the whole manuscript. The system may sound complicated at first hearing, but once code numbers are established for data, the operator soon learns to use them and they save time. the same code numbers may be used for notations on card indices or for punching IBM or key sort cards if these are used for analytical purposes (see Appendix C).

Recognizing that the files are aimed at classifying data related to various elite groupings, large blocks of data may be classified under military, political, bureaucratic, religious, hereditary, business, intelligentsia, and other elite groupings of any territory covered in the analysis. Identifying information on individuals and groups may be coded from the journals on cards to be filed in a master file under the proper classifications, if machine or hand-sort card systems are not possible or practical. Such information as the name, age, sex, location, primary occupation and activities of persons should be noted. Supplementary data on club affiliations, clique identifications, hobbies, family connections, political affiliations, interests in public and private issues and/or projects may be noted.

As a power structure comes into focus in the analytical process described in preceding pages, data related to the characteristics of its group composition, action patterns, and individual interrelationships may be isolated from the bulk data for frequent reference. Lists of influentials may be kept. They may be kept in an order of ranking of power of various top elites and subordinates. At any rate, such listings should contain more than the names of the persons. They should have enough identifying data to enable the operator to locate the person by phone, letter, cable, or telegraph and by proper title. It is obvious, perhaps, that such lists and all other data gathered are of a confidential nature and should be protected from public scrutiny. In fact, it is wise to restrict information as to the very existence of files, since the idea of dossiers is unpleasant to most people.

XXIX-5. *Keeping information up-to-date.* No social grouping remains static. Leaders rise, gain top prestige and influence, lose it, die. The process of attrition in a stable elite may be slow, but movement in such groupings is perceptible and spot checks, to be outlined in the next chapter, must be utilized to make a running inventory of elite changes. Records must be changed accordingly. Clipping files on changes in elite membership composition are vital and must be kept up to date. It may be a serious mistake, for example, not to know that a person has been elevated to a new position, or that another has died leaving a vacancy in the elite structure to be filled by someone – perhaps someone already known to the operator.

XXIX-6. *Evaluation problems.* A record of informants may also be kept, properly dated and with identifying information, and some evaluation of the reliability of such communications as might be received from them. Informants may be members of other governmental agencies, they may be members of the local elite or sub-elite groupings. Evaluations of information may depend upon the operator, or in some cases, and in accordance with the nature of the information received, may be reviewed select staff members or by the staff conference method.

XXIX-7. *Allowing for custodial change.* Staff assignments change. Operators move. Thus the records left are often one of the key sources of information for an incoming staff. The adequacy of the information gathered in the initial phases of elite analysis insures a good backlog of information for ongoing operations and is in the best interests of the agency and the nation served by it. Staff change also requires making records collections impersonal: Their understanding and use must absolutely not depend upon the "mental files" of the user at a given moment.

PART E

THE USE OF TARGET INTELLIGENCE

XXX

EMERGENCY TARGET INTELLIGENCE **PROCEDURES**

Many suggestions compiled in this manual have a common failing – they take time to put in effect. And, in the interim, the operator will face his daily tasks. It would be poor procedure to postpone improving to hope that he could target intelligence until the many phases of gathering, analysis and evaluation which have been suggested are completed. The operator must cope at first, and in fact forever, with "emergency" target intelligence problems, on which both the amount of information available and the amount of time to get information are limited.

An example of such an "emergency" may be visualized. Suppose the operator is in the earliest stages of information gathering. Say he is presented with a directive ordering the immediate distribution of 1,000 copies of an important speech to the leading influentials of the area in which he is assigned. There is no escaping the fact that whatever solution reached under such conditions will be far from ideal. Likewise, there is no escaping the fact that immediate dissemination of the 1,000 copies to a list of persons which contains at least some of the important influentials is better than mulling the problem until the timeliness of the message has been destroyed.

IMPROMPTU ANALYSIS PROCEDURES.

XXX-1. *The "pilot study" approach.* The solution to the emergency problem posed above is essentially to do a two-hour or four-hour (or whatever time is available) "pilot study" of the elite in one or several of the patterns which have been suggested in this manual. The sources, to be sure, would have to be the most obvious. Classifications would have to be modified in accordance with the availability of information. Some techniques would have to be ignored for the moment. But in almost any conceivable situation, there will be several possible techniques available to the operator which will get the 1,000 copes in the direction of the desired target. The following suggestions are specific and any one may be impossible in given situation. What they seek to demonstrate is that the operator can use the rationale of the manual even in such "emergency" situation to good effect.

a. The operator might simply draw a random sample of 1,000 names from a *Who's Who* of the target area. The *Who's who* should contain most of the names of the influentials. The sample should contain some of them.

b. He might take the top names from official lists of office-holders, utilizing the formal institutional roles. To be sure, he would miss many influentials, but his 1,000 names would cover at least part of the target.

c. He might sit down with an American correspondent or businessman or resident and get as many names as one or several of them could provide. The biases of the individual sources would be reflected but to the degree that they knew the target

elite, the final list would cover at least part of the target.

d. If language were not a barrier, he might go to a library and compile a list from a combination of sources. If the lists contained information making a subjective discrimination possible he could eliminate in this manner; if they lacked such information a direct sampling procedure would yield 1,000 names including a part of the target.

e. If the operator had enough information about the target to know its structural and functional organization, he could set up classifications based on this knowledge and fill in names.

f. If he had knowledge of elite organizations and could get rosters or officers, he would have another approach. If organizations were known, but officers not, he could send his copies to organizational addresses, directed to the attention of officers.

g. If he had observed a geographical concentration of elite in a district of the community, he might simply deliver his copies to every residence in this elite area.

h. If the elite were concentrated in official buildings or offices, he might try to have a copy placed on every department head's desk.

i. If there were a city directory which described occupations, he might select a sample of 1000 from among those individuals with the skills more likely to be found among influentials.

j. If use of telephones was restricted to upper income persons, a sample of 1,000 names from the phone book might be a solution.

XXX-2. *Limitations of such approaches.* It is not argued that any of these approaches is ideal; it is merely argued that one or more the them (or of analogous approaches) will be available in any target area and can be used in limited time. The most obvious limitation of these fragmentary approaches is that each is probably biased in its "description" of the elite. If the entire group is taken, the total bias will be present; if a sample is taken it will probably be no better (and may be worse) than the original.

Further, there is a danger in any quick "pilot study" that the original assumption which indicated that a particular technique be used, may have been incorrect. Thus, the preliminary structural-function analysis might have indicated that businessmen were important influentials and the list weighted to include more of them. Later information may show that their importance was more apparent than real. The same might go for assumptions made about possession of telephones or possession of official office.

Yet another limitation is that such approaches give the operator very little assurance that he is reaching the very center of the target. The informal influential may show up in none of the lists; top influentials may not have listed telephones; they may have power independent of office or organization.

XXX-3. *Improving emergency procedures.* Inevitably, the suggestion that emergency intelligence procedures be improved brings the operator back to the beginning point – he can improve them if he has more time. If he had time enough to study a given area, for example, he could surely pick out of the list of suggestions just recited those which would be effective and those which would not; in addition, he would be in a better position to use the appropriate ones.

But to keep within the framework of the emergency example, the operator would improve his emergency approach if he could use two of the suggestions proposed in XXX-1 rather than just one. The expectation would be that two procedures would give him the beginning of duplication of names, i.e. if he made two lists by

method a) and by d) he would have less than 2,000 names because some of the same persons would appear on both lists. Even if he found very little duplication, the operator would not have engaged entirely in lost motion. He could then sample from his larger list, with the expectation that the mixed group would have a higher percentage of influentials than the single group. (He also would have an indication that power-holding was relatively dispersed in the target.)

XXX-4. *Utilizing the non-random characteristics of the population.* All of this discussion has been based upon the original assertion of elite theory – that populations are not made up of randomly distributed individuals. They are grouped and many of the groupings relate to the power that individuals have. Thus, looking for the elite need never be like hunting a needle in the haystack.

To emphasize this point, one might change the setting of the emergency problem to an American community. Armed with nothing more than a general knowledge of American communities and a single aid – the humble classified telephone directory, one could select in a few hours the names of 1,000 persons, firms and organizations in a city of 50,000 with a good expectation that his list would contain a major portion of the names of the top influentials. The non-randomness of the community is well demonstrated in the classified section; utilization of this plus general knowledge of American communities would produce a list of influentials, without using any other source of information. To be sure, there would be biases and imperfections in such a restricted approach. For example, the use of "unlisted telephones" by influentials would bias the list, but even here many persons would be at least partially located through the selection of the names of business firms or elite organizations with which they are associated.

Such a handy clue to the constitution of the elite is missing in many foreign communities. On the other hand, there is no need to restrict oneself to a single device; there are many others which have been touched upon. All of them seek to utilize the non-random arrangement of the target population.

XXX-5. *Specialized emergency targets.* If the emergency target involves a specialized elite, the task is simpler. Such a problem would arise when the operator must get a delegation of visiting engineers or ministers or labor leaders into contact with the leading influentials in their respective fields in the target area. The narrowing of the target base will mean that gross numbers need not be dealt with and that sources will be more easily discovered. At the same time, there will also be a reduction in the total amount of available material.

Taking this into consideration, the solution is essentially doing what was described in XXX-1 within the framework of the specialization. Most often the problem can be solved by working with source persons or material directly within the special area, but sometimes the nature of the specialization will suggest the availability of peripheral sources. A search for labor leaders might well start by getting names from an employer; engineers might be located though talking to industrialists; educators through contact with municipal officials.

The special sections of this manual dealing with such groups as the bureaucracy, military, etc. will offer many additional suggestions which could be used even though the operator were faced with lack of knowledge of the special elite and severe time limitations.

XXX-6. *Continuing emergencies.* Finally, it should be noted that years of analysis and operation will not remove emergencies. Elites change composition. The non-relevant group of yesterday becomes the relevant group of today. Sub-elites challenge top influentials; obscure persons rise to power. Well-worn channels suddenly clog or lead to dead ends.

The Composition of the elite and its manner of operation is a dynamic thing, hanging as the result of many internal and external factors. While many of these changes can be anticipated by the operator, others inevitably will not be, and he

will find "emergency" intelligence procedures necessary.

PART E

THE USE OF TARGET INTELLIGENCE

XXXI

FEEDING TARGET INTELLIGENCE INTO OPERATIONS

Research in evaluation and communication is useless unless it is operational. By operational is meant that the procedures for discovering fact are included in the work process itself, instead of being separated from it, and the work process is guided by the findings. Operational research means that the research becomes part of standard operating procedure and so established in routine that the operation cannot occur without, at the same time, accomplishing the intelligence function and incorporating the results of that function. Research that is not operational becomes simply gratuitous advice and is an expensive waste of time.

This section intends to point up what has been the theme throughout the manual, that a thorough knowledge of priority targets is an essential part of regular short-term and long-term propaganda operations. Although many suggestions have already been made that fit easily into established common procedures among information officers, this section is intended to make the problem more conscious and systematically solvable. It is to answer some of the questions of the operator who may say, . Very well, I know now a great deal about my local elites, after I've done some of the work prescribed in the manual. Now what difference does that make to me between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. of the working day?

FITTING ELITE ANALYSIS TO OOPERATIONS

XXXI-1. *Local material design.* Adequate elite analysis should facilitate the local design of materials, establishing standard and controls outside of the individual preparing materials and allowing local artistic talent to be held within the limits of objective analysis. Frequently, the local design of materials has suffered from the lack of knowledge of the behavioral sciences of the only local people who can produce messages in suitable media form.

XXXI-2. *New media.* Elaborate priority target analysis exposes time after time the inability of traditional and customary media to deliver messages to top-priority targets. Hence, knowledge of what the target is really like and what its communication channels are, in detail, by groups, by individuals and all other combinations, should foster development of new media. When it is not based on elaborate target analysis, propaganda tends to degenerate into simplism and pure formalism, using traditional mass media on a superficial level of operation.

XXXI-3. *Distribution of materials.* A set of books on the elite should prove efficient, easy, flexible, and inexpensive access to precise targets. The physical locations of the targets are specified. Their place in the social structure is known. Moreover, specification sheets for the distribution of material are more easily drafted when a systematic identification of priority targets is available.

XXXI-4. *Design of general materials.* Local availability of target analysis that is standardized in relation to the elite of other groups within the area, in adjoining areas, in whole regions, and universally, should assist in constructing general

propaganda materials for the use of operators in several different areas. A quantitative rank ordering of generality of use can easily emerge from the Central Office if the Central Office has designed materials with a full and precise awareness of the condition of a target in a whole group of countries, by standard criteria.

XXXI-5. *Mailings.* Mailings are a common, time-consuming, and expensive facet of everyday operations. Target analysis books should serve to reduce expenditure of both time and money.

XXXI-6. *Personal Approaches.* Adequate target analysis should facilitate greatly personal relations with the local elite that may otherwise be engaged in haphazardly, without prior knowledge of the persons contacted and without preparation as to the kinds of information required from the influential about other individuals, groups, and issues.

XXXI-7. *Matching elite elements with media capabilities.* In a number of cases, one knows the capabilities and the medium in which a message is contained better than the target for which it is intended. Knowing the elite allows a better judgment on the probable effects of the medium and its message in reaching the elite.

XXXI-8. *Reporting.* The standardized systematic features of the procedures outlined in the manual should be emphasized, for they facilitate standardized reporting, both of all materials within a given group or country, and among several reporting centers from different countries or cultures. This enables the Central Office, in a truly comparative fashion, to judge the targets and their conditions in

the several countries, to prepare better forms of media and methods /effects analysis and evaluation, and to design better messages and materials.

XXXI-9. *Directive construction.* Given the better reporting that results from systematic analysis, the development of country plans, directives, strategy and tactical plans will be facilitated in a country headquarters and central offices. Frequently directives have been couched in general, ambiguous and vague terms because of lack of precise conception of the targets and their locations in the countries and groups at which the directive is aimed. Elimination of such faults should be cumulatively successful, without resulting directives having much greater utility as they specified less ambiguously and with greater detail and a realistic perception, the tasks that are to be carried out by the operators.

XXXI-10. *Operational planning locally.* Local planning for long and short-term periods should be facilitated by checks and tests on the condition of the elite targets at periodic intervals. The availability of great detail on the targets should allow for more elaborate and precise planning.

XXXI-11. *Preventing oversights.* Like prolonged and magnified scrutiny of photographs of artillery target areas, that can bring to light many more targets than an observer can see at first glance, extensive and intensive target analysis of the elite will reveal a number of targets that do not at first seem approachable, will suggest means of reaching others and will reveal new target elements that previously had been known to exist only generally.

XXXI-12. *Relating target intelligence to directives.* If propaganda operations are to be conducted according to plan, and there is to be any scientific value as

well as any possibility of the execution of country plans, target analysis is necessary. The attached and accompanying hypothetical country plan reproduce from the book *Truth is Our Weapon* by Edward W. Barrett has been footnoted with the contributions that the work described in this manual could make to the effectuation of the plan and to the further clarification and development of this plan in future revisions.

TYPICAL COUNTRY PLAN

Following is a hypothetical plan to illustrate the approach used by U.S. Information Services in tailoring the information program to a target country.

COUNTRY PLAN X

Revised August, 1952.

Country X
Priority III, Y million population.

Situation Analysis.

The primary political objective of the United States is to keep Country X an independent, sovereign nation, free from domination by an aggressive Communist power and to encourage social and economic betterment which will stem social unrest in the country.

To this end U.S.I.S. objectives are:

1. To convince the people of country X that the United States provides positive and stable leadership in the free world, that our policy is not imperialistic and respects the sovereignties of the nations with whom we deal (1).

To expose the nature of communism, its debasing effects on living conditions and its negation of freedom and human dignity, its threat to national sovereignties and particularly country X (2).

* Footnotes which follow presuppose that the operator would make use of sections of the manual dealing with the overall elite network (such as I, II, IV, XII, XIII and XIV) with informal groups and leaders (VIII,IX, and XI), and with the implementing of intelligence (XXIX, XXX, and XXI), even though they are not cited. Without fitting knowledge of both formal and informal groups into the overall elite network, without checking informal elite groups and individuals, and without correct operating procedures, the operation would be incomplete and disorganized. The specific citations are to sections or paragraphs which offer suggestions directly applicable to the particular problem raised by a detail of this hypothetical country plan.

(1) (XXV, XXVI-6)

(2) (XXI - int ; XXIV-int.)

3. To stimulate optimum use of the assistance available under American and UN

technical and economic assistance programs, to encourage the people of country X to raise their standard of living by developing their own resources. (1).

4. To give full publicity to the work of American technicians in X and to inspire confidence of X in itself to solve problems arising by virtue of its . transitional. state and accompanying social unrest, in co-operation with the technical assistance available (2).

5. To support X. s participation in the U.N. framework (3).

6. To build an enduring foundation of understanding between America and the people of X, based on mutual respect and appreciation of the respective cultural heritages (4), to correct distortions of the American scene, particularly with regard to color problems. (5) .

BASIC ATTITUDES

Aspirations. Freedom from unwelcome pressure of interferences from any foreign source (6); intense pride in their national heritage, former influence and culture (7); the improvement of political, economic and social conditions by the gradual adoption of modern methods (8); avoidance of provoking any foreign power to take action which would impair or destroy the sovereignty of country X(9); more constructive government leadership at all levels (10); with increasing responsibilities and power in rural officials(11), combined with attempt to hold neutralist position (12) insuring X. s independence through manoeuvring big power interplay.

Towards U.S.S.R. : Traditional mistrust of Russian motives (13); concern about

the communist menace though not sufficient to inspire government action to prevent growing strength of communist-infiltrated popular-front movements(14).

- (1) (XXVII-6; XXIV-7)
- (2) (XXIV-7; XXVII-5,6)
- (3) (IV-5; V-3; XXII-6; XXIV-8)
- (4) (III; IV; V)
- (5) (XXV; XXVI; XXVII)
- (6) (XXVIII-1,2,4)
- (7) (III,IV-8,10; V-3)
- (8) (III,V-6,7;VII-20;XV-7,10,12,13,14;XVI-2;XVII-5;XXII;XXIV-7;XXV-8)
- (9) (IV-5;V-3,5, 6,7; XXIV-9)
- (10) (V;VII;X;XVII)
- (11) (XX)
- (12) (XXV-4)
- (13) (III;IV-5;V-3)
- (14) (XV-3,6,7,8;XVI-1,2,3,4,5;XXI-9)

Towards Britain: Previous ties have been prejudiced by resentment at Britain. s . colonial attitude (1); frequently depreciated in nationalistic press as waning power which tends to cling to outmoded empire (2); some doctors and professionals British-trained (3).

Towards Germany: Respect for come-back in industrial potential since the war (4); some of X. s professionals are German-educated (5).

Towards France: Residue of cultural leadership (6), though no longer looked upon as great political or military power

Towards neighboring states: Traditional rivalry, friendly veneer.

FACTORS AFFECTING U.S.I.S. OPERATIONS

Favorable - Traditionally friendly relations with United States based on United States philanthropic, educational and medical activities (7); increasing evidences of benefit from American economic (8) and technical assistance(9); growing realization in provincial areas of the benefits of aid projects (10); distrust of age-old Russian imperialism; basically energetic people when self-advantage can be demonstrated, national characteristics - quick mind, lively imagination, adaptability, facility to learn quickly (11).

Unfavorable - Almost morbidly obsessed with importance of X as a peg of international security (12); unstable and inefficient government (13) which takes credits for all successes, blames foreigners for all mistakes, paradoxical combination of characteristics of mercurial emotional range and widespread defeatism; concentration of wealth (14); backward attitude towards women, private capital unwilling to invest widely in national projects(15) lack of social consciousness among rich business

(1) (XXVII -7)

(2) (IV-5; V-3; XXIV-8)

(3) (XXIV-3,4; XV-16)

(4) (XV-10)

(5) (XXIV-3,4; XV-16)

(6) (XXVII-7)

(7) XXVIII-5,6; XXIV-8

(8) III-6,7; V-6; VII-10,20:XXII

(9) XXIV-7

(10) XX

(11) XV-5; XVI-3; XVIII-4

(12) IV-5; V-3

(13) XVI, XVII

(14) IV-7; XV-7,12; XVI-2; XVII-7; XVIII-5;XXII; XXIII; XXIV

(15) XXII

interests(1); excessive illiteracy in rural areas (2); youth is unstable, cynical, socially insecure, energetic but intrained for citizenship responsibilities or work (3); heavy bombardment by Soviet radio propaganda (clandestine and openly operated) and subsidized press in the capital (4).

Soviet communist activities - Local communist party, though outlawed, actively agitates, has reportedly increased in strength during past year (5), concentrates among restive student (6) and labor groups (7), particularly in factories in provincial areas and among large groups of unemployed who have flocked to the capital as a result of recent national economic difficulties (8). Publishes clandestine newspapers, organizes demonstrations, has several front organizations Soviet broadcasts in X dialects totaling 24 hours a day blanket some portions of the country (9). Extent of covert activities not known but believed widespread.

Other foreign interests, activities. British and French continue efforts to maintain influence through information and cultural services; B.B.C. has good signal; Reuters, B.I.S. and A.F.P news agencies operate (10).

Other united states programs - United states military mission has trained X army, reorganized military practices (11), substantial economic and technical assistance program. (12).

Non-Government United States factors - Rockefeller Foundation has operated some health and educational programs; now being co-ordinated with United States technical assistance programs (13). Minimum American business activity - local representatives of larger United States firms in international field, especially automobiles (14). United States News Services, A.P. and U.P. (15).

(1) XXII

(2) XX; VII-18

- (3) VII-18
- (4) XXV-3,4; XXVI-6
- (5) VII-2,16; XVI
- (6) VII-18, XXIV
- (7) XXI
- (8) III-3,4
- (9) XXV
- (10) XXVII-1,2,3,4,5,6,7.
- (11) XVIII
- (12) III-3,4,5; XXVIII-6; XXII-9
- (13) XXVIII-5
- (14) VII-20, XXII
- (15) XXVIII-2

Mass communications channels:- Press: 109 dailies and weeklies, estimated 175,000 circulations; 19 magazines, Radio: estimated 90,000 sets, mostly in cities: four government stations operate locally (1). V.O.A. heard shortwave, signal medium to strong (2) films; Hollywood mostly, occasional Soviet, some British and French (3), censorship required. United States publications, some in the capital but expensive (4). Other: rural coffee houses(5)

Attitude forming groups - Religious : 95 per cent belong to state religion, especially effective rurally (6). Education: elementary system growing through curricula (all learning by rote) (7); danger communist penetration among industrial workers (8); government-supported union formed to counter communist-dominated union, but government program ineffectual(9). Military: conscription, attempt now being made to give positive educational value to military service period (10). Governmental: leaders 4,000 (11) and civil servants 100,000(12).

Priority target groups-

1. Leaders in :
 - a. government (13); b. education (14); c. press (15)
2. Leaders of :
 - a. farm organizations (16); b. labor unions (17).
3. Intellectuals and professionals (18).
4. Youth: university level (19).

Significant current documents -

Reports on mass media and public opinion study by Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University:

OIR Report, CS 5.5. Part III, December 25, 1951 (Secret).

NIS Survey (Secret).

USIS Semi-annual reports.

- (3) XXVII-8
- (4) XXVI-7
- (5) XX
- (6) VII-17; XIX; XX
- (7) VII-8, XXIV
- (8) XXI-9
- (9) XXI-10
- (10) XVIII-1,2,3,4,5,6.
- (11) VII-1,16; X-1,2,3,4,6,7; XVI
- (12) VII-6,9,12; XVII
- (13) VII-1,6,7,16;X;XVI;XVII
- (14) VII-17;XIX;XX;XV-16
- (15) VII-22;XXIV-4,10;XXVII
- (16) XX
- (17) VII-21;XXI
- (18) XXIV;XV-16;XIX-12
- (19) VII-18.

PART F

APPENDIX A

SAMPLING

The suggestion has been made several times in this manual that the operator gain information about the elite by using sampling. Such suggestions may have created a common sense image of "tasting a bit of what's in the kettle" for some and for others may have conjured up frightening statistical visions. Actually, the sampling which the operator can engage in need be neither so simple as to be dangerous, nor so complex as to be frightening. It is the purpose of this Appendix to strike a middle ground, recognizing that in most instances the operator is not prepared to use the more complex statistical tools, but also recognizing that he needs some minimum equipment to use sampling wisely.

By sample is meant any fraction of a total *population*, or as the statistician says, of a *universe*. Whenever one examines less than a total population – of persons, books, wheat, iron ore, families – he examines a sample. And the sample, no matter how it is drawn from the total population, will have some of the characteristics of the total population. The hope is that it will have most of the characteristics and that information obtained from it can be "projected" to the population.

At the outset of this discussion, it is important to make clear that the statistical approach to sampling is basically an extension of that of a logical man to the problem inherent in examining a part of anything and then talking about the whole. The logical man recognizes – at least vaguely – the chance factors which

limit the usefulness of any sample; the statistician has developed mathematical devices to speak about these chance factors more precisely. None of what is to follow will destroy any previously-used *logical* approaches of the operator. An appreciation of statistical treatment will only rarely demonstrate that previous approaches thought to be logical are in fact fallacious; most of the time, it will only make it possible to be more precise about them.

WHY SAMPLE?

Generally speaking, one examines a sample because (1) he wishes to know something about the total population: (2) it is impossible or impractical to measure the entire population. To emphasize these points, one is *not* interested in the characteristics of the sample for themselves alone. They invariably are interesting or useful only to the degree that they can be projected to the total population. The impossibility of measuring the total population may be in terms of time or money, possibly even in terms of physical unavailability. Moreover, it may often be that measurement by sampling will be just as accurate as measuring the population.

POPULATION IN A STATISTICAL SENSE

A population or universe is the total collection of units of the same class as those taken in the sample. Defining the given population in a given sampling situation is an arbitrary thing. The sampler can decide that his population will be all of the living human beings in a certain geographic area, or he may limit it to men over thirty-five years of age. It could be all of the books in a certain library, or it could be just those books classified under all numbers referring to political science. If the entire population has been measured, the result is called a *census*. If qualities

and characteristics of the total population have been obtained and have been expressed in numbers, they are called *parameters* of the population.

While definition of the population under study is arbitrary, it is usually advisable to define it in such a way that it is possible to get at all the individuals in it. Thus when a sampler is interested in a particular population buried or intermingled in a larger population, and there is no ready way to subdivide them, he had best accept the larger group which is available and accessible. In terms of elite study, this might mean sampling from fairly large populations in which the elite might be "intermingled" unless the operator possessed information making it possible to delimit the population because of parameters which were available to him. As a general rule, however, the sampler seeks to make his population or universe as small as possible, to limit the area under study.

WHEN NOT TO SAMPLE

There is a time and place for sampling. It may seem unnecessary to mention it, but a regular warning is this; Don't sample until you are certain that the information you seek is not available elsewhere. A surprising amount of information is available and it is senseless to go through a sampling study when a census of the information one seeks is tucked away in the recess of some library.

Another warning, which will be expanded upon later, is this: Don't sample when you can determine in advance that the results of your study cannot possibly give you information of sufficient precision to meet requirements which may be imposed upon you.

A final suggestion: Don't sample when you are quite certain that the quality or characteristic you seek to measure to the population is very rare. In a sense, this is a restatement of the second warning. To make it specific, if the hypothesis is that .001 per cent of a population possesses a given characteristic, it is almost

hopeless to seek to measure this by sampling the total population.

REPRESENTATIVENESS OF A SAMPLE

It was noted above that any sample, no matter how it is taken from the population, will have *some* of the characteristics of the population. In this sense, it "represents" the population. The degree of representativeness is expressed in terms of measurements of the sample and measurements of the population. If the sample is of males and females from a population equally divided between the sexes, the sample would be perfectly representative of this characteristic if it were also divided 50-50. One can see that a check on the sex-ratio in the population based on taking samples of two, has three possible results – one which is perfectly representative, one which over-represents males and one which over-represents females.

Since the purpose of sampling is to project the measurements of the sample to the total population, the sample hopes to restrict the chances of studying a part of a population which has a low degree of representativeness. In particular, he hopes to get rid of practices on his own part, which will mean that the sample will be non-representative. If one endeavors to determine the sex ratio by a sample of two persons, it would be almost certain that it would over-represent females if one chose the first two persons to come out of the door of a girls' school. And taking two names from a list of trade union leaders would almost certainly produce two men. Checking at the doors of American homes in the afternoon would probably over-represent women and taking two persons out of a fight audience would over-represent men.

If it could be arranged that every person in this population, made up half of males and half of females, had an equal chance of coming into the sample, there would be a better chance of getting a representative sample (size two) since one out of two times the correct ratio would be obtained. (There are two ways to get a 50-50

split, only one way to get an all-male sample, and only one way to get an all-female sample.)

HOW TO OBTAIN REPRESENTATIVENESS

It is of little value to measure an unrepresentative sample of the population. The results, if projected, will give a false picture. How then to determine in advance that the sample will be representative?

One method involved the use of the parameters of the population. If several measurements are available, it will be possible to construct a sample which will be a fairly exact replica of the population, *as far as these parameters are concerned*.

It is not certain at all, but the chances are frequently good that such a sample will also be like the general population in the unknown characteristic, provided it is correlated with the known measurements. This sampling method is usually referred to as "quota" sampling. Sometimes small samples, which will serve as a continuing "panel" to be studied on successive occasions, are also chosen by this system.

Another method involved taking individuals from the population complete by chance (in a statistical sense). In this system, care is taken to see that each individual in the population has an equal (or known) chance of being chosen. The sample is then drawn by a method which prevents the researcher from exercising control over the choice of any individual. In working with small populations, it is possible to do this by assigning numbers to every individual and then drawing the desired sample "from a hat" or in a way analogous to that. It is called simple random sampling.

MEANING OF 'BIAS'

If the sampler takes a chunk of individuals from the population because they happen to be handy, or because they "look" representative, or because they are his friends and don't mind being questioned, he will have no assurance that his sample will be representative. Most often, his sample will be biased, i.e., the very nature of the drawing of such a sample will mean that if the process were repeated, certain portions of population would be over-represented (or under-represented) consistently. Suppose one took his sample from the crowd passing his office door on a busy street. Some persons would pass by this door so regularly that their chance of coming into the sample would be very high – almost a certainty. Some other persons in the population of the city might never come by the door. If the office were in the financial district, there would be a preponderance of persons connected with banks and brokerage houses. If it were in a warehouse district, the workers and officials of wholesale firms would predominate.

Actually, if it so happened that the "chunk" taken by this method were made up of individuals who varied in the same way as the population on the factors being studied, this sample would not be biased. But this happy event most often does not occur. The "chunk" sample is usually biased in its very nature, and one projects results from measuring it to the population at his own peril.

MEANING OF RANDOM

The term *random* was introduced in the above section. It has a special statistical meaning, which is not synonymous with everyday usage. One speaks of a person wandering randomly through a field or making a random choice from a box of candy. Yet such behavior is usually not random at all. The position of the box of

candy and the position of the person's hand may reduce the chances of taking a particular piece; subjective values concerning kinds of candy or colors or attitudes about the presence or absence of nuts will enter into the random choice. Almost all human behavior is non-random to a high degree.

If the operator wishes to check himself, let him endeavor to write down twenty-five one-digit numbers in his best attempt at randomness. Then let him write down the figures 0 to 9 on ten pieces of paper and draw twenty-five times from a hat, recording each number. A comparison of the two lists of numbers will demonstrate the inability of man to be random. One person will over-correct, producing a very even distribution of numbers. Another will over-represent a favorite number. Almost all persons, given such instructions, will tend to write down more numbers one digit removed from each other (because of the normal pattern of counting) than can occur by chance. Almost no-one will write down the same number twice in succession, though such an event can occur by chance. Here is another factor which frequently will have an effect: as a person discovers that he has not written down a particular number, it becomes almost certain that he will chose it next.

Suffice it than to say, that if any sampling scheme calls for a random selection (or selection purely by chance) the operator must use methods which will prevent human foibles from making it non-random.

GETTING A BAD SAMPLE BY CHANCE

While random methods of selecting samples have been somewhat exalted here, they are not perfect. They are subject to what is known as sampling error. In a statistical sense, this refers to the possibility that a given sample will tend to give a value which is *not* representative of the population. This can be demonstrated by considering what happens when one samples in an effort to measure a characteristic which varies considerably from one member to another.

Consider this hypothetical study of age of an elite population. Let us say that there were 100 members of the elite with ages ranging from 22 to 78. Say that the 10 youngest range from 22 to 31 (with one in each age bracket), and the ten oldest from 69 to 78. The 80 remaining are from 31 to 69 years old. If one were attempting to get an estimate of the average age of the population by taking a random sample of 10, it would be possible to draw these 10 youngest or 10 oldest. Even though the true mean of this population were 43, it would be possible to get one sample which would indicate the average age was 26.5 years, and another which would indicate 73.5. These are very bad samples – and could be drawn by chance – but they are only two out of more than seventeen trillion possible samples of size 10 which could be drawn from a population of 100. And all the rest of the possible samples will yield estimates of the mean which will be closer to the true value of 43. Further, while there is only one combination which will yield an average as low as 26.5, there are billions of samples which will yield values between 40 and 45.

To bring the probabilities of this example down to manageable size, suppose that ages were so distributed that exactly 50 of the elite were 40 years old and the other 50 were 46 years old. In such a circumstance, there would be only one chance in 1024 that a sample of 10 would contain ALL persons who were 40 years old, while the chance that the sample would contain half 40 and half 46 (and would be exactly representative of the true average age) would be approximately 1 out of 5. Additional probabilities that the average 10 chosen would fall in more or less equal numbers around the mean would add to the probabilities of the result being usefully realistic.

The above examples were set up so that the populations from which the examples were taken were approximately "normal." Normal has both a statistical and a general sense. To take the latter first, normality of distribution is what one sees in nature; people vary from one extreme to another in size, height, income, number of children, with most of them being concentrated about a central value in the vicinity of the midpoint between two extremes. This is true of a tremendous number of measurements, not only of human populations, but of animal

populations, inanimate objects, in fact of a considerable percentage of the distributions of measurements that man has taken.

This concentration of cases around a central value means that there are almost always more possible samples which will give values near to the true population mean, than those which are far removed.

Normality in a statistical sense has a more precise meaning, which indicates that exact proportions of the values of individuals in a distribution will be a certain amount greater or lesser than the central value. This kind of regularity is the basis of much of the statistical treatment of sampling.

To be specific about the normal distribution, it can be stated that 68 per cent of the cases in it will have values which are no more than one "standard deviation" greater than the mean, or no less than one "standard deviation" less than the mean. (The term standard deviation will be taken up in subsequent paragraphs.) Further, 95 per cent of the cases will occur between two values represented by the mean minus two standard deviations and the mean plus two standard deviations.

Departures from normality in a distribution are spoken of by the statistician as "skewness." This refers to a concentration of values either higher or lower than the mid-point of the range between the extremes. If the values are greater the distribution is said to be skewed to the right; if they are smaller, it is skewed to the left.

CENTRAL VALUES

In order to speak more precisely about a population (or a distribution of characteristics of a population) it is necessary to have some meaningful system of combining individual characteristics into a group characteristic. In talking about

the normal distribution, we have already introduced several terms which help describe a distribution. One of these is the *mid-range*, which is the point equidistant from the extreme values.

A common measurement of central value used universally is the average, or as the statistician calls it, *the mean*. It is obtained by adding all of the individual values and dividing by the total number of cases. The *median* is the point which divides the distribution into equal parts as far as numbers of cases or measurements are concerned. The *mode* is the point in the distribution on which the largest number of cases fall.

If the distribution were perfectly normal all of these measures of central value would coincide. As it departs from normality, these central values tend to move away from each other. Thus a comparison of these several central measurements can tell considerably about the "shape" of the distribution. If the mean, for example, is to the right of the median, one knows that the distribution is skewed to the right, i.e. there are more higher than average values than there are lower than average values, or the number may be balanced but the differences between the high values and the average is greater than that between the low and the average.

Much of the operator's work may be in determining how a population is divided, i.e. what proportion has a characteristic and what proportion lacks it. This may seem quite different from measuring a variable such as age, yet it can be conveniently thought of as the same kind of variable and the same statistical approach used. The rationale is this: the presence of the characteristic is recorded as a 1, and the absence as 0. There is then a "distribution" (with only two possible values). The mean is obtained by adding up the "1s" and dividing by the total number of cases, which yields a fraction (identical to the percentage). This approach will be useful later when other statistical measures are considered.

MEASUREMENTS OF DISPERSION

As well as measuring the central values of a distribution, it is useful to measure its dispersion. The *range* and the *standard deviation* are such measures.

Another would be obtained by dividing the distribution into four equal parts, or quartiles, by frequency of cases. This might show, for example, in the case of ages of the 100 elite, that the first quartile included those from age 22 to 34; the second from 35 to 40; the third from 41 to 52; and the fourth from 53 to 78. Such a division would indicate that the elite were relatively young – half of them being 40 or under. It would also show a considerable dispersion in the oldest quartile, as well as that the distribution is skewed to the right.

To obtain the *standard deviation* of a distribution, one first computes a statistic known as the *variance*. It is obtained by squaring the differences between the individual measurements and the mean, adding them together, and dividing by the number of cases. The square root of the variance is the standard deviation.

This measurement tells about the dispersion of the distribution in two useful ways. First, as can be seen from the operations involved in computing it, the standard deviation tends to emphasize cases which are considerably greater or considerably less than the mean. In the hypothetical study of age of an elite population of 100 (as introduced above but with additional ages and frequencies provided) we would obtain a population standard deviation of about 10 years. This standard deviation would be affected much more by the single person 78 years old, who would contribute $(35)^2$ or 1225 to the variance, than by the several persons 44 years old, each of whom would contribute only $(1)^2$ to the variance.

In combination with the mean, the standard deviation also tells us, depending upon the normality of the distribution, approximately how many cases will be within a given distance from the mean. Thus in the hypothetical study of age, the standard deviation of 10, along with the mean of 43 years, would indicate that about 68 per cent of the cases would be between 33 and 53 years, or that 95 per

cent of them would be roughly between 24 and 63 years. Actually, since this population is skewed to the right as the foregoing chart shows, there are somewhat more than 5 per cent of the cases outside of these limits.

As well as telling approximately how many cases can be expected to be found within a given distance from the mean, the relationship between the standard deviation and the mean shows whether this is a very widely dispersed population or a concentrated one. It will be found that as a population is made up of individuals which have very nearly the same values as the mean that the standard deviation will approach zero. And it will be found that as a population is made up of individuals with very different values from the mean, the standard deviation will increase.

SAMPLING ERROR

The standard deviation of a population (in contrast to that of a sample) is usually not known; it would not be available unless a census had been taken, and even then, the computation of it would often be a lengthy, tedious task. But mathematicians have demonstrated a relationship between the standard deviation of a population and the deviation of samples, which makes it possible to talk about chance effects upon representativeness of the sample in a more precise fashion.

The relationship grows out of these facts. If one were to draw successive samples from a population, record the means that they provided, and to measure the distribution (or standard deviation) of these averages, he would find that they tended to describe a normal distribution – even if the original population did not.*

Thus, if repeated samples were drawn from a population, very few means will be more than three standard deviations from the true mean. Further, we can say that generally 68 per cent of the sample means will have a value between two points

represented (a) by the population mean minus one standard deviation, and (b) by the population mean plus one standard deviation. Going out two standard deviations in both directions will include a little more than 95 per cent of the sample means.

*It can be shown that no matter what the population from which one is sampling, it is impossible for more than 1/9 of the possible sample estimates to differ from the average of all estimates by more than 3 times the standard deviation of the sample estimates." Hansen, Hurwitz, Madow. *Sample Survey Methods and Theory*. 1953. p.22.

In addition, it has been shown mathematically that the variance of a distribution of sample means (the square of the standard deviation) has a fixed relationship in regard to the population variance. It is this: the variance of a sampling distribution of averages will be equal to the population variance divided by the number of cases in the successive samples.

The quantity obtained by making this computation is called the sampling error of the sample mean. It will always be smaller than the standard deviation of the sample, and will be reduced as the size of the sample is increased.

USE OF SAMPLE VARIANCE AS ESTIMATE OF POPULATION VARIANCE

This mathematical relationship makes it possible to pull ourselves up by our bootstraps. We can now substitute the sample variance as an "estimate" of the unknown population variance and divide it by the size of the sample. Then taking

the square root of this number, we obtain the "sampling error." Applying it through the use of the normal curve factors, we can set up limits within which we would expect the population value to be located a certain percentage of the time.

In the example on elite ages, the sampling error would be obtained in the following manner. The sample variance (100) would be divided by the sample size (10), giving a result of 10. In turn, we would then take the square root of 10, which is approximately 3.1. From this we can infer, on the basis of the one sample, that if we drew successive samples, 68 per cent of the time, the means that the successful samples provided would lie between 39.9 and 46.1 years, or that 95 per cent of the time the means would lie between 36.8 and 49.2 years.

This process of substitution may be used if the sample includes at least 30 cases. It would be of no use, for instance, if the sample of ages taken from the population were only 10.

STANDARD ERROR OF A PROPORTION

The relationship between (a) the measurement of a characteristic of a population which varies in the same fashion as age, and (b) a measurement of the presence or absence of a quality which yields a percentage or proportion has already been established in the subsection on Central Values.

Number in Sample	Standard Error (in %) of a proportion	95 per cent Confidence limits (in %)
50	6.9	46.5 - 73.5
100	4.9	50.4 - 69.6
200	3.5	53.1 - 66.9
500	2.2	55.7 - 64.3
1000	1.6	56.9 - 63.1

As was noted, the percentage can be thought of as the same as a mean. A similar relationship exists between the standard error of a measurement like age and the standard error of a proportion. The main difference, as far as the operator is concerned, is the ease with which the latter may be calculated.

The standard error of a proportion is obtained by multiplying the obtained proportion (usually called "p") by 1-minus-the-proportion (called "1-p" or "q"), dividing the result by the number of cases in the sample (usually called "n"), and taking the square root of the final result. In formula form this looks like this: $\sqrt{(p \times q) / n}$. The result is the

\sqrt{n}

standard error of the proportion, and like the standard error of a sample mean, is used to indicate the percentage of all possible samples which can be expected to yield proportions (means) within certain limits.

For most of the operator's purposes, it will be sufficient to use the 95 per cent confidence level, which sets up limits based on the obtained proportion, plus approximately two times the standard error (actually 1.96) minus two times the standard error. As can be seen from the formula, this standard error of a proportion will vary in accordance with the obtained proportions, getting smaller as they become more extreme; it will also vary with sample size, getting smaller as the sample size increases. The confidence limits will accordingly shrink (or expand) at the same time.

An idea of how sample size will affect the standard error of a proportion is

provided in the following table, based in each instance on an obtained value of 60 per cent:

These values will *always* be obtained when the sample is of the size indicated, when the percentage is 60 per cent, and when the 95 per cent confidence level is used. Similar tables could be worked out for every percentage.

One caution on the use of the standard error of a proportion should be made. If the division of the sample is very extreme (beyond a 90%-10% split) and there are less than five cases in the smaller percentage, this formula should not be used.

Another caution relates to the use of breakdowns. Thus, a study might indicate that an elite population is divided 60 to 40 in favor of the U.S., with confidence limited based on a sample of 200. Breakdowns of the figures might show that the sample contained 50 members of Party A, of whom 60 per cent were favorable, 20 of Party B, with 50 percent favorable; 20 of Party C, with 75 per cent favorable, and 10 of Party D, with 50 per cent. The confidence limits of each of these percentages must be based on the number of cases in each of the sub-samples, rather than on the total sample. Obviously, as far as the universe of Party A members is concerned, one has only a sample of 50 upon which to base his estimate (and similarly for each of the subsequent cases).

THE FINITE MULTIPLIER

In most sampling to obtain proportions, the population is very large in relationship to the sample. However, if the population is somewhat smaller and the sample represents a fairly large part of it, it becomes useful to consider a factor known as the *finite multiplier*. This factor works to reduce the standard

error and, as a result, to give more confidence in the results. Since the operator will quite often be sampling from rather small populations, the possibility of his using this factor is increased.

The finite multiplier is represented by that portion of the population which is *not* drawn into the sample. Thus, if the sample represented 1/10th of the population, the finite multiplier would be 9/10th s. The figure obtained by completing the $p \times q$ is multiplied by the finite n multiplier, and the square root is taken of the resulting figure. Since the multiplier will always be less than 1, the resulting standard error will always be smaller. The larger the percentage of the population taken, the more the standard error is reduced, until the entire population has been taken, in which case it is reduced to 0.

There is obviously little to be gained by using the multiplier when 1/100th or less of the population has been taken in the sample, since the multiplier will be .99 or larger and the change in the standard error will be almost imperceptible.

EXAMPLES OF USE OF STANDARD ERROR OF PROPORTION

Let us now apply the information of the last two subsections on some specific examples. Suppose the operator had a card file of 1000 members of the elite which he had gathered from various sources, containing considerable information which had not been analyzed. Suppose he is interested in a quick study of several characteristics of the elite, such as membership or lack of it in a religious group; attendance or lack of it at a university. Let him draw a sample of 50 by random methods, and suppose that his results show that 40 per cent of his sample are members of religious sects and that 55 per cent attended university.

The formula for the standard error of a proportion would be applied in this fashion. For the obtained value of 40 per cent, he would multiply $.4 \times .6$, getting .24. This would be divided by 50, giving .0048. Since he took 5/100^{ths} of the

population, the finite multiplier would be $95/100^{\text{th}}$ s. This would give a value of .00456. The square root of this is approximately .68 (or 6.8 %). The same kind of computation of the 55 per cent value would give a standard error of 6.9 per cent. Calculating the confidence limits at the 95 per cent confidence levels would give limits of from 26.7 to 53.3 per cent for the religious affiliation figure and from 41.5 to 68.5 for attendance in college.

If the operator had taken 200 of his 1000 population, much narrower confidence limits would be obtained. Gaining both from the increase in sample size and the decrease in the finite multiplier, the two standard errors would be very considerably reduced, down to 3.1 for the religious affiliation figure, and to 3.3% for the college education result. This would result in confidence limits of from 33.9 to 66.1 for the religious affiliation and of 48.5 to 61.5 for the college attendance.

CHOOSING SIZE OF SAMPLE

Since sample size has such large effects on the confidence with which one may use the results, it becomes a key question in any sampling operation. What size sample is enough? The exact answer, in any given situation, is something like the old riddle about the length of a piece of string – it has to be long enough to go around whatever one wants to tie up.

Thus, it is up to the operator to decide in advance how precise a result he wishes. He can always determine the broadest part of the possible confidence belts by assuming an obtained result of 50 per cent, and by calculating the confidence limits based on the size of the sample and its relationship to the total size of the population. If this result, which will be his worst or largest confidence limits, seems too imprecise to be of value *for his purpose*, the operator had better increase the size of the sample until he reaches limits more acceptable for his purposes.

Some notion of the gain in precision which comes from increasing sample size is shown in the example three paragraphs before. By quadrupling the sample, the size of the standard error was cut a little more than half (the extra gain coming because of the decrease in the size of the finite multiplier). This relationship will hold generally; to reduce the sampling error by an amount equal to any factor, it is necessary to increase the sample size by the square of the factor (less whatever benefits accrue from taking a larger percentage of the population).

REQUIREMENT FOR SIMPLE RANDOM SAMPLING

All of the statistics of sampling are based upon the premise that the sample is drawn in a random fashion. Several factors which relate to this have already been taken up, but the requirements for the drawing of such a sample will be spelled out in detail here.

1. The total population must be available.
2. Numbers must be given to each individual in the population.
3. The sample must be taken from this "list" of numbers in a completely random fashion.
4. There must be no substitution of individuals drawn in the sample.

AREA SAMPLING

A modification of the simple random sampling method which can sometimes be used is what is known as "area sampling." In such a case it is impossible (or

difficult) to enumerate the entire population, but it is possible to enumerate some subsidiary list (usually much smaller than the total population) to which the individual units can be "attached."

The system is most often applied in drawing a random sample of households in a large city, or from a nation as a whole. In the U.S. case, generally a list of counties is made, numbers are attached, and a sample of counties is drawn. Then the chosen counties are split up into geographical sub-areas, and a sample of these are taken. By successive steps, the sampler moves down to smaller geographical units, finally choosing dwelling units in blocks, and individuals within the dwelling units, each step being performed in a random manner. Then interviewers visit the specific individuals selected by this process, getting their opinions, attitudes and behavior.

Such a device requires excellent maps of the area to be studied. In addition, if there are very considerable differences in the population sizes of the various sub-sections it may be advisable to do what is called "sampling in proportion to size." This method simply calls for allowing counties, or other chosen units, additional chances of being selected in accordance with their population. Thus one would give a county with a population of 10,000/10 opportunities to come into the sample (by assigning 10 numbers to it instead of 1) and would give a county with only 1000 population only 1 chance to come into the sample.

Generally speaking, the operator will probably have little opportunity or need to use the area sampling method in this sense. However, sampling systems analogous to it may be used in keeping with the kinds of problem that he will face.

For example, if the operator wanted to sample a voluminous edition of a book like *Who's Who*, he could use a modification of this system. He could divide the total volume into pages (after a check to determine that the number of biographies per page was roughly the same), and then draw one name from each page by some standardized system (such as taking the 5th name from the top of the page in the left hand column, or some other number drawn at random). If the book were

very large, he might even take every other page. If he had a table of random numbers, he could draw a set of numbers which would govern which page he took.

QUOTA SAMPLING

A methodology long used in the United States, particularly by public opinion pollers is what is called "quota sampling." In this methodology, a considerable number of characteristics of the population are known as the result of various censuses. The sampler, then, endeavors to build up a sample which has the same characteristics as the universe. Taking such measures as sex ratio, age, economy status, education, political affiliation and other divisions of the population, which are known, he selects individuals who fit the "quota" which he sets up.

Thus, if the operator had available several parameters of the total elite population, such as age, sex, political affiliation, membership in church organization, job or skill classification, he might put together a sample which would have the same proportions, with some hope that it would be representative of the universe in the characteristic he wished to measure as well as the known parameters.

Two problems arise with this methodology. First, it is necessary that the unknown characteristics vary along with (or be correlated with) the known characteristics. Thus, if he were endeavoring to measure favorableness to U.S. messages in an elite population, and it happened that this quality did not vary with age, sex, political affiliation, and church membership, he might obtain a very unrepresentative sample, despite careful polling of quotas along the proportion of these traits. The chances, of course, are that if a sample is controlled in several basic, characteristics, it will also be controlled in the characteristic under study. Secondly, this method makes it inadvisable to apply the statistical checks which have been suggested above. This arises because of the nature of the selection of individuals to be in the sample. It is almost always NOT random in a statistical

sense. As a result, the formulas developed specifically for the testing the confidence limits of *random* samples cannot be applied. This represents the position of statisticians. In actual practice many persons using quota sampling DO apply statistical tests. The assumption is that they will be *indicative* of the precision of the results of the quota sampling, even though there is no statistical rationale for their use.

PANEL SAMPLING

Choosing a small sample in a purposive way to make a *panel* which would be a cross section of the population is actually a special case of quota sampling. As such, it is also impossible to determine sampling error by statistical methods which have been described – or by any other method, for that matter.

A characteristic of the *panel* is that it is used over and over again. Care must be taken in this process to determine whether the experience of being questioned is influencing the panel in such a way as to make it less representative.

Despite these difficulties, the small panel can often be very illuminating. The information the operator gains from the panel may provide hunches as to the characteristics of the population from which it is drawn. And the combination of panel information with other material available from other sources may make it possible to speak about the population with considerable accuracy.

SIGNS AND SUGGESTIONS

While sampling statistics give an impression of great precision, even the best of methods is far from precise. However, a knowledge of how basic chance factors

affect the characteristics of samples is of value to the operator, even if he never calculates a confidence limit, nor figures out a standard deviation. For awareness of the chance factors will suggest to him that he had better go slow at some times, because his result may be primarily the result of chance. The nature of bias in a sampling methodology and the alertness of it, will also suggest greater incredulity when he looks at "hard figures" based on sampling methodology which is inherently faulty.

It is suggested here that several conditions should be noticed by the operator who is doing his own sampling, or who is utilizing material worked up by others. Among these are:

1. Always check a measurement of a central value (average or proportion) against the size of sample and the size of the population.
2. If a measurement of dispersion is available, the larger it is the less confidence one should put in the measurement of central value.
3. If the interest of the operator is in the variation of the population rather than its central value, somewhat smaller sample sizes are acceptable.
4. In evaluating information obtained from large scale sampling, one will find that a *properly drawn* random sample of 3,000 or more – no matter what the size of the population – usually has high enough precision to make its results quite dependable.
5. Be skeptical of breakdowns from samples which may be adequate in size on major points, but which may have very small numbers of cases on which to base the breakdowns. Thus in the preceding case (4), though the 3000 may be an excellent sample, a comparison of two small pieces of it (say of 20 and 35 cases) will have a much greater probable error than the sample as a whole.
6. Be particularly skeptical of breakdowns of quota samples. Often they are controlled on a limited number of factors. Total divisions of the populations may

be based upon representative samples, but breakdowns may be samples which – in effect – have not been controlled.

7. If a sample is identified as a random or probability type, check on the percentage of individuals chosen to be in the sample who were actually measured. Sometimes 25 per cent or more of the chosen sample cannot be reached. This affects adversely the confidence with which one may use the results.

8. Always look for a discussion of the sampling methodology in any report based on taking a part of a population. Generally, if a high quality job has been done, the system used will be described in considerable detail.

Finally, the operator need not let the weight of statistical arguments overwhelm him. He will almost always be in a position where *some* information is better than *no* information. If he gains information from a non-random sample it is not rendered useless if it cannot be checked by the methods given here. Such information, combined with other material may provide much insight into the composition of the elite or on the problem of locating its members. The cautions given here should be thought of as relative, not absolute. And when precise sampling techniques can be used to help with the job, they should be used. If the complications in using them are too great, they can be considered uneconomic methods and put aside for a more suitable task. They should never be used just for the sake of using scientific techniques.

PART F

APPENDIX B

CONTENT ANALYSIS

At numerous points in this manual the suggestion has been made to the operator to "analyze the content" of this or that material. For the most part, the suggestion has related in printed materials, such as newspapers, magazines, books, codes of laws, lists of organizations, lists of names of office holders. At some points, it has also been suggested that the operator analyze personalized material, which would be written down but not necessarily printed, such as diaries or other personal documents, answers of informants to questions, replies of individuals to questionnaires. In addition, there has been some mention of non-printed content, such as that of speeches and radio programs. All the communication forms mentioned have been subjected to successful content analysis along restricted lines.

Thus, a definition of content is suggested; it is simply any body of symbols. By symbol is meant any sign or word or number or other means of conveying information. For the most part, the operator will be dealing with content which is made up of words, although he may have content with a high and useful percentage of number symbols. This approach can be extended to think of a picture as being a body of content made up of a number of symbols, or of a piece of music satisfying the definition. Successful content analyses have shown trends in styles, motives, and scope of paintings and musical compositions.

The size of the "body of content" can vary tremendously; it may be a single one-

hour speech, or it may be 100 years of the files of a newspaper. As far as the operator is concerned, the body of content will always be limited to that which is pertinent to his needs. Thus he may be interested in only a portion of a list of names or organizations, or only the editorial pages of a newspaper, or a series of radio programs which lasted for two weeks. In terms of sampling methodology suggested in Appendix A, the "body of content" becomes the "universe" or "population" which he is studying. The universe of content, then, might be all of the editorial pages of X newspaper published in a two-year period, and the actual "sample" studied might be a randomly selected 25 pages drawn from the 730 making up the universe. Such sampling is very frequently done in content analysis to reduce the bulk of the material. Within the limits of sampling error, it is a very useful kind of reduction.

Whenever the suggestion to analyze the content has been made in the manual, several basic assumptions have been made at the same time. The first is that the content is not a random collection of symbols, but that it is a patterned collection of symbols which convey information, i.e. the content is a communication. The second is that the pattern is cumulative, i.e. there will be more of some kinds of symbols than of others, and that the frequency of these symbols will tell something about the content. Third, it is assumed that the symbols can be quantified, or in plain words, may be counted in some systematic fashion. Fourth, it is assumed that by counting the symbols and analyzing the resulting tabulations, one can discover more precise and more useful information about what the body of content contains than by some other method.

Almost all bodies of content satisfy the first two points. Not all satisfy the third, and many fail to meet the fourth. Only when all of these assumptions can be satisfied should the operator engage in content analysis. In following pages means of testing content in advance to see how it measures up to the "criteria" will be given.

LEVELS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS

While specific details of "content analysis" have not been mentioned in the manual, it is apparent that there are several levels of activity which have been thought of when this term has been used. Three levels may be identified : (a) subjective; (b) mechanical ; (c) subjective-mechanical.

By "subjective analysis" is meant simply the reading or listening to or looking at any body of symbols and endeavoring to abstract from the multitude of symbols which it contains one or several central messages. This is the natural habit of any reader or listener. One spends two days reading a book; to an inquirer, he describes in a few words that the book is about. Or again, one listens to a speech for an hour and when a friend asks what the speaker said, one answers briefly with a summary of the information as he sees it. It might take the form: "Jones spent the whole hour talking about the danger of communism."

That there are serious limitations to this approach to what any body of symbols contains is readily apparent. One may misread the book, or one may fail to cumulate the points which might have been cumulated, or one may over-emphasize certain content because it fits his own point of view. Similar problems may limit the effectiveness of subjective analysis of a spoken body of symbols. There may be additional problems of simply remembering what the speaker said at the beginning and what he said at the end; or there may be problems of not hearing clearly, all of which may affect the reliability of the analysis. On the other hand, there are many advantages of this subjective kind of study. It is quick and effective. Actually, no one works with symbols without using it.

While the operator will often be forced by the exigencies of time to be satisfied with such an analysis, it should be noted that it is not content analysis in a scientific sense. One of the experts on the subject, Bernard Berelson, says that "content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication." Reading over a communication will give one information on its "manifest content," but it is difficult to assert that such a method is objective, systematic or quantitative.

To get away from the lack of rigor and the ever-present problem of bias of the subjective approach to content, one can make what has been termed here a "mechanical" analysis of the material, which would meet the demands of the above definition. To return to the example of the speech, such as an analysis might result in changing the subjective statement: "Jones spent the whole hour talking about the danger of communism" into "Jones mentioned the danger of communism seventeen times in his one-hour speech." If there were several speeches in which the operator were interested, such a mechanical counting might make it possible to move from the subjective statement: "It seems to me that Jones speaks more about the danger of communism than Smith," into the more precise statement, "In his last speech Jones referred to the danger of communism seventeen times while Smith in his speech only mentioned it three times."

Such a mechanical approach may provide a relatively small amount of additional information over the subjective analysis of a generalized book or speech. But when one is confronted with materials which has more pronounced repetitive characteristics, the mechanical analysis may be very much more useful than the subjective approach. Thus, if one were analyzing a copy of *Who's Who* subjectively, he might flip through the pages and discover that there seems to be a concentration of men from certain eastern colleges and universities; or he might note that there seemed to be quite a few Episcopalians, or not as many Catholics as he expected to find. These subjective judgments about the contents of *Who's Who* would be rather weak, however, unless the analyzer were unusually proficient in counting things in his head as he went along. And again, his special interests, his own biases, might make it possible for him to be quite sure that certain characteristics were predominant, when in fact they were not.

If the mechanical approach were taken instead, the analyzer would record the mentions of various universities and possibly the presence or absence of college education, the religious background, the political party membership and several other dimensions suggested by the biographical material. And when he had finished, he would have a rather precise analysis of the content of the *Who's Who*. He could now say that 43 per cent of the men mentioned came from twelve

eastern universities, that 25 per cent were Episcopalians and that 22 per cent were Catholics (or whatever the figures showed). This would provide him with much more useful information about the content than the subjective estimates mentioned earlier.

Since a relatively low percentage of the available collections of symbols are organized in the highly repetitive form of a *Who's Who* however become necessary to use a more complicated system of content analysis. It is dubbed here the "subjective-mechanical" system, since it involves (at least for the operator) a considerable measure of subjective choice, yet applies much of the rigor of the simple counting method. Such a procedure might be more effective in telling what Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones were talking about. For example, it could have been that Jones, despite his seventeen mentions of the "danger of communism" actually put all but one of them in contexts which showed that he was de-emphasizing the "danger" while Smith, with only three mentions, put all of his into contexts which emphasized them. Thus, a better approach than the simple mechanical would be not only to count the mentions of the phrase, but also to evaluate each use of it as "emphasizing" or as "de-emphasizing."

Specialists in content analysis endeavor to define rigorously what they will regard as "emphasizing" or "de-emphasizing" or "strong-weak", or "favorable-unfavorable" in advance of beginning such an analysis, so that several different individuals will be able to code the content in the same fashion. They have gone a long way toward removing the subjective nature of such evaluations. On the other hand, the operator, working under the conditions that he must, had best remember that there are subjective factors when he departs from mechanical recording of symbols.

PROBLEMS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS

It is undoubtedly apparent that there will be many problems in the use of this

scientific tool. They may be thought of conveniently as those of the pre-counting period, those of the counting period, and those of the analysis of data period. Actually, most of them relate to the first period. This is particularly so far the operator. Because of his lack of time and personnel, he must work out in advance almost all of the problems which may be anticipated, otherwise he may find that he has put in many hours of work and has failed to get a useful result.

1. *Knowledge of the body of content.* A first pre-requisite to useful content analysis is to have a reasonably good knowledge of the body of content one proposed to study. This must be obtained by the subjective kind of analysis which was set up as the "first level of operation." It may be possible for the research scientist to start counting symbols on the suspicion that his totals may reveal something of interest, but it is not wise even for him. The pre-knowledge should include general information on what the material contains, something about the kinds of symbols which are present, something about the frequency of those symbols, some pretty good hunches on what patterns exist and what they may tell if they are measured more precisely.

This pre-knowledge of the content has many additional facets. If one is dealing with newspapers and hopes to make a time study over several months or years, he had better make sure that copies of the paper will be available in the pattern than he chooses. If he hopes to compare the output of several publications, all must be available and contain comparable materials. If he is dealing with newspapers or magazines, he should probably have some information on their political affiliation or pre-disposition. If he is dealing with a directory, he ought to know whether it represents a comprehensive coverage of the persons in the field it essays to cover, or whether it is merely a "vanity book" in which entries represent the payment of fees. He ought to know whether the 1955 edition represents a complete revision or just a bringing up to date of material gathered in 1939.

In summary, he ought to know enough about the material to predict with some accuracy the nature of the pattern he expects to find, the classifications he will

need to record symbols referring to the pattern, the rough proportion of quantity of frequencies.

2. *Language Problems.* Eventhough the content may be in a foreign language, the operator may find it possible to make useful content analyses of the mechanical type, provided that he has a minimum knowledge of the language. It would be possible for a person with a very modest knowledge of a language to make a fairly good analysis of a *Who's Who* or other biographical compendium, provided he learned the limited vocabulary used, the system of abbreviations, and other characteristics of the particular work.

But in order to make an accurate and meaningful analysis of a general body of content in a foreign language, a considerable expertness is required, particularly when one moves in the direction of the subjective-mechanical approach. Any attempt to measure the "direction" of content along a "favorable-unfavorable" or "strong-weak" continuum requires ability to catch the nuances of a language, to understand its idiom. Even a simple word count approach may offer some problems. One group of students who measured the occurrence of a set of symbols in newspapers of five different nations (in four languages) noted: "No symbol list is perfectly translatable between languages." In order to make their lists comparable, they found it necessary to translate some key words into several possible synonyms in the foreign language, and at other times found it necessary to limit the use of a particular word to contexts which provided the meaning they wanted.

3. *Hypotheccation.* To make content analysis useful, the operator must be prepared to make a "hypothesis," to develop a theory, or to have a strong hunch about what his analysis will show. It might be stated in this form: "If I count the frequencies of this list of symbols, it will show that the elite are predominantly of X background," or any variant of this which is pertinent. What is important is to have a theory of what the analysis will show before engaging in it. To return to

the *Who's Who* example, it would be eminently foolish to start recording the universities attended by the persons listed, unless one could predict in advance that the elite were clustered among a certain small group of schools (and that knowledge of this fact would be of aid to the operator). In terms of elite, analysis it will always be necessary for the operator to have an expectation that the content analysis will tell him something about the elite in a more precise fashion than he presently knows. Further, he must decide in advance whether this information will be useful to him.

It can be said that almost any content analysis will provide *more precise* information about the material under study. But sometimes the information amounts merely to "making the obvious precise." The operator cannot afford the luxury of using this time-consuming tool for such a result.

While the need of a working hypothesis about the result in advance of analysis has been stressed, the operator should consider – once he has decided to use it – the possibility that the gathering of some small additional amount of information may provide him with more insight into the patterns of the content. Thus he might "risk" a small amount of additional time on the hope that information will "emerge". While the possibility of "emergent hypothesis" should not be overlooked it should not be the main motivation.

4. *Categorization.* The construction of a hypothesis about the content will usually suggest categorizations. Several levels of categorization will be required. They will vary with each individual problem, but they will generally fall into one of the four levels to be listed here: (1) They will involve the setting up of classes of symbols which be recorded or counted. Such would be the key words relating to the hypothesized pattern, the presence or absence of a particular school or religious faith, etc. (2) They will involve setting up classes of referents of the recording symbols, i.e. the persons, ideas, nations, things to which the recording symbols refer. (3) They will involve setting up classes or sub-divisions of the total body of content, as articles, or pages, or columns, or items. (4) They may

also involve setting up classes of context which will show the direction of the symbol in relation to the referent among some continuum, as "strong-weak" or "favorable-unfavorable."

Suppose the material were the ubiquitous "*Who's Who*" and the hypothesis that there was a predominance of persons from a small group of universities. The major class of recording symbol will be schools of higher education; to reduce tabulation, it may be decided to set up geographical classifications or to provide evidence on the hypothesis, a list of ten or twelve schools might be made recording symbols, with all others to be placed in miscellaneous. The problem of referent is also simple – each recording symbol will refer to one person listed in *Who's Who*. The organization of the volume suggests a ready made subdivision of the total body of content, the single biography. If the study were expanded to record religion and political party, the list of recording symbols would be expanded, but referents and content subdivisions would remain the same.

Suppose the hypothesis were that the laws of the nation provided more special privileges for the clergy than for any other elite group. Here it would be necessary to list classes of symbols which would relate to "privilege." Advance knowledge of the general tone of the law and subjectively obtained information on the content of the total code would perhaps suggest that recording symbols be classified broadly into "economic privilege," "privileges before courts," "enforcement of deference to ...," etc. The actual symbol list might be of groups of words as presented in sentences, or paragraphs of the code, rather than in individual words. The referents would be elite classes. If the law sometimes granted privileges and sometimes withheld them, it might also be worth while setting up categories of context, such as "grants indulgence" or "withholds indulgence." The organization of the legal code might suggest the paragraph as the content subdivision unit, or the section, or some other unit inherent in the organization of the material.

5. *Special Problems of Referents.* Most of the time, the operator will

automatically have the elite (or potentially elite) individual or organization as referent. Yet there will be cases which call for another referent. If he is investigating attitudes of the elite as exemplified in their personal documents or in their special publications or in their answers to questions, the referents may become national states or governments or political parties or ideological concepts.

The more concrete the referent the simpler will be the design of the analysis. Vague, inclusive referents make it difficult to tie the recording units down. Content analysis has been described as determining "Who is saying WHAT about WHOM with WHAT EFFECT." The "about whom" which is more precise will be more useful. Thus the use of particular individuals as referents, or groups of individuals who can be identified quite positively, will make the analysis more meaningful.

6. *Special Problems of Context Units.* In most cases, the operator should probably avoid the problem of context by so designing his study that useful material can be obtained without measuring the context within which a symbol is found. However, it may be imperative to measure the direction of a body of content, and in such case, the checking of context cannot be escaped. Thus one might have a hypothesis that the press of country X which formerly was hostile to the U.S. has now become more favorable. This immediately raises the problem of how big an area of context is necessary to determine whether the use of a symbol is favorable or unfavorable. One approach might be to record the mentions of U.S. (and synonyms for it) and to record them as "favorable-neutral-unfavorable" on the basis of the individual sentence in which they occurred. The sentence, "The U.S. has the finest air force in the world," provides a mention which one has no difficulty as describing as favorable. But suppose the next sentence says: "However, the basic power in military conflict today is not air power but land power." The juxtaposition immediately suggests the use of a larger contextual area. But this solution is not without pitfalls, for as the sign of context units is increased, the judging of direction becomes more and more subjective.

Despite this limitation, it can be said that the speed (and possibly the accuracy) of analysis is improved by the use of larger contextual units. If the operator is in doubt on a particular piece of content, he may test by scoring direction on the basis of a smaller unit, and then on the basis of the larger unit. In most cases, the two approaches will provide similar scores, and the larger unit has much economy as far as time is concerned, as well as in reducing the number of ambiguous findings of direction.

7. *Choice of Content Subdivision Unit.* In cutting up the body of content into subdivisions, it is also advantageous to have them as large as possible. But an even more useful approach is to have the subdivisions correspond to the natural subdivisions of the body of content. Several examples which have been given have suggested just that. In *Who's Who* it was the individual biography; in a newspaper it might be the item; in a code of laws the section or paragraph. One of the difficulties of the natural unit is that it may vary in size considerably. This may not be important as far as the biographical item is concerned, but it may be quite important in recording information about newspaper articles. In the latter case, while the item is preserved as a unit, it may be scored in a measure which will reflect variations in size, such as the column inch. Recording in this fashion, however, does not remove all of the difficulties of equating units exactly. Very slight variations in type size may mean considerable variations in the gross content of an equal number of column inches; the same can be said for slight variations in column widths, which are hardly discernible to the naked eye. These factors become important when one wishes to compare the gross content on a particular subject, for example, in one newspaper with that in several others.

If time is not as much of a factor, smaller units may be used. One could go to the "word" as unit of content, subdividing the material, in effect, into individual words and recording the presence or absence of chosen recording symbols. A somewhat larger unit of content (also used as a contextual unit or recording unit) is the phrase, also referred to as the "theme" or "statement." This requires breaking down sentences into the several statements they may contain. The

sentence, "The most powerful organization in this city is The Bankers Club," breaks down into "The Bankers Club is an organization in this city," and "The Bankers Club is the most powerful organization in this city." This approach makes necessary the sub-division of more than half of the sentences of English content, since complex ideas are produced with about that frequency. Such an approach to German, because of the nature of the language, would produce a much higher ratio of statement for sentences, and would increase the amount of time necessary for the analysis.

In analyzing spoken communications a time-unit is sometimes chosen. Thus radio programs might be analyzed by 15-minute segments, or a speech by five-minute segments.

This discussion of units is by no means definitive. The nature of the content and of the design of the analysis may suggest others which will be pertinent and effective.

8. *Choice of recording Unit.* Similar variations in size are possible for recording units as for the several other types which have been discussed. At the outset, it should be noted that the analysis will be simpler, if the recording unit is made as small as possible, in direct contrast to the recommendations made on the other units. For as the size of the recording unit is decreased, it becomes more precise; the word is easier to record accurately than the "theme," the theme than the paragraph or item, etc.

Even in the selection of the word as a recording unit, however, problems may arise. Is the analyst to record only the occurrence of the specific word, or shall he accept synonyms, slang expressions, figurative expressions? Thus, the decision to record the symbol "U.S." or "United States," raises the problem of also recording "America" (in the sense of the U.S.), "Uncle Sam," "The Land of the Free," "the leading power of the western states," "The outstanding imperialist nation in the world," etc. The analyst should explore such possibilities in advance of recording,

and he can expect that even with careful consideration additional synonyms may require consideration. Or he may decide, on basis of knowledge of the content, that he will record only the concrete symbol and ignore synonyms.

9. Sampling Problems. Detailed information on sampling has already been presented in Appendix A, but a few special problems of content sampling will be touched upon here. One relates to the sampling of any printed material issued serially, such as a newspaper, magazine or other periodical. Such issuance usually means that there is a pattern of presentation of information which tends to make certain issues of the week, month, or quarter specialized in function. As a result, sampling must be designed to prevent an under or over-representation of these differentiated issues.

The daily newspaper in America, to illustrate this point, has a concentration of religious content in its Saturday issues. Thus, if one were seeking a representative sample of daily newspapers, the lack of Saturday copies would mean that the religious news would be missed – while any concentration of Saturday copies beyond 1/7 of the sample total would over-represent the amount of religious news. In the case of a daily publication with such a pattern, the choice of an interval such as 5 or 15 will automatically prevent the "serial" quality of the publication from over-representing a particular day of the week.

This characteristic of publications usually is related to a basic serial pattern in the human events which the publications describe. Thus a sample overweighted with October issues of newspapers or magazines in the U.S. would over-report news of elections, while LAN overweighing of April issues of a Russian publication would over-report information concerning preparations for May Day celebrations. This characteristic of both events and publications can be used by the operator to his advantage when he seeks information about a particular class of events. Here he can concentrate his study in the time period most likely to carry the information he seeks.

Some mention of sampling levels also should be made. In any study of printed materials, the first level of sampling would be of titles – thus one might take a sample of five from all of the newspapers of a region, or a sample of three magazines out of a class containing 80. The next level is that of issues within the selected titles – thus one might take every fifteenth issue of a newspaper issued during five years. A final level of sampling would involve taking a certain part of each issue, such as every other page, or only the front page, or some other part of the total.

If the sampling at the several levels is random in the sense explained in Appendix A, it can be said that the final sample represents the total body of content. On the other hand, the subjective choice of a "sample" at any particular level, would make it necessary to reduce the total universe about which one spoke when he reported his final results.

10. *Coding Problems.* Moving to the period of actual recording of data, new problems are discovered, although they are not independent of those already discussed. Coding problems, which refer to difficulties arising when one endeavors to record the occurrence or the direction of the various symbols which have been decided upon, are actually separate from the choice of unit problems only in a time sense. The greatest danger here lies in the possibility that coding may not be consistent, that identical uses of symbols may be recorded as favorable at one time and as unfavorable at another, or that synonyms for the chosen symbol may be counted at one point and not another, or that subdivision units may not be held constant.

In a large scale content analysis project many coders may be employed, and the problem is augmented. Different coders may have different understandings of units, or of the decided-upon definitions of context which will be considered favorable or unfavorable. Many tests have been made of coder reliability (the degree to which two or more individuals code the same material in the same way.) The results almost never show perfect reliability, but in well-planned operations

using competent and well-instructed coders correlations of .9 are frequently achieved. (A perfect correlation would be 1.0 and an absolute lack of correlation would be .0).

If the operator hopes to turn coding over to assistants he will have to face this problem. A rigorous training period in advance is necessary to obtain coder reliability as high as .9. If the operator has to depend upon personnel of relatively low skill, he may find it necessary to restrict the analysis to the recording of simple information so that there will be a minimum of opportunity for coder interpretations which may produce variations in recording.

If the operator does his own content analysis, the problem is reduced. Nevertheless, if he sets up a complicated scheme with finely shaded classifications and all-inclusive units, he may discover that his own reliability from one part of the content to another is not very good. A simple test of reliability is to take a complicated piece of content which has been scored sometime previously and to re-score it. Here, however, there will be a tendency to remember the previous scoring which will obscure a possibility to "drift" away from earlier practices in coding a long and complicated body of material. A better procedure would be to request another individual to code a body of content which the operator has coded, and to note differences.

If the single coder will keep his criteria in mind, however, he can code reliably. And what is especially important, he will know the kinds of decisions that went into the production of this or that total score for a symbol or context. Further, a single coder can adjust a pre-arranged unit or coding system to accept an unexpected kind of symbol or context better than two or more coders can, since he does not run the risk of having the unexpected situation produce two interpretations which may be inconsistent.

11. *Emergent Hypothesis.* Some mention of the possibility of "Emergent" hypothesis was made in Paragraph 3. As the operator is actually coding, he may

discover signs of a pattern which suggests a new hypothesis, perhaps unrelated to the original one which he set up. Such a result is one of the potential "bonus" values of content analysis and should be utilized whenever possible. It might require a refinement of the coding system to reveal it in greater clarity. A change, of course, may require returning to the previous material and rechecking.

13. *Analysis: Statistical Significance:* When frequencies have been cumulated and the whole array of data is available, the operator must turn to analyzing what he has obtained. One of the first factors is that of statistical significance. Here, he will apply the suggestions of Appendix A, at least roughly, to discover what degree chance might have played in his results. Actually, this phase might be little more than recognition that he CANNOT apply statistical tests of significance, because of the method of selecting his sample.

14. *Analysis Comparison with outside criteria.* One of the best tools of analysis of data will be comparison with outside criteria of one form or another. If the operator has analyzed content which will show social class of the elite, he will put his obtained information along side of information on class distribution of the total population. If he has obtained information on education, the same kind of comparison is suggested. If he has information on other elites, or on elites of the United States, there may be the possibility of making cross-cultural comparisons.

One of the problems of symbol counts, seeking to determine the direction of content of a publication, arises here. The operator may be without any criteria. His result of 47 per cent favorable might be quite precise, but it will mean little unless he can put it in relationship to some other figures. If such criteria are lacking, the operator may have to break down his material into time periods, so that he can show change at least within the body of content studied; or it may be possible to relate the changes in content to outside events, or to data which has been obtained through interviewing informants.

15. *Analysis: By Inference.* Sometimes it will be possible for the operator to set up a series of logical steps from the result of his content analysis to an estimate of elite behavior or intentions. One of the most interesting cases of this type came during the war, when British content analysis correctly inferred from studying the content of Nazi propaganda, that the Germans had a new secret weapon, the V-2. The opportunity to analyze the propaganda output of an elite, or of a particular member of an elite, will be available to the operator and often he may find it impossible to make inferences on the basis of such analysis.

Heavy emphasis should be given to the necessity of applying all other factors known about the elite in making such inferences. While content analysis is a useful research tool, it is not a magic one. Another problem of inferences based on analysis of propaganda content, is that sometimes the elite behavior will be the inverse of what the face indications of the analysis show. In the V-2 case, the inference was based upon positive references (in advance of the firing of the rocket bombs) to secret weapons, plus the fact that this class of propaganda had never been used in the past in the "Cry Wolf" sense. However, another case of inference by the same kind of approach, (which involved correct estimates of the Nazi elite perception of their Italian ally's will to fight) involved a reverse twist. Here the propaganda content showed a tendency on the part of the Germans to assert positively that the Italians were staunch allies. The correct inference was that the Nazi elite thought they were not.

RELATING THEORY TO PRACTICE

It is recognized that in many cases the operator will find it impossible to reach even the simpler levels of content analysis which have been suggested here. Nevertheless, the operator will find it possible to use even subjective analysis

more effectively, if he has become aware of the possibility of more rigorous methods. For one thing, he may detach some of the positiveness which he has attached in the past to his subjective evaluations of content. For another, he may be more aware of the patterns and cumulative characteristics of the content, so that his subjective analysis will be sharper, more likely to catch the indications of the pattern.

If he finds it possible to use even a modest program of content analysis over a period of time, he will build bases for comparisons, so that his occasional "soundings" will provide him not only with a look as of a given moment, but also with information about changes in the composition of the elite.

This is not to say that content analysis, even in its most complicated sense, will become a magic thermometer from which he can take periodic readings on the temper of the elite, or on its composition, but it will provide him with more precise information than he has available by guessing and simply playing hunches.

PART F

APPENDIX C

USE OF PUNCHED CARDS IN TARGET INTELLIGENCE

Coded punch-cards are numbered among the devices which the human mind has developed to carry out its logical processes with less fatigue and without interferences caused by memory and calculation that are part of its total complexity. The active storage of data is an increasing problem of human operations in an age of practical science. Practically every field of observation on which technical, scientific and administrative action relies for guidance has expanded beyond the easy recall of a simple or collective intelligence. In artillery firing, for example, more and more weapons are employing target finding systems that perform automatically - by mechanical or electrical means - the analysis of data that once was done in primitive form by the gunner. The intelligence function in actions involving human relations has similarly resorted to more automatic facilities for storing information and readying it for use. Hundreds of bibliographies, censuses and public opinion studies, for example, employ coded punch-cards to hold their data in a form that may be swiftly and routinely analyzed.

The use of punch-cards in propaganda-target analysis is new, but the pattern of needs, types of data used, and analytic procedures demanded are analogous to widely tested and quite practical operations, in other fields. As with other techniques and facets of elite target analysis, the use of punch cards is limited by

personnel, considerations of time, the availability of comparative data, and the number of cases that are relevant to the operator's interests. When the technique has been generally explained, its limitations may be better understood and the operator will be not only armed with its advantages but warned against its weaknesses.

THE NATURE OF PUNCHED CARDS

The punched card is the central tool in a kit of techniques that improves greatly any day-to-day intelligence operation based on a fair-sized number of cases about which a number of comparable items of potentially useful information is known. The card itself is any size of cardboard suitable to hold the data estimated for its surfaces. It may hold prose material upon it, but its essential contribution is to hold punches to which standard meanings are assigned. Thus, an occupational status, "lawyer" is not usually written on the card but is recorded on it in the form of a punched hole that occupies a set position on the card. Only other cases who are "Lawyers" have the same punch in the same place, so that when, from a number of cases of different skills, lawyers are to be selected, the separation may be accomplished by a simple manual or machine operation that isolates all lawyers' cards and only lawyers' cards from the universe of cards. Subsequent breakdown of lawyers into communist or socialist, old or young, rural or urban, etc. may be accomplished by exactly analogous operations upon the isolated cards of the lawyers. In other words, the fundamental method of coded, punched card analysis (as against certain kinds of scoring or total computing systems) is analysis by successive subtraction of irrelevant cases from the original universe.

Both hand-and machine-sorted cards may be used in elite target analysis. The latter system, of course, requires more elaborate machinery for punching the cards and sorting them; it requires a greater capital investment and certain amenities such as electricity and servicing. But in operation it is little more expensive than the hand-sort process. The operations of punching, storing, sorting

and counting hand or machine cards are semi-skilled. They should be distinguished from the acquiring of data, the intellectual development of the coding system (which is fundamentally a classification of data), the coding of the actual case, and the analysis of findings, which are challenges to professional skill. The basic punched card operations, whether by hand or machine, may be learned and a reasonable speed attained within a few days. One feature of both kinds of punched card operations is that they may be delegated to workers with scanty bi-linguistic knowledge or knowledge of the contents; the officer need only order the required punches, sorts and counts and accurate results can be obtained, provided the worker is reliable and can read, add, and copy arabic numerals. Wherever several hours a day must be devoted to manual card operation, converting to a machine operation becomes an economic possibility.

Hand-sorted cards have one or two rows of holes along one or more edges.

A meaning is given to single holes or combinations thereof. Whenever a case in hand has a given meaning, its card is clipped open at the hole assigned to that meaning. To isolate all cards of a given notch, corresponding to an identical meaning, a long pick or needle is used.

The needle is inserted into the hold and lifted; as the needle moves up it carries with it all the cards that have not been notched to that hold, and drops all notched cards.

The notched cards are the relevant cards – e.g. "lawyers" in the example cited above.

Machine-sorted cards can store much more data than the hand-sorted type because they may be punched throughout their surfaces. For example, the kind

produced by International Business Machines Corporation contains eighty rows of twelve positions each.

Obviously a large number of relevant characteristics of a leader or an organization (newspaper, party, association, etc.) can be contained on a single card. If even more data is relevant, it can be punched onto a supplementary card which will then form part of a second deck containing supplementary cards on all the individuals or organizations in the universe being analyzed.

Machine-sorted cards are mechanically punched

according to a code prepared in advance. When used, they are fed automatically through a sorting machine in which the punched holes of any single column are automatically sensed by electrical or mechanical contacts and fed into appropriate piles.

The piles may then be manually counted, unless, as is usually (and preferably) the case, an automatic counter is geared to the sorting to present complete sums for each pile at the end of a sort or a run.

These brief descriptions of punched card methods are not intended to launch the operator fully into punched card operations; many small details and instructions must be learned at the inception of such operations. However, it is fair to say the complications will not multiply, and that the use of punched cards is not a difficult or remote extension of the logical processes ordinarily engaged in when the operator records any information on the elite or wishes to use any such information to choose targets for his messages.

WHEN TO RESORT TO PUNCHED CARDS

Considering the dozens of offices whose requirements are in mind here, it is impossible to state precisely the circumstances under which punched cards should be resorted to and the extent to which they ought to be used. No elite is so small as to preclude their use. A couple of hundred leaders of importance to the operator's policies are found in every area, enough cases to employ at least a hand-sort in punched card system. It may be assumed that those 200 or more cases will each have twenty or more characteristics – such as occupation, religious habits, and past and present office-holding experience – that should be made readily accessible. The beginnings of a card system then are already suggested. Adoption and extension of the system will follow according to a number of criteria:

- 1) The more numerous the elite the more necessary a resort to punched card records.
- 2) The more complicated and divided the elite, the more useful will punched cards be. Memory and ordinary files succumb quickly under these circumstances. Also, the need for separatistic appeals is enlarged, requiring more systematic and careful attention to divisions.
- 3) The greater the number of special missions aimed at partial or limited targets the greater the need for punched cards. (Here there is a mutual effect and one will discover that the greater the use of punched cards, the more able the operator to undertake special missions aimed at partial or limited targets.)
- 4) The greater the number of individual or personal targets, the more useful is a card system. In deciding to whom personal attention should be given, a card system can be used to reduce a large elite to those particularly important. Then

individual scrutiny of cases can be used to select single persons for contact.

5) The greater the turnover in operating personnel, the greater the value of a card system. Many operators will recognize the disillusioning experience of going through the intelligence files of a predecessor. Such files are often mere memory-jogging or miscellaneous collections peculiar to the previous operator. Frequently the files become quite dead upon a succession in office. A punched card file is as live to the newcomer as to the oldtimer, because the code index to the card is as much as anyone need know to use almost all of it.

6) The more complete the data and the more standardized the data on individual elite members, the more useful a card system. A card system requires having information on the same item (say, occupation or party affiliation) for all or most persons in a file to whom the item pertains. So far that matter does any useful record system, but there is no use engaging in a punched card operation when the records are quite inadequate. (Conversely, however, the attempt to convert records to punched cards will sometimes reveal the inadequacies of an informal system of records that had been highly trusted, and will reveal intelligence gaps that can be filled.)

7) Punched cards may facilitate content analysis. Suppose the operator wishes to discover the trend of opinion on the U.S.A.'s Point 4 program in Country X. He may accomplish this by instituting a deck of cards, each one of which represents a newspaper of specified characteristics (periodicity, size, circulation, partisanship, location, ownership, etc.) for each issue of the selected sample of issues over the time period in question, the ascertained sentiments (favorable – neutral – unfavorable – no mention, etc.) may be punched onto the cards so that both a continuing trend analysis on this issue and a conclusive trend analysis at the end of the period may be made.

8) Punched cards may facilitate the analysis of elite institutions. An initial deck of cards may be composed around the press of an area, for example. The important factors that determine the power of periodicals or newspapers can be

initially punched onto cards, together with the results of an initial content analysis giving proportions of space devoted to domestic or foreign politics, editorial policies, political news, stance of relevant policies, etc. At any moment thereafter, a few minutes' manipulation of the deck will provide a generalization about the press with respect to some question that arises in the operator's mind.

The press is only one example of an elite institution whose analysis may be facilitated by punched cards. A deck of cards may be established with reference to voluntary associations in general (parties, factions, sects, employer's organizations, labor unions, farm organizations, etc.). Into the cards may be punched the essential qualities of the association that relate to the operator's policies, such as its size membership, political connections, prestige, publications, financing, and official and unofficial collective attitudes.

9) The deck can then be broken down under conditions set by any one of a number of missions. Suppose, for example, that a difficult U.S.A. policy is pronounced – difficult in the sense that it is indirect, devious, or tough – and the operator's main immediate task is to muster all faithful local support of it. He can isolate from his association deck those groups most highly favorable to the U.S.A. and strive to activate them to its support. In a contrary case, where an American policy is ideally suited to impress and subdue the consistently opposed groups (e.g. the Supreme Court decision on race segregation in public schools), the operator can quickly isolate the associations consistently opposed to U.S. policies and communicate to them the meaning of the event, foreseeing that it is exactly the type of message to which they are likely to be most vulnerable.

10) The more answers that are sought by the home office, the more useful a card system. For prompt, systematic answers to questions of concern to the central office's policy and message-drafting agencies, punched card systems are superior to the ordinary record systems. A valid, generalized reply is always superior to and more impressive than a guess. The home office with its changing personnel and partial isolation from the field cannot laboriously weight every response or statement from the field by a thorough appraisal of each respondent

operator. The more the reports stand on their own method and content, the more they may be accepted and used at a distance. Furthermore, the operator will find that orderly card files will save him trouble, time, the torment of writing lengthy narratives, and creative energy that may be more effectively directed at local targets.

11) When the central office needs full intelligence of certain types from the field but the field lacks analytic personnel, whole decks of punch cards may be duplicated at negligible expense and forwarded to the central files for preservation and analysis there.

CODING FOR PUNCHED CARD

Coding is the procedure by which information is put into categories. In the punched card process, coding is the process of organizing information into categories to which places are assigned on cards preliminary to punching the cards. Thus, if it is desirable to indicate the education of a politician on a punched card devoted to his personal characteristics, the coding process requires that his education (e.g. 7th grade) be fitted to a code category (e.g. "grade school or less") in a categorical series regarding education ("grade school or less," "high school," "college," etc.) In order that in a given position on his card, a punch may later be made to indicate the precise category he occupies. Later, the sorting process, if it is aimed at isolating all politicians of a grade school education or less as targets for a cartoon pamphlet, will surely select him along with all others of the same category. Thus, punched card coding transforms raw data into categories that in turn become symbols corresponding to positions on cards to be punched.

How does one establish the categories to be used in coding. To a small extent, one works backwards from the type of card to be used. If the card provides for only a few items, obviously the categories must be few and/or simple. More

importantly, for the tail should not wag the dog, the categories should be as many and as refined as the future operation will demand, and the card (including supplementary ones) should be adequate to contain all the necessary punches. Referring to the text of the manual (paragraphs IV-6 to IV-9) for examples on categorizing of occupations, it will be noted that there are several ways of classifying the occupations of elite members. The operator may choose one of them as most useful for his area and problems, or most suited to the kind of punched card he is using. It should be noted that all the types mentioned group originally more particular categories into broader categories. Thus a man who is a *lawyer* (itself already a category) is placed in the category of *professional* according to one coding system. Then the professional category would acquire a distinctive punch-position on the card.

Some information is readily categorized and coded for card use. Other information is not. Biographical and organizational material is sometimes sharp and unambiguous, as information of place of birth or age. At other times and on very important points, data may be correctly categorized or coded only by the exercise of skilled judgment. For instance, a list of criteria for categorizing groups as communist-affiliated may be theoretically complete, but the question of assigning group X to that particular code category may be quite difficult if the evidence is incomplete, or ambiguous, or in any event, if the qualities of X do not correspond neatly to the criteria. Of course, a special code category to note the fact of ambiguous placement is always possible, but the more complete the categorizing of the item on all cases, the more easily and surely the punched cards may be used.

What are some code-categories that might be used in punched card form in the analysis of elite targets? The extent of one's data, differences in purpose from area to area, or economic limitations will vary the number, length (or abbreviation), or formulation of the punched data. However, some typical useful codings can be presented here for personal, institutional and symbolic intelligence.

Personal Items that might be coded in various ways:

Age :

Birthplace : Rural or urban region

Place of upbringing : Rural or urban region

Residence at present : Rural or urban region or district
(actual residence can be carried on face of card).

Parental Status : Birthplace of parents

Education of parents

Occupation of father

Ancestral status

Parental religion

Excellence in skills : Substantive
(knowledge of Occupation: superior, excellent, good, fair, poor)

Instrumental
(bargaining, organizational, violence, oratory, other propaganda:

—

rank in order: superior, excellent, good, fair, poor.)

Education : Highest level attained

type of sponsorship of schools
(private, public, etc.)

skill specialization

Career : Primary occupation

secondary occupation

military experience

Elite posts held : (Allow coding of several in chronological order)

Present post (if any).

Membership in voluntary associations : Occupational, Political

Avocational, "Social" (clubs, etc.)

(record on face of card)

Wealth : Upper tenth, well-to-do, modest, poor

Marital record : Status of wife (if any) same, higher, lower. (Remarks in detail can be carried on face of card)

Favorableness to U.S.A. : Present attitude (rank 1,2,3,4,5) by degrees of favorableness)

in early career (if applicable)

Attention to general domestic issues : High, medium, low

Attention to general international issues : High, medium, low

Social network : Diffuse and general, "normal," tight and special

Political posture : Conservative, "Middle-of-road," radical

Temperament : Optimistic, normal, pessimistic

Drive : High energy, normal energy, low energy

Items on Institutions that might be carried on punched cards in various ways:

(name and address on face of card)

Social Location : Physical scope (area spread)

Number of members

Number of non-member followers

(usually an estimate or ration with membership)

Social scope (homogeneity of membership)

Function : Goals:

(production, propaganda, administration, social intercourse, power)

Functional Specialization:

(economic categories; religious categories; occupational categories; etc.)

Instrumental Specialization:

(bargaining, organizing, violence, propaganda)

Targets: (public, functional groups, the state, etc.)

Internal Organization : Centralization: (federal, informal, decentralized, unitary)

Formal system of leadership: constitutional or not; elective, co-optative, or hereditary

Social status differences between leadership and rank and file: (degree)

Informal system of leadership.

elective, co-optative or hereditary

Professionalism of leadership: wholly, partly, none.

Cohesion : (4 or 5 degrees)

Activity pattern:

extreme J-curve, moderate J-curve, moderate J-curve with significant minimum.

External Relationships : Contacts : (restricted, some, many)

Channel of contacts with elite: overlapping, direct, via other institutions, via public

Publicity : esoteric and clandestine; secret; secretive; public to membership, general publicity

Status

: social (high, middle, low, heterogeneous)

: power (high, middle, low)

: efficiency (high, middle, low)

: legal (official, encouraged, accepted, illegal but tolerated, illegal)

Political Posture : Official attitudes towards U.S.A.(if any)

Unofficial attitudes towards U.S.A. (if any)

Position (if any) on domestic issues
(by type and degree of conservativeness)

Mode of Access : General press; special press; leader conferences; public meetings; special meetings; individuals; correspondence; direct mail

Resources : Propaganda apparatus (degrees of (besides membership) affluency); financial status (degrees of affluency); mode of financing (dues, contributions; assistance by government (types).

Items Usable in Punched Card Form for Institutional and Content Analysis of Press

(name and address of publication on face of card)

Periodicity : Daily, weekly, monthly, etc; irregular

Physical size : Number of pages on average Column

Inches to page

Format : Proportion photographic

Advertising : Yes or no

(if yes) proportion to other copy

Factual Tone : Scholarly, popular, breezy

Emotional Tone : Strident, moderate subdued

Proportion factual to opinion : (1-1,2-1,1-2, etc.)

Audience : Consumer vs. trade, business, and professional

If consumer, whether general or specialized

If consumer whether juvenile, mixed

If specialized, whether political form, religious, sports, adventure, confessional, movie, fraternal, photography, ethnic, etc., depending on country.

If trade, business, or professional, whether basic industry, manufacturing, distributive, retail, service, academic, etc. depending on country.

Proportions of material : Using above classes, note rank order of average news content to fifth degree

Attitudes to U.S.A.: Highly favorable; generally favorable; spotty; usually negative; hostile

Domestic policies : Conservative, middle-of-road, radical, inconsistent

Capital wealth : High, medium, low

Income : Well in black, in balance, in red

Reception of overtly processed release : Hostile, moderate, cordial

Average proportion of international news : If applicable

Control : Note principal owners and editors on face of card; personal; media entrepreneurs; industrial; foreign; party; association

PART F

APPENDIX D

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SELECTED WORKS ON POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO METHODOLOGY

P R E F A C E

The bibliography which follows is presented in two parts. The first part encompasses general works dealing with political leadership and many related aspects. The second part deals with biographical directories and dictionaries, organized on an area basis.

No attempt at completeness has been made but it is believed that most of the important works in the field are included.

The first part of the bibliography is followed by a section of cross-references which attempts to bring together all works dealing with a particular aspect of political leadership, as indicated by the section headings. These section headings also correspond to those used in the manual entitled "Elite Target Analysis".

A number of items in the first section of the Bibliography are borrowed from the bibliography contained in Lasswell H.D., Lerner D., and Rothwell C.E., *The Comparative Study of Elites*, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1952. The second section is most completely taken from the same source. It has been brought up to date with the kind assistance of the Reference Staff of the Hoover Institute and Library on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California.

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PART F

CROSS-REFERENCES BETWEEN BIBLIOGRAPHY AND THE SECTIONS OF THE MANUAL

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