Husserl's static and genetic phenomenology: Translator's introduction to two essays

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Which “matters,” which “Sachen” can be given to the phenomenologist depends in part upon how the phenomenologist approaches them. The way of approach we call a “method.” Phenomenological method is a style of openness that in turn allows one to be struck by modes of givenness, by the phenomena. Yet it would be misleading to characterize phenomenological method only in this manner, namely, as a way of circumscribing modes of givenness, since the phenomenal field can on its own part overstep the bounds of a pronounced or presupposed methodological undertaking and demand the formulation of a new methodology. This is the position in which we find Edmund Husserl and his phenomenological philosophy by 1921. For it was at this time that Husserl was lead to formulate explicitly the difference between static and genetic phenomenological methods.

Presented here for the first time in English are two fundamental essays Husserl penned concerning static and genetic phenomenological methods. Taken from the B III 10 signature manuscripts, the first of these writings was originally published in Edmund Husserl, Analysen zur passive Synthesis, ed. Margot Fleischer, Husserliana XI, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966), while the second was published seven years later in Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Zweiter Teil, ed. Iso Kern, Husserliana XIV (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973). The translations of these essays are excerpted from the English critical edition of Edmund Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic, trans. Anthony J. Steinbock, Husserliana Collected Works, forthcoming with Kluwer Academic Publishers. It is here that they will be joined in their rightful context of Husserl’s analyses that attempt to work out a “transcendental aesthetic” and “transcendental logic.”
These two essays are significant for several reasons. Not only do they mark Husserl’s explicit effort to formulate systematically a difference internal to phenomenological method in terms of the static and the genetic, they also show the distinctive traits of each method, as well as how the methods are to be organized in terms of the motivational descriptor of “leading clue.” Further, they present the impetus for what came to be known as a “regressive” phenomenological approach that begins within the natural attitude, rather than a “progressive” one that begins with a complete bracketing – an approach that is elaborated, to give two examples, in Husserl’s Erste Philosophie (1923/24) and in his Krisis, (1934–37).

To be sure, Husserl was not the first to distinguish between static and genetic elements of experience. Husserl himself suggests this by referring to the difference between static and genetic method in terms Dilthey used for psychology, namely, “descriptive” [beschreibende] and explanatory [erklärend]. But whereas Dilthey takes description as interpretive description and explanation as something for the natural sciences, Husserl takes descriptive phenomenology in a narrower, “static” sense in order to contrast it with a genetic phenomenological research perspective that takes up an interpretive position with respect to the teleological genesis of sense. Lurking in the background is not only Dilthey, but also Brentano and his distinction between descriptive psychology and genetic and physiological psychology.

Moreover, 1921 was not the first time Husserl conceived of a distinction between static and genetic matters. For example, in June, 1918, Husserl writes to Paul Natorp that “already, for more than a decade, I have overcome the level of static Platonism and have situated the idea of transcendental genesis in phenomenology as its main theme.”

To cite these historical precedents is to acknowledge that phenomenology did not develop in a vacuum; it does not mitigate the originality of Husserl’s own phenomenological distinctions no matter how tardy they may seem to the contemporary reader. The originality of Husserl’s distinctions between static and genetic phenomenology consists in the fact that Husserl was led to formulate the difference between methods and matters from motivations internal to the development of phenomenology itself. Because Husserl had described genetic matters that exceeded the scope of static constitution, including phenomena like apperception, normality and abnormality, kinaesthesia, and association – phenomena that came under the general title of “primordial constitution” – Husserl was provoked by the very matters themselves to catch up reflectively with his own descriptions. This means that Husserl had undertaken genetic analyses implicitly without phenomenology having been explicitly cognizant of itself as having this genetic methodological dimension.
Looking back, with the distinction between static and genetic method and matters in hand, we can say that Husserl’s initial preoccupation was with matters and an approach that are “static.” By static we understand two things: first, a constitutive approach that is concerned with how something is given or modes of givenness, and second, a concern with essential structures. In Husserl’s terminology, a static method can address both strictly “phenomenological” (i.e., constitutive) as well as “ontological” (i.e., essential) dimensions of experience. Thus, a static approach can interrogate the interplay of intention and fulfilment, the meant features of an object, the noetic qualities of an act, as well as the structural or essential possibilities of the particular object or act within the intentional correlation. Here one would examine the structures and the being of these structures (for example, formal and material essences, typicalities, regions, etc.).

The fact that Husserl actually began from a static research perspective betrays the following two-fold methodological prejudice. First, it was assumed that it is better to begin with constitutive questions rather than taking the being of things for granted, that is, it is more helpful to see how sense as constituted is given to the constituting pole of experience, and then to proceed to structural or ontological questions. Second, it was assumed that it is better, constitutively, to proceed with something at rest rather than something in motion. In other words, it is advantageous to begin with the “simple,” and then advance to the “complex.” Accordingly, Husserl granted a methodological priority to an investigation into constitutive problems that did not broach the question of temporal genesis.

By genesis Husserl understands three variations of experience:
1. genesis within the purely active sphere of experience where the ego functions in rational acts,
2. genesis between the active and passive spheres of experience, where one traces the origins of activity in passivity (or between the judicative in the perceptual spheres of experience), and finally,
3. “primordial constitution” as a phenomenology of apperception, association, kinaesthesis, and the unconscious.

Here “passive genesis” refers most often to the receptivity or affectivity relating to the habitual lived-body and its genesis of sense. These three dimensions of genesis are all broached in one way or another in Husserl’s Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic, though the emphasis on the first two parts of Husserl’s manuscript is on the latter two, especially since he is intent upon preparing the basis in a “transcendental aesthetic” for a “transcendental logic.” (There has been a “missing” third part of these lectures that deals explicitly with the transition from pre-predicative judgment to predicative judgment. This third part, from Winter
semester 1920/21, will be published in German as part of an *Ergänzungsband* in the series Edmund Husserl, Gesammelte Werke, and will be translated and included in the forthcoming English edition of *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*).

The fact that Husserl began with static structures and a static model of constitution, and not genesis, does not mean that genesis was absent from the horizon of his thought. For to prefer stasis, even if it be in the form of ignorance, is already to acknowledge the problem of genesis for later work, implicitly rooting the problem of stasis in that of genesis – something that Husserl himself came to see. It is for this reason that Husserl provocatively asks whether one could fully undertake a static phenomenology without a genetic dimension already being in play.7

Once again, at issue in the two essays presented below is the explicit formulation of this distinction between static and genetic method and the implications it has for phenomenology. As noted, Husserl thought that the best way to handle more complex matters in phenomenology (like the problem of self-temporalization or later the problem of cultural communities and historicity) was to prepare the groundwork with static investigations. Following this, it would be suitable to proceed to higher constitutive levels of analysis.

Yet it was only after explicitly tackling the problems of genesis and more “complex” features of experience that Husserl retroactively understood the problem of genesis not to be more complex than that of stasis, but rather more concrete and more fundamental. Likewise, static matters were no longer seen to be “simple,” but now more abstract. This inversion was only discerned after having arrived explicitly at genesis through the leading clue of stasis, even though one could in no way derive genesis from stasis. In this respect, the order of reality for Husserl in no way echoes pedagogical style. Genesis has to be seen as more fundamental than stasis, though pedagogically, stasis guided us to the problem of genesis without the latter being reducible to the former.

It was also at this time that Husserl took ontological questions, the being of things as they can be presented in the natural attitude, to function as “leading clues” to constitutive questions, both static and genetic. In this way, static phenomenology is not to be taken as a final stance for phenomenology, but only as a leading clue to matters of genesis (and eventually to the problem of generativity).8

While Husserl was initially wary of genesis (at least in the *Logische Untersuchungen* since empirical psychology imputed to ideal objects a subjective genesis in consciousness instead of taking logical entities as self-given to consciousness), he did confront the problem of genesis in a forceful manner
after 1915. This is not to say that there are no themes peculiar to the problem of genesis earlier, say, as early as the *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900–1) with his notion of motivation or association, or his *Ding und Raum* (1907) with descriptions of the kinetic syntheses of perception and kinaesthesia. Husserl’s own point is that these and similar analyses are still too implicit and abstract. Even Husserl’s work on time-consciousness from his *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins* (1905) is not really a full-fledged genetic analysis because it is too formal: “Mere form is admittedly an abstraction, and thus from the very beginning the intentional analysis of time-consciousness and its accomplishment is an analysis that makes abstractions.”

Remaining solely on the level of time-constituting consciousness in terms of impression, retention, and protention is still too formal, too abstract, and it is not until we get to the habitual lived-body, the problems of association and affection, and the individuation of a monad that the problem of genesis really comes into play in a decisive manner. This is due to the fact that an inquiry into the question of constitution is not necessarily an inquiry into the problem of genesis: “attending to constitution is not attending to genesis, which is precisely the genesis of constitution and operates as genesis in a monad.”

The matter of genetic phenomenology, then, concerns monadic individuation or monadic facticity. What is monadic genesis?

The monad is an indivisible being as a process of continually becoming in one unique time with one unique ego. As temporally enduring, the monad is not confined to a Now-point, but exists as having been, a having been that transcends the past toward a futural becoming. Yet to say that the monad endures is not to say that it is a collocation of nows. Rather, as a uniform temporal form by virtue of horizons everything is related and interconnected to everything else in the dynamic unity of the monad. The monad is a “living unity” capable of having dispositions that are “unconscious” and so qualify genetic phenomenology also as a “phenomenology of the so-called unconscious.” This unconscious level of the monad for Husserl refers not only to the intentionality of drive and instinct, or to the null-point of vivacity within retention, but also to the movement of habituality. It is true that habitualities as the sedimentations and precipitations of acts are no longer actively conscious since they have receded from the living present and become sedimented; nevertheless, there is a dynamic interplay between act and affection, because, as expressing an “abiding style” or “abiding *habitus*,” the habitual character of the monad can provoke sense, prefiguring a perceptual or even judicative world from the density of that personal character. This density, by which the monad retains its identity passively, points to the concrete individuation of the monad and the fact that the monad is a unique “unity of its living becoming,” a unity of its “sedimented history” that it bears as a heritage of the
past. Phenomenology of genesis then is the phenomenology of the original or primordial becoming in time, of the genesis of one shape of consciousness emerging from another, acquiring a historical opacity through the processes of motivation, apperception, affection, and association. In short, it is a phenomenology of what Husserl calls at this time, “facticity.”

As individuated in its personal orientation, the monad is unique and, in this sense, “absolute.” But this concreteness of absoluteness is not tantamount to independence. Husserl writes, for example, that in contrast to his contention in the Third Logical Investigation (and in Ideen I, §15, as well), what is concrete should be regarded as non-independent; only an analysis that makes abstractions can view “phases” as if they were concrete and independent. This holds not only for the temporal phases of impression, retention, and protention in relation to the concrete unity of the living present or living presents as phases in relation to the concrete monad, but mutatis mutandis for the phases of individuated monads in relation to an intermonadic community. Through a genetic account of monadic genesis, a static, one-sided account of intersubjectivity is implicitly called into question.

When Husserl began reflecting on the genetic dimension of experience, he revised the significance of static and genetic phenomena into a relation of the concrete to the abstract; he called into question some of his earlier assertions, namely, that the concrete is independent; he recast his very understanding of the absolute, moving from independent consciousness (as suggested in Ideen I) to the self-temporalizing genesis of the monad; and he articulated the very relation obtaining between static and genetic methods. The questions to be handled now concern “how the investigations are to be ordered,” and working out the order of these “necessary phenomenological investigations” entails addressing “the leading clues of the system.” Simply naming two different methodological dimensions is not sufficient for describing the (structural) differences between stasis and genesis, for this would still remain static. Rather the very formulation of static and genetic methods and matters itself demands a genetic description; Husserl does this by depicting the procedure by which one moves between static and genetic methods and matters as a relation of leading clue.

Expressing the differences between static and genetic methods produces a ripple effect within transcendental method. First, one does not move progressively from constitutive phenomenology to eidetic considerations, but now regressively from the natural attitude and essential structures (and sciences of those structures) to constitutive matters. “Beginning with the natural attitude, one can also take the ‘natural concept of the world’ [i.e., the lifeworld] as a leading clue.” One begins with static method as eidetic analysis, which can
take place “naively” within the natural attitude and all its rich implications, and then submit these results to a constitutive, properly speaking phenomenological analysis. He writes: “Is not static phenomenology precisely the phenomenology of leading clues, the phenomenology of the constitution of leading types of objects in their being . . .?” A decade later, Husserl returns to this issue, clarifying: “Thus, that is static phenomenology. I analyze ontologically the being-sense world and correlative I inquire into the certainties of being, specifically, I inquire concretely into the modes of givenness. Ontological analysis is the leading clue for the analysis of correlative validities of being.” Within a static register now one moves regressively to constitutive phenomenology.

Second, although we can find such a methodological reconfiguration implicitly at the conclusion of *Ideen I* as Husserl prepares to launch into a regional ontology of *Ideen II* – which in turn orders those very constitutive investigations of nature, the body, and personal spirit – this reconfiguration of transcendental method comes into sharper focus for Husserl when the entire static method of investigation is placed in a relation of leading clue to genetic method. Here static ontology is not merely a leading clue to constitutive problems in general, but static constitution also becomes a leading clue to genesis. “Another constitutive phenomenology” named “phenomenology of genesis” is one that works from results of static constitutive phenomenology; a genetic phenomenology follows the histories of the constitution of objects that are there for the concrete monad as well as traces the genetic “history” of the monad itself.

Third, once Husserl has discussed the problem of genetic method and its matters in relation to static method and its matters, and has done this as a relation of leading clue, a peculiar reassessment takes shape. I have already noted that the “higher” more complex phenomena of genesis are now seen as more fundamental, in relation to them, static phenomena are grasped as “finished,” as abstractions from temporality. But to recognize this is to reverse the direction of “leading clue.” For now it is genesis that orders the investigation into static constitution and into structure. Now one must inquire into the essential relations on the basis of phenomena that are disclosed genetically, which may entail, as it did for Husserl, that one revise the previous results of static analyses from the perspective of genesis, but which nevertheless had served formerly as a leading clue to genesis. This is the reason one can move from a genetic constitutive analysis back to an eidetic analysis, back to examining invariant structures in the natural attitude, back to empirical sciences, etc. It is also now that we are able to grapple with both the genesis of structure (i.e., the structure of monadic individuation) as well as the very structure of genesis.
Such a brief introductory sketch of the background, import, and implications of Husserl’s distinction between static and genetic phenomenological methods alerts one all the more painfully to what both needs to be said and to what can be said about this issue. But even with more said, the formulation of static and genetic methods would not be the ultimate story told for phenomenology – if indeed one could give an exhaustive narrative of the generation of phenomenology and its possibilities. At least the two essays by Husserl presented here do give us a privileged and crucial glimpse into a pivotal moment in phenomenology, one which, for the English speaking audience, is long overdue.

A note on the translation. All square brackets “[]” in the text indicate the translator’s insertions; all angled brackets “<>” indicate the German editor’s interpolations. German terms, when cited, are included in the endnotes. All other remarks included as endnotes are preceded by the source, i.e., “Husserl,” “Editor,” “Translator.”

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We must make the following distinction under the rubric of the laws of genesis:

(1) Laws of genesis in the sense of the demonstration of laws for the sequences of particular events in the stream of lived-experience. They are either laws of immediate, necessary succession for concrete events or for abstract phases, moments of such events like the necessary connection of retentions to lived-experiences that have lapsed, or the necessary connection of retentional phases to the respective impressional phase. Or they are also laws of a mediated sequence, for instance, the laws of association, laws for the emergence of reproductions for a present lived-experience within the present and the like for the emergence of intentions of expectation – in the widest sense of empty intentions, fulfilled or unfulfilled processes of pointing-toward or pointing-back.

(2) Lawful regularities that regulate the formation of apperceptions. Apperceptions are intentional lived-experiences that are conscious of something as perceived which is not self-given in these lived-experiences (not completely); and they are called apperceptions to the extent that they have this trait, even if in this case they also consciously intend what in truth is self-given in them. Apperceptions transcend their immanent content, and belonging essentially to this transcending is the fact that within the same stream of consciousness whose segments are being continually connected, a fulfilling lived-experience is possible that, in the synthesis of fulfilment, supplies its self-given as the same, and in that other lived-experience supplies what is not-self-given and the same [self-given]. Insofar as this is the case, there is a law here regulating the future, but a law merely for future possibilities, concerning a possible continuation of the stream of consciousness, one that is ideally possible.

Defined in this general way, apperception is a concept that encompasses every self-giving thus every intuitive consciousness. Originary apperception
is perception, and every modification of apperception in imagination contains an apperception precisely in the shape of this modification. If we consider here that every present consciousness (every span of presence belonging to the stream of lived-experience) not only is, but is "perceived," that is, is present now to consciousness in an impressional manner, then we also mean that an "apperception" lies in every present consciousness. In fact, we cannot even conceive of a consciousness that would not go beyond the strict present in its essential flux from presence to new presences, consciousness is inconceivable without retentional and protentional horizons, without a co-consciousness (although a necessarily non-intuitive one) of the past of consciousness and an anticipation of an approaching consciousness (no matter how indeterminate it may be). Thus if something "arises out of something" at all in the stream of consciousness, then apperceptions necessarily arise from apperceptions. We do not need to consider here whether there are primordial apperceptions that could be placed at the "beginning" of the stream of consciousness. In any case, there are apperceptive horizons, kinds of such horizons, kinds of apperceptive intentions (I also say appresenting intentions) that must arise at each place in the stream according to the universal lawful regularities of conscious life – like the examples given above show. But this also holds likewise for those that can arise – even if they must not arise – at every place in the stream, namely, insofar as they are bound to conditions that are possible at each place. To the latter belong the intentions that customarily come into question under the rubric of association. At each place in the stream it is possible for constellations that are similar (I use an empty term [constellations] whose scientific content is still to be specified) to be produced again with earlier ones, to recall the earlier similar ones, to point back to them, to bring them perhaps to intuitive presence, and then as fulfilments to show them synthetically unified with the present ones, etc. Yet even these apperceptions, and likewise these apperceptive combinations – which exhibit the unities of a combined phenomenon, whose combinations presuppose apperceptions and encompass them – these apperceptions can only take place when other, especially suited apperceptions have preceded them.

Could we not also define apperception in the following way: a consciousness that is not only conscious of something within itself in general, but at the same time intends this something as a motivation for a consciousness of something else; thus, a consciousness that is not merely conscious of something, and then still something else that it does not include, but rather, a consciousness that points to this other one as one that belongs to it, as what is motivated through it. In any case, we will have to expand and give sharper contours to our previous definition.
In addition, types of complicated apperceptions can occur, which, once they are there, are repeated in a further stream of consciousness according to primordial laws under universally producible conditions; indeed, they run through this stream of consciousness steadily, like all natural apperceptions, all objective apperceptions of reality, apperceptions which in accordance with their essence themselves have a history, a genesis according to primordial laws. Thus, it is a necessary task to establish the universal and primitive laws under which stands the formation of an apperception arising from a primordial apperception, and to derive systematically the possible formations, that is, to clarify every given structure according to its origin.

This "history" of consciousness (the history of all possible apperceptions) does not concern bringing to light a factical genesis for factical apperceptions or factical types in a factical stream of consciousness, or even in all factical human beings, thus it is not at all similar to the development of plant or animal species. Rather, every shape of apperception is an essential shape and has its genesis in accordance with essential laws; accordingly, included in such an idea of apperception is that it must undergo a "genetic analysis." And what is given is not the necessary becoming of the particular, single apperception (when it is understood as a fact); rather, the mode of genesis is only given with the genesis of essence; in this mode of genesis any kind of apperception of this type must have arisen originally (in one stroke or piecemeal) in an individual stream of consciousness. And after it had arisen (as primordially instituting, so to speak), individual apperceptions of the same type were able to arise in an entirely different manner, namely as genetic after-effects of the earlier ones already formed – in accordance with intelligible laws of a primitive form. The theory of consciousness is directly a theory of apperceptions; the stream of consciousness is a stream of a constant genesis; it is not a mere series, but a development, a process of becoming according to laws of necessary succession in which concrete apperceptions of different typicalities (among them all the apperceptions that give rise to the universal apperception of a world) grow out of primordial apperceptions or out of apperceptive intentions of a primitive kind. Every apperception exhibits the structure of noesis and noema.

Every apperception carries out in its own way a sense-giving and a positing of objects in doxic modalities. We have to undertake a unique form of analysis in order to elucidate the intentionality of an apperception, in order to describe, according to their noetic and noematic structures, the possible types of fulfilment and the systems of possible omnifaceted, complete fulfilment, or the systems of a fulfilment that is continually in the process of becoming complete. With these descriptions, namely the constitutive ones, we are in no way inquiring into an explanatory genesis. In our descriptions of all the modal
modifications in retentions, rememberings, expectations, etc., we likewise do not inquire into genesis when we pass from the original impressions (perceptions) as a generally typical generic character that concerns all apperceptions, over to a constitutive character, and therefore tracing a principle of systematic ordering of apperceptions, a principle of ordering that intersects the division of apperceptions according to the highest genera of objects (actual and possible existing regions of objects). A universal doctrine of consciousness is thus a universal doctrine of apperceptions, correlative to a universal doctrine of the highest categories of possible objects and their categorical modifications—a universal constitutive phenomenology. The latter is preceded by a universal phenomenology of the most general structures and modalities that encompass all categories of apperceptions. To this one must add a universal theory of genesis.  

In a certain way, we can therefore distinguish "explanatory" phenomenology as a phenomenology of regulated genesis, and "descriptive" phenomenology as a phenomenology of possible, essential shapes (no matter how they have come to pass) in pure consciousness and their teleological ordering in the realm of possible reason under the headings, "object" and "sense." In my lectures, I did not say "descriptive," but rather "static" phenomenology. The latter offers an understanding of intentional accomplishment, especially of the accomplishment of reason and its negata. It reveals to us the graduated levels of intentional objects that emerge in founded apperceptions of a higher level as objective senses and in functions of sense-giving, and it reveals to us how they function in them, etc. But in these investigations we are concerned in the first place with apperceptive forms, with modes of consciousness that are conceived so generally (that is, left so indeterminate) that they must belong to the make-up of every monad (e.g., perception, memory, etc.). Other ones have a different universality and necessity. If we take as our point of departure the "natural concept of the world" and the human ego as subject of knowledge, then what we have gained through an eidetic analysis is the idea of a monad that is precisely in relation to a "world" of this corresponding concept, and in this way we have a pure range of monads in whose stream of consciousness "necessarily" emerge the corresponding types of apperceptions (spatial-causal thing, animal being, human being), although perhaps they do not necessarily belong to the idea of a monad as such—what in any case is not immediately and a priori certain from the start.

Further, in monads that correspond to human beings within the natural attitude, we find factically peculiar occurrences of reason in particular shapes. We <want to investigate> the intentional typicality that is made available to us through the phenomenological-eidetic analysis of the ideas "human being" and "world," we want to investigate it systematically according to all possible
frameworks of reason (that is, we want to investigate its frameworks and ultimately the entire world of these monads most basically in the possible frameworks of "concordant," ratifying experience of the respective objects), and we want to gain its essential shape. Likewise, we investigate in the free realm of possibility the essential structures of the formal lawful regularity of a reason in general as formal-logical reason, etc. Aside from the fact that we form the corresponding thoughts and realize truths in ourselves – we recognize through them how possible rational subjects would think; through this we construe in an indeterminate generality subjects of pure reason and their shapes of rational activities in which they live toward and attain true being and truths, as well as true values and goods. But even with all this, we do not gain knowledge concerning how a monad, as it were, looks in its completeness, and which possibilities are prefigured for such complete monadic individualities, and through which lawful regularity of individuation.

Let us note that we remain here within the sphere of reason, within the realm of the active ego, and that we cannot describe a shape of active apperception, that is, any coherent unity of active configuration (which as a unity of consciousness is intentional and accordingly is apperceptive configuration) without also constantly speaking of genesis. Every inferring is an active apperceiving, and as an active process of configuring it is a judging because another judging has preceded it – one judgment is passed on other judgments that have been passed. The conclusion follows from the premises, it is generated from them, the lived-experience genetically issues from the grounding lived-experiences, even if other genetic frameworks play a founding role there. Thus, every activity is motivated, and we have pure genesis in the sphere of acts as a pure act-genesis in such a form that I, who execute acts, am determined by the fact that I have executed other acts. Further, we have acts that are motivated through affections and that stand in a genetic relation to spheres that fall outside of the sphere of activity. We have, finally, genesis in the sphere of pure passivity, even though formations which have their origin in an earlier activity may play their part in them, but now they themselves emerge passively.

Accordingly, in the doctrine of genesis, in "explanatory" phenomenology, we have:

1. Genesis of passivity, that is, a general lawful regularity of genetic becoming in passivity that is always there and, without a doubt, has origins that lie further back, just as apperception itself does. Special types that belong to the general idea of passive genesis.

2. The participation of the ego and relationships between activity and passivity.
3. Interrelations, formations of pure activity; genesis as an active accomplishment of ideal objects and as an accomplishment of real generation. Secondary sensibility: general laws of the consciousness of what is habitual. Everything habitual belongs to passivity. Even the activity that has become habitual.

4. Once we have gained all the kinds of genesis and their laws, we will then ask to what extent one can assert something about the individuality of a monad, about the unity of its "development," about the regulative system that essentially unites all the particular geneses in the form of one monad, and about which types of individual monads are a priori possible and construable.

5. And connected to all of the preceding we ask: in what sense the genesis of a monad can be implicated in the genesis of another, and in what sense a unity of genesis can, according to laws [of genesis], combine a multiplicity of monads. On the one hand, passive genesis, which in the case of the constitution of an anthropological world (or rather, an animal world) refers to the constituted physiological processes and to their conditions in the unity of the physical world with the lived-body of another; on the other hand, active genesis in the form of the motivation of my thinking, valuing, willing through that of others. Thus, considering the individuality of the monad leads to the question of the individuality of a multiplicity of coexisting monads, monads genetically combined with one another. With respect to "our" world it leads to the question of making understandable monadologically the natural psychophysical world and the communal world.30

6. Again, all this relates to the question concerning the genetic explanation of a monad within which a unitary nature and a world in general is constituted genetically, and how a unitary nature and a world in general remain constituted from this point onward throughout its entire life, or through an exceptional span of life, and further how a world with animals and humans is constituted in a constant process of identifying itself. Having preceded this is the static elucidation of world-apperception and of the sense-giving that is carried out in it. But, it seems, it is only possible to undertake an absolute consideration of the world, a "metaphysics," and to understand the possibility of a world first through a genetic consideration of individuation.

7. My passivity stands in connection with the passivity of all others: One and the same thing-world is constituted for us, one and the same time as objective time such that through this, my Now and the Now of every other – and thus his life-present (with all immanences) and my life-present – are objectively "simultaneous." Accordingly, my objectively experienced and
ratified locations and the locations of every other share the same locality; they are the same locations, and these are indices for ordering my and others’ phenomenal systems, not as separated orders, but coordinated orders in "the same time." That is, my life and the life of another do not merely exist, each for themselves; rather, one is "directed" toward the other. Not only have sensations occurred in me in this or that order such that, in accordance with the laws of genesis, a nature had to be constituted for me, and not only has this nature endured, but a typically stable lived-body is mediated in this process. Realized is also the possibility that there are things similar to my lived-body in the nature that is given to me. Furthermore, not only has empathy ensued, but this empathy has been ratified by the fact that the interior life of the other ego has expressed itself in a regular manner, and from then on newly determined and ratified my appresentations again and again.

Primordial laws of genesis are the laws of original time-consciousness, the primordial laws of reproduction and then of association and associative expectation. In relation to this there is genesis on the basis of active motivation. If we compare static and genetic frameworks, then we will have to ask whether one can achieve a systematic phenomenology of static frameworks (like that of noesis and noema), that is, whether the genetic dimension can be fully suspended here. On the whole, the question is how the investigations are to be ordered. It is clear that one will initially proceed from particular fundamental types, some of which – as I already said above – will occur necessarily, others which will be presented as possibilities. The question concerns the leading clues of the system. As leading clues, we have types of objects, that is, leading clues from the standpoint of ontology. And with this constitutive teleologies. Here ideal possibilities of concordant modes of givenness are elaborated, ideal possibilities of monadic streams in which the unity of an accomplishment is constituted, and other possibilities outside of these are to be considered as opposing forms.

Another leading clue is the unity of a monad as a unity of a genesis, and then the investigation of the typicality of possible monads, namely, of possible types of the unity of an individual monad, of an individual ego, and of that which it had to find [in its environing-world], and how it had to encounter itself, or how it bears within itself a rule of individual character traits that are then recognizable (perhaps through others).

Beginning with the natural attitude, one can also take the "natural concept of the world" as a leading clue. One raises the natural world to the eidetic level, analyzes it according to its strata, extracts types of constituting objects and describes constituting consciousness, and finally the constitution of this type, world – all without paying any attention to genesis.
Perhaps I can be more clear by writing: Necessary successions in the open sphere of lived-experience: That which is arriving is then not only arriving, but following necessarily according to the evident law of necessary succession. Naturally, one can call that a law of genesis.

All "horizons" or all "apperceptions" naturally arise in this way. But in a "static" regard, we have "finished" apperceptions. Here apperceptions emerge and are awakened as finished, having a "history" that reaches way back. A constitutive phenomenology can regard the frameworks of apperceptions in which the same object is constituted eidetically, in which it shows itself in its constituted Selfhood in the way it is expected and can be expected. Another "constitutive" phenomenology, the phenomenology of genesis, follows the history, the necessary history of this objectivation and thereby the history of the object itself as the object of a possible knowledge. The primordial history of objects leads back to hyletic objects and to the immanent ones in general, that is, to the genesis of them in original time-consciousness. Contained within the universal genesis of a monad are the histories of the constitution of objects that are there for this monad, and within the universal eidetic phenomenology of genesis this very process is [explicated as] accomplished for all conceivable objects in relation to all conceivable monads. And conversely, one gains graduated levels of monads corresponding to the levels of objects.

I must now go through the Ideas once more to become clearer about what still distinguishes the doctrine of the structures of consciousness from the constitutive considerations if I also regard everything immanent "constitutively."
Essay 2

The phenomenology of monadic individuality and the phenomenology of the general possibilities and compossibilities of lived-experiences: static and genetic phenomenology

EDMUND HUSSERL
Translated by Anthony J. Steinbock

(1) Phenomenology of possible “phenomena” and phenomenal frameworks and their constitutive accomplishments that can occur in monads, in general.

(2) Phenomenology of monadic individuality, the investigations of laws that are included among the laws of lived-experience, and establish what the individual unity and discreteness of a monad requires, what belongs necessarily to an individual monad as its proper nature, which universal form it necessarily has, which species of elements or moments this form necessarily contains, and what in this form guarantees to them precisely unity and discreteness.

If the monad necessarily has the form of the unity of becoming, of a unity of unflagging genesis, then its concrete structure is only made up of “elements” that are themselves unities of becoming, and like the entire monad, these unities of becoming have an abstract structure with respect to their phases. Every phase has its own necessities and not merely compossibilities; thus, every lived-experience that is being “delimited” for itself demands its “background,” a horizon, every moment in a phase makes its demands with respect to becoming: thus, for the continued genesis of every streaming that constitutes the demand of temporality, etc. We must certainly not proceed with naturalistic concepts here. The monad is a living unity that bears within itself an ego as the pole of effecting and being affected, and a unity of wakeful and concealed life, a unity of abilities, of “dispositions”; and what is concealed, “unconscious,” is a peculiar modality for the discreteness of the monad, a modality whose necessary sense must be fashioned originally in ways peculiar to it.

But the title for (1) above is not sufficiently clear. We investigate the phenomena in the transcendental bracketing of “transcendent” reality. Belonging here in quotation marks is the thing-world with respect to the necessities and possibilities that it bears as the intuitive thing-world, and belonging here is experienced nature as such. I describe the mode of givenness of orientation
according to time and space (of perspective), the modes of givenness according to sides, the appearing sides and the mode of appearance of the sides, the sense-data as adumbrations-of, the apprehensions, the frameworks of perceptual appearances as such that constitute unity and self-sameness, etc. I describe the relation to the ego, the grasping, relating, explicating, “comprehending” (thinking under universals, conceptually), predicating; I describe the meant affair-complexes, propositions, syllogisms, the modes of attentiveness of the ego, of affection, of [attentive] turning toward, cogitating activities of the ego. I judge the premises and motivated by it, as a consequence of it, I draw the conclusion, and so forth. These are all occurrences in “immanent time,” in the time of “lived-experiences.” And in considering the monad, we have precisely its inherent framework of immanent time and its lived-experiences and the unities constituted in it. And this entire framework itself (a further step!) has its constitution in the original flux of time in the corresponding primordial lived-experiences.

All of this sketches a certain path of phenomenological considerations – after one carries out the phenomenological reduction, which forms the point of departure. I must proceed step by step; at first I still do not even see that a stream of lived-experience is constituted internally; I have not yet fixed it scientifically at all, to say nothing of monadic individuality [or] the ego of abilities constituted in it, etc.

Do I not have to develop this consideration to the point of showing that there is a unity of genesis in immanent time, and constituted within the unity of genesis, a unity of the monad being constituted for itself temporally? Do I not need to show that this unity of the monad must however be brought back to the analysis of the primordially living monad whose absolute being consists in a multifarious streaming, and that constituted within this streaming is the immanent phenomenon of filled immanent time, of the phenomenal immanent monad?

The investigation of the individuation of the monad, then, bears on both: on the individuation of the immanently constituted monad, and by going back to the lawful regularity of the primordially constituting streaming, on the individuation of the absolute monad. Here, the inquiry bears on the necessary form of this unity of filled immanent time, on that which gives a necessary unity to all content in the succession and simultaneity of every phase, and gives to all individual components, moments within this unity, a singularly unique framework that cannot be rend asunder. The monad is a “simple,” indivisible being: that is, what it is as continually becoming in time, and everything that belongs to it, is at some location of this continual becoming, and has its being as temporal fullness in this immanent, filled time and is nothing for itself, since this fullness is continual and is related to one and the
same identical ego-pole. Everything that is related to one identical ego-pole belongs to a continual stream of becoming of a unique filled time, a time which is one unique time with one unique ego. Where it is a question of two monads we then have in mind two streams of becoming having a uniform temporal form, but not two streams of becoming having the same temporal form with two egos. The immanent time of one ego can never go unfilled, never have gaps, never crumble into several separate streams, or be separated by pauses. Everything is connected to everything else in the monad.

But under the rubric “monad” we have had in mind the unity of its living becoming, of its history. But it also has its living present and it has become in this present, and directly continues in this becoming. It belongs to the nature of this present that, on the one hand, it is a primordial impressional present as the newly surging, actual moment of life having the shape, “impression”; on the other hand, as the heir to the past, so to speak, together with the impression, this present has its obscure backgrounds that can be illuminated, bears in every Now its history as the horizon into which it can peer, which it can run through once more, and as it were, live through once more in the shape of isolated or interrelated rememberings. It belongs to the nature of monadic being that every phase of its becoming has this structure with all the accompanying marvels. We have a filled unity of immanent time through the sequence of primordial impressions, but that is not everything that was or is in the process of becoming. In all phases, we also have the sedimented history of these respective phases, in each one the monad had its concealed “knowing,” its habitual structure. And now this, now that was remembered in the present, the past became alive once more, and became related to the present. The monad not only is what it is now, it is also as having been, and it can gain knowledge of its past in the present, can endeavor to dwell upon its past, can have acts that connect present and past, etc.33

Let this suffice. In this direction, we can thus regard the unity of the monad in itself and what the essential demands of this unity entail, although there is nonetheless something contingent in the stream; all sense-data, even if they occur through empirical motivations in expectation, are contingent, for something different can still occur.24 But however much there is contingency here, and however much the idea of a color-sensation does indeed indicate that it belongs to some sensating ego (but in its ideal generality, leaves open an indeterminate infinity of possible egos as sensating), it is indeed different for an individual color-sensation. It is not the case that its individuality would be a trait, a moment, which comes to it via the general traits; rather, the sense-datum is what it is only as a sense-datum being constituted in this monad in its regulatively formed temporal context, and has its being as the unity of a streaming life, as what is intentionally unitary within it and what is
identifiable over and over in this unity peculiar to the ego of the monad; and as the form of its individuality it has the unique temporal location, the index of originally constituting life. Whatever is constituted in a monad does not belong to the monad like something that could be for itself and could then enter into this monadic framework as a member and, in the final analysis, could just as well occur in a different monadic framework. Everything immanent is indeed individual, but non-independently individual, and only the monad itself is independent. Through its phases, through its immanently objectivated order of lived-experiences, the stream yields the individuality that makes the monad distinct in the monadic framework, that is, in the framework of what is constituted with respect to immanent time. But all of these special individualities are just as non-independent as the individualities of each phase in relation to that of an independent concretum; everything concrete in the monad is non-independent, and we see that one cannot identify the concept of what is independent with that of the concrete like I did in the *Logical Investigations*.

Now, I can however regard the structures of the stream of lived-experience noetically-noematically in their general typicality; I can [describe] their possible modifications, their frameworks of essence, etc., without pursuing the inquiry into the lawful regularity of the individuality of a monad. The phenomenological-eidetic reduction places me on the footing of a possible monad in general, but precisely not of a monad thought individually and identically, and under the charge of circumscribing the individual identity according to its possibilities and necessities. But I can also set this new task and, of course, do so by using the doctrine of the essence of acts, of structures being constituted, etc. One can even say that I can also describe individuated geneeses, and the laws of genesis, without systematically tackling the problem of the universal genesis of a monad and the nature of its individuality.

I can doubtless designate phenomenological investigations as static, investigations that attend to the correlations between constituting consciousness and what is constituted as an object, and exclude genetic problems altogether. I have to distinguish from the latter phenomenological investigations that consider the typicality of different self-exhibiting shapes of lived-experiencing and of genesis according to their essential possibilities, compatibilities, etc., but without the problems of individuality within this framework. Finally, we have the phenomenology of monadic individuality, and included in it, the phenomenology of a genesis integral to it, a genesis in which the unity of the monad arises, in which the monad is by becoming.

A systematic phenomenology, as I have conceived it, attends to the levels of possible modes of constitution, at the lowest level, the continual, necessary constitution of the immanent temporal stream and the constitution of monadic
ESSAY 2: ON STATIC AND GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY

being as an immanent temporal unity; then the genetically higher levels, the levels of transcendence, phantoms, etc., the constitution of a nature, the constitution of animals in nature, everything “aesthetic.” Then the accomplishments of thought that could be set to all levels, and to its different shapes according to these levels (activity of the ego). Accordingly, these are genetic considerations, and as the description of already constituted structures and their modes of constitution, are placed into the framework of genetic investigations. One can also describe these correlations for themselves in their typicality and necessity of the integral relatedness of such correlates. It is through genesis that we will be able to understand the monads’ process of becoming from out of the constitutive founding levels.

As we proceed systematically the foundation will also be laid for a systematic doctrine of the levels of monads, depending upon whether or not they carry out higher developments, that is, advance to higher modes of constitution. And every higher monad is developed from a lower monad; it was lower in a previous developmental level. But then that still requires its own consideration of the individuation of a monad, just that it is questionable whether it would have to be an encompassing theory. At all events, we must keep this problem in mind.

Which problems motivate the entire investigation? I must distinguish the questions:

1. What belongs to the possibility of a monad, to its unique nature with respect to ideal possibilities and necessities?
2. What belongs to a monad that is to be capable of constituting a nature?
3. What [belongs] to a monad that is to have other monads given, is to be able to experience and recognize a plurality of monads as coexisting, and what belongs to these monads themselves if they are to stand in commercium?
4. Among the essential possibilities of a monad as monad are those of conceptual knowledge. What kinds and forms of conceptual knowledge “are there,” which are concordant possibilities with respect to possible concepts, judgments, and frameworks of judgments which are to be constituted, and which with respect to truth? Here we consider, in all generality, possible knowing as such, possible meaning, possible true being as knowable for the knowing monad, and we continue to remain in the context of the possible monad as such. Thus, we do not gain knowledge of the monad here in the way that we gain general truths for all numbers as such, as valid for every single number. But just as we know that it <belongs> to the nature of a pure number as such to be integrated into a series of numbers, and just as there is a system of special laws for prime numbers, sums, products, etc., which do not have to be laws that concern every given number, or just as we inquire
geometrically into possible spatial figures and find laws for the types and species of figures that do not express the essential features of every figure, so too are the essential laws that we find for possible monads not expressions, or not necessarily expressions, of features that every monad must necessarily possess. Not every monad must be a logically thinking one, not every one practicing moral acts, and yet the essential laws of logical consciousness and of moral consciousness do certainly belong to the general realm of the science of possible monads as such.

(5) Another question concerns the systematic possibilities of monadic consciousness, concerning these or those possible fundamental shapes (species), concerning the essential laws that regulate the possible occurrences, acts, states, formation of systematic frameworks of the constitution of object-unities, of contents of thought, etc.; and it is still another question that concerns the laws to which is subject the individual identity of a monad, then further, the laws to which is subject a compossible plurality of monads, monads that are to be able to motivate each other reciprocally, that are to be able to be determinative in relation one another spiritually, etc. Naturally, both lawful regularities go together. But not every essential possibility is compossible for the ego and the lived-experience of the ego within the individual unity of a monad. Every imcompossibility in the essential [possibility] also excludes something in the individual unity of a monad. But there are also laws that positively prescribe what belongs to the necessary formal structure of a monad, and moreover prescribes what must become if a certain individual content is already there. Thus, the primordial law of genesis is the law of original time-constitution, the laws of association and reproduction, the laws through which the monad is constituted for itself as a unity, etc.

Are not the specific laws of genesis the laws of individuality, or only a branch of these laws, namely, related to the becoming of the monad, while the other branch would concern the laws of coexistence? But is that not a poor approach?

Every law of compossibility in coexistence also prescribes a law for possible genesis. Laws of compossibility concerning temporal coexistence already presuppose the constitution of time, and also have along with them laws of compossibility in succession; these are general laws of compossibility in simultaneity and succession. But in addition to this we have laws that do not merely concern compossibilities, but necessities of succession. The former implies that if an $a$ is, then a $b$ cannot be (hence, coexistent); the latter implies that if $a$ is, then a $b$ must be, in temporal simultaneity or in succession. But what is temporal is constituted, and we encounter primordial frameworks of the stream in which, once again, both kinds of laws play their role, only in a altered sense.
These are fundamental questions concerning the distinction, but also the ordering of necessary phenomenological investigations. Where they are concerned, I will always speak of static and genetic phenomenology. What was actually the leading perspective here? My point of departure can be external perception; I take this type of lived-experience, I have the relation to the meant object, hold firmly to this, contrast it with meant features and what is found with regard to sensations, adumbrations within and relating to perception itself, I can pursue the possibility of further perceptions, perceptions that are continually unified with the initial one and are all the perception of the same thing, describe the changing sensations, the forms of apprehension, forms of the synthetic frameworks, etc.; I follow the correlation: unity of appearing object and manifold of appearances being united harmoniously, noetically, etc. Here I construe essential possibilities for such lived-experiences and the nexuses of lived-experience, and therefore also for a monad in which they may occur. A monad is possible as bearing such possibilities within it. I do not inquire here after the genesis of the monad, after the way in which such phenomena arise. I pursue the idea of a concordant nexus of experience related to an object of nature perduring identically, but also at the same time, as another possibility, the branches of discordance [occurring] at any point, and naturally with this I alter the monad and its inherent genesis. Or (like the physical things before) I have given purposeful objects, spiritual formations, books, etc., and ask how they are given. I proceed entirely from objects, even ideal ones like conceptual thoughts, mathematical principles, and ask how the consciousness of them can look, how a manifold consciousness of them is possible, and how they are “constituted” as self-given in the intentionality of consciousness.

All of these questions here are constitutive ones, and the constitution concerns the essential correlations between the object of knowledge and knowing, the consideration of the noetic frameworks in which ontic frameworks, even those between objects and concepts, truths, etc., are constituted. By ideas “being for me,” I have certainly always understood “objects,” even if I am directed toward something immanent; and I regard modes of consciousness, or more clearly, noetic-noematic correlative modes that function constitutively there, or modes of activity, grasping, observing, comparing, etc., which once again are also constitutive for higher objects. We persistently attend to possible modes of consciousness in relation to objects that we had in mind and thought under the idea of true being; they still remain before us as intentional in the phenomenological bracketing of their existence, and guide the composition of the frameworks.

But attending to constitution is not attending to genesis, which is precisely the genesis of constitution and operates as genesis in a monad. Is not static
phenomenology precisely the phenomenology of leading clues, the phenomenology of the constitution of leading types of objects in their being, and the phenomenology of the constitution of their non-being, of mere illusions, of nullities, of contra-concordance, etc.? I have here the integral relatedness of essences as those of correlation, but genesis is not conditioned by that; we are not making the conditioning into something conditioned here. By the phenomenology of genesis attending to original becoming in the temporal stream, which itself is an originally constituting becoming, and by attending to the so-called “motivations” that function genetically, a phenomenology of genesis shows how consciousness arises out of consciousness, how constitutive accomplishments are also continually carried out here in the process of becoming, thus the relation of conditionality obtaining between the motivating and the motivated or to the necessary transition from impression into retention, in which is constituted the consciousness precisely of this becoming, and correlatively of the alteration of the Now into a Now that is just past.

However, I do describe statically not only the constitutive possibilities in relation to an object as a leading clue, I also describe the typicality of the frameworks in consciousness of any kind of developmental level: thus, in the Ideas, the structures of pure consciousness as structures of possibly appearing phenomena in the unity of an immanent phenomenal framework.40

But if we are to hold fast to the individuality of a monad, then all possibilities must be selected; there are demands within existence for individual unity, and individual unity can only be demanded according to laws. It is also a law that what occurs within the form of unity precisely fits into the unity according to specific laws, and that through the law of unity, that which fits is something demanded by the framework (cf. Logical Investigations, Investigation III).

Is it therefore not the case that, on the one hand, we have the laws of possibility, of compossibility as such in the monads, and distinguish from them the laws that belong to the unity of a monad as an individual unity? But individual unity is subject to the laws of genesis. Thus, the phenomenology of absolute individuality, of the monad as individual unity, must clarify precisely the development of individual phases arising from one another, each one of which has its law of individuality. And general laws of the individuality of these phases?

Notes

2. I would like to thank Bob Scharff for many engaging discussions on the relation between Husserl and Dilthey.
5. Especially, but not restrictively, during 1917–1921 in the D13 signature manuscripts.
6. See pp. 139–140.
7. See pp. 139, 141.
10. See pp. 150 and 141, 146.
14. See for example, pp. 135–136, 145, 150.
15. See for example, pp. 139–140.
16. See pp. 141, 149.
18. See p. 150.
20. See p. 142.
23. Editor: From 1921.
24. Husserl: What is meant here is not immanently inherent, adequate givenness, but being perceived in the genuine sense.
25. Husserl: Consider how the concept of apperception is to be circumscribed. Apperception: a consciousness that is conscious of something individual that is not self-given in it (self-given does not mean being contained in perception in an intimately inherent manner); and it is called apperception to the extent that it has this trait, even if it has something in addition that is self-given in it. Namely, a consciousness can be apperceptively conscious of something, and that same something can also still be self-given in the same consciousness that extends even further than this apperceiving. For example, if in this way we call a consciousness of a sign an apperception, then that which is signified [das Bezeichnete] can also be self-given along with the consciousness of a sign in the unity of a consciousness. Or in the unity of a perception of a hexagon there appears a hexagonal plane and at the same time another; but one of them appears with reference to the other one, and the other one is itself appearing. This holds in general with respect to the components of self-givenness peculiar to external appearing phenomena.

Every motivation is apperception. The emergence of a lived-experience A motivates the lived-experience of a B in the unity of a consciousness; the consciousness of A is equipped with an intention that points beyond, “indicating” a coexistence. But here we must add that every unfilled intention, every unfilled horizon contains motivations, systems of motivations. It is a potentiality of motivation. When fulfillment takes place, a current motivation is there. One can also say that apperception is itself a motivation, that it motivates whatever may occur as fulfilling, that it motivates beyond itself into an emptiness. But that will depend upon more precise definitions of apperception and motivation. Moreover, one will certainly not be able to say that a sign [Zeichen] motivates if it is not an indication [Anzeichen], a word-sign, for example. But we must also ask whether one will want to speak of apperception in that case. Admittedly, we have formulated our
concept in an extraordinarily broad manner. Deeper investigations are needed here. If one
speaks of apperception, perception will not necessarily express a positing consciousness,
for the co-perceived is then not necessarily co-positied, to say nothing of perceived in the
[broader] sense of “perception” [perzipiert im Sinne von “wahrgenommen”].
Fundamental for the theory of consciousness is the universal exploration of the relations
of consciousness intending beyond itself (beyond its Self) – what we call here apperception
– to association.
26. [Nacheinander].
27. [Auseinander].
28. Husserl: Phenomenology:
   a) Universal phenomenology of the general structures of consciousness,
   b) Constitutive phenomenology,
   c) Phenomenology of genesis.
29. [Gegenständlichkeiten].
30. Translator: The expression “our” world designates a first person plural world constituted
    through various historical and intersubjective processes of appropriation and disappropri-
    ation; as such it becomes for Husserl in the 1930s a term for the generative phenomenon
    of “homeworld.”
31. Editor: June 1921.
32. Husserl: And as the pole of personal characters.
33. Husserl: Does all of this not concern the mere passivity of the monadic stream and, for the
    ego, have a general potentiality, the general “ability,” to be able to have within it a field
    of affection and action? But in a special sense, the ego also has its individuality, i.e., a
    principle of regulating acts from the side of the ego, whereby new lived-experiences are
    integrated into the stream. Is this individual ego, in its unity of individual egoic abilities,
    not the counterpart of the unity of the thing, whose individuality is also not circumscribed
    by general laws of constitution?
34. Husserl: The sense-datum, contingent. The fact of regulation of sense-data, and in the
    direction of forming the apperception of a thing, in the direction of constituting a nature
    and world, [is], as fact, contingent. How is this with the individual ego that is determined
    by what is contingent, but in its individuality is certainly not contingent in the same sense?
    Am I not a “necessary fact,” and is my contingency only determined by what cannot be
    grasped with respect to the material codetermining my psychic (monadic) development?
    The necessity consists in not being able to be crossed-out, and in the intelligible unity
    under these presuppositions, but a unity which under other presuppositions would still be
    the same individuality and never a different one.
    Press, 1982), the Third Logical Investigation, and specifically §17; and see Ideas Pertaining to a Pure
    Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book, trans., F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus
    Nijhoff, 1983), §15.
36. [konstituierter Gegenständlichkeit].
37. Translator. The “phantom” for Husserl is the “schema” of the concrete material object,
    that is, examined without regard to a possible nexus of causality.
38. [Bedeutung].
39. [Gegenständlichkeiten].
40. Husserl: Question whether from the very beginning one must view the structures of pure
    consciousness as constitutive occurrences.