Abstract: This essay examines Foucault’s stance towards the Enlightenment as formulated in three works he published in the last decade of his life. These works represent a partial modification of Foucault’s attitude to the Enlightenment, rather than the dramatic shift claimed by some commentators. In order to substantiate this claim, the essay provides a reconstruction and critical assessment of three articles Foucault devoted to Kant and the Enlightenment, namely, ‘Qu’est-ce que la critique?’ (1978), ‘Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution’ (1983), and ‘What is Enlightenment?’ (1984). It argues that Foucault’s reformulation of Enlightenment ideals in terms of an ethos of transgression and an aesthetic of self-fashioning is much closer to Nietzsche’s vision of a transvaluation of values than to Kant’s notion of maturity and responsibility (Mündigkeit).

Foucault saw himself as perpetuating the principle whereby philosophers ’enlighten’ their present, which Kant introduced in his classic 1784 paper that defines Enlightenment as an emancipation from self-imposed ‘immaturity.’ But while Foucault may have tried to enlighten our present, he was hardly a figure of the Enlightenment. Indeed he is often taken as the great modern counter-Enlightenment philosopher and historian. More precisely, Foucault’s nominalism is directed against the universalism of the Enlightenment . . . In reversing, dispersing, and criticizing what was taken to be universal, Foucault attacks what, in the present, has come to be regarded as the Enlightenment.¹

One of the last writings Foucault was able to complete before his death in June 1984 was an essay entitled ‘What is Enlightenment?’. This was meant to be delivered at the University of California, Berkeley, in the spring of 1984 as part of a seminar on modernity and the Enlightenment whose participants would have included Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Richard Rorty, Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow. The seminar never took place, due to Foucault’s death, and the essay thus became a sort of testament of Foucault’s stance towards the Enlightenment and, more specifically, towards Kant’s answer to the question ‘Was ist Aufklärung?’ formulated in 1784 in the pages of the Berlinische Monatsschrift. But Foucault’s interest in Kant’s answer to the question ‘What

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is Enlightenment?’ went back at least a decade. He had in fact composed an article entitled ‘Qu’est-ce que la critique? [Critique et Aufklärung]’, which was delivered as a lecture before the Société française de Philosophie in May 1978, and devoted the opening lecture of a course at the Collège de France in 1983 to an assessment of Kant’s essay on the Enlightenment and his attitude to the French Revolution.² In these essays Foucault presented what may be called a qualified defence of the Enlightenment, in particular of its critical attitude to the present, which he termed a ‘philosophical ethos’. In offering a qualified endorsement of the Enlightenment ‘ethos’ of critique, Foucault appeared to betray his earlier understanding of the Enlightenment as the age that paved the way for the ‘sciences of man’, i.e. the sciences of discipline and normalization, of surveillance and control of bodies and souls, of marginalization and exclusion of the deviant, the abnormal, the insane. ‘In the history of the sciences’, he wrote,

it is a matter at bottom of examining a reason, the autonomy of whose structures carries with it a history of dogmatism and despotism — a reason, consequently, which can only have an effect of emancipation on condition that it manages to liberate itself from itself . . . Two centuries later, the Enlightenment returns: but not at all as a way for the West to take cognizance of its present possibilities and of the liberties to which it can have access, but as a way of interrogating it on its limits and on the powers which it has abused. Reason as despotic enlightenment.³

Judged against the tenor of this statement, Foucault’s later pronouncements strike a discordant note. In his 1984 essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’ he characterizes it as a ‘permanent reactivation of an attitude — that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era’.⁴ Not surprisingly, a number of commentators have explored this tension or contradiction in Foucault’s attitude towards the Enlightenment, and reached fairly similar conclusions. Habermas, for instance, ends his brief eulogy of Foucault with the following observation:


Only a complex thinking produces instructive contradictions, ... He contrasts his critique of power with the ‘analytic of truth’ in such a fashion that the former becomes deprived of the normative yardsticks that it would have to borrow from the latter. Perhaps the force of this contradiction caught up with Foucault in this last of his texts, drawing him again into the circle of the philosophical discourse of modernity which he thought he could explode.5

Richard Bernstein claims that many responses are possible to Foucault’s contradictory stance towards the Enlightenment, for example, that he changed his mind, that he adopted a more conciliatory tone, that he was rewriting his own history, and so on. Perhaps, he says, ‘we can give a different, more sympathetic reading of what Foucault is doing’, a reading that enables us to get a better grasp of his critical project, but that still leaves us with a number of unresolved problems, chief among which is the lack of an adequate evaluative perspective from which to specify what is uniquely dangerous about modernity and its techniques of normalization.6 Thomas McCarthy, for his part, recognizes that Foucault’s ‘belated affirmation’ of the philosophical ethos of the Enlightenment ‘signals important changes in Foucault’s understanding of his critical project’, but claims that neither Foucault’s ‘social ontology of power’, nor his later concern with techniques of ‘self-fashioning’ provide ‘an adequate framework for critical social inquiry’.7

I would like in what follows to provide an equally critical but nuanced perspective on Foucault’s attitude to the Enlightenment. For this purpose I will offer a detailed examination and assessment of Foucault’s essays on Kant and the Enlightenment, starting with his 1978 article ‘Qu’est-ce que la critique?’

**Enlightenment versus Governmentality**

The aim of this article is to examine the emergence in the early modern era of a ‘critical attitude’ in response to the development of a system of power that Foucault called ‘governmentality’. In 1978 and 1979 Foucault had given a number of lectures on the question of governmentality at the Collège de France in which he analysed the development of a set of political strategies and techniques that aimed at governing individuals in a continuous, regular and permanent fashion.8 These techniques and strategies of governmentality were

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the product of two different conceptions of political power: the Christian model of pastoral rule and the Greek model of the self-determining polis. Out of these two conceptions there arose the rationale underpinning the modern doctrine of ‘reason of state’. Such a rationale entrusted political authorities with a power to survey, control and discipline individuals which had previously been the prerogative of religious authorities. Foucault’s studies on governmentality offered a historical genealogy of those techniques of political control and surveillance that would eventually culminate in the modern forms of disciplinary power so well documented in his pioneering book *Discipline and Punish*. But, as we know from that book, each form of power generates its own form of resistance, so Foucault’s account of the emergence of governmentality involves at the same time an account of the emergence of the specific form of resistance which this new form of power instigates or makes possible. The lecture ‘Qu’est-ce que la critique?’ is devoted precisely to providing an account of the distinctive form of resistance to governmentality. In this lecture Foucault argues that resistance to governmentality did not take the form of an absolute opposition. The answer to the question ‘how to govern?’, which dominated political discourse in the early modern era, did not, in fact, take the form of ‘how not to be governed’. Rather, it crystallized around a set of more specific issues, such as: ‘how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of principles such as that, in view of such objectives and by the means of such procedures’. For Foucault, this attempt to question or challenge the particular forms in which the ‘art of governance’ is exercised signals the emergence of the modern notion of critique — which Foucault characterizes as ‘the art of not being governed in such a manner’.

This questioning or resistance to governmentality is directed both at the spiritual authority of the church and at the temporal authority of civil rulers: their claim to speak with authority is met with a resistance which takes the form of questioning their power to define the truth for the subject. As Foucault puts it, ‘the focus of critique is essentially the bundle of relations which tie . . .

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9 Foucault remarks: ‘Our societies proved to be really demonic, since they happened to combine these two games — the city-citizen game and the shepherd-flock game — in what we call the modern states.’ Foucault, ‘Omnes et Singulatim’, p. 239.


power, the truth, and the subject'. Thus, while governmentality subjects individuals to a power that lays claim to truth, critique is ‘the movement by which the subject gives itself the right to interrogate the truth with respect to its effects of power and interrogate power with respect to its discourse of truth’. Critique is thus best characterized as ‘the art of voluntary inservitude’ (an ironic and purposeful reversal of the title of Etienne de La Boétie’s political tract of 1550, *Le Discours de la Servitude Volontaire*), as ‘a thoughtful indocility’ which aims at ‘desubjectification’ within the ‘politics of truth’.

After having provided this account of the origins of the idea of critique, Foucault turns to an examination of Kant’s definition of Enlightenment, a definition that he considers very pertinent to the issue explored in the first part of the lecture, namely the mutual implication of critique and governmentality. Kant’s definition of Enlightenment is as follows:

> Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. *Imma-
> turity* is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is *self-incurred* if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: *Sapere aude*! Have the courage to use your own understanding!

Four aspects of Kant’s definition are seen as relevant to Foucault’s own discussion of the intertwining of critique and governmentality. First, the Enlightenment is defined as the opposite to a state of immaturity or tutelage. Second, this state of immaturity is seen as the incapacity to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another (heteronomy). Third, Kant suggests a connection between an excess of authority on the one hand, and a lack of courage and resolution on the other. Finally, the domains in which the contest between a state of immaturity and one of enlightenment takes place are those highlighted by Foucault in his discussion of the opposition of critique to governmentality, namely religion, law and conscience.

Kant’s definition of Enlightenment thus bears a close affinity to the issues raised in Foucault’s essay. Moreover, according to Foucault, Kant’s defence of Enlightenment was not blind to the interplay between critique and power. The Enlightenment’s motto: ‘*Sapere aude!*’ — have the courage to use your own reason — was counterbalanced by the injunction, attributed to Frederick the Great: ‘*Argue* as much as you like and about whatever you like, but *obey!*’ By counterposing these two claims, and by accepting as legitimate the restrictions imposed on the private use of reason, Kant seems to acknowledge the limits of critique. The courage to know is at one and the same time the courage to

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13 *Ibid*.
14 *Ibid*.
recognize the limits of reason. Such a reason finds its legitimate employment only in its public use, by which Kant means the use ‘which anyone may make of it as a man of learning addressing the entire reading public’. The intertwining of argument and obedience contained in the quote attributed to Frederick II indicates Kant’s awareness of what Foucault calls the ‘play of power and truth’. Obedience to the sovereign is made legitimate by being grounded on the autonomy of reasoning subjects. The activity of critique is a play of power and truth (of obedience and argument) insofar as it gives the subject the power to determine itself, to retain its autonomy while acknowledging the authority of the sovereign.

It would be fair to say that Foucault’s interpretation of Kant’s essay, however ingenious, fails to provide an adequate account of Kant’s intentions and motivating concerns. For Kant, in fact, was not so much concerned to counterpose argument and obedience, or to acknowledge the interplay of power and truth. Rather, he was acutely aware of the limits to the exercise of freedom at a time when the vast majority of the population had little opportunity for developing their critical faculties and thus for becoming truly autonomous. His concern, shared by many thinkers of the Enlightenment, was how to preserve social cohesion and political stability once the archaic prejudices and irrational beliefs that sustained the old order were undermined by the demystifying power of critical reason. In other words, in the 1784 essay Kant was contributing to a general debate about the possible dangers of enlightenment in eroding those common assumptions and tacit prejudices that were seen by many as contributing to the stability of the old regime. This concern underlies the distinction that Kant made between the public and the private use of reason. Only by allowing the ‘public’ use of reason, by means of which anyone as ‘a man of learning’ may address ‘the entire reading public’, could the danger to the stability and cohesion of the social order be held in check. Foucault’s treatment of Kant’s 1784 essay is, in this respect, rather unhistorical insofar as it fails to acknowledge the specific concerns and intentions that animated Kant’s arguments on behalf of the Enlightenment ideals of autonomy and publicity.

Having explored in such a peculiar fashion the links between Kant’s definition of Enlightenment and his own conception of critique (‘the art of voluntary inservitude’), Foucault turns, in the final part of the lecture, to consider the fate these ideals underwent in the nineteenth century. According to Foucault, the history of the nineteenth century can be seen as carrying on the critical project which Kant identified with the Enlightenment, but with critique now turned at the Enlightenment itself. Three crucial developments are seen as motivating this re-orientation of critique towards the original ideals of the Enlightenment. First, the development of positivist science. Second, the emergence of a teleological (viz. Hegel) and technocratic (viz. St Simon) conception of the state.

16 Ibid., p. 55.
Third, the binding together of positive science and the state into a ‘science of the state’.17

Faced with these developments, can the Enlightenment ideal of a critique of absolutist forms of political power be sustained? Can the critique of governmentality be effective once reason, in the form of positivist science, has been shown to be intimately connected to the excesses of state power? Foucault identifies two responses to this dilemma. The first, developed in Germany in the writings of the Hegelian Left, Weber and the Frankfurt School, takes the form of a critique of positivism, scientism and instrumental reason, seen as the handmaidens of an insidious form of power. The second, developed in France in the works of historians and philosophers of science such as Cavaillé, Bachelard and Canguilhem, takes the form of a critical inquiry into the factors conducive to the emergence and eventual predominance of one particular form of rationality. Here the question that is raised is what Foucault calls the ‘réciproque et l’inverse’ of the original aspirations of the Enlightenment, namely: ‘How is it that rationalization is conducive to a desire for power?’18

This question had also been at the centre of the Frankfurt School’s critique of instrumental reason, and Foucault acknowledged the deep affinity that existed between his genealogical inquiries and the work of the Frankfurt School.19 Both had been concerned with the question that Kant addressed for the first time in 1784 (‘What is Enlightenment?’) and both could be seen as continuing the interrogation of reason initiated by Kant. In the case of Foucault, such interrogation must now take the form of ‘historico-philosophical’ investigations which examine the relations between the structures of rationality that articulate true discourses and the mechanisms of subjectification which are bound to them.20 The question ‘What is Enlightenment?’ invites now the question: ‘What is it that I am, the me which belongs to this humanity, perhaps to this fragment . . . to this instant of humanity which is subjected to the power of truth in general and of truths in particular?’21

The aim of the ‘historico-philosophical’ inquiries which address this new question is, as Foucault puts it, to ‘desubjectivize philosophical questions by recourse to historical content’, and ‘to free the historical content by an interrogation of the effects of the power of this truth’.22 These inquiries will concern themselves with that extended epoch which constitutes ‘the moment of forma-
tion of modern humanity’, with ‘Aufklärung in the broad sense of the term, of that period without fixed dates to which Kant, Weber, and others, make reference, of those multiple entries by which it may be defined, such as the formation of capitalism, the constitution of the bourgeois world, the establishment of the state system, [and] the foundation of modern science with its correlative techniques’. Thus, to pose today the question as to ‘What is “What is Enlightenment?”’ is, Foucault concludes, ‘to encounter the historical problematic of our modernity’.23

**Enlightenment and Revolution**

Foucault’s 1983 lecture, translated into English with the title ‘Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution’, indicates a slight change of direction. Enlightenment is no longer viewed as being closely tied to the idea of critique, as exemplifying the attitude which had emerged in response to the techniques and strategies of governmentality. Rather, the focus now is on the Enlightenment as a period in history marked by a novel awareness of its own presentness and singularity. Kant’s essay on the Enlightenment introduces ‘a new type of question in the field of philosophical reflection’, namely ‘the question of the present, of the contemporary moment’ which is without precedent in the history of philosophy.24 In Kant’s essay, Foucault maintains, ‘one sees philosophy . . . problematizing its own discursive present-ness: a present-ness which it interrogates as an event, an event whose meaning, value and philosophical singularity it is required to state, and in which it is to elicit at once its own raison d’être and the foundation of what it has to say’.25

Foucault now stresses the link between the new kind of philosophical reflection inaugurated by the Enlightenment and the focus on modernity. ‘Philosophy as the problematization of a present-ness’, he writes, ‘the interrogation by philosophy of this present-ness of which it is a part and relative to which it is obliged to locate itself: this may well be the characteristic trait of philosophy as a discourse of and upon modernity.’26

Foucault also emphasizes the fact that with the emergence of the Enlightenment there appears a new way of posing the question of modernity, ‘no longer within a longitudinal relationship to the Ancients, but rather in what one might call a ‘sagital’ relation to one’s own present-ness’.27 The Enlightenment is, in

25 Foucault, ‘Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution’, p. 89.
fact, the first age which named itself the Enlightenment (Aufklärung); in this
sovereign act of naming itself ‘a cultural process of indubitably a very singular
character . . . came to self-awareness’. The Enlightenment is the first epoch
which ‘names its own self’ and which, rather than simply characterizing itself
against other epochs as ‘a period of decadence or prosperity, splendour or
misery’, views itself as a period with its own special mission and purpose.

Foucault then proceeds to examine Kant’s essay of 1798, The Contest of
Faculties, focusing on Kant’s discussion of the French Revolution. He argues
that there is a deep connection between the 1784 essay ‘What is Enlighten-
ment?’ and the 1798 essay, insofar as both were concerned with exploring the
meaning of the present, of the contemporary moment. In 1784, he writes, Kant
‘tried to answer the question put to him, “What is this Aufklärung of which we
are a part?”’ and in 1798 he answered a question which contemporary reality
posed for him . . . This question was “What is the Revolution?”’.

Kant’s analysis of the French Revolution is pursued in the context of attempt-
ing to answer the broader question ‘Is the human race continually improving?’.
In order to answer this question, one had to identify an event in human history
that would indicate, or be a sign of, the existence of a permanent cause which
guides mankind in the direction of progress. Such a cause had to be permanent
in the sense that it had to be shown to be operative throughout the course of
human history. Hence the event that will enable us to decide whether the human
race is constantly improving must be a sign that is rememorative (showing that
the alleged cause of progress has been operative in the past), demonstrative
(demonstrating that it is active in the present), and prognostic (indicating that
it will also operate in the future). Only then will we be sure that the cause which
makes progress possible has not just acted at a particular moment in time, but
guarantees a general tendency of the human race as a whole to advance in the
direction of progress.

Kant found the sign of such progress in the French Revolution, an event
which he identified not with ‘those momentous deeds or misdeeds of men which
make small in their eyes what was formerly great or make great what was
formerly small’, but with ‘the attitude of the onlookers as it reveals itself in public
while the drama of great political changes is taking place’. In the
‘universal yet disinterested sympathy’ that the public openly shows towards
one set of protagonists, regardless of the cost it may carry to themselves, Kant
finds evidence of human progress.

28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 91.
31 I. Kant, ‘The Contest of Faculties’, in Kant’s Political Writings, ed. Reiss, pp. 176–
90, at p. 181.
32 Ibid., p. 182.
Their reaction, because of its _universality_, proves that mankind as a whole shares a certain character in common, and it also proves, because of its _disinterestedness_, that man has a moral character, or at least the makings of one. And this does not merely allow us to hope for human improvement; it is already a form of improvement in itself, insofar as its influence is strong enough for the present.33

In sum, it is not the success or failure of the Revolution, but rather the ‘sympathy which borders almost on enthusiasm’ with which it was received by the non-participating spectators, that provides a sign that the human race is improving.

This sympathy cannot be caused, Kant says, ‘by anything other than a moral disposition within the human race’. This moral disposition manifests itself in two ways: (1) the _right_ of every people to give itself a republican constitution, and (2) the _aim_ of submitting to those conditions enshrined in a republican constitution by which war may be averted.34

It is clear, as Foucault remarks, that these two elements are also central to the process of enlightenment, that the Revolution ‘does indeed complete and continue the process of _Aufklärung_’, and that, to this extent, ‘both _Aufklärung_ and Revolution are events which can never be forgotten’.35 As Kant puts it:

> Even without the mind of a seer, I now maintain that I can predict from the aspects and signs of our times that the human race will achieve this end [of giving itself a republican constitution which will prevent offensive wars], and that it will henceforth progressively improve without any more total reversals. For a phenomenon of this kind which has taken place in human history can never be forgotten, since it has revealed in human nature an aptitude and power for improvement of a kind which no politician could have thought up by examining the course of events in the past.36

Moreover, anticipating the sceptical challenge,

> even if the intended object behind the occurrence we have described were not to be achieved for the present, or if a people’s revolution or constitutional reform were ultimately to fail, or if, after the latter had lasted for a certain time, everything were to be brought back onto its original course . . . our own philosophical prediction still loses none of its force. For the occurrence in question is too momentous, too intimately interwoven with the interests of humanity and too widespread in its influence upon all parts of the world for nations not to be reminded of it when favourable circumstances present themselves, and to rise up and make renewed attempts of the same kind as before.37

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33 Ibid., emphases added.
34 Ibid., pp. 182–3.
35 Foucault, ‘Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution’, p. 94.
37 Ibid., p. 185.
Thus, even if the Revolution may miscarry, its very existence attests to a permanent human disposition or potentiality that cannot be ignored: it is the guarantee for future history that the human race will continue to improve.

Now, just as Kant was not concerned to provide a justification for the success or failure of the French Revolution, but to interpret the significance of that event for the present, so Foucault is not concerned with determining ‘what part of the Revolution should be retained and set up as a model’. Rather, as he puts it, ‘it is to know what is to be done with that will to revolution, that “enthusiasm” for the Revolution, which is quite different from the revolutionary enterprise itself’. 38

This statement is rather striking and liable to divergent interpretations. The employment of a term such as ‘the will to revolution’ to characterize the enthusiasm displayed towards the event by sympathetic spectators bears strong Nietzschean traces (the ‘will to revolution’ as a synecdoche of the ‘will to knowledge’, and thus of the ‘will to power’). This is, in effect, how Habermas interprets it in his eulogy of Foucault.

For Foucault, the challenge of the Kant texts he has chosen is to decode that will once contained in the enthusiasm for the French Revolution, namely, the will-to-knowledge . . . Up to now, Foucault traced this will-to-knowledge in modern power-formations only to denounce it. Now, however, he presents it in a completely different light, as the critical impulse worthy of preservation and in need of renewal. 39

This is indeed a legitimate reading of Foucault’s statement, but an equally legitimate one is to stress that the ‘will to revolution’ is not a synonym of the ‘will to power’, but a synonym of a ‘will to freedom’ understood in a prosaic, non-Nietzschean sense. Such a will to freedom would transgress against the limits of the given and provide a space for the refashioning of subjectivity. I will take up this issue later in my discussion of Foucault’s essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’. For now it is sufficient to notice that Foucault saw revolution and revolt (the example he used was that of the Iranian Revolution) as the means whereby subjectivity ‘introduces itself into history and gives it a breath of life’. 40

Revolution, in this sense, provides the opportunity for such a ‘will to freedom’ to interrupt the continuum of history and to refashion subjectivity in a novel way.

Foucault concludes his essay by noting that the two questions — ‘What is Enlightenment?’ and ‘What is the Revolution?’ — are the two forms under which Kant posed the question of his own present. They are also, he maintains,

38 Foucault, ‘Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution’, p. 95.
the two questions which have continued to haunt, if not all modern philosophy since the nineteenth century, at least a great part of it. But he is quick to point out that it is not a question of preserving alive and intact the heritage of the Enlightenment.

It is not the legacy of Aufklärung which it is our business to conserve, but rather the very question of this event and its meaning, the question of the historicity of the thought of the universal, which ought to be kept present and retained in mind as that which has to be thought.

‘The historicity of the thought of the universal’: here Foucault’s historicism and nominalism come to full view. What matters for him is to relativize and contextualize those historical factors that since the eighteenth century have enabled the ‘thought of the universal’ (of the necessary, the obligatory, the transcendental) to prevail over the ‘thought of the singular’ (of the contingent, the arbitrary, the merely empirical), and to disqualify and subjugate the latter. The urge to demystify the privilege accorded to the ‘universal’ in the tradition stemming from the Enlightenment is reasserted in the concluding paragraphs of the essay, where Foucault draws a distinction between two critical traditions initiated by Kant. The first, which he calls an ‘analytic of truth’, is preoccupied with defining ‘the conditions under which a true knowledge is possible’. This is the tradition initiated by Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The second, which he terms ‘an ontology of the present, an ontology of ourselves’, is concerned with the question ‘What is our present? What is the contemporary field of possible experience?’ This other tradition, which he sees emerging in Kant’s essay on the Enlightenment and his reflections on the French Revolution, abandons the search for those universal conditions that determine whether sentences can be true or false, and concerns itself exclusively with the question of actuality, namely the question of our present and its field of possible experience. In separating the ‘ontology of the present’ from the ‘analytic of truth’ in such a radical fashion Foucault lays himself open to Habermas’s charge, to wit, that he deprives himself of the normative standards that the former must unavoidably borrow from the latter. A more generous reading, however, would point out that the ontology of the present and of ourselves favoured by Foucault is meant to open up a space for reflection, for a critical interrogation that destabilizes our currently accepted ways of being, of doing, of thinking. It is to these questions that Foucault turns his attention in the last of the essays he devoted to Kant. Let us then look closely at what he has to say.

41 Foucault, ‘Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution’, p. 95.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., p. 96.
Enlightenment as Transgression

In his 1984 essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’ Foucault attempts to formulate an answer to the very same question that was posed to Kant in 1784 by the German periodical Berlinische Monatsschrift. In his view, ‘Was ist Aufklärung?’ marks the entry into the history of thought of a question that modern philosophy has not been capable of answering, but that it has never managed to get rid of, either... From Hegel through Nietzsche or Max Weber to Horkheimer or Habermas, hardly any philosophy has failed to confront this same question, directly or indirectly.44

Foucault argues that Kant was not the first philosopher who had sought to reflect on his own present. Throughout Western history philosophers have posed the question of the present and, broadly speaking, their answers have taken three forms:

1. The present was seen as belonging to an era of the world marked by inherent characteristics (the present as a definite world era, exemplified in Plato’s Statesman);
2. The present was interrogated in order to discover signs of a forthcoming event (the present as a threshold, exemplified in St. Augustine’s The City of God);
3. The present was conceived as a point of transition towards the dawning of a new world (the present as an accomplishment, exemplified in Vico’s La Scienza Nuova).

Kant’s originality consisted in inaugurating a new way of thinking about the relation between philosophy and the present. For Kant, the Enlightenment is ‘neither a world era to which one belongs, nor an event whose signs are perceived, nor the dawning of an accomplishment’.

Kant defines Aufklärung in an almost entirely negative way, as an Ausgang, an ‘exit’, a ‘way out’... He is not seeking to understand the present on the basis of a totality or of a future achievement. He is looking for a difference: What difference does today introduce with respect to yesterday?45

Enlightenment is not conceived within the framework of a progressive teleology of history. Rather, it is seen as a process that releases us from self-incurred immaturity, a process that is at the same time an individual task and obligation. It is ‘a process in which men participate collectively’ and ‘an act of courage to be accomplished personally’.46 Enlightenment means the striving for maturity and responsibility (Mündigkeit). It represents the moment ‘when humanity is...

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44 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, p. 32.
45 Ibid., p. 34.
46 Ibid., p. 35.
going to put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority’.

It is precisely at this moment, Foucault remarks, stressing the connection between Kant’s essay on the Enlightenment and the three *Critiques*, that ‘the critique is necessary, since its role is that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be known, what must be done, and what may be hoped’. It is only when the legitimate employment of reason has been defined, in both the theoretical and practical spheres, that its autonomy can be assured. Thus, the critique is ‘the handbook of reason that has grown up in Enlightenment; and, conversely, the Enlightenment is the age of the critique’.

Foucault sums up his assessment of Kant’s essay by noting how this text is located at the crossroads of ‘critical reflection’ and ‘reflection on history’. By this he means not simply that it represents a reflection by Kant on the contemporary status of his own philosophical enterprise. Rather, he means to highlight the fact that ‘it is the first time that a philosopher has connected in this way, closely and from the inside, the significance of his work with respect to knowledge, a reflection on history, and a particular analysis of the specific moment at which he is writing and because of which he is writing’. In this respect, ‘it is in the reflection on “today” as difference in history and as motive for a particular philosophical task that the novelty of this text appears . . . to lie’. Kant’s text on the Enlightenment thus provides the outline of what Foucault calls ‘the attitude of modernity’.

It is at this point that Foucault’s essay takes a rather unexpected turn. He claims that modernity should be seen as an attitude rather than as a period in history — ‘a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling’. Such an attitude is a way of ‘acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. A bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks called an ethos.’ In order to characterize such an attitude or ethos, Foucault turns to a discussion of Baudelaire’s essay ‘The Painter of Modern Life’. Baudelaire was one of the first to recognize that modernity meant an awareness of the discontinuity of time, of a break with tradition, that it induced ‘a feeling of novelty, of vertigo in the face of the passing moment’.

53 *Ibid.* Habermas also draws on Baudelaire to characterize the new attitude of modernity. He claims that: ‘The spirit and discipline of aesthetic modernity assumed clear contours in the work of Baudelaire . . . Aesthetic modernity is characterized by attitudes which find a common focus in a changed consciousness of time . . . The new time consciousness . . . does more than express the experience of mobility in society, accel-
In his essay Baudelaire defined modernity as ‘the ephemeral, the fleeting, the contingent’, and stressed that these elements must ‘on no account be despised or dispensed with’. One had no right to despise the present. Rather, one had to adopt a certain attitude towards it, an attitude which recaptured something eternal in the fleeting moment. As an example, Baudelaire cites the work of Constantin Guys, who was able to ‘extract from fashion whatever element it may contain of poetry within history, to distil the eternal from the transitory’. The attitude of modernity makes it possible, in Foucault’s words, ‘to grasp the “heroic” aspect of the present moment . . . it is the will to “heroize” the present’. This ‘heroization’ of the present, Foucault pointedly remarks, is ironical. It does not treat the passing moment as sacred in order to preserve it, nor does it involve collecting it as a fleeting and interesting curiosity. Rather, the ironic heroization of the present is an act of transfiguration. Transfiguration ‘does not entail an annulling of reality, but a difficult interplay between the truth of what is real and the exercise of freedom’. In this interplay, ‘natural’ things become ‘more than natural’, and ‘beautiful’ things ‘more than beautiful’. It is in this sense of a transfigurative interplay of freedom and reality that Foucault characterizes the attitude of modernity, its ironic heroization of the present.

For the attitude of modernity, the high value of the present is indissociable from a desperate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it otherwise than it is . . . Baudelairean modernity is an exercise in which extreme attention to what is real is confronted with the practice of a liberty that simultaneously respects this reality and violates it.

As we shall see, this is very much the attitude or ethos that Foucault adopts vis-à-vis the present: simultaneously to respect it in its singularity and to violate it in its claim to embody universality (whether such universality pertains to the structure of reason, the logic of history, or the truths of human nature). His stance is indeed one of transgression, one that he set out brilliantly in his preface to Georges Bataille’s œuvre in 1963. The same can be said of his attitude to

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56 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, p. 40.
the self. Drawing again on Baudelaire, he claims that modernity is not simply a form of relationship to the present; it is also ‘a mode of relationship that has to be established with oneself’.60 ‘To be modern’, he writes, ‘is not to accept oneself as one is in the flux of the passing moments; it is to take oneself as object of a complex and difficult elaboration: what Baudelaire, in the vocabulary of his day, calls dandysme.’61 The deliberate attitude of modernity is tied to an ‘indispensable asceticism’. The dandy ‘makes of his body, his behaviour, his feelings and passions, his very existence, a work of art’. Modern man does not seek ‘to discover himself, his secrets and his hidden truth; he is the man who tries to invent himself’. He is constantly faced with the task of ‘producing himself’.62

Foucault’s attitude to the present is thus closely tied to his attitude to the self: just as the former must, ultimately, take the form of a possible transgression, so the latter must take the form of an original production and invention of the self, a self-fashioning or ‘souci de soi’. There is no ‘human nature’ to discover or unearth, no ‘human essence’ to be freed or unshackled. There is only the constant, ever-renewed task to create ourselves freely, to pursue and give new impetus to ‘the undefined work of freedom’.63

This attitude or ethos of self-fashioning which is to be freely adopted by each subject is certainly congruent with Baudelaire’s reflections on the dandy, but is by no means congruent with Kant’s position. As Thomas McCarthy has perceptively pointed out, ‘the representation of autonomy as aesthetic self-invention eliminates the universality at the heart of [Kant’s] notion, the rational Wille expressed in norms binding on all agents alike’.64 Foucault was fully aware of the distance separating his ethics of self-fashioning from any morality based on universal criteria. As he declared in his last interview: ‘The search for a form of morality acceptable to everybody, in the sense that everyone should submit to it, strikes me as catastrophic.’65 He never inquired whether a form of morality based on universal principles freely agreed to by all subjects, a morality that provided a general framework of principles of justice within which
individuals would be free to pursue their own particular conceptions of the good life, would be equally pernicious.

Foucault, in effect, wanted to adhere to an ethos of transgression and aesthetic self-fashioning (‘couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art?’ he declared in a 1983 interview with Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow) and attempted to trace such a modernist ethos, via Baudelaire, to Kant’s reflections of the Enlightenment. He wished to emphasize ‘the extent to which a type of philosophical interrogation — one that simultaneously problematizes man’s relation to the present, man’s historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject — is rooted in the Enlightenment’. Preserving the legacy of the Enlightenment, however, does not mean ‘faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an attitude — that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era’.

Foucault goes on to offer a positive characterization of this ethos, after having contrasted it negatively with what he calls the enlightenment blackmail of being either for or against the Enlightenment, and with the conflation of Enlightenment with humanism. Such a philosophical ethos, he writes, may be characterized as a limit-attitude . . . Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits. But if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge had to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question today has to be turned back into a positive one: in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?

Reiterating the theme that has been at the centre of my reading of Foucault’s attitude to the Enlightenment, he asserts that the point is ‘to transform the

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67 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, p. 42.
68 Ibid. Emphasis added.
69 As regards the former, he maintains: ‘One has to refuse everything that might present itself in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian alternative: you either accept the Enlightenment and remain within the tradition of its rationalism . . . or else you criticize the Enlightenment and then try to escape from its principles of rationality.’ (Ibid., p. 43.) As regards the latter, he argues that: ‘The humanist thematic is in itself too supple, too diverse, too inconsistent to serve as an axis for reflection . . . I believe that this thematic . . . can be opposed by the principle of a critique and a permanent creation of ourselves in our autonomy . . . From this standpoint, I am inclined to see Enlightenment and humanism in a state of tension rather than identity . . . We must escape from the historical and moral confusionism that mixes the theme of humanism with the question of the Enlightenment.’ (Ibid., pp. 44–5.)
70 Ibid., p. 45.
critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the from of a possible transgression’.71

This is a philosophical ethos with a marked affinity to Georges Bataille, to Nietzsche, to the surrealist revolt against the stultifying bourgeois standards of cognition and action, of knowledge and reality and morality. It is an ethos of transgression which revolts against all that is normative, all that which in Foucault’s understanding leads to ‘normalization’, to the regime of surveillance and control, of disciplinary power. In its most extreme version this transgressive ethos, as Habermas has pointed out, ‘is addicted to the fascination of that horror which accompanies the act of profaning, and is yet always in flight from the trivial results of profanation’.72

Foucault did not, in the end, embrace this version of an ethos of transgression. Although he did actively seek certain ‘limit-experiences’73 in both his work and in his life, he was more concerned, ultimately, with testing the ‘contemporary limits of the necessary’.74 In the context of his reflections on Kant and the Enlightenment, this meant a reappraisal and reformulation of the concept most central to the Enlightenment, namely the concept of critique.

Criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with the universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying.75 Such criticism is ‘genealogical in its design’ and ‘archaeological in its method’. Archaeological, ‘in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events’.76 Genealogical, ‘in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think’.77 In this respect, criticism ‘is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom’.78

Foucault is quite aware that this liberating criticism, this work done ‘at the limits of ourselves’, must be experimental, so that it may be able ‘both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise

71 Ibid. Emphasis added.
72 Habermas, ‘Modernity versus Postmodernity’, p. 5.
73 For a stimulating discussion of Foucault’s fascination with ‘limit-experiences’ see J. Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault (New York, 1993).
74 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, p. 43.
75 Ibid., pp. 45–6.
76 Ibid., p. 46. Emphasis added.
77 Ibid. Emphasis added.
78 Ibid.
form this change should take’. This criticism must also give up the hope of ever acceding ‘to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits’. The criticism of limits and the possibility of moving beyond them are always limited; but rather than being a drawback, we should acknowledge that this is what enables us to always begin again. Criticism, in other words, must be constantly reactivated; only in this way can it provide an impetus to our ‘undefined work of freedom’.

We can see from these statements how Foucault’s ethos of critique remains bound to certain limits even while it attempts to transgress or subvert them. It is this which distinguishes his position from the one taken by the more radical exponents of an ethos of transgression. Yet it is the figure of Nietzsche, rather than that of Kant, that provides the major source of inspiration for Foucault’s notion of critique. As he puts it in the concluding reflections on the meaning of that critical interrogation on the present and on ourselves inaugurated by Kant:

The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.

Epilogue: Nietzsche or Kant?

A few comments before closing. It is indeed a peculiar feature of the discussion around Foucault’s work on Kant and the Enlightenment that a number of American commentators have tried to interpret it as somehow a return to the fold of a reasonable, accommodating community of ‘enlightened’ inquiry. Dreyfus and Rabinow, to take an example, characterize Foucault’s ironic stance towards the present as one that encourages a ‘conflict of interpretations’. They suggest that ‘the archaeological step back that Foucault takes in order to see the strangeness of our society’s practices does not mean that he considers these practices meaningless. Since we share cultural practices with others, and since these practices have made us what we are, we have, perforce, some common footing from which to proceed, to understand, to act. But that foothold is no longer one which is universal, guaranteed, verified, or grounded.’ It follows, therefore, that ‘what makes one interpretive theory better than another . . . has to do with articulating common concerns . . . while leaving open the possibility

79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., p. 47.
81 Ibid., p. 50. Emphases added.
of ‘dialogue’, or better, a conflict of interpretations, with other shared discursive practices used to articulate different concerns’.82

This is what I would call the American ‘taming’ of Foucault. In the hands of such interpreters, Foucault’s transgressive stance begins to look ‘human, all too human’. What is missing in such a reading is Foucault’s Nietzscheanism, a stance for which the project of autonomy pursued by enlightenment thinkers from Kant to Habermas requires as a corrective a strong dose of ‘inhuman thoughts’. Foucault’s critical ontology of ourselves, his ethos of transgression and aesthetic self-fashioning are indeed much closer to Nietzsche’s vision of a transvaluation of values than to Kant’s notion of maturity (Mündigkeit).83 Even though in his last works on ‘le souci de soi’ Foucault moved away from a concern with transgression to a focus on the various practices of self-discipline (askesis),84 it remains the case that in this last phase Nietzsche’s influence remained central. If the object was no longer the transvaluation of values but those practices of self-discipline and self-fashioning that were seen as conducive to freedom, the operative assumption is the same: in Nietzschean terms, it is the striving to become who we are, to creatively fashion our identity in conscious opposition to the claims of morality, normativity and universality. Let us not betray Foucault’s inheritance by making him appear as, ultimately, a child of the Enlightenment. As the ‘masked’ and ironic philosopher that he was, he deserves a better treatment from us.

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83 For a contrasting ‘French’ reading that stresses Foucault’s debt to Nietzsche, see G. Deleuze, Foucault, trans. S. Hand (Minneapolis, 1988); and V. Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, trans. L. Scott-Fox and J.M. Harding (Cambridge, 1980).