Copyright 1983 NPG,Ltd. NUCLEAR PROTECTION ISSUE: Does it make sense to invest in extensive civil defense measures in a time of nuclear capability? (1) Yes. Millions of lives can be saved in event of a nuclear attack. That is worth spending some money on. Or, (2) No. The percentage of lives saved in a nuclear attack and the horror and health damage survivors face afterwards are not worth the kind of investments required. More important, making these investments misleads the public and officials about the prospects of surviving at all. BACKGROUND: A year ago, in the Fall of 1982, the Reagan administration asked Congress for $4.3 billion for civil defense in this country. Spread over seven years, the funds would be spent to develop plans and facilities to help minimize the consequences of a nuclear attack on the civilian population. Estimates of probable civilian survival after a nuclear attack vary. The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Vessey, testified in April 1983: "If we rode out the attack, probably 30 percent would survive today." General Vessey said that the percentage would decline in coming years, as the accuracy and power of Soviet missiles increases. Though criticized for implementing a new notion of "winning" a nuclear war, officials of the Reagan administration have argued that their position is similiar to that first announced by President Nixon (a policy reportedly described in National Security Decision Memorandum 242, signed in January 1974). According to press reports, President Carter issued a further amplification that was labeled Presidential Decision Number 59. These documents are all classified, so their actual contents would be impossible to verify. However, in May 1973 Defense Secretary Weinberger's five-year guidance to the military services was leaked to, and published by, the Washington Post and other papers. In that document Mr. Weinberger reportedly said: "Should deterrence fail and strategic nuclear war with the U.S.S.R occur, the United States must prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States." POINT: Civil defense measures are simple common sense. Nuclear war would be horrible, but why make it even more so by neglecting to prepare protective measures? As the Soviets become more beligerant and the world power balance becomes unstable -- as happens every so often -- a prudent country would prepare. If our surveillance systems warn us that the Soviet Union is shifting its civilian population away from the central cities -- which would indicate that country is preparing for an exchange of nuclear weapons -- we must be able to respond in kind. Otherwise the Soviets can use our own civilian population as hostage. The anti-nuclear forces have taken the horror of nuclear war and blown it completely out of proportion. We know quite a bit about nuclear effects, and we know that there are definite measures we can take -- now -- which will significantly reduce these effects. We all know that a nuclear war would be terrible, but if we allow ourselves to become traumatized to the point of not even thinking about it, and if we do nothing to reduce the possible problem, we are being very irresponsible. Indeed, if this kind of "reality-avoidance" gets too strong, it will actually increase the potential for war; the Soviets will see it as an irresistable opportunity. COUNTERPOINT: The whole civil defense concept is outmoded and a waste of taxpayer money. But of far more importance, development of a massive civil defense program will tend to encourage government officials to continue to be even more beligerant with their Soviet counterparts. If the program is large enough, and highly publicized, the public may be -- falsely -- led to believe that nuclear war is not that bad after all. The civil defense program is so silly it would be laughable if it were not so serious. One part has the entire populations of major metropolitan areas departing en mass for the hinterlands. The traffic problem alone would be almost incomprehensible. But this doesn't seem to bother the administration -- its officials just say, in effect, "have faith because we will have it all figured out by the time we need it." Beyond creating unprecedented waste, the kind of massive civil defense program sought by the Administration has the potential -- in the not too distant future -- of turning the country into a police state overnight. All we have to have is some international tension -- either real, imagined or conjured -- and the military and their civil defense civilian counterparts will take charge. Of course, it will be "for our own good." QUESTIONS: o Is it worthwhile to invest lots of money for measures to protect the small portion of the populace which is expected to survive, say 30% or less? o If we learn the Soviet Union is actively shifting its civilian populations away from presumed targets, what should we do? o Do you think that civil defense precautions actually encourage government officials to become more bold in their relations with the Soviet Union? Do you think the same way about the Soviet Union's government officials? o What would happen to our economy if we had a civil defense plan, and it was accidentally triggered, causing a mass evacuation of the country's major cities? REFERENCES: o Administration's Nuclear War Policy Stance Still Murky, Michael Getler, The Washington Post, November 10, 1982, p.A22 o Joint Chiefs Back Plan for 100 MX's, Michael Getler, The Washington Post, April 22, 1983 o McNamara hits protracted nuclear war, George Archibald, The Washington Times, March 1, 1983 o Thinking About National Security, Harold Brown, Westview Press, 1983 o The Wizards of Armageddon, Fred Kaplan, Simon & Schuster, 1983 (Note: Please leave your thoughts -- message or uploaded comments -- on this issue on Tom Mack's RBBS, The Second Ring --- (703) 759-5049. Please address them to Terry Steichen of New Perspectives Group, Ltd.)